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
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THE DIARY OF
SIR JOHN MOORE
VOL. I



Sir John Moore
From the picture by Sir Thomas Lawrence

LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD, 1904

THE DIARY OF SIR JOHN MOORE

EDITED BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. F. MAURICE, K.C.B.

WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I

LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD

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DEDICATION

DEAR MISS MOORE

I had hoped that this record of the career of your noble Uncle would have been published before your hundredth birthday. I am sorry that it will not reach you till that date has passed. You have known all the changes in the popular impressions about him. You remember the national enthusiasm which greeted the news of the hero's death. To that generation his career was familiar as a household word. It was not possible that all the details that were necessary to make it understood should have been set forth much before the present time. That lofty character easily lent itself to misrepresentation because it was not moulded to the pattern of the passing hour. I have a strong belief that the inherent strength of the figure as it comes out from his own casting will bear the shocks of time. I have done my best to clear away the extraneous matter that has settled on the grand statue. I hope I have not in doing so marred it with rude hands.

Yours with the deepest respect

F. MAURICE

December 5, 1903

PREFACE

WHEREVER the English language is spoken or known, with it the name of Sir John Moore is known also. The fame of the name has been carried to the ends of the earth by the poem which at the moment of his death gave voice to the feelings of his countrymen and of the army. The force and fire of that poem have made it a specimen of English writing familiar to foreigners who have scarcely read another word of English. Of Moore himself, of the history of his life, of what he did, and of the causes of the wonderful influence which he exercised on his contemporaries, nothing is understood by most of those who quote his mere name with easy familiarity. The very grandeur of the circumstances of his death has tended to concentrate attention upon it and to make his life appear to his countrymen under the lurid light of it as a melancholy though a noble failure. To that result one very unfortunate circumstance has largely contributed. There was hardly ever a period in our history when party passion ran so high as it did during the years between the end of the Peninsular War and the Reform Bill of 1832. Among those who joined in the fray there were no more fierce fighters than Southey and Sir Walter Scott on the one side and William Napier on the other. It was just in the very heat of the fiercest party warfare that Southey and Napier produced their respective histories of the war, and that Sir Walter Scott wrote his "Life of

Napoleon." In regard to that part of the war which concerned Moore, Napier had at his disposal very ample documents, Southey and Sir Walter Scott hardly any whatever. But as Napier was a fierce partisan, he could not resist mingling with the panegyric of his great hero the most passionate and often unfair denunciations of every act of Castlereagh and of Canning. To attack Moore was therefore supposed to be the duty of every good Tory. The tradition has come down to our own time, and has coloured with a strange bias the work of Mr. Oman, the latest historian of the war. If the report of a Scottish newspaper, which has been sent me, be true, the tradition has reached its most fantastic form in the mouth of some Scottish professor who lately spoke with scorn of Moore as a "Whig General"; that is, I presume, an incompetent soldier pushed forward by Whig influence. A more grotesque travesty of truth it would be difficult to devise. As a matter of fact, as will be seen, Moore was at a very early stage in his career returned to Parliament, and became a strong supporter of Pitt, long before the great secession of the Whigs. Later in life, at a time when it seemed likely that there would be a pause in warlike operations, Moore twice thought of being again returned to Parliament, each time as a supporter of Pitt and as an opponent of Fox. He, in still later life, became the close personal friend and military adviser of Pitt. He, I believe, never spoke to Fox; though after Pitt's death he was, by the wish of Fox, who had a great admiration for him at a distance, attached as military guide, counsellor, and executive officer to the statesman's brother, General Fox, at a time when, had Fox not come into power, Moore would almost certainly have been appointed, instead of the

statesman's brother, to the command in the Mediterranean, as in fact, as soon as the Tories came in again, he was.

Under peculiar circumstances, which have never till now been recorded, Moore very strongly resented certain personal treatment which he had received from the Cabinet to which Castlereagh and Canning belonged. The story is too long for this preface, but it had nothing to do with any party differences. The strange result has followed that, while every separate step that Moore took during the Peninsular campaign was officially approved by that Cabinet, and defended by them in Parliament, good party men have thought themselves in duty bound to condemn almost every one of them.

Moore was no partisan. If I could only persuade my contemporaries to lay aside traditional prejudices, and to understand that it may be possible for us to have had among us a hundred years ago a man who stood loftily apart from the passions and party cries of the hour, who supported Pitt because he had earlier than Burke or Portland discovered that Pitt was the one pilot who could weather the storm for us, who, throughout his life, thought of his country first and of himself last, it might be possible that, reading themselves the plain story I have to lay before them, they would see that this was a man to repudiate whom is folly for any party; that he is one for a nation to claim. Moore's views of life and his criticisms on the events which passed under his eyes are such as none in our time would venture to dispute, though in his own day they were so much in advance of the standard to which public opinion had been educated that they were often "caviare to the general."

Certainly to me, and, I think, to most men, autobiography is far more interesting than biography. A man in writing the record of his life, in almost every sentence unconsciously paints himself whether he wishes to do so or not. Though, therefore, materials of all kinds are in my hands, more complete and ample than can often be at the disposal of a biographer, I have preferred to make the substance of this Life of Moore consist of the Journal which he kept up from day to day throughout all his campaigns, from the time when the great war with France began to within three weeks of his death. The original Journal has been lost. The copy from which these pages are printed was, after I began to inquire for materials for the Life of Moore, found by the late Lord Aberdare among the papers of Sir William Napier, and sent to me by him. He had found it as profoundly interesting as I have done, and as, I think, all who read it will do. The copy was made by Lady Napier, the lady to whom at one time Moore had thought of making a proposal (p. 111, vol. ii. *post*).

It is, so far as I am aware, and as far as I have been able to ascertain from those who are better acquainted than I am with the vast field of the world's literature, unique in its continuity and completeness, not merely in military literature. I do not think that any other great man of action has kept up from day to day a record such as this for any period approaching that which is represented by our occupation of Corsica in 1794, our capture of St. Lucia in the West Indies, Moore's very stormy governorship of that island, the Irish Rebellion of 1798, our two campaigns on the Helder in Holland in 1799, the Cadiz expedition, the conquest of Egypt by Sir Ralph Abercromby in 1801,

the occupation of Sicily and the transactions in the Mediterranean connected therewith, including the terrible fiascos of Duckworth's expedition to Constantinople and the failure at Alexandria under General Fraser, the strange episode of the Swedish expedition to help a mad king, and, finally, Moore's share in the Peninsular War.

The Diary thus covers the whole of the period of the great war prior to the Peninsular campaigns.

As Captain Mahan has shown, that is a period of our war with France which does not deserve the neglect into which it has been allowed to lapse. Its vast importance from the naval side is now universally recognised, but I hope to show cause in the course of the two volumes why the share of the army in these transactions should not pass into oblivion. The Peninsular War was necessarily in all its circumstances very exceptional. In the present condition of the Continent it is scarcely conceivable that a British army should ever again be employed as Wellington's army was in Spain. The circumstances of the earlier period of the war implying the closest possible co-operation between the navy and army are much more typical of the ordinary means by which the pressure of a great sea power may be brought to bear upon land power. If that be recognised, then here will be found the mistakes and causes of failure, the successes and causes of success as they were observed by one of the keenest and shrewdest of soldiers, and noted down at the time as and when they occurred. I venture to think the lessons to be learnt both from the failures and the successes are of even more interest to the nation and its statesmen than to soldiers, for whom Moore's whole life is chiefly interesting, as Sir Bartle Frere has

said of him, because they can have "no brighter example."

Of what was lacking to the co-operation of the two services there is such ample evidence during the earlier period, and of the glorious success attained when Cochrane and Moore were allowed to work out the landing in Egypt between them such full statement that he, whether soldier or sailor, must be blind who cannot see what is to be learnt. I doubt if any landing in the face of an enemy was ever more skilfully managed than that at Alexandria, but though, as Sir Henry Bunbury says of it, Moore's landing "was long a theme of especial admiration in the army," it has long since been forgotten. It depended for its success on the elaborately prepared and practised co-operation of navy and army to which Sir Ralph Abercromby had, as a consequence of a long previous history of failure and "confusion" throughout the war, succeeded at last in inducing Lord Keith to give his consent. They had entrusted it to that great sailor, Cochrane (Dundonald), and that great soldier, Moore, and though times have changed, and the details would be now much varied, again I say that he must be blind indeed, be he statesman, writer, or simple tax-payer, who cannot read the lesson of these experiences as applicable to our own time.

The experiences begin with the "confusion" of the escape from Toulon, the "confusion" of the landing in Corsica, the "confusion" in the West Indies, the Helder landing, and the Cadiz fiasco, to lead up to the climax of the glorious result at Alexandria, when the lessons have been fully learnt. It is a story worth the reading of any patriotic Briton. Let us hope that it will not be with us the case, as it has been often before, that

we refuse to profit by our own experiences, and that others to our deadly disadvantage learn from them.

It is a little disappointing that Moore's being a pure War Diary should not have been carried on during the time of his command at Shorncliffe. As, however, I have here at my service the old trunk that travelled to Corunna, brass lettered "J. Moore," and as it is filled with the most complete series of the copies of Moore's own letters and the originals of those he received, docketed and endorsed, with the date of receipt, I am naturally at no time restricted to that reckless copying of one another which, as I shall show, has been the staple of the historians other than Napier, who have, whether in the Peninsula or elsewhere, created for themselves an imaginary Moore who has as much likeness to the original as—I cannot complete the comparison. When Mr. Gould gives us a caricature of Mr. Balfour he does not represent him as a dwarf, nor does he show us Mr. Chamberlain with a dull, stupid countenance. The caricaturist exaggerates real characteristics. No, they have not caricatured Moore. They have represented him in each separate feature as what he was not.

If it were possible to tell the story of Moore's life, ignoring the fictions that have gathered round it, that would be by far the pleasanter and the easier task. Unfortunately it is impossible. The two traditions run on side by side with one another—the one that which was handed down of him by those who knew him and came in contact with him, by a cloud of witnesses, all of them men of mark; the other, that which has been composed by those who knew nothing of him till he appears in the Peninsula and there carries out that great stroke of war which they have been wholly

incompetent to understand ; a stroke of war for which I have claimed that, as a recent American historian has said of it, "It is a brilliant page of English history, perhaps the finest record in its entire course of glory." If so, it was worth the while of Mr. Oman, the man to whom we ought rather than to any other to have looked to bring out the glories of English history, instead of following past mistakes and adding some of his own, to have allowed me to supply him with materials I should have gladly put at his disposal. Partly from want of them, partly from mistaking the duties and functions of a General commanding an army in the field, the effect of his work is to rob us of the glorious example of not only one of the grandest pages in our history, but, as I have shown, of the "boldest, the most successful, the most brilliant stroke of war of all time." Those who, when they have examined my facts, can take up my challenge and supply us from their knowledge of history with the example that compares with the blow which Moore struck at Napoleon, may still be content with the fancy portraits of the man. With what recklessness these have been put together will perhaps best be illustrated by the example of Sir Herbert Maxwell's repeating Mr. Stapleton's ridiculous report of Canning's conversation, a blunder from which a careful study of the Wellington despatches—not, one would have thought, too much to ask of Wellington's biographer—would have saved him. It almost looks as if Sir Herbert had here copied at second-hand from Sir Bartle Frere, who could not be supposed to know the despatches with the accuracy we might have expected from Sir Herbert. The case is fully dealt with in the chapter on Moore's quarrel with Ministers.

I merely notice it here in order to show why, throughout these volumes, I have, from the very beginning to the end, been obliged from time to time to throw in other light besides Moore's own upon the facts in order to present a complete picture. The reasons why the Diary could not have been published at an earlier date will be sufficiently clear upon the face of it. I have alluded to them in the first chapter, but it is well to notice in this preface that it is precisely the very qualities in it which made it impossible to publish it soon after Moore's death which give it its value now. I have no fear for its reception: my only apologies are due for the fact that I have been obliged to supplement it with other matter. I cannot but hope that, whatever my own failures may have been, the features of the "noble Moore" will so shine out from his own honest, clear, and graphic narrative that my part in it, at all events after it has cleared the way for his, may be forgiven and forgotten. If so, there will have been restored to our Valhalla one of the grandest figures that ever adorned it.

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 PORTRAIT

SIR JOHN MOORE, from the picture by Sir Thomas Lawrence . . . *Frontispiece*

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CORSICA	<i>At end</i>
ST. LUCIA	,,
NORTH HOLLAND	,,

NOTE ON THE MAPS.

The Maps in this volume are all from contemporary sources. Those of Corsica and St. Lucia are from originals in the British Museum, which are reproduced by the kind permission of the Governor. I owe them chiefly to the zealous and most friendly help of Mr. Soulsby. Unfortunately I have been unable to trace any map of that date giving the interior of St. Lucia. The places mentioned by Moore are almost always the planters' houses, named after their owners. These are not recorded, nor are the minor hills and French fortifications. Only the general character of the country can therefore be seen. In Corsica the names mentioned by Moore are all given, except, I think, two small villages passed by him in one of his tours, and the temporary forts and local names of small places round the French fortifications, of which all trace is lost.

The names on the Dutch map are taken from an old portfolio in the United Service Institution, found for me by the kind care of the Assistant-Librarian.

For all names outside the actual campaigns and islands I have adopted the spelling of the *Times Atlas* as most convenient for readers in general, and must refer to that. Moore's own spelling of names is usually phonetic and variable, as is almost necessarily the case with officers campaigning. I have therefore unscrupulously endeavoured to make map and text correspond.

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¹ In one or two instances this has been quoted by error as "Sir Charles Bunbury" for "Sir Henry."

THE DIARY OF SIR JOHN MOORE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCING THE DIARY

SIR JOHN MOORE'S Journal begins at one of the most dramatic periods of the world's history. The Conqueror, whom, all unknown, France had been very roughly schooling for his future career, was just ending his long apprenticeship of misery, of penury, of fierce struggle and adventure, of careful self-preparation, by the study of the thoughts and deeds of other men, and was about to emerge from his obscurity. By his achievement at Toulon he was first to attract the eyes of the world. He had yet many falls and failures before his feet were so firmly planted on the ladder of success that his mounting upward became the central fact of European history. Success or failure at Toulon was for Napoleon the first turning-point. Failure would probably have ended his career under the guillotine. His fierce Corsican patriotism had long inspired him with a savage hatred of France, and had made him for a time the devoted admirer of the great Corsican patriot, Paoli, who symbolised the claim of Corsica to insular independence. But the man who was to become the genius of the European revolution

had broken with Paoli some years before that purely Corsican statesman, who loved Britain and British liberty with his whole heart, invited George III. to accept the protectorate of Corsica, to assist the local patriots in expelling the French, and to replace French rule by sending an English Governor to deal with the complex situation which then existed in the birth-land of Napoleon. Napoleon had quite recently attached himself definitely to the Jacobins by publishing the "Supper of Beaucaire."

The situation in Toulon was this. The Girondists, appalled by the excesses and the triumphant progress of the Jacobins, had appealed to all the European powers to assist them in saving Toulon and the French fleet within its harbours from falling into the hands of these cruel monsters. They had nominally become Royalists to get the help they needed. Britain had responded by sending a fleet under Admiral Lord Hood. Spain also had sent a fleet. Both nations had reinforced the Girondist garrison with some soldiers. Austria had promised reinforcements, which did not arrive in time. Britain was endeavouring still further to increase her troops there, and amongst the reinforcements was the regiment which Moore commanded, the 51st. It had been in garrison at Gibraltar from the 25th March 1792 to December of that year.

Lieut.-Col. Moore was at this time thirty-one years of age, having been born in Glasgow on the 13th November 1761. His father, Dr. Moore, was a physician and an author. He published four novels, of which the best-known was "Zeluco." He was also the author of several medical works involving original research, and of an account of the various countries

he visited during the tour with the Duke of Hamilton and his son John, of which more presently. By our generation he will probably best be recognised as the "witty Dr. Moore," quoted by Carlyle as describing the scene when the Swiss defended the Tuileries against the Paris mob and the Girondists.¹ His "Journal during a Residence in France," from which this scene is taken, covers much of the most exciting period in Paris, and is often quoted by Carlyle, who in the Tuileries incident makes a dramatic point by contrasting the keen observation of Dr. Moore on the spectacular aspect of the event with that of another eye, Napoleon's, who was noting for future use the fact that had the Swiss had a leader they would have won the day. John's mother was a daughter of Professor Simson of the University of Glasgow. John Moore had passed some time at the High School of Glasgow; but, when he was only eleven years of age, his father was given the charge of Douglas, the young Duke of Hamilton, then in his sixteenth year, so that the Duke might complete his education by European travel. He took John with him. This tour, in many ways, largely determined John Moore's whole career. From 1772 to 1776 John and the young Duke were travelling under the father's guidance through France, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. He learnt French so thoroughly that his father, when John was only thirteen, reported to his mother, who had remained at home in charge of the family, "He speaks, reads, and writes French admirably well;" and, as to other accomplishments, "he draws tolerably well. He has a very good notion of geography, arithmetic, and the easier parts of practical geometry." As

¹ "French Revolution," vol. i. p. 503.

a means of judging of the father's standard in speaking of his son's accomplishments, this actual specimen may be given :—

GENEVA, *December 7th, 1772.*

MA CHÈRE MAMA,—Je vous écris en François, et Jeany vous traduira ma lettre en Anglois. J'aime beaucoup Genève parceque j'entends le François assez bien à présent, et J'ai un grand nombre de camarades François, Allemands, et Genevois, aussi bien que des Anglois; et j'ai fait connoissance avec beaucoup de familles, ici, qui ont beaucoup d'amitié pour moi.

Papa est très satisfait parceque je m'applique assez bien au Latin, au François, et à l'écriture; et je suis résolu à faire tout mon possible, pour que ma chère Mama n'ait point de raison de rougir pour moi.

Faites mes amitiés à ma chère sœur, à mes frères, et à mes parens, et à tous mes camarades, particulièrement à Peter et Jaques Murdoch.

Je suis, très, très chère Mama, votre obéissant et affectionné fils,

JOHN MOORE.

And at the end of an English letter to his mother of October 27th, 1773, from Chatelaine—

“Faites bien mes complimens à ma chère sœur. Elle est bien heureuse d'être toujours auprès de vous. J'espère qu'elle fait tout son possible pour vous soulager et vous amuser pendant l'absence de notre cher Père, c'est le seul moyen d'être aimé du monde ou content d'elle-même. Adieu, ma très chère Mama. Je suis tout à vous,

JACK MOORE.”

That he was an exceptionally handsome manly boy is testified so universally by all who saw him that we do not need to depend on his father's words for record of it. The picture in the National Portrait Gallery speaks for itself as to the man towards whom

the boy was growing. He had, when he was only twelve years old, made up his mind to become a soldier, and his father, who quite approved his decision, reports with satisfaction, "He is often operating in the fields, and informs me how he would attack Geneva" (where they then were), "and shows me the weak parts of the fortification." His father was a man of wide culture, and under his influence John had already acquired a taste for history, poetry, and the best class of literature, a taste which he preserved throughout life. Prussia was at that time the model for all Europe in matters military, and, during a visit to Hanover, John writes to his brother :—

"My father is constantly with Field-Marshal Sporken, who is a fine old soldier with grey hairs, and has been in many battles. He loves the English, and is very good to me. At Brunswick the Duke got a sergeant, who came every day and taught us the Prussian exercise. We are both pretty alert, and could fire and charge five times in a minute. We fired thirty times each, the last day of our exercise."

That letter is dated May 2nd, 1775, when John was not fourteen. His father had already written home : "He dances, fences, and rides with uncommon address." Towards the end of May the party was very graciously received by the great Frederick at Berlin. John there saw field manœuvres such as could have been studied in no other place in Europe. Nearly forty thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery were during three days directed by Frederick himself in imitation of actual warfare. The boy's martial enthusiasm had other stimulus. The old "Earl Marischal" of Scotland, who, after the final failure of the Stewarts, had taken

service with Frederick, had become one of that great soldier's favourite generals. Having been at first attracted to the Moores' party by the presence of the premier duke of Scotland, he soon took a great fancy to the keen boy, who was studying with such zeal as I have recorded in order to prepare himself for the career on which he had set his heart. The old soldier presented John with a pair of Prussian pistols and a small pocket Horace, which became his companions throughout life, and are still preserved in the family.

From Berlin the party went to Vienna, where Joseph II. offered young Moore rapid promotion in the Austrian army if he would accept a commission from him. Moore, as he told his brother Graham, then about to enter the Navy, had already in his mind's eye a very different prospect, closely foreshadowing what was before him. "I hope," he writes on October 21st, 1775, "that in some years after this you and I will thrash the Monsieurs both by sea and by land; but I hope we won't make war on the Spaniards, for the Spanish Ambassador is the best and the kindest man I ever saw." It was fated that his brother Graham should, by the destruction of their treasure-ships, inflict on the Spaniards one fatal blow which did in fact lead us into the second of two wars with them, which were to precede the time when John was to fall in doing for Spain heroic service. At this moment Moore's zeal to "thrash the Monsieurs" was due to the fact that France was threatening to aid the revolted colonies by the war which began in 1777, while Spain was also watching her opportunity, which came in 1779. Moore was longing to be in the Army in order to take his share in the fighting. During his stay in Germany he had gained a knowledge of

German. From Vienna they went to Rome and Naples, where he only just escaped with his life from getting too near the crater during a visit to Vesuvius, so that he had to run from an avalanche of lava. At Naples, when fifteen years of age, he obtained, through the influence of the Duke of Argyle, an Ensigncy in the 51st Regiment. The regiment was then at Minorca, and because of his youth, he obtained leave which proved long enough to enable him to add Italian to the other languages he had already acquired. From Italy they returned to Geneva.

The following incident is so typical of Moore throughout life that I give this extract from a letter from his father to his mother as showing the gradual growth of the boy into the man.

From Dr. MOORE to his wife.

GENEVA, July 11th, 1776.

Jack quitted Geneva a boy and has returned a man. Though he has been caressed by all the high and mighty of the Republic, and is always invited with the Duke and me, yet if, at the same time, he has an invitation from any of his old acquaintances, of a much humbler class, he always prefers the latter. I pressed him one day to go with us, because the people had insisted particularly on his coming; it was to a fine villa, and a most brilliant party; he silenced me with this sentence: "They who have invited me are poor; they were kind to me when the others did not think me worth their notice." Never was a creature less spoilt than your son by all the great people who have caressed him, nor by all the uncommon fine situations he has been in; though his manner is manly and noble, yet it is simple, and he assumes no airs; he

is a charming youth; I wish you had him in your arms. . . .

From Geneva Moore returned to England to get his uniform and visit his mother before joining his regiment. The Duke of Hamilton returned with him, and was naturally seized upon by London society, and more particularly by Lady Derby, who undertook the task of modelling him according to her own ideas.

Moore's comments on the process are so characteristic of himself and so graphic as a sketch of Society at the time that they are worth reading. Dr. Moore had remained in Paris, watching the developments in French society and completing his book on the various countries they had visited together. To him John Moore writes on Sept. 19th, 1776, from London :—

“ . . . Lady Derby has been doing all she could to make him a fop, but I am sure will succeed only during the Duke's stay here, and would not succeed even for that time if it was not for his own peace and quietness. She has bought a large pair of buckles for him; has obliged him to take off half a dozen suits of dress coats, as many frocks, and four or five rich waistcoats, which you know whether he will wear or not after he has left this. In short, it would be needless to tell you all the extravagances she obliges him to go into. Templeton (the *valet de chambre*) told me that she said that he was perfectly like a barber's boy; she obliged him to send for one of the most famous hairdressers in London to put a dozen curls on each side; but, however, she has only as yet prevailed upon him to make the one he does wear a little larger. I am sure I wish he was away from this place; if he becomes a coxcomb it will be with his eyes open, for no one is more sensible of the ridiculousness of this than himself. Do as they choose, they will never make him like dress, but they will make him dress every day.”

Early in 1777 he joined his regiment in Minorca. The fortress at Port Mahon was under a fine old soldier, General Murray. Whilst in Minorca Moore was offered a Lieutenancy in a battalion which his friend the Duke of Hamilton had received permission to raise for the American war. Lieut.-Col. MacLean was the commanding officer of this, which was then numbered the 82nd. Moore was appointed paymaster. After a short training at home six companies embarked for Halifax, Nova Scotia. MacLean was made a Brigadier-General and given the command in Nova Scotia. In June 1779 Sir Henry Clinton, then Commander-in-chief in America, ordered MacLean to construct a fort in Penobscot Bay. This gave Moore his first experience of fire. The object of the movement was to establish a settlement for loyalist refugees then in New York, to protect Nova Scotia, and to harass the commerce of Boston. Boston promptly replied. On July 25th, when the fort was not nearly finished, six large frigates, thirteen privateers, and twenty-four transports, carrying 3000 troops and siege material, arrived at the mouth of the Penobscot. The Bostonians made on successive days several ineffectual attempts to land; but on July 28th three battleships opened a heavy fire on the woods which concealed the British outposts. The young recruits of the Hamilton Regiment which found the picquets that day had never faced fire till then. Most of them, as soon as the enemy landed, fired a volley and fled. Moore commanded the left picquet of twenty men. When the others ran, his own men were at first affected by the general panic. "Will the Hamilton men leave me?" he called out; "come back and behave like soldiers."

When the officer commanding the picquets reported his hurried flight to General MacLean, "Where is Moore?" asked the General. "I fear he is cut off." "What then is the firing I still hear?" MacLean at once ordered Captain Dunlop, who because of MacLean's having become a Brigadier was in command of the Hamiltons, to take a company and either drive off the enemy or bring in Moore and his men. Dunlop found Moore still holding the Bostonians at bay. He had had the advantage of woods which concealed his weakness, but he had lost seven of the twenty men. Dunlop decided to fall back with him upon the unfinished fort.

Moore in a letter to his father thus describes his first experience of fire:—

"I was upon picquet the morning the rebels landed. I got some little credit, by chance, for my behaviour during the engagement. To tell you the truth, not for anything that deserved it, but because I was the only officer who did not leave his post *too soon*. I confess that at the first fire they gave us, which was within thirty yards, I was a good deal startled, but I think this went gradually off afterwards."

The General's confidence in the young officer who had thus behaved, was shown by his selecting him to command fifty men who were to be held in reserve in case the Bostonians made an immediate attack on the fort. His orders were that as soon as the enemy were in the ditch of the fort he was to attack them in flank with charged bayonets. The colonists missed their chance. They began a regular siege and landed a siege train. MacLean was thus able to keep them in play for three weeks. At the end of that time Commodore Sir George Collier with a small fleet arrived in Penobscot Bay. The Bostonians promptly

abandoned the siege and re-embarked. Their improvised fleet was caught by Collier at a deadly disadvantage, hampered as it was by the transports. Fleet and transports were destroyed.

For Moore's career one of the important results of this little campaign was that he acquired the friendship of MacLean. MacLean was a man who had studied his profession thoroughly, and he seems to have been the first person to introduce Moore to European military literature. He had a library of French and German books, which Moore's previous training made available for his study. Moore was, probably on MacLean's report, promoted to a Captaincy. He went on leave to New York hoping to see more service with Lord Cornwallis' army. He only arrived in time to hear of the capitulation of that army at Yorktown, Virginia, on October 19th, 1781. Whilst in New York he accidentally met both his brothers, Graham the sailor and James a medical officer, who was subsequently his biographer, and had just returned from Cornwallis' army.

After the peace in 1783 the Hamilton Regiment was disbanded, and Moore was put on half-pay. When Pitt dissolved Parliament in March 1784, in order to appeal to the country against the coalition of Lord North and Fox, by whom he had been constantly outvoted in the House of Commons, Moore was returned for Scottish boroughs under the influence of the Duke of Hamilton. He became a faithful follower of Pitt, but he had claimed from his friend the Duke an entire independence of judgment on every measure, and refused to enter Parliament on any other terms. Burke, who was a friend of his father's, but was as yet still acting with Fox, paid the young member on the opposite benches

the compliment of high appreciation of his speeches and action in the House.

In 1787 two battalions were added to the 60th Regiment, by buying "recruits on the Continent of Europe at seven guineas a head."¹ Moore was promoted Major, and assigned the work of organising one of the new battalions. In 1788, after he had been commended for his success in this work, he was, on these new battalions being disbanded, transferred as Major to his old regiment, the 51st. It was at Cork. The Lieut.-Colonel was a man who exceedingly objected to the interference or suggestions of an energetic young Major, who had, since he was twelve years of age, been devoting himself to the study of his profession. The Lieut.-Colonel appears to have belonged to the type of man, not unknown to the British army, who thanked God that his regiment never had been a good one, and might have added, "Please God, as long as I command it, it never shall be." Moore, after a few vain efforts, accepted the situation, and enjoyed himself much among the pleasant society of the lovely county. Fortunately, what is known to history as "the affair of Nootka Sound," which nearly led to a war with Spain, had at least the desirable result of causing the Lieut.-Colonel to send in his papers. The regiment had been warned for active service in May 1790, and active service did not suit a man "ignorant and," during peace time, "proud of his own ignorance." Moore purchased his Lieut.-Colonelcy.

It is the fate of all reformers that the things for which they have to struggle in the teeth of the public opinion around them, become such commonplaces for

¹ Fortescue, "History of the British Army," vol. iii. p. 517, quoting from "Secretary's Common Letter Book," 6th November 1787.

the generations that succeed them, that their words about them read like platitudes. In order, therefore, to understand the point of Moore's next letter, it is necessary to have first read the following description of the British army at or a little after this time, from the graphic pen of Sir Charles Bunbury.

"Men of the present generation," writes Sir Charles in 1854, "can hardly form an idea of what the military forces of England really were when the great war broke out in 1793. Our army was lax in its discipline, entirely without system, and very weak in numbers. Each colonel of a regiment managed it according to his own notions, or neglected it altogether. There was no uniformity of drill or movement, professional pride was rare, professional knowledge still more so.

"Every department of the staff was more or less deficient, particularly the commissariat and medical branches. The regimental officers in those days were, as well as their men, hard drinkers; and the latter, under a loose discipline, were much addicted to marauding and acts of licentious violence, which made them detested by the people of the country. Some of the cavalry, dashing fellows in a fight, piqued themselves on being 'rough and ready,' to which might justly be added, 'drunken and disorderly.'

"But the most crying infamy was that which resulted from the employment of crimps on a large scale. Our Government made contracts with certain scoundrels (bearing the King's commission!), who engaged to furnish so many hundred men each for such and such sums of money. The deeds of atrocity, to say nothing of the frauds, which attended the working of this

scheme, could hardly be credited in the present times. They occasioned many serious riots, and they spread the taint of disaffection to the service.”¹

When Moore first joined the 51st in Minorca he had been exceptionally fortunate. General Murray had told him that he did not believe that there was such a corps of officers in the Army. “There is no such thing,” Moore writes himself at that time, “as either drinking or gambling going on.” Yet so completely in those days did a regiment depend, as Sir Charles Bunbury says, upon its Colonel, that, when Moore came into command, the battalion had gone to pieces under the man to whom he succeeded.

The following extract from a letter to his father will show with what he had to contend and how he dealt with it:—

CORK, Feb. 17th, 1792.

I have been obliged to punish soldiers twice, since I joined, very severely, for drunkenness upon duty. It is a crime I have often declared I never would pardon. About a week ago a lieutenant of the regiment was guilty of it; he went rioting about the town, and was absent from his guard all night. There may be some excuse for a poor soldier forgetting himself so far; there can be none for an officer. When it was reported to me, I had still fresh upon my mind the disagreeable recollection of a flogging which had been inflicted upon a corporal, for something very similar, two days before. I assembled the officers, related what I had heard, and sent the adjutant with a message to the lieutenant, who was confined to his room, and not present, immediately to dispose of his lieutenancy to the ensign the first for purchase; for if he hesitated, I should put him in arrest, and report him to the Commander-in-chief. He knew if I did so, he must be broke, and therefore chose to take the money. He was a blackguard, as you may

¹ Bunbury, pp. vii.-xviii., xx.-xxi.

suppose, and we are well quit of him; his example will, I trust, prevent everything of the kind in future. I do think, that after the recent and severe examples made among the men, for the same crime, sentenced by courts-martial consisting of the officers of the regiment, any one of themselves who could be guilty of it, must be totally devoid of every feeling and sentiment of a gentleman. I said so to the officers, and had the satisfaction to find they all agreed with me.

But though he, of course, carried with him for the moment the general sense of what had been substantially a good regiment, he had gradually to get rid of other inefficient officers, and it was not till some months later that he was able to say, as he did on 30th Sept. 1793, "I have got the machine into as good order as I can, and I wish to have it used." This, however, was after he had reached Gibraltar, his embarkation for which is recorded in the next letter.

"BRUNSWICK" TRANSPORT, COVE OF CORK,
8th March 1792.

MY DEAR FATHER,— . . . I have been hurried to death with the embarkation; the new sergeant-major I had been obliged to appoint not being conversant with the business. But I have been much pleased with the behaviour of the regiment. Their orderly conduct upon leaving a town like Cork, in which they had formed many acquaintances, was more than I could have expected. Upon the parade, the evening before we marched, I told them they might enjoy themselves, and be jolly with their friends till nine, when I expected every man to be in his quarters; and that at seven next morning they should come sober to the parade ready to march. They were glorious that night; however, with a very few exceptions, they retired to their quarters at nine, and came next morning (to the parade) perfectly sober. We lost one man only by desertion since we received orders to embark, and we recovered him yesterday. . . . It rained during the march (to the Cove), and the

roads were very deep; but whilst the commissary was mustering us on the beach it cleared, and turned out a very fine afternoon. Two other regiments were arranged upon the beach waiting for the return of the boats, the sun was shining, and the sea perfectly calm. I ordered none of the boats to put off till the whole regiment was embarked, that all might proceed together. By signal we gave three cheers, which were answered by the regiments on shore: the bands playing, colours flying, &c., the whole forming a lively animating scene. In ten minutes we were rowed aboard our different ships . . . and at daylight to-morrow, if the wind continues fair, we sail.

His arrival at Gibraltar is thus noted.

GIBRALTAR, *26th March 1792.*

MY DEAR FATHER,—I have only time to tell you that, after a most delightful passage, we anchored in this Bay, the eleventh day from our leaving Cork. We landed yesterday, and everything is so completely opposite to the arrangements in Britain or Ireland, that we are much at a loss, and must continue so for some time, in spite of every exertion on my part. I have been up at daylight ever since we anchored, and seldom off my legs till bedtime. The weather is that of a hot July in England. Oranges, green peas, &c., are in perfection; and notwithstanding the descriptions I had of the Rock, it surprised me more than any place I ever saw. Sir Robert Boyd (the Lieutenant-Governor) acknowledged me as an old acquaintance, and has been extremely civil. . . .

He soon afterwards made a trip through Spain, visiting Cadiz, Xeres, and Seville. It was whilst he was at ordinary garrison duty at Gibraltar that war was declared against us by the Revolutionary Government in France. The opportunities presented by the situation both in Toulon and in Corsica were too tempting to be thrown away by our Government. It

was under these circumstances that the 50th and 51st Regiments were embarked from Gibraltar. From this point Moore's Journal begins.

There are one or two facts which ought to be understood before the Diary is read. As to the whole of it, which henceforth covers the period of Sir John Moore's war life, till the MS. ends abruptly at Sahagun on December 24, 1808, twenty-three days before his death at Corunna on January 16, 1809, it is to be remembered that it is throughout a record written down, on the dates given, for his own remembrance. It was never designed for publication; and his most secret thoughts on all the events which took place, and his portraits of the men around him, are given in it with a freedom from restraint which would have made its publication impossible at an earlier date. Napier has truly said of him, that Moore "maintained the right with vehemence bordering upon fierceness." Evidence of this will be early seen in the Journal; but as the reader calmly studies its pages I am mistaken if the sense does not gradually grow on him of that "noble disposition and refined understanding," of that "disinterested patriotism," which Napier also claims for him. It is not given to man to judge infallibly of vice or merit, but in the judgments that Moore here passes on those around him, the earnest purpose to choose the right and avoid the wrong, to be the "stern enemy to vice," "the steadfast friend to merit," "the just and faithful servant of his country," can, I think, hardly be unobserved by any who themselves would have been worthy of the regard of such a man as Napier has in these phrases sketched. Whilst I am anxious, as far as possible, to leave Moore to portray himself, it is necessary to remember always the nature of the Journal,

which, chiefly for his own education in his profession, records freely his current impressions, and leaves them to be judged by the future result. Thus his view of actions, in which he as a matter of duty warmly supports his superiors, is often, as it here appears, not at all the same as theirs. This may be seen in the case of General Dundas, with whom he was on the most cordial terms.

That his resolutions, whether always infallible or not, were formed on the principles which Napier attributed to him, will, I think, be sufficiently apparent. Nevertheless, in the "rough and tumble" of the world it is not given to man to avoid sometimes appearing, to those whose judgment he would value, in a light which does justice neither to them nor to him. Not without "dust and heat" is the "immortal garland to be run for." As there was much dust and much heat during the Corsican period, it will be right to give the views of others on some of the questions involved in these transactions.

The two works which should be read side by side with Moore's Journal on the Corsican period are Captain Mahan's "Life of Nelson," and the Countess of Minto's "Life and Letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot, first Earl of Minto." Captain Mahan's great book deals very fully with that all-important incident in the course of our war against the French Revolution, the gaining and losing of Corsica. He has shown that the retention or the loss of the island, at a time when we had no other foothold in the Mediterranean, meant the maintenance of our power in that sea or its abandonment, and that therefore our pressure upon France, for which the command of the Mediterranean was essential, depended on this question. The cir-

cumstances, therefore, under which it was won, and the causes which led to its loss, are of immense interest to any one who wishes to know the true history of the essentially maritime period of our great war. It will be found that Moore's evidence, jotted down almost day by day, supplies facts nowhere else recorded which throw much light upon the sequence of events. That they were written down at the time, and not modified in accordance with subsequent impressions, gives them a value of their own, more especially from the biographical point of view, such as hardly any other form of narrative possesses. If Moore makes a mistake in his calculations or in his first impressions of men, it stands recorded here. He makes many, and is no more ashamed to own them and to learn from them than were Nelson or Napoleon to learn from their own blunders. On the other hand, where he clearly sees the inevitable consequences that must follow certain lines of conduct, which he records, these vaticinations remain to be judged by their fulfilment.

Of the physical features of Corsica, Sir Gilbert Elliot's word-pictures, written during his occasional tours through the island, are from the artistic and literary point of view much more graphic than Moore's. On the other hand, Moore knew the people incomparably better than Sir Gilbert. He lived among them, and does not merely sketch them as seen from a throne. Of most of the actors Moore's portraits are so clear and vigorous that they require no words but his own to introduce them. Indeed, most of them are such typical specimens of men who present themselves in every age, that if one wanted to put on the stage or in a novel types that one has known in the end of the nineteenth century, these figures from the end

of the eighteenth might very well serve as models. The case is different with two men, Lord Hood and Sir Gilbert Elliot. To obtain a full view of them other light besides Moore's must be thrown on their figures.

Lord Hood was now seventy years of age, and, till Nelson came into contact with Sir John Jervis, afterwards Lord St. Vincent, he looked up to Lord Hood as our best Admiral afloat. Unfortunately Hood had the same incapacity for judging of land affairs that Napoleon had for affairs at sea. In a measure, as Captain Mahan has admirably shown, Nelson shared this quality with him. I do not think it will be found easy to resist the evidence here supplied that at Toulon Napoleon so completely outwitted Hood that, whereas if Hood would have condescended to suppose that in regard to their own business on shore all soldiers were not necessarily fools, he might have carried away and added to our navy the whole of the French fleet then in Toulon, he in the result was only able very imperfectly to destroy it from want of time. The facts on which Napoleon's success were based were so simple that they were clearly evident to General Dundas, who was on shore; and they would probably have been realised by Lord Hood himself, when they were pointed out to him, had he not remained on ship-board, taking for granted that any dangers that were suggested by mere landsmen could not be worth considering.

The true reading of the facts of this earlier period is of supreme importance to the general history of the war, because, as Captain Mahan has shown conclusively, it was the initial advantage which we gained against France by the even partial destruction of her fleets,

handed over to us by the Girondist *soi-disant* Royalists, that enabled us permanently to cripple the efficiency of their naval service, by shutting them up in harbours and preventing service at sea. Had it been possible to destroy the arsenal and dockyard of Toulon and to remove the French ships, the French could not have so far recovered their naval strength as they in fact did; obliging us, when Corsica was given up, to withdraw for a time from the Mediterranean. Therefore the evidence on this subject of General Dundas here given by Moore is worth considering. The criticism of Sir Gilbert Elliot favours Hood because Dundas suggested a danger to be met and dealt with, while Hood scorned to notice it, with the always fascinating "Who's afraid?" I do not think that Sir Gilbert's judgment in this matter counts for much, considering the result, in the exact fulfilment of Dundas' prediction, and the panic which, in the actual hour of danger, was the direct consequence of Hood's "undisciplined valour."

To pass to Corsica: there are few points in regard to Hood which do not come out with sufficient clearness in Moore's narrative. When, however, it is stated in the biography of Sir Gilbert Elliot (vol. ii. p. 239, notes), that "the disagreements between the two branches of the service gave great dissatisfaction at home and ultimately led to the supersession of Lord Hood, a step much regretted by Sir Gilbert and by the officers of the fleet, and more especially by Nelson. Intemperance of language was all the fault they recognised in their late chief," it can only be said that that is solely because the facts were not understood, just as they are suppressed throughout the graceful biography of Sir Gilbert. It might be assumed that no civilised

government could maintain in authority an officer of either service who had used that authority to attempt to induce the chief officers of the other to mutiny against their general or admiral. That is a point of view which may not have been quite obvious to the lady who produced so charming a life of Sir Gilbert, but it is very certain that the facts were not known to Captain Mahan when he penned some of his sentences either about Hood or about Moore, towards whom, given the assumed facts, he is both generous and appreciative. Nevertheless it was not due to any incidents in Corsica, but to a personal quarrel with Lord Spencer, then the head of the Admiralty, that Lord Hood's naval career was brought to an abrupt end.

It is difficult to imagine a situation more trying than that in which Moore was placed. Fully recognising that General Dundas, though a good officer, was "perhaps not sufficiently enterprising," he would himself at an early stage of the operations have done the very thing that Sir Gilbert and Lord Hood desired, that is to say, he would have marched to the heights above Bastia whilst the enemy were panic-stricken; but the opportunity once lost was not to be regained. The enemy had recovered themselves. He felt bound to support his General. Captain Mahan¹ speaks of the "San Fiorenzo leven" of which Moore was, in the belief of Nelson and Hood, the source. I am mistaken if, when he sees these graphic details of Moore's decisions day by day, he will not agree with General Stuart, of whom Mahan² himself speaks as "an officer of distinguished ability and enterprise," in thinking that under the most trying circumstances

¹ "Life of Nelson," vol. i. p. 145.

² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

Moore had during the Bastia period acted with extraordinary judgment, rectitude, and good sense. The evidence here supplied shows distinctly that in the result Bastia fell by the precise means which all along Moore had predicted could alone under the later circumstances lead to its fall—viz., famine induced by the strictness of the blockade and the interception of all land supplies by the Corsicans. Every round fired by the batteries, which were erected against Moore's judgment, was a round uselessly expended that would be very much required afterwards.

The odd thing is that neither biographer seems to see that both Sir Gilbert and Nelson substantially confirm this view as soon as they are able to investigate the condition of the place. "This garrison (of Bastia) was very strong in numbers," writes Sir Gilbert. "There remained at the surrender about 3500, all regular troops, and much finer men and better clothed and more like soldiers than I like to see them. The blockade of the port was undoubtedly the chief means of reducing the place, *which was in total want of food when it surrendered*. I am glad there were not many of the inhabitants killed, nor is there much material damage to the town except at the end near our batteries."¹ "I never yet told Lord Hood," wrote Nelson a year later, "that after everything was fixed for the attack of Bastia I had information given me of the enormous number of troops we had to oppose us."² In other words, if Nelson was right as to the impression which his representations had made on the Admiral, Hood throughout was acting on false information. The words of the French officers combined with this evidence

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 25.

² "Life of Nelson," vol. i. p. 124.

are decisive on the subject. Whether in their intercepted despatches or in their conversations with Moore, they alike assert that they were obliged to surrender by famine alone. "The heroic 1200 troops and seamen to whose attack Nelson attributes the surrender never, as Moore says, "advanced an inch." Had they done so they must have been cut up. The numbers of the garrison were 6000, not 3500. Nelson's "gasconade," as Mahan rightly calls it—"I always was of opinion, have ever acted on it, and never have had any reason to repent it, that one Englishman was equal to three Frenchmen"¹—had no support whatever from this case to which he nevertheless applied it. The action of the 1200 had no influence whatever on the siege. It will be seen that shortly afterwards the loss of ammunition involved in their operations had a very serious effect in endangering subsequent success. Nevertheless, my conviction is that Hood was never deceived as to the means by which Bastia could be reduced. There is in the British Museum a letter from Hood to Paoli, dated as early as March 3rd, 1794, in which he says, "The French are, however, so distressed for provisions they cannot long hold out."² That being so I am inclined to believe that Hood, in the attack by batteries against the town, was playing a game of bluff, that he was not in the least imposed upon by Nelson, that he knew well all the time that it was by famine and by famine alone that Bastia could be reduced, but that he wished to have the credit of making an actual attack, thus playing to the gallery at home.

It is to be remarked that it is not fair, as is done too often in the "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," to speak of

¹ "Life of Nelson," vol. i. p. 125.

² Brit. Mus., 22,988.

"Lord Nelson" and "Lieut.-Col. Moore." This brings in the authority of the hero of the Nile, of Copenhagen, of Trafalgar. Now, as Captain Mahan has most wisely said, "After a man's reputation has been established there is always the danger of giving undue weight to his opinions expressed at an earlier time somewhat casually and not under the sobering sense of responsibility."¹ At this time Moore, Sir Gilbert Elliot, and Nelson were all in their 'prentice days. It is to be hoped that from the mistakes he made during his 'prentice days in administration Sir Gilbert learnt like the others, though he never acknowledged his errors. I pass from Lord Hood to Sir Gilbert, and broadly speaking, from the question of how Corsica was won to the sequence of events which caused its loss.

Sir Gilbert Elliot was one of those "old Whigs" who, partly under the influence of Burke's strenuous appeal to them and partly from their own spontaneous patriotic feeling, came over from their party to give their support to Pitt in the conduct of the war. Shortly before the situation at Toulon had begun to develop, he had felt it to be a matter of patriotic duty to offer his services, and had been despatched from England, with the warm approval of Burke and of most of the other statesmen of the war party, first on what, in consequence of our failure at Dunkerque, became an abortive mission, and then as Civil Commissioner to Toulon. When we also failed there, and when Corsica was attached to the British realm under the circumstances here recorded, he, during the time required to reduce the French fortresses on the island, had been chiefly in Italy, arranging very skilfully and generously for the reception of the

¹ "Life of Nelson," vol. i. p. 169.

unfortunate Girondist and Royalist refugees from Toulon, and subsequently in endeavouring to cement alliance against the Revolution among the Italian states. He was for the rest of that period on board Lord Hood's flagship the *Victory*. As soon as the island was taken over by the civil power, it was only natural that the Government should appoint him as Governor.

There was perhaps one defect in his previous training which threatened danger to his success. It is obvious from his own account of himself, and from all the records furnished by his biographer, that he was fully possessed of a view of mankind which was probably pretty nearly universal among the British statesmen of his day, but certainly quite universal among the Whigs; viz., that the one panacea, for all the woes of all the world, was to apply the British Constitution in its then existing form to each of the races upon earth. It has been only the long training of experience that has gradually made us realise that the great value to us of the British Constitution has been that it has adapted itself to the growth of the nation, and, whilst preserving a marvellous conservancy of form, has, in fact, varied very considerably with succeeding generations. Sir Gilbert Elliot was making one of the earliest experiments in attempting to fit the British coat to other backs. From the failure of that attempt much was to be learnt.

Hardly would it have been possible for a man to be placed under more difficult circumstances for the application of his theory. Corsica was a country inhabited by fierce mountaineers. Almost every family had as its most treasured tradition a vendetta against its next neighbour. When, as one of the most valued parts of the British Constitution, trial by jury was

introduced, Sir Gilbert was himself, after a year's experience of its practice, obliged to consent to its abolition; because, as he tells us, there had not been "a single instance of the conviction of any prisoner since the crown has been accepted by his Majesty, although there have been many trials in which the offence was proved in a manner to leave no degree of doubt and no possibility of innocence. This evil arises from one of the most remarkable and most rooted peculiarities in the Corsican character—I mean clan-ship and the attachment of blood-relationship and friendship. A Corsican is deemed infamous who does not avenge the death of his tenth cousin, and he fears the dishonour of convicting his relation or his friend, or the relation of his friend, much more than that of breaking his oath as a juror."¹

For my purpose this illustration, given on the evidence of Sir Gilbert himself, is only important as showing that as in this instance, so in all, the Corsicans were wholly unadapted to a constitution like our own, which had been the product of centuries of struggle, gradually thereby adapting itself to the British people. Now one of the most essential conditions of our constitution is the subordination of military to civil power. The liberties of England depend on this; and the British soldier must be very ill provided with historical experience if he does not recognise that, quite as much for the happiness of the army as of the nation, the supremacy of civil law over military force is essential to the well-being of a free country, that has had such training in orderly liberty as ours has had. Very naturally, therefore, in transferring the British Constitution to Corsica Sir Gilbert

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 264.

Elliot proposed that he should become the supreme head of the military force in Corsica. Ultimately, though after a long delay, the Ministry at home agreed to this. As he understood that position, every detail in the defence of this island, and in the organisation of its forces, was to depend on his personal judgment. The officers who applauded his views were to be trusted, those whose military judgment differed from his were to be and were dismissed. To the terribly long delays which intervened between his application for these powers and their formal approval, Sir Gilbert Elliot and his biographer attribute in large measure the failure which ultimately attended his government.

There can be no doubt that this delay did very seriously excite patriotic anxiety in the mind of Paoli, always exceedingly suspicious of the ways of statesmen and diplomatists. Nevertheless, for the hesitation of the Ministry there was not a little justification. Having appointed Sir Gilbert Elliot, it was obviously necessary to support him heartily; and this necessity of general administrative probity was from a purely party point of view the more essential, because Sir Gilbert was for the time the most prominent representative abroad of the Pittite Whigs. It was, from a party point of view, as important to maintain their connection with the Government as at a later date it has been to preserve the connection between the Liberal-Unionists and the Conservatives. But the question was one that could hardly have been solved at home without grave consideration. The importance to us of Corsica at the time depended on its efficiency as a fortress. It was practically the exact equivalent of what Malta now is, except that it presented not one only but several harbours, and that these all required armed defence. It

is true that, as is pretty nearly the case in Malta, the maintenance of the eager feeling of attachment to the British connection of the inhabitants was essential to our possession. But, though this was probably not at the time recognised at home, the inhabitants were much more inclined to accept a military than a civil dictatorship. The danger of French attack was imminent, and they wanted security. Though there were certain semblances of representative government existing in Corsica, it is truly said by Sir Gilbert's biographer that "Nothing could be more democratic than the forms, nothing more autocratic than the result. Neither unnaturally nor unwisely in the existing condition of their country, the Corsicans used their rights to invest with supreme authority the man who had won their affections and their confidence, and except when asked to lay down their arms, or to take up their tools, their submission was complete."¹

In other words, it was Paoli's influence alone which had induced them to offer the crown of their island to George III. There was only one possible means of maintaining their loyalty to the King, and that was by always carrying Paoli ostentatiously along with the Government in whatever it did. In the earliest conversation between Paoli and Sir Gilbert as here recorded, it is evident that what was really rankling in Paoli's mind was this, that neither Hood nor Sir Gilbert would recognise the fact that the Corsicans had chosen to invest him, Paoli, with despotic powers, and that he had a right to speak in their name. I hope the reader will study the point and judge. The one thing that seemed needful to Sir Gilbert was "to assimilate the constitutions of Great

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 262.

Britain and Corsica." As his biographer truly says, "Sir Gilbert, like most of his countrymen of that day, was profoundly convinced that the great State, which alone had known how to combine personal liberty with legal obedience, was the only safe model for all others to follow."¹ It interferes much with any possible understanding of the course of the relationship between Sir Gilbert and Paoli, as given in his biography, that this very important first conversation is altogether unreported in it.

There was in his eyes one essential condition of the British Constitution for export as much as for home consumption. As the day by day facts mentioned by Moore conclusively prove, Sir Gilbert Elliot adopted it in its rigour. There must be two parties. Pozzo di Borgo was for a civilised governor an incomparably more attractive man than Paoli. Pozzo was courtly, agreeable, and eloquent, a lawyer, and not a rough, blunt, jealous, and suspicious patriot. Sir Gilbert avowedly made the two parties consist of the followers of Pozzo and of the followers of Paoli. He let it be clearly understood that every appointment, civil or military, was to be given to those who would avow their connection with Pozzo's party and disavow Paoli. To do so was to make a British party in the island against the Corsicans. The result was what might have been foreseen. Of course, in name Pozzo's Government was one that included men of all parties. We always in making a new party inscribe "No party" on its banners. Paolists were welcome provided they abandoned Paoli.

As Sir Gilbert Elliot himself declares just before taking over the island, "They are indeed passionately

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 264.

attached to Paoli, and the violence that was threatened to his person by the French Convention was the signal for the most general and instantaneous rising among the people ever known in that country of general insurrection."¹ "I do not believe there was a man, woman, or child amongst many thousands whom we saw, that came within hail of us without calling '*Viva Paoli e la nazione Inglese!*'"² In less than two years from that time the island had to be given up because there had occurred a most serious revolt of practically the whole population—a revolt which in fact had forced Sir Gilbert to dismiss five of his Ministry in response to mob violence.³ The fact that the change from enthusiastic loyalty to revolt was the essential cause of our being obliged to give up what was then an all-important island, is thinly veiled in Sir Gilbert's biography. It is demonstrated in Captain Mahan's *Life*. Nelson and Sir Gilbert's friends attribute it to the perversity of the Corsicans. Those who follow the facts here recorded may assign another reason for it. Things looked different to those at sea no doubt. It was necessary, in order to judge of them fairly, to watch them day by day and close at hand. The actual result was reached after Moore had left the island. The successive acts of the Governor which led up to it and caused it are duly recorded in the following pages. If history be philosophy teaching by example, certainly these are lessons of what to avoid in administration. They must be here studied in detail to be appreciated. That Moore, from the reasons which he explains, became daily more anxious as to the results

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii, p. 214.

² *Ibid.*, p. 221.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

which were sure to follow from the course of action pursued by Sir Gilbert Elliot, is evident enough from what he has written; but in order to judge fairly of two men by their biographies it is necessary that these biographies should both be composed on the same principle. I have made no attempt biographically to "paint out the warts" from Moore's beautiful face. If any of his actions or words, his vehemence or occasional mistakes, appear to the reader to have that character, here they are for him to see them. On the other hand, I shall have to note from time to time facts as to Sir Gilbert's action which were doubtless unknown to his biographer since they nowhere appear in the Life.

There is one very important change in the practical working of the British Constitution since Sir Gilbert's day, which it would be unfair to him not to notice, because it tends to prejudice judgment against him in the exercise of his constitutional government of Corsica. Sir Gilbert, as is quite frankly acknowledged by himself and his biographer, maintained in office Pozzo di Borgo as his chief Minister and *alter ego*, in the teeth of the wishes of the Corsicans and of their representatives. Pozzo's government was "good government," Pozzo's party was his party, and from that position no representations would make him stir an inch. Now, thanks to the long reign of Victoria, the position of a monarch in England becoming as regards acts of state a member of a party is for us unthinkable. Queen Victoria in the early part of her reign, under the training of Lord Melbourne, was in private opinion a Whig. In the latter part of her reign she had become, under many influences, in her private opinions a Conservative; but whatever her private opinions might be, nothing affected the official relations which she main-

tained with Mr. Gladstone, whom she disliked, or with any other Minister whom her loyal people placed in office. In the reign of George III. that was not so. The King avowedly had a party and gave it all his support. In transferring therefore to Corsica, as he intended to do, the British Constitution, Sir Gilbert Elliot was quite consistent with his own ideal in avowedly becoming the support of one party, and of one party only. It was unfortunate for us that this should be the form of the British Constitution applied to Corsica; but it was correctly studied from the original model.

The General Dundas in Corsica is the "Sir David Dundas" who became subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, and had long before that time been its first effective organiser. He introduced unity where all previously had been uncertain and dependent on individual caprice. We have a graphic picture of him from Bunbury as "a tall spare man, crabbed and austere, dry in his looks and demeanour. He had made his way from a poor condition (he told me himself that he walked from Edinburgh to London to enter himself as a fireworker in the Artillery), and there were peculiarities in his habits and style which excited some ridicule among young officers. But though it appeared a little out of fashion, there was 'much care and valour in that Scotchman.'" ¹ Not at all a man likely to find favour with Sir Gilbert. From him must be carefully distinguished "Henry Dundas," subsequently Viscount Melville, who during the whole Corsican period was Secretary for War, having become the first holder of that office in 1794,

¹ Bunbury's "Narrative of some Passages in the Great War with France," p. 46.

and continuing to hold it till March 1801. As both by Moore and by Sir Gilbert each of these two men are often mentioned simply as "Dundas," I must draw attention to my notes, which indicate the "Dundas" meant in each case where confusion might arise.

On one matter of orthography I have followed, after some consideration, Captain Mahan, though I am certain that in point of etymology Sir Gilbert Elliot is right and we both wrong. It therefore requires explanation. As Sir Gilbert Elliot happily¹ describes the facts: "Mortella Bay means Myrtle Bay, and is no doubt so called from the quantity of myrtle which grows round it; as in Teviotdale we should speak of 'Broom House' or 'Ferny Lee'; and in this country the weeds are Myrtle and Arbutus, and the fields are covered with a hyacinth of which the stalk is often three feet high and is as strong as a stick." Nevertheless I have everywhere substituted the spelling "Martello," always given to it in Lord Hood's MSS. letters in the British Museum.² My reason is that I am not aware that anywhere else than in this Diary (p. 56) the incidents, which, when they were reported in England, led ultimately to the whole coast of England and Ireland being surrounded by a continuous series of "Martello towers," are recorded by one who saw them. To spell the word "Mortella" would, now that the name has been fixed in England as "Martello," disguise the connection between this little fight and its result on our coast defences. I think that it is possible to trace the origin of the change in the name, and that the circumstances which led to it have an interest of their own. In James' "Naval History"

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 234.

² Additional MSS. 22,688.

it is mentioned that in September 1793, whilst Moore was still in Gibraltar, and while our troops were in occupation of Toulon, Lord Hood had sent Commodore Linzee to co-operate with the Corsicans. As a whole the expedition failed for lack of any military force; but incidentally Captain Wolseley without much difficulty captured the Martello tower by broadsides from his ship, the *Lowestoffe*, which, without inflicting much damage, alarmed the garrison into abandoning it. It was then taken possession of by a landing party from the *Lowestoffe* and handed over to the Corsicans, from whom it was on the 24th of the same month recaptured by the French, Commodore Linzee having removed all the guns to fit out a tender. The French rearmed the tower with the guns, which, as will be seen in the Diary, proved so effective against the fleet. When Captain Wolseley first captured the tower he was so much struck by the peculiarity of its construction that he made a plan of it, which was sent home officially with his report. As he was only for a short time on shore he no doubt picked up the name of *Mortella* really from the Corsicans, and wrote it "Martello." Lord Hood, at a later date, followed the spelling of Captain Wolseley's original report, heading his despatches "Martello" when in the bay, and so the name became fixed in England. I am convinced that it was the fact that Dundas was, as Moore here records, present at the incident of the attack on the tower on the 9th February that subsequently, in consequence of the impression then made on him, led, during the time of the threatened invasion by Napoleon, to his proposing the construction of similar towers along the coast of Britain. In order to account for the name James introduces an engineer named "Martel," who, to the

best of my belief, had no existence. It is a curious story of the way in which imaginary origins are invented to account for names the true source of which has been lost because of some accidental misspelling. The whole bay and not only the tower is called Mortella, and the Myrtle Bay can hardly have taken its name from an unknown engineer. It will be seen that the contemporary map, herewith, gives the name as T(our) de la Mortella. Nelson, in his MS. diary of the siege, now in the Record Office, calls the bay and the fort "Mortella." The Dictionaries and Encyclopædias are amusingly divided as to the origin.

CHAPTER II

TOULON AND ST. FIORENZO

GIBRALTAR, 1793.—On Sunday the 5th December the 50th and 51st Regiments embarked on board four line-of-battle ships for Toulon. From some misunderstanding, though the regiments were under arms at seven in the morning, the boats were with difficulty procured by twelve, and as it blew pretty fresh from the N.W., it was dark before some of the boats reached the ships. Monday was employed in getting the camp equipage and baggage embarked. The wind was fair both Tuesday and Wednesday. It is therefore difficult to say why we did not sail, especially as it is known that we are much wanted at Toulon. Thursday morning we unmoored. Intelligence had come to some of the merchants from their correspondents at Barcelona that the French having obtained possession of some works from whence they threw shot into the town of Toulon, it had been thought necessary to dislodge them. This was accordingly done without much loss, but General O'Hara had marched from thence into the country with about 2000 men. He had fallen into an ambuscade. The whole party were routed with very considerable loss both of officers and men. General O'Hara himself had lost his arm, had been shot through the thigh, and been taken prisoner. This intelligence hastened our departure. Captain Dickson went on board to see Admiral Gell, and immediately upon his return weighed anchor and the little squadron were behind the rock by four in the afternoon. I have been so long accustomed to false reports at Gibraltar that I am not without hopes of finding upon our arrival at Toulon that this last is at least in a great measure so. General O'Hara

has had too much experience to fall into an ambuscade; besides, as his advancing into the country could not have been foreseen by the enemy, it is the more unlikely that they should have had an ambuscade prepared. If, however, he has been taken his loss will be severely felt at Toulon.

H.M.S. "EGMONT," 20th December.—The wind blew fresh from the N.W. all night, and continues to do so. We are already off Cape de Gatta. The four line-of-battle ships, viz. the *Egmont*, *Colossus*, *Fortitude*, and *Ardent*, sailed well; but *La Moselle*, a French sloop, cannot carry sail when it blows so hard, and she retards us. 21st.—The *Ardent's* signal was made yesterday to speak a Spanish man-of-war, and in the afternoon reported she was a cruiser a few days out of Carthagena. She confirmed the melancholy news from Toulon. About six o'clock this morning the wind changed to the S.E., and since breakfast it has rained. There is not a book belonging to the ship except a few medical ones of the Surgeon's; our baggage is so circumscribed that we could of course bring but few, and those cannot be got at till to-morrow. The Captain is so frequently called up on deck that with the assistance of a few newspapers he fills up his time. In the ward-room I believe frequent recourse is had to cards and backgammon. To such as are not fond of those amusements and have no duty to attend to, a rainy day is particularly tiresome.

29th Dec.—The weather has been uncommonly bad and the wind contrary, and though from the appearance of the first two days we had the prospect of a short passage, it was not till the 28th we made the land. We stood near enough that evening to know exactly what land it was, and then stood off for the night. We stood in again in the morning, though not so early as we might have done. We should probably have got into Toulon about four or five o'clock. About eleven or twelve in the forenoon the *Fortitude's* signal was made to speak a strange sail. The rest of the ships continued their course under an easy sail. The stranger

showed Spanish colours and made the signal to speak. We laid-to and the *Fortitude* sent a boat on board; his information was that Toulon was evacuated upon the 19th after setting fire to the arsenal and eleven sail of the line. Lord Hood was in Hieres Bay with the army on board, and had taken three of the largest of the French ships with him. Several Spanish and English frigates were cruising off Toulon to prevent any of our ships from going in. The Spanish fleet were gone to Mahon. Captain Dickson said he would of course immediately join Lord Hood in Hieres Bay. The wind was not exactly fair; but we could have worked up in a few hours. A little later he made a signal for the Captains to come on board. I remained in the cabin till they were all assembled and beginning to consult, when I of course withdrew. They all appeared happy at the evacuation of Toulon; from some it dropped that they would now get home. Since the capture of Toulon the service has been extremely unpleasant for the navy. They have been employed in conveying either bullocks, &c., from Genoa and Leghorn, or troops from Gibraltar, and the season has been very unfavourable.

Captain Poole, of the *Colossus*, told me as he came out of the cabin that we should endeavour to speak to some of the English cruisers and then go into Hieres. As soon as he was on board his signal was made to chase in-shore a vessel which was close to the entrance of Toulon. The weather became thick, and we soon lost sight of the *Colossus*. We stood off in the evening. I could not conceive why we did not immediately make for Hieres Bay the moment we were told Lord Hood was there. It was now plain we were not to attempt it that night; we continued standing off till eight this morning, which was much longer than was necessary, if the intention is to get into Hieres to-day. We are not, however, so far from the land but that by setting sail we might be in in five hours, as the wind is perfectly fair. This we are not doing. Captain D. seems undetermined; from his conversation and manner he seems to have no wish to go in, and I can see no military reason for his

staying out; on the contrary, I should think it was his duty to make every exertion to join Lord Hood as soon as possible. Both the ships and the troops may be wanted. At any rate, there can be no use in our keeping the sea. Independent of these reasons I am naturally anxious to get in. It is impossible not to wish to know the nature and immediate cause of the evacuation of Toulon, the loss sustained, &c., and also the destination of the regiments, whether they are to return to Gibraltar or be employed in some expedition in this neighbourhood.

31st Dec., Tuesday Morning.—We are now standing for the land, and are within a few miles of the entrance of Toulon. In a couple of hours I take it for granted we shall be at anchor in Hieres Bay. All yesterday was lost, if the object was to get in. In the evening the *Colossus* bore down upon us, and a boat was sent to her which brought back a letter from Captain Poole. He had spoken the *Romulus*. Lord Hood had only seven sail with him. He thought, therefore, it was absolutely necessary to join him. He stood off in the evening as usual, but tacked at four this morning, and I hope we are going to do what we ought to have done four days ago.

HIERES BAY, 1st January 1794.—It was almost dark before we came to anchor here yesterday. I went on board the *Victory* with Captain Dixon, and was introduced by him to Lord Hood. He received the state of the regiment which I presented to him with my orders from Sir Robert Boyd, which were to put myself under his Lordship's command, expressed some surprise at the smallness of our numbers, said we were rather late, and then turned to one of the navy officers with whom he had been transacting business. I then retired into the outer cabin to General Dundas.

The reader will, I hope, not miss the dramatic point of this first interview between Hood and Moore. We have seen how, from December 5th, Moore had been restless because of the delays, which he thought inexcus-

able but had no power to stop. Those delays had prevented him from reaching the *Victory* earlier. Hood at once reproaches him of all men for the delay, and does not even ask at what date he left Gibraltar. Nor apparently does Hood take any steps to ascertain why his own officers did not report to him earlier. He behaved like the railway passenger who abuses a porter for the faults of a railway company.

Every part of the ship, I observed, was crowded with French people, men and women; they are the principal families of Toulon, who made their escape on board the night of the evacuation. I heard a fiddle and dancing in the ward-room, and was not a little surprised when I was told it was the French dancing out the old year; few of them have anything but the clothes on their backs, and the prospect before them is but gloomy, yet they contrive to make themselves happy. I returned this morning to the *Victory*. Her quarter-deck forms a curious medley. There were French ladies and gentlemen, officers of the navy and army, commissioners, commissaries, &c. I had a very long conversation with General Dundas; he pointed out upon a very large plan of the environs of Toulon the different attacks which had been made, &c. The defence of the harbour and town comprehends a space of fifteen miles, in which, besides the smaller, there are five or six principal posts. The loss of any one of these rendered the place untenable. The only possibility of securing it was therefore to have marched an army into the country and to have acted offensively. It was his opinion, and that of General O'Hara, that they ought to have abandoned it long before; as it was evident to them that they should be forced to do it soon, perhaps with the loss of the greatest part of the troops, and possibly even part of the fleet. This was represented in the strongest manner to Lord Hood, who chose to follow his own opinion. The consequence has been that the destruction of the fleet and arsenal, which might have been complete, has

been but partially effected in the hurry of a forced retreat. Lord Hood did not seem to think this could happen, and he only consented to it after Fort Mulgrave and the Height of Faron had been carried on the morning of the 17th. No previous arrangement having been taken for such an event, everything was hurried and confused. Officers' baggage, regimental stores, &c., were abandoned. Had not the weather been favourable the troops who embarked the night of the 19th could not have gone on board, and might have been forced to lay down their arms. The burning of part of the ships was entrusted to the Spaniards. They neglected it, probably through design.

H.M.S. "LOWESTOFFE," HIERES BAY, 12th *January*.—We have remained here because of the bad weather. We are in daily expectation of going elsewhere, report says to Porto Fararo, in the island of Elba. Three days ago I received a note from Lord Hood. He wished to see me. General Dundas told me when I got to the *Victory* the intention was to send me with Major Kochler, Deputy-Quartermaster-General, to Corsica, to report from observations upon the spot how far an attack upon that island with our small military force was practicable. Lord Hood explained to Major Kochler and me, from a drawing of the Gulf of Fiorenzo, the situation of the place, his views, &c. Sir Gilbert Elliot goes also to have an explanation with Paoli. We all embarked in this frigate last night, the wind having been contrary for two days. We are now under way.

CORSICA, 14th *January*.—We landed at the island of Rozza this morning. The people seemed happy to see us, and gave us three cheers. We were received by Signor Leonati, nephew to General Paoli, who commands in this district. Leonati served at Gibraltar during the last siege, when he commanded a corps of Corsicans. It is impossible to show more joy than he did at meeting Major Kochler, with whom he had been intimate during the siege of Gibraltar. The house we were first conducted to was, I

believe, an inn, where they brought us figs, oranges, &c. The room was immediately filled with the people of the place, their muskets, without which they never move, slung over their shoulders. As soon as mules could be procured for our baggage, Signor Leonati conducted us to his house upon a hill two miles from the shore. A guard of about twenty of the inhabitants attended us. They expressed much pleasure at seeing us, and great love for the English nation, who, they hoped, would deliver them from the French. When we approached Leonati's house, or rather castle, muskets were discharged from the windows, and our attendants also kept up a very hot fire in return, loading as they went on, till we arrived at the gate, where a number of the people from the village huzza'd, calling "Buoni Inglesi," &c. The windows are barricaded. The French post of Calvi is only about three or four leagues off. We walked till dinner could be made ready, attended again by a guard. The country is mountainous and wild, the valleys fertile, whilst the tops of the hills are covered with snow. The only tree is the olive; oil is the staple of this part of the island. We found on our return to the castle Leonati's wife and mother-in-law; we dined and passed the evening with them; they had never been out of Corsica. Nothing could exceed their hospitality, their manners simple and unaffected. We are to set out before daylight to-morrow for Morato, thirty miles from this. General Paoli is there. The Corsicans are in possession of the whole island, except the posts upon the coast of St. Fiorenzo, Bastia, and Calvi, which are occupied by the French. Leonati says that, including disaffected Corsicans, their force in those three places does not exceed 2600 men, viz., in St. Fiorenzo, 700; Bastia and a post communicating between it and St. Fiorenzo, 1400; Calvi, 500. All that is wanted, he says, is a few cannon to drive them from there.

H.M.S. "VICTORY," 28th *January*.—We proceeded on the morning of the 15th on our road to Morato; the road was so bad and so very hilly that it was dusk before we reached Pietra Alba, five leagues from Leonati's house (Monticello). The

different villages through which we passed received us with volleys of musketry, "Viva Paoli, la patria e la Nazione Inglese." We were entertained at Pietra Alba at the house of one of the principal inhabitants. The whole village poured in, and the people remained in the room till we had supped and retired to bed. This was the case wherever we stopped, and it seemed to be the custom of the country to enter familiarly into one another's houses without invitation. Leonati apologised for the rudeness of his countrymen. Sir Gilbert and I had but one bed between us. We rose early, and after a breakfast of dressed meat we mounted our mules and arrived at Murato about one o'clock. We found General Paoli lodged in a convent of Recollets which had been abandoned since the revolution. The convent was surrounded with armed peasantry who, as we were afterwards informed, come voluntarily from different parts of the Island, with a few days' provisions upon their backs, and without pay serve as a guard to his person. They are obliged to return home when their provisions are expended, but they are succeeded by others. This strong proof of attachment these poor people give to General Paoli from a sense of gratitude for his services against the French and Genoese in support of their liberty and independence.

We were received by the old General in one of the cells of the convent. After the first compliments I was surprised to find that, though Sir Gilbert delivered him a letter from Lord Hood explaining the nature of our mission, instead of speaking to him he addressed himself to Major Kochler and me, and began a discussion upon the nature of the country and the style of attack we should adopt. Seeing no end to this I thought it necessary to mention to him that I had been sent with Major Kochler to concert with him the military operations, but that we were under Sir G. Elliot, who was one of the King's Commissioners in the Mediterranean, and until he (General Paoli) had had some previous conversation with Sir G. Elliot, Major Kochler and I could not enter upon the subject of our mission. He made some odd answer to the effect that he was tired of

Ministers and negotiations. He, however, then turned to Sir G. Elliot. He desired some people who were in the room to withdraw, and said he was sorry to find by Lord Hood's letter that he continued unexplicit and diffident of him! In affairs of this kind it is necessary to be open and candid. "I wrote long ago to the King and to his Ministers; I have also repeatedly written to Lord Hood that I and my people wished to be free, either as subjects of Great Britain, which I know does not want slaves, or free under the protection of Great Britain, as the King and the country may hereafter think most convenient to adopt; having said this, I can say no more. Why, therefore, does his Lordship tease me with more negotiations? *That man* has already injured me sufficiently with promises of succour which he has always withheld. If it is meant to include *mes compatriotes* in any arrangement which may hereafter be made with the Bourbons, I can have no hand in it. I shall retire. All I wish is to see, before I die, my country settled and happy after various struggles during these 300 years past. I think my countrymen will enjoy a proper degree of liberty under the protection or government of the British nation. I have told them so, and they have that confidence in me that they believe me and wish to make the experiment!" The General seemed much affected; the tears came into his eyes whilst he spoke.

Sir Gilbert never attempted to interrupt him, though some of the General's expressions with regard to Lord Hood were not the most polite. When he had finished he calmly told him he had misconceived Lord Hood's letter, that no advantage was meant to be taken of the General or his countrymen. The object of his mission was to know if any method could be taken, by assembling the states or otherwise, of getting the public assent of the Island to what the General said was their wish. The General said, "How can this be done at present? The enemy must first be expelled. It is then my intention to call the states together. In the meantime I know what is their wish and can answer for them." After a little more conversation

dinner was announced, and we descended to the refectory. The General is much broken since I saw him in England. He has of late had an attack upon his chest. The death of his only brother, to whom he was much attached, has also affected him. This man was so beloved by the Corsicans that though he has only been dead a month they believe him to be a saint, and are convinced that with his influence in heaven they are at last to get happiness and independence. In the war in 1769 he distinguished himself much, and was supposed, though not so good a politician and scholar, to be a better general than his brother Paoli. We retired after dinner to a house in the village of Morato, a quarter of a mile from the convent. It belonged to a young man attached to Paoli. Had he expected payment it was impossible to have been more attentive or to have shown more anxiety to supply all our wants.

Next morning we returned to the convent to breakfast, after which, as Sir Gilbert had told me he wished to have some private conversation with the General, Major Kochler and I rode to the neighbourhood of St. Fiorenzo, one of the ports we wished to reconnoitre. We were accompanied by Signor Pozzo di Borgo, a young man in the confidence of Paoli. He had been at the commencement of the Revolution deputy from Corsica to the National Assembly. Till that time when he went to Paris he had never been out of Corsica. Instead of returning to Morato in the evening, we remained at the village of Oletta, still at private houses. There are no public ones. We were employed the whole of the next day in reconnoitring the position of St. Fiorenzo and its neighbourhood. Our escort of about forty or fifty volunteers had a little skirmish with a party of the enemy. One only was wounded. I was much pleased to see the judgment with which our people occupied the different positions; we got back late in the evening to Morato. I was glad to hear from Sir Gilbert that he had had an explanation with the General, and had succeeded in convincing him that it was the wish of the King's Commissioners to give the Corsicans every assistance in

expelling the French from the island. He declared that Paoli was satisfied with the assurances he had given, and willing to leave for future discussion the particular mode of government which might be adopted by the King and his Ministers.

It was agreed that next day Major Kochler and I should settle our business with the General, and if possible set out upon our return to Isola Rozza the day after. I put upon paper the different questions I wished to ask the General, and also the outline of an attack upon the works of Martello, which had suggested itself to the Major and me in the course of our reconnoitring. After breakfast we began our business. Having never seen the General but as a well-dressed man going to court and routs, I had conceived, without better foundation, a poor idea of his abilities. I soon changed my opinion. I never recollect to have met with any officer but General Maclean who had such sound views upon military subjects. From his conversation I take him to be an excellent officer. Sir Gilbert Elliot told me he was equally surprised to find him remarkably intelligent on all political subjects. He struck us all as a very superior man. He was particularly entertaining all day, relating anecdotes of the French and Corsicans during the war of 1769, drawing comparisons between the latter and the Greeks, &c. He is an advocate for *coups de main* and daring enterprises. The loss on these occasions seems great because it all occurs on one day. It is in reality less than that which is suffered by regular approaches, consequent sickness, &c. "In war and in love, opportunities never recur; it is in vain for an officer to say, Next time I shall do so and so." This was particularly pointed at Lord Hood.

On the morning of the 20th Sir Gilbert and I set out on our return. Major Kochler at the request of General Paoli remained behind. Paoli was afraid that, if we all left him, it might have a bad effect upon his people. We reached Palasca in the evening, and next morning Isola Rozza, where Sir Gilbert found the *Juno* frigate waiting with despatches for him. I went on board with him, but

finding the despatches contained no orders for me, I returned to Monticello to wait for the arrival of the fleet. Sir Gilbert went to Porto Ferraro in the Island of Elba to prepare some arrangements for the French refugees. I remained at Leonati's for several days. I received every sort of attention from him and his family. I had an opportunity of reconnoitring a little of Calvi, and of making out my report to Lord Hood. On Saturday the 25th, in the morning, the fleet appeared. About 10 o'clock at night a boat was sent for me from the *Juno* frigate. I went on board immediately. It blew hard the whole night, but in the morning of Sunday I was on board the *Victory* off Cape Corse. I delivered the following report to Lord Hood and Lieut.-General Dundas:—

"MY LORD,—Agreeably to your Lordship's order I landed in Corsica and waited upon General Paoli. The following is my report upon the different heads of instruction delivered to me by Lieut.-General Dundas. The first object appears to be the possession of Martello Bay for the security of the fleet, and to enable it to effectively co-operate with the army when landed. The works which defend the bay are a stone tower with two or three light guns (4-prs.) at Martello point, another of the same kind at Farinole. The fort of Farinole consists of a strong battery immediately under the tower, and a redoubt open in the rear, lately erected upon a height between the towers of Martello and Farinole. In the last there are four guns of different calibres. One hundred and fifty or two hundred men from the garrison of St. Fiorenzo guard these different works. They are chiefly designed to act against shipping, but are commanded by heights in their rear. If these are occupied with cannon the works must be abandoned. The road leading to the heights has generally been thought impracticable for cannon. It is, however, by no means so for light guns or howitzers. I annex a detailed plan concerted with General Paoli for the attack on the works of Martello, by landing a body of 500 men with light field pieces at the northern point of the bay, and marching by a

path, which has been reconnoitred, under cover of the hills to a place called Vechiagia, which commands within a few hundred yards the new redoubt and the tower of Fornoli. The possession of this bay having been secured for the fleet, General Paoli points out the bays of Vechia and Nonza upon the eastern side of the Gulph of Fiorenzo as places proper for the landing of the troops, provisions, ordnance, &c.

"The army immediately upon landing will have to move with a few light guns about a league into the country and co-operate with General Paoli in driving the enemy from the villages of Patrimonio and Barbaggio. These are held by a small body of the enemy, who in Patrimonio are confined to one house, in which they have a gun or two. General Paoli conceives that this will be an operation of little difficulty, particularly as previous to the landing of the troops he means to occupy the heights between those villages and Bastia, and prevent their being reinforced during the attack. The possession of Patrimonio and Barbaggio will afford a lodgment for part of the troops, effectually prevent the communication between St. Fiorenzo and Bastia, and secure the road from the landing-place for the transport of provisions, ordnance, &c., for the cannonade of St. Fiorenzo, the works of which, besides being old and in many places decayed, are commanded on all sides by heights within 1200 yards, from whence they may be plunged into and many of the batteries taken in reverse.

"I could only reconnoitre Bastia from the top of a mountain at the distance of three or four miles. It also is commanded. The inhabitants are generally supposed to be favourable to Paoli. From the information I received from him and others, I should conceive the attack on Bastia an affair of still greater facility than that of Martello Bay and St. Fiorenzo. There is a good carriage road leading to it from the latter place, by which the artillery, stores, &c., may be conveyed and a communication kept up with the fleet. Calvi is a place of much greater strength than either Bastia or St. Fiorenzo, and may require a more serious attack; it is, however, commanded within a few

hundred yards by a place called Mozzello, upon which is a small advanced work. The harbour of Calvi may be blocked by frigates and gunboats whilst the fleet and army are employed in the reduction of the other places. This will probably subject the garrison to such inconvenience as to render it not very willing, perhaps incapable, of much resistance.

“The French and the few Corsicans in their interest are confined to the posts I have mentioned by the inhabitants attached to General Paoli, who call themselves ‘patriots,’ and give to the others the name of ‘Jacobins.’ Paoli’s men are armed in general with fowling-pieces, and turn out voluntarily with their provisions on their back and serve without pay. When their provisions are expended they return home, but are succeeded by others in the like manner. Thus though the individuals fluctuate a body of men is constantly kept up, sufficient to stop the communication of the enemy by land. General Paoli can command at any time for a particular service a considerable body of Corsicans, but he thinks that 2000 will be sufficient to embody as a permanent corps to act with the army. To enable him to do this he requires £4000 immediately, 100 barrels of powder, with a proportion of lead and flints, and if possible 1000 stands of arms. He will endeavour to provide provisions himself, and only wishes that when his people are detached with the British they may occasionally receive rations.

“The Corsicans seem to be in general a stout, hardy, and warlike people, excellent marksmen, and well adapted to the country they have to act in. They will be particularly useful in possessing heights, and by surrounding our posts prevent the possibility of surprise. The chief productions of the island are oil, wine, and chestnuts; neither straw or forage in any quantities can be supplied for the cavalry. General Paoli wishes that the Regiment of Dragoons may be landed at St. Fiorenzo, and, though the country is but little calculated for the movements of cavalry, a few he thinks will be useful to prevent communication, &c. There

are villages and houses in the neighbourhood of the places to be attacked sufficient for the lodgment of the troops. Tents will be required for the outposts and batteries only, and these may be made more comfortable by the brushwood with which the country is covered. Upon four days' notice mules may be procured for the different services of the army; the owners will feed them, and must be paid accordingly.

"The ordnance belonging to the army, together with what may be occasionally landed from the fleet, will I apprehend be sufficient for every purpose. The season of the year does not admit of time being spent in regular approaches, and fortunately the posts to be attacked do not require them. If there are not a sufficient number of shells for the attack of Calvi I presume they may be procured in time. The island affords materials for fascines and platforms, but intrenching tools, bill-hooks, hatchets, nails, &c. &c., and that apparatus which immediately belongs to the engineers' department, must be provided elsewhere. The strength of the enemy at the different posts, according to the best information I have been able to procure, is as follows:—Troops of the line and Corsicans at—

St. Fiorenzo, including Martello Bay	390
Bastia	810
Communication between St. Fiorenzo and Bastia	250
Calvi	500
	<hr/>
	1950

besides which there are the crews of four frigates, two at St. Fiorenzo and two at Bastia.

"With such a land force as that of the British, it would be in vain to attempt Corsica without the hearty concurrence of the inhabitants, but with this concurrence in the present state of the French garrisons there is every reason to hope for success. The attempt must, however, be made immediately. If delayed it is impossible to say what effect despair and the dread of being exposed to French violence

and cruelty may have even upon those who at present are the best disposed. The drawings which accompany this were taken upon the spot by Major Kochler, to whom I have been greatly indebted both for his assistance and advice. At the request of General Paoli he has remained with him. He will thereby be able to gain a more perfect knowledge of the country and even to make some arrangements for the lodgment of the troops, which particularly belong to his department as Deputy-Quartermaster-General. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. A detailed plan for the attack of the works which defend Martello Bay is enclosed."

THE "HELMSELEY" TRANSPORT AT SEA, OFF THE GULPH OF ST. FIORENZO, CORSICA, *the 5th February*.—The evening before we put into Porto Ferrara, Captain Englefield came down about 1 A.M. General Dundas, Sir James St. Clair, and I were lying in the Admiral's outer cabin. He told us that it was time to dress ourselves. He was afraid the ship would be ashore. He passed on and we could hear him make the same report to Lord Hood, viz., that the ship would not be able to weather the land. My cot was immediately opposite to the Admiral's door, which Captain Englefield had left open. I turned round to observe his countenance. It was not the least discomposed. I could see him dress himself with the greatest deliberation. This had such an effect upon me that I very soon fell asleep. Lord Hood went upon deck and remained there near two hours, during which the ship weathered the land. The next day we got into Porto Ferrara. I then left the *Victory* and returned to the *Egmont*. We remained there several days. The time was usefully employed in making carriages for the light guns and preparing different things for the descent on Corsica. Much ordnance had been embarked upon the evacuation of Toulon in such hurry and confusion that nobody knew where the different articles were. Guns were in one ship, carriages in another, &c. Captain Collier, who commanded the artillery, took much pains to arrange and collect the different articles of this department.

The town of Ferrara is built upon a neck of land which runs into the sea and helps to form the bay. The ground rises from the sea. The town is consequently upon an ascent. It is surrounded with works, and upon the top is a citadel. The works are kept in good repair, and garrisoned by three or four hundred soldiers in the pay of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The French who came from Toulon upon the evacuation are to be landed at Ferrara, and to remain till it is determined where they are finally to be sent to. The *Commerce de Marseilles*, commanded by Admiral Trogoff, has been at Ferrara for some time. Commodore Linzie was appointed to command the first descent upon Corsica. The troops were embarked in transports. We sailed the evening of the 4th February under convoy of the *Alcide*, *Fortitude*, and *Egmont*, 74. The *Britannia* and *Windsor Castle* were ordered to remain with the *Commerce de Marseilles* in Ferrara. The *Victory* and the rest of the fleet could not get out the same evening, but are intended to follow, and to cruise off St. Fiorenzo whilst the operations are being carried on against Martello. It was put in orders before we sailed that the first landing was to be made by the Royals, 25th and 51st Regiments under my command.

CAMP OF ST. BERNARD, CORSICA, 1st March 1794.—Ever since I landed in this island I have been so much occupied that this is the first moment I have had to continue my journal. I shall endeavour to recall the different events since I landed. On the forenoon of the 7th the fleet anchored in a small bay at the back of Martello Point. When I went to the *Alcide* I found the General undetermined whether to disembark that day or not. The troops had been dressed and ready since daylight. I, therefore, pressed him to allow me to land, that I might be able to start early next morning. He consented. The Royals, consisting of 200, and 51st, 350, with a 6-pounder, 5½-inch howitzer, 30 artillery, and 120 seamen from the men-of-war under Captain Cooke, were ordered to land immediately with their blankets, and three days' provisions, drest. It was almost dark before everybody and everything were on

shore. We lay upon our arms at a small distance from the coast that night. Major Kochler, Deputy-Quartermaster-General, who had continued till now with General Paoli at Morato, accompanied me, and undertook to assist in forwarding the artillery.

My orders were to march to the Bocca Fattojagi, and, from heights in that neighbourhood, which overlook the enemy's works, fire upon them with the 6-pounder and howitzer, and then attack them with the infantry. This was in accordance with what I had myself proposed to the General, and from the state of their works when I saw them three weeks before I had reason to hope for success. We marched at daylight in the morning, but the road soon became so very difficult that the two pieces of artillery could not keep up with the troops. Indeed, I even doubted if it would be possible to bring them forward at all. I halted for them at the top of a hill, and, after waiting for some time, received a message by Captain Nepean, of the Engineers, that Captain Cooke required thirty soldiers to be sent back to assist the seamen in getting the guns forward. Having directed the Royals to furnish this party, and the commanding-officer to wait with the rest of the Royals and guard the guns, I pushed forward with the 51st, wishing to get to the intended ground in time to reconnoitre the enemy's posts.

I reached a small plain at the foot of the hills which form the Bocca about twelve at noon. I ordered the regiment to pile their arms and refresh themselves. Major Pringle and Captain Stewart ascended the hill with me, and we reached a point within 1400 yards of the enemy's works. I was much mortified to find how well they had employed their time since I had viewed them with Major Kochler. Every part was strengthened and some new works erected. The attack on them was no longer an affair of two days, 500 men and two light guns. The advanced redoubt of Martello was greatly enlarged, and they still appeared busy in closing it. The tower of Fornoli had embrasures in every direction. A closed battery was thrown up in front

of it, and in the low battery, called the Fort of Fornoli, a mortar and several new guns were mounted.

As Major Kochler had been employed with me in the mission to Corsica, and had agreed in all the particulars of the report I made, I wished for his opinion again before I wrote to General Dundas. I immediately sent to him to leave the guns to Captain Cooke and the officer of artillery and to come to me by daylight in the morning. The regiment was ordered to prepare to pass the night upon their arms, the officers to sleep with their companies, &c. Before dark I received messages that the guns were not very far from camp. The 6-pounder was brought in that night, the howitzer, escorted by the Royals, next morning early; nothing could exceed the zeal of Captain Cooke or the exertions of the seamen. Both were necessary to accomplish such a service. Major Kochler set out on receiving my note, and arrived about two in the morning. I imparted to him everything I had observed, and we agreed to take a view of the works in the morning with Captain Nepean.

The regiment stood to their arms an hour before daylight. As soon as they were dismissed Kochler, Nepean, and I set out, and after examining the works for several hours returned to camp. They agreed with me that the force I had was not equal to the undertaking, I then wrote to General Dundas, reporting the state in which I had found the enemy's works. I said that the attack on the works of Martello Bay, which had been entrusted to me as a previous step to that of St. Fiorenzo, had now, from the time that had been given to the enemy to fortify themselves, become an operation which would employ the whole of his force, but that, when those works were carried, the business would probably become easy. I described to the General the situation of the enemy, but begged that he would come himself and judge upon the spot. I said that in the meantime I had taken measures to ensure fresh provisions for the troops, and that with the assistance I had from the Corsicans, I conceived myself to be secure in the post I had chosen.

When upon the heights reconnoitring, the day before, we saw the tower of Martello, behind which we had disembarked, and where the ships of war and transports still lay, attacked by the *Fortitude*, a 74, and *Juno*, 32-gun frigate. The tower had only two guns, but these were perfectly covered. The walls were 18 feet thick, of old masonry. An 18-pounder carronade was also mounted against it upon the land side at the distance of 200 yards. The ships were obliged in the course of the day to sheer off. The *Fortitude* lost above sixty men killed and wounded, and was set on fire and much disabled. In the course of next day more guns, which kept up a constant fire, were mounted on the land side; but such was the thickness of the walls of the tower that a breach was not effected. The officer, however, who commanded the tower, seeing the inutility of further resistance, since he had not been able to fire a single gun against the land battery, at length surrendered. He was a Garde Marine, and had eight or ten Grenadiers and some seamen with him, two of whom had been severely wounded.

James, in the "Naval History," attributes the ultimate capture of the tower to the fact that the bass-junk with which, to the depth of five feet, the parapet was lined, was set on fire by hot shot from the shore battery. Probably both statements are correct. They are quite consistent with one another.

In the course of the forenoon on which the tower surrendered General Dundas came to the camp. He viewed the enemy's position, dined, and remained the night with us. From the different conversations I had with him he seemed undetermined what to do. Kochler and I pointed out situations nearer Martello where batteries might be erected, and, from our having possession of the tower, much land carriage would be saved. He was firmly of opinion that light guns would not do from any situation, and the difficulty of getting guns of a large calibre over such rugged

rocks frightened him. He left me with orders to remain with the 51st in my present situation and to get forward the camp equipage, but as the Royals and the 69th Regiment had also joined us, he directed me to send them back to the shore because they had no tents, and must of course suffer in case of bad weather. This was done during the two following days. The weather was so fine that, though both men and officers were for eight or ten days without any covering whatever, there was hardly a sick man in the regiment. At night each company made a large fire in a place allotted to it, round which we all lay in our cloaks or blankets.

Major Kochler accompanied the General back on his return. He discovered a spot for a battery within 600 or 700 yards of the redoubt of Martello. I went to it next day, and wrote to the General that I was convinced that if a couple of 18-pounders were mounted on it no person could live in the redoubt. It was resolved to make the trial, and by the force of tackle joined to the exertions of the sailors from the men-of-war, two 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer were dragged up a steep rock and mounted in the course of two days. At another place of easier access a 10-inch mortar and one or two other guns were also mounted. The moment it was determined to establish batteries in this quarter the Corsicans were ordered to occupy the heights. The night the guns were landed the French sallied out and attempted to dislodge them, but were repulsed by the Corsicans. The enemy's redoubt, called "The Convention," was cannonaded by our batteries the greatest part of two days, and several of their guns were dismounted. I still remained at the camp I had first chosen, called Monte Rivinco, but I had been frequently at the batteries which plunged completely into the redoubt. General Dundas told me that he intended to have it stormed as soon as it was sufficiently battered, and that I should have the execution of the attack, and he explained to me the mode in which he wished it to be done.

On the forenoon of the 17th February, the second day of our fire, I had taken the regiment out to exercise in order to accustom them to move through the brushwood without too much disorder, when, in the field, I received a letter from the General to say that he meant to attack the enemy's work that night at nine. He therefore desired me to leave my camp at 4 P.M., and halt in the neighbourhood of the Royal's encampment in the rear of our batteries. I of course immediately returned with the regiment to camp, and, having given the necessary orders and set the regiment in movement at the time ordered, I went myself by a shorter road to headquarters. The General, from one of the batteries, again explained to me the ground. With the Royals and the 51st I was to move from our principal battery and to attack the redoubt in front. The 50th and 25th were to move from the other battery, and, keeping along the sea for some distance, turn to the right and attack the redoubt in flank near the flagstaff. A body of Corsicans were to attack the other side, or rather remain upon the other side between the redoubt and the tower of Farinole, and, if we succeeded, were to cut off the retreat of the enemy.

Upon leaving the General I found the regiment under Major Pringle at the place directed. Major Kochler walked with me, and from a drawing he had taken gave me a perfect idea of the work I was to attack. The interval was employed in explaining to the officers the nature of the attack, making the dispositions, and warning the men not to fire, but to trust to their bayonets. The attack was to be made in column of companies. The Grenadiers and light company of the Royals, being weak, formed one and the leading division, the 51st Grenadiers the second, the 51st light company the third, then the battalion of Royals in five divisions, then three companies of the 51st. I ordered the remaining five companies of the 51st, under Major Pringle, to move at an interval of fifty yards in the rear of the others, to form behind the different traverses as they got in, and to be ready to support or cover the retreat of those who made the

rush, as occasion might require. One hundred and thirty sailors, under Captain Cooke, followed in rear of the whole with intrenching tools.

I put myself at the head of the Grenadiers and light infantry of the Royals, and began to file from our battery at half-past eight. The ground did not admit of any but a file movement. The greatest silence was preserved, and the moon shone very bright. After marching about 500 yards through a very thick brushwood we came to a place which I thought suitable for forming the divisions. Whilst this was being done I advanced a few paces to view the ground over which I had still to pass. Three or four shots were fired at me by an advanced picquet. I immediately returned to the column and gave them the order to advance. This we did pretty quickly downhill to the foot of that upon which the redoubt was placed. Upon the brow of this and within 50 yards of the redoubt, perceiving that we were covered from the fire, I halted to give the men breath and get the divisions into order. They were a little broken from the quickness of the last movement and from the roughness of the ground.

We then advanced briskly up the hill and jumped into the head of the work. I called to the man next me to follow me. Trusting to those who came after us to put to death such as defended that part of the work, I ran on to a traverse, where I knew there was a gun, with a view to prevent it being fired. We carried the traverse instantly. We found the gun elevated to fire on our battery. We instantly made for a second traverse, where there was another gun. This traverse was very high, with two embrasures and a narrow passage upon the right of it. I jumped upon the embrasure. One of the Frenchmen had the match in his hand lighted, but from some unaccountable accident he did not then fire the gun. Some of our men followed me. Others attempted the passage upon our left. The enemy fired upon us and charged their bayonets. Here, for the first time, our men began to fire; but the enemy showed so much firmness that we were fairly checked, and the

bayonets of both crossing, our people, without attempting to turn, stepped back.

We were endeavouring to encourage the men and get them to make a rush through the passage. I make no doubt they would have done it, but at that moment I heard some men in the rear cry out that there was another passage on the right. I immediately made for that and got in. Many of the French stood and fought till they were bayoneted. Others threw down their arms and obtained quarter. We then made for the flagstaff, where many shots were fired. The 50th and 25th, who had been impeded by the difficulty of the ground they had to move over, at this instant reached the redoubt and came into it. From the number of soldiers, sailors, and Corsicans who now came in the confusion was great. I was much afraid of the consequence of a counter-attack had one been attempted. I knew we were within grapeshot range of the tower and redoubt of Fornoli. It was necessary, therefore, to take steps for covering ourselves. The noise and crowd were such that it was difficult to know where to begin, and though an engineer had been ordered to attend, none was forthcoming. Luckily Major Kochler came in, and about the same time the guns of Fornoli began to fire grape. Kochler was extremely active, and gave orders for the work which it was necessary to commence. The grape helped to stop the confusion. Plenty of intrenching tools and sand-bags were found in the redoubt, and the men worked so hard that we were soon in a great measure covered from the fire of Fornoli, and should certainly have been completely so before morning; but about twelve or one o'clock I was informed that the works of Fornoli were abandoned. I detached Major Pringle with our Grenadiers and light infantry companies to take possession of them, sent the different corps back to their camps except the 50th and 25th Regiments, which I kept for the guard of the redoubt.

Our loss in killed and wounded was between thirty and forty, a great number of them bayonet wounds; the enemy, including prisoners, lost above 100. I happened to be

so situated at one time as to be obliged to make use of my sword. The first thrust I made it bent, but luckily a second, which was instantaneous, went through the man's body. Those who defended the redoubt were soldiers of the line, in white. Our people gave quarter as often as asked, but the Corsicans, who failed in cutting off the retreat of the fugitives, who numbered between 400 and 500, were active in killing and pillaging the wounded of both parties. General Dundas came to the redoubt about five o'clock next morning. I went with him to Fornoli, and from thence to camp. He thanked me in very handsome terms, and in the course of the day gave out an order extremely flattering to the troops employed in the assault.

Next day, the 19th, Captain Hislop, Deputy-Adjutant-General, was sent to summon St. Fiorenzo. General Dundas directed Major Kochler and me to reconnoitre the enemy's position at St. Bernard and the ground near the gorge, through which the road passes from St. Fiorenzo to Bastia, with a view to my taking up a position with 500 men and the light gun and howitzer, to cover the disembarkation of the troops in that quarter for the attack on St. Fiorenzo. Kochler and I accordingly walked to Oletta, a small village at which I had been when on the island the first time. Here we met General Paoli. Before supper a report, of which we had heard something before we left camp, was confirmed, viz. that the French had abandoned St. Fiorenzo and had retired to Bastia, and that the English were in possession of the town. Our mission having been thus rendered useless, we set out next morning with General Paoli for St. Fiorenzo. General Dundas desired me to bring the regiment forward. I did so next day, and he encamped the 50th, 51st, and 69th Regiments under my orders on the St. Fiorenzo side of the gorge. The rest of the troops, or the greatest part of them, were quartered in the town. A considerable quantity of guns, mortars, and ammunition were found in St. Fiorenzo and the works of Martello. The enemy remained upon the heights of Titime for a day or two, and blew up part of the road. They

were attacked by the Corsicans, and retired down the hill to the neighbourhood of Bastia.

So ends the story of the capture of St. Fiorenzo. It will, perhaps, surprise one who has read it, but it will explain a good deal that happens afterwards to see the account of the same events as they appeared to Sir Gilbert Elliot, who had been absent in Italy during these operations, and, from his quarters on the *Victory*, subsequently visited the scene. "I went," he writes to his wife, "the other day to see the road by which they carried cannon to the top of a high hill in order to attack the French battery on the heights of Fornalli. General Dundas, and indeed many other people, said it was childish stuff to talk of getting cannon there—it actually seems impossible. But Captain Cook of the navy, with 200 seamen, carried four 18-pounders and two mortars, and opened the battery in two days; if this had not been done we should not have taken San Fiorenzo. The distance about a mile, the ground very steep and rough, considerably steeper than the green face of the craigs (the Minto Crag) leading to the castle from the new strip near the mill, and it is infinitely rougher with rocks and underwood. They fastened great straps round the rocks, and then fastened to the straps the largest and most powerful purchases or pulleys and tackle that are used on board a man-of-war. The cannon was placed on a sledge at one end of the tackle, the men walked downhill with the other end of the tackle. The surprise of our friends, the Corsicans, and our enemies, the French, was equal on this occasion. The battery played for four days on the French redoubt on the heights of Fornalli before it was stormed; during this time Captain Cook and the sea-

men and several officers and soldiers slept in holes in the rocks."¹ From this any one would imagine that the carrying of the guns was an idea suggested by the sailors, and that the "many other people" who agreed with General Dundas in calling the idea "childish stuff" included Moore and the soldiers generally. It will be seen that, on the contrary, it was Major Kochler, a gunner, who originally selected the spot for the guns, being at the time in company with General Dundas; that it was Moore who officially applied to General Dundas to get the help of the sailors with tackle to carry up the guns; that General Dundas, whether he in the first instance did or did not use some such impatient expression as Sir Gilbert, very much at second-hand, records, at least fully accepted Kochler and Moore's proposal, and must have applied for the help of the sailors and the tackle. Sir Gilbert's is a very good description of the ordinary methods for such purposes. Either sailors or garrison gunners are familiar with such a use of tackle; and, though it is much to be regretted that in our day field artillery are not practised, as they ought to be, in carrying out, with the help of infantry man-hauling, such operations, yet methods for the purpose have always been laid down in field artillery drill-books. Moore does justice to the splendid zeal and energy of the sailors, and Dundas, in his official report, is enthusiastic as to "the surprising exertions of science and labour" by which the task was achieved, but the story as told by Sir Gilbert is easily to be explained. Any one who has had the experience of collating the accounts of many different men in a combined action knows the tendency of each man to imagine that his own part is the whole, or at least that it is the only part of any

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," pp. 235, 236.

importance. Sir Gilbert naturally went round with some sailors who had come with him ashore. He heard from them of their physical exertions, very important to the result, not therefore justifying the exclusion from consideration of the efforts of the men who faced the breach and carried the works. As Captain Brenton writes of these very operations, "In all conjoint expeditions of the army and navy the landing or transporting of cannon is performed by the seamen, after which the artillery officers mount the guns and complete the batteries." One of the many influences which thus tended to prejudice Sir Gilbert's mind against the army is here fully illustrated. He was throughout its bitter enemy at a time when some slight understanding of what was necessary in regard to it and of the limitations of his own powers of judgment on military matters was essential to his own success in rightly serving his country.

NOTE 1.—The Captain "Cooke" who is called "Cook" in Sir Gilbert's Life is, as far as I have been able to trace him, a Captain Edward Cooke who had been Flag-Lieutenant to Lord Hood and was promoted for very excellent service at Toulon. It is only fair that the right man should have credit for such good work as he did.

NOTE 2.—There are two forts, one east, one west, in St. Fiorenzo Bay, one Fornoli or "Fornalli" near Martello, one Farinole on the other side of the bay near St. Fiorenzo.

CHAPTER III

BASTIA

THE next day, I believe it was on February 22nd, I went with General Dundas to reconnoitre Bastia. We approached it near enough to see distinctly with our glasses the situation. It was determined to return early the next morning. Upon his return Dundas ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Villetes, with the 69th, to encamp upon the heights of Titime next day. The town of Bastia is defended by four detached redoubts and a citadel placed upon heights at a small distance from the town, which is itself open and close to the sea. The ground which I had reached commands those redoubts, and batteries might be placed upon it within 400 to 500 yards of them. The redoubts are small and badly constructed, some of them without flanks. They are, however, of masonry, and the parapets pretty thick. The great difficulty in attacking Bastia is that of transporting cannon, &c., to the places where the batteries ought to be placed, and of keeping up for nine miles over mountains the communication with St. Fiorenzo, from whence every supply must come. The coast near Bastia is quite open, and no dependence could therefore be placed on supplies from sea. Though General Paoli had promised to cut the communication between Bastia and St. Fiorenzo whilst we were engaged in the attack on Fornoli and Martello, the Corsicans had never attempted to carry out his undertaking. They had also failed to cut the retreat of the fugitives from the Convention Redoubt on the night of our attack. Bastia was therefore reinforced by the garrison of St. Fiorenzo, which consisted, notwithstanding the loss of 200, which they say they sustained in our attack, of 500 to 600 veteran troops of the line. These made the force in Bastia

amount to 1200 to 1300 troops of the line, besides the crews of the two frigates, and 1000, or probably more, armed Corsicans, a force superior to ours.

General Dundas seemed sensible of the difficulty of the undertaking. He ordered me the next day to move the regiment to Titime, and take upon me the command of the two corps. In the meantime the French sallied out of Bastia, attacked and drove the Corsicans from the village of Carda, and established themselves upon the ground which we must have possessed to batter the redoubts. Before I reached the heights their advanced picquets were pushed forward to within a couple of thousand yards of ours. General Dundas was up as soon as the regiment, and pointed out the ground for our encampment.

From a letter of Dundas to Paoli in British Museum, Paoli Correspondence 22,680, of February 25th, this must have been on February 24th. On February 23rd Hood congratulates Paoli "on the success of your brave people last night." Presumably flattery for Paoli, when the Corsicans let the French slip.

The cold upon the top of the mountain was very great, and the fog so thick, as in every sense to make our situation uncomfortable. Our position, however, was strong, and with the vigilance from which I never depart, it was impossible to come on us unawares. Captain Alcock had the advanced picquet. He heard them hard at work the whole night. They were entrenching themselves upon ground which we must possess in order to take Bastia. In the morning the Adjutant-General, Sir James Sinclair, brought me orders from the General to retire down the hill, using every precaution that the French might not perceive the movement and harass me. Orders were accordingly given for a march. Tents were struck immediately, and to the surprise of everybody the troops moved back. I remained with the four companies for about an hour after the rest to call in the picquets and cover the retreat. We encamped in front

of the gorge near which the French camp had formerly been, and we consequently called it by the name of St. Bernardino.

This seems to have been near Barbagio, the gorge being that of the little river Serraggio.

The 50th continued in the camp on the other side of the gorge where we had left them. It was put in orders the next day that the three regiments encamped would receive their orders from me.

CAMP OF ST. BERNARDINO, 13th March 1794. — For some days after I returned from the heights I conceived that it was the General's intention, as soon as everything was ready, to move towards Bastia, and that he had recalled us merely because he found that the necessary arrangements for the attack of that place would take up some time. I generally saw him at least once a day, and though in his conversation he was never sanguine of success, he never expressed anything which made me doubt his intention of making the attempt. He told me that Lord Hood was pushing him to take Bastia, and he laughed at him for looking at it as a thing so easy. I however at last found out that the General had given up the attack as a thing impracticable with the force he had.

About four or five days ago the Adjutant-General of the Fleet, Captain Englefield, with Captains Hood and Wolsley, called upon me. Lieutenant-Colonel Villettes of the 69th was with them. Captain Englefield said he came with those gentlemen by Lord Hood's order, to wait upon Colonel Villettes and me as commanding officers of corps, to know our opinions upon the practicability of attacking Bastia; that General Dundas had said to his Lordship it was impracticable and chimerical; but Lord Hood thought differently, and was willing, if it was attempted, to take the whole responsibility upon himself, and wished to know what the different officers at the heads of corps thought upon the subject. They then offered to get up, saying they did not

wish for a hasty opinion, and would therefore leave us to consult by ourselves for a little. I told Captain Englefield that it was unnecessary to give him that trouble; that I at least was perfectly ready to give him my answer, which was, that I did not conceive that I could with any propriety give Lord Hood an opinion upon such a subject. If General Dundas, as Commander-in-chief, chose to attack Bastia, I was ready to go with the regiment there, and do my duty to my utmost; but if, thinking it impracticable, he did not choose it, it did not become me to give any opinion upon it. Indeed I could not but think that Lord Hood had not sufficiently considered before he sent such a message, for, after what they told us that General Dundas had declared, it seemed to me a species of mutiny for a subordinate officer to pass any opinion. At any rate, as such opinion could not be acted upon, I saw no purpose it could answer but that of criminating the General hereafter.

I happened to dine that day with the General, but said nothing to him of what had passed. In the evening Colonel Villettes called upon me, and we agreed that it was proper the General should be made acquainted with it next morning. I repeated to him the conversation I had had with the captains of the men-of-war. He was surprised at it, though he said it was of a piece with his, Lord Hood's, whole conduct. He then read to me a correspondence he had had with Lord Hood upon the subject of the attack on Bastia. The General's letters were full of good sense and moderation. His Lordship's were not remarkable for those qualities. The General said Lord Hood was a man who never reasoned himself, nor would he listen to reason from others. He had always found him dogmatical and obstinate. Sir James St. Clair came in; the conversation continued; the General said he would return to England.

I saw him next day. He showed me a letter he had just received from Lord Hood, in which his Lordship said that upon the evacuation of Toulon he conceived the General's command to have ceased; and from that moment he, Lord Hood, had the supreme command of the fleet and

army, and it was from courtesy only that he had admitted the General to interfere. The General's answer to this was very full, thanking him ironically for his courtesy, and urging him to show his commission from the King appointing him to the supreme command, &c. The General next day called the commanding officers of corps together, read the correspondence to them, and gave them his reasons for quitting the command—bad health had made him write home so long ago as from Toulon for a successor, &c. &c. We all agreed as to the absurdity of Lord Hood's pretension to command the land forces, and agreed to resist any such attempt.

Colonel D'Aubant had the day before appeared in orders as Brigadier-General till His Majesty's pleasure should be known. Upon the 10th instant the General gave up the command to the *Brigadier as senior officer, that command to be held by him in the same manner as by General Dundas*. On the 11th Dundas embarked in a frigate for Civita Vecchia. That morning he took me aside and asked if he could do anything for me by speaking or otherwise more than he already had done, and paid me some compliments upon my conduct. He had no idea that D'Aubant would have remained, and he had hoped to have left me in command. Having thanked him, I told him my sole object was to be employed; it was a great mortification to me that he was leaving us, and to find myself tied to such an insignificant service as this was likely to become. Emolument was not my immediate object. All I desired of him was that if an opportunity offered, wherein by mentioning me or the regiment, he could get me employed, he would use it. I wished for nothing else. This he assured me he would do.

Sir Gilbert Elliot, who returned from Ferrara and Leghorn during the latter part of the correspondence, walked with me to camp. He is very desirous that the attempt upon Bastia should be made. I told him that from what I had heard drop from General D'Aubant I believed he would find it difficult to persuade him to undertake it. D'Aubant's views seemed to be limited to fortifying

St. Fiorenzo. I agreed with Sir Gilbert in wishing the attempt to be made on Bastia. I did not pretend to say that it would be successful—far from it; but perhaps the situation of affairs required the attempt; if it failed, the island had better be abandoned. St. Fiorenzo was unhealthy, and not a post by itself to be kept; to fortify it was nonsense. I paid my respects in form yesterday morning to the General. His predecessor was a man of so little ceremony that this one's formality is the more striking, his language and manner having become already perfectly official. I have been in camp this whole day. Before dinner I received a note from the General asking me to breakfast with him to-morrow, and to bring a copy of the report made to General Dundas on my return from Corsica. Within this hour I have received a letter from Lord Hood, expressing concern and disappointment that I should decline giving him my opinion respecting an attempt for the reduction of Bastia. Having been led to come to Corsica by my report, he had therefore an undoubted right to expect my opinion. His Lordship has perceived how much he committed himself when he sent the captains to Colonel Villetes and me as commanding officers of corps, and he now wishes to give it another turn.

14th March.—This day was so wet that there was no stirring from camp, and I could not wait upon the General. I answered Lord Hood's letter by assuring him that it was from no disrespect that I declined giving an opinion to the captains who waited upon me by his orders upon the practicability of an attack on Bastia; that, after General Dundas had viewed the situation himself and declared the attempt impracticable with our forces, I did not conceive it possible for me, without being guilty of gross impropriety, to give an opinion upon the subject.

15th March.—I was half-way to St. Fiorenzo in order to wait on General D'Aubant this morning when I met

Major Kochler, who told me I must turn with him, that the General desired that he and I should examine the position of the enemy and report to him upon it. We were obliged to defer it till next day upon account of the very thick fog upon the mountains. We returned to town to the General. He seems much averse to the attack on Bastia. He has not the boldness to say so. It is difficult to speak more nonsense than he does with more gravity and decorum of manner. It was agreed that Kochler and I should reconnoitre the French to-morrow. From the General I went to Sir Gilbert Elliot. I told him how much I regretted General Dundas leaving us; that he was a man who, whatever he undertook, we could have confidence that he would execute it well; but with regard to D'Aubant, that though I was convinced the business of Bastia was to be done, I was as much so that D'Aubant was unequal to it and would bungle it. I therefore could not help wishing it might not be attempted.

16th March.—I received a card this morning desiring my attendance at headquarters at half-past ten upon urgent business. The reconnoitring was again put off. I found a council of war was to be assembled of the admirals and field officers to decide upon the propriety or expediency of an attack upon Bastia. It was at the request of Lord Hood. I cannot recollect all the nonsense that was spoken by D'Aubant. Major Kochler and I were the only two who spoke our sentiments openly, and we agreed in saying that with regard to the position the enemy had lately taken we could not judge, never having seen it; but we had no difficulty in saying that if the enemy were driven from it, and we had it in our power to possess the ground we were upon the day we first saw the works of Bastia, such a position could then be taken as, with the assistance of the Corsicans, would certainly prevent the possibility of an attack from the enemy. The troops having been made secure, ammunition, guns, &c., might in time be brought forward and batteries erected to

batter and bombard the works of the town. This in time might force a capitulation, especially as the place would be simultaneously closely invested by the fleet; but everything now depended upon the kind of position they had taken since they had driven the Corsicans from Carda and the heights. This opinion would be generally conceived to be contrary to that of General Dundas, upon which much had been said. Nobody, I said, had a better opinion of that General's abilities than I had. I respected him as an officer, and had much reason to like him as a man. I was conscious that my opinion against his would have little weight; but being called upon to give an opinion, I must give my own whether it differed from the General's or not; that, however, there was no reason to think General Dundas did not mean to go on to Bastia until he found that the French had occupied that second position. If he did not, why did he advance the 51st and 69th Regiments to the heights of Titime? I knew as much of the General's sentiments as most people, and from his conversation I always thought he meant to move forward as soon as he had made the necessary preparations. Nothing was settled. A decision was *postponed* until Kochler and I return from our reconnoitring. He is to call upon me early to-morrow.

19th March.—Kochler called upon me early on the 17th, and we ascended the hills by the great road with an escort of 80 or 100 Corsicans. About a mile below the place where we were formerly encamped we struck off to the left by a path which leads along the high ridge of the mountains, and which descends and strikes off to either Carda or Villa, villages on the north side of Bastia. There was so thick a fog upon the mountains that it was impossible to reconnoitre anything from thence. We therefore descended to Villa, from whence we had a profile view of the enemy's new position and a complete one of the town and neighbourhood of Bastia.

We saw the absurdity of the proposal the Corsicans are eternally repeating, that of taking the forts and citadel by

means of the town. The inhabitants, they say, are well affected to us, but I rather suspect that, like those of most open towns, they will be affected to the party they think likely to be the strongest. Nothing could appear plainer to Kochler and me than that if the town was surrendered to us we durst not take possession of it. The citadel, which is strong on that side, completely commands it, and no operation can be carried on against the works on the north side. The opinion I always had was confirmed, that to take the forts a position must be taken somewhere between the White House and the height of Gardiola. The enemy, sensible of this, took possession of it themselves the day after I was upon it with General Dundas. They have erected a large redoubt upon Gardiola, and have taken a strong position half a mile above it, in front of the White House, facing the mountain. Between this and the redoubt are a chain of posts among the rocks to prevent their advanced position from being turned, and to support or cover the retreat from it.

After remaining above an hour at Villa, the fog having left the mountain, we reascended, and, from a situation above the enemy's advanced position, at a distance of half a mile, we had an opportunity of reconnoitring it. As the position they now hold is the only one from whence we could have formerly attacked the forts above Bastia, so the place in the mountains from whence we reconnoitred their advanced position is that from which this last can be attacked. It is extremely strong, and as, from the cold and constant fogs, there would be no possibility of remaining encamped so high in the mountains till such time as artillery, &c., could be brought forward, the attack upon the advanced post must be made with infantry and such light guns as could be carried upon men's shoulders. The enemy's position is strong, the ground to be passed in order to attack them rough and much against the attacker; if, notwithstanding these difficulties, we were successful, it could not be without considerable loss, and the enemy would be secure of retreating to the Gardiola, whereas if we

were unsuccessful, as there would be a precipice behind us, we should probably be destroyed. Upon the whole, Kochler and I were of opinion that the attempt is beyond our powers with the present force.

In our report, which we wrote and delivered yesterday, we described the position without passing an opinion. But to Sir Gilbert Elliot, upon whom we called as soon as we left Brigadier-General D'Aubant, we told fairly what we thought. The French are certainly equal if not superior to us in numbers. Their posts are so fortunately circumstanced that they may support without risk the most advanced of them with the whole or any given part of their force, for their retreat cannot be cut. The faults committed, which have, I fear, decided the fate of Corsica, were: First, Paoli's not cutting the communication between Bastia and St. Fiorenzo whilst we were occupied in the attack of Fornoli and Martello. He undertook to do it, and in this case 500 to 600 of their best troops of the line must have capitulated in St. Fiorenzo. Secondly, the Corsicans failing the night the Convention Redoubt was stormed to cut off the retreat of the fugitives. They would have done it with ease had they obeyed the orders given to them. I gave them the orders myself, but upon every occasion they have failed us.

Thirdly, had General Dundas moved his troops boldly up the hill and possessed the ground, which he only reconnoitred, on the day the 69th encamped at Titime. He had seen it the day before, and should have known the importance of it. The enemy were then certainly panic-struck; following them and encamping close to their forts must have had the best effect; but General Dundas, who is certainly a good officer, is perhaps not sufficiently enterprising. He wished to feel his way, and trusted the Corsicans to keep these heights. The Corsicans allowed themselves to be surprised and driven both from the heights and from the strong village of Carda. There is no doubt but that before this General Dundas meant to advance; why otherwise should he have made the 69th, and afterwards the 51st, encamp at Titime? Besides, he was taking measures to forward provisions, &c.,

and from his conversations with me I never doubted his intentions to move forward with his whole force as soon as the stores, artillery, &c., were ready; but the spirit of enterprise the enemy showed in moving out, attacking the Corsicans, and possessing the heights above their works, the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of dispossessing an enemy of this kind, equal at least to us in numbers, from a strong position, and afterwards besieging them in their forts, decided in all probability the General to withdraw us, as he did, and to give up the idea of attacking Bastia. In war, an opportunity lost is never to be regained.

The report which we delivered yesterday was particularly *relished*; the tendency of it undoubtedly was to prevent an attack on the enemy; this I believe *he* was determined not to attempt at any rate.

21st March.—Yesterday the council of war was again assembled. The members were Lord Hood, Admirals Hot- ham and Goodal (Crosbie did not come), and Commodore Linzie, Brigadier-General D'Aubant, Lieutenant-Colonels Moore, Villetes, Wauchope, Sir J. St. Clair, Majors Pringle, Brereton, and Kochler. The report made by Kochler and me, together with that made by Lieutenants Duncan and Debrett, were read. The latter was very short, and said that batteries might be erected on the north side which would considerably annoy the enemy. It had appeared to both Major Kochler and me so impossible to think of attacking upon that side, that we concluded Lieutenant Duncan had considered the situation as a mere artillery officer, and, having seen ground upon which batteries might be erected, had reported so without considering further how these batteries were to be supported, the communication kept up, &c. &c.; but when called into the council he said he had considered those things, and was of opinion that a position could be taken in that quarter for troops, and batteries erected with effect against the citadel. Kochler and I, though not upon the exact spot where Lieutenant Duncan had been, yet had seen the situation of the north

side of Bastia from the church of Villa perfectly distinctly. We both declared that we thought the idea of attacking the citadel and works of Bastia from that quarter perfectly absurd. If we went round by sea and landed near Toga the enemy were left in possession of the heights. The land communication with St. Fiorenzo must be given up and a sea one depended on for every supply.

After a great deal of foolish conversation a question was at last proposed to the council—"Whether it is expedient in a military point of view to attempt the reduction of Bastia with the force of the present fleet and army." The youngest members gave their opinions first. Some of them were singularly expressed, but the whole of the army officers were against the attempt. Mine was, "I do not think our force equal to the attempt." The navy were unanimous that an attempt should be made, but as they are not military men, and had never had the opportunities for judging for themselves, I took the amount of their opinion to be no more than this, "that it was a desirable thing to make an attempt if possible." Brigadier-General D'Aubant wished to decline giving a public opinion, but when pressed gave one against the attempt. He deserves, in my opinion, to be broke for deciding without having attentively reviewed the situation himself. I have no conception of a commanding officer deciding an affair of such importance from the report of others when he has it in his power to see and judge for himself, but it was evident from the beginning that whatever report was made he was determined to do nothing.

When asked at a public council I could not but say that our force was unequal to the attempt. At the same time, I feel that in similar circumstances I should have called for no council, but would have made many efforts before I had given the affair up. The Corsicans have hitherto failed us; but Paoli might be worked upon to make an effort, and with an exertion from them no doubt the French might be driven from the heights, but with General D'Aubant it is needless to think of such attempts. He is unequal to them in every respect. It is difficult to paint

conduct more unlike an officer than his has been in these two councils; as for the other, Lord Hood, he enters little further into the subject than to say, "Take Bastia," just as he would say to a captain, "Go to sea." He conceives they are both to be done with equal facility. Having taken up this idea, no reasoning has the smallest effect upon him. Orders are given to-day for the embarkation of the regiment acting as marines. These form at least the half of our force, and the report is that Lord Hood means to land them on the north side of Bastia and attack the place.

24th March.—There is now no doubt that Lord Hood means to attack Bastia with the marines and sailors by landing on the north side. He has, I understand, demanded an engineer and artillery. Captain Collier has given in a list of the ordnance which will be necessary, which exceeds what is in store. Mortars, &c., are sent for to Naples, and Collier's idea is that the citadel may be teased by shells into a surrender. The Corsicans are convinced, and have persuaded others, that the town will declare for us and force the citadel to yield. This last may happen. If it does not, I do not believe, from the distance our batteries must be placed, that it will be possible to force the enemy. If the Corsicans make an effort and drive them from the heights, then we may get upon them and place batteries to advantage; but on the north side we shall never be able to move a step beyond Capanelli, which is said to be 1400 yards, but I should rather think it is upwards of 1600 yards, from the citadel. I much fear that some misfortune will happen to the detachment landed. If the enemy have good intelligence they may cut them up the first or second day of their landing; or if they hear that we mean to attack on that side they will probably make an effort to take Villa, which, if successful, will prevent the possibility of our taking a position on that side. In short, I am more and more persuaded that if Bastia is attempted it should be from the heights. I am equally convinced that a clever fellow, if the Corsicans gave tolerable assistance, would take it from thence; but our force is too small for diversions;

they may succeed, but the risk is too great. Major Kochler is disgusted, and has obtained leave of absence; he goes to-morrow to Leghorn. I shall feel his loss much. My acquaintance with him began on board the *Victory*, and having since been much employed together we mutually contracted a friendship for each other. He is a most zealous, indefatigable officer, who thinks of nothing but his profession, for which he certainly has considerable talents.

Of Moore's mode of life at this time Sir Gilbert¹ gives this little sketch: "Colonel Moore's camp is in a very picturesque situation; his bed consists of some loose straw covered with meadow hay, and there he has slept in his clothes ever since our arrival at San Fiorenzo, generally making a tour of a mile or two himself in the course of the night. He is in love with his profession, and as all the services one renders to a mistress are pleasant, he enjoys discomforts." Sir Gilbert does not seem to have realised that the reason why Moore was "in love with his profession" was that it was the means by which, with the greatest personal sacrifice of ease and comfort, he could best serve his country in her hour of need, and that the "mistress" in whose service he "enjoyed all discomforts" was that far-away little island which contained all that he held dear, and carried with it memories of the "invincible knights of old," for him no more than for Wordsworth all soldiers. Shakespeare and Milton were with him as with Wordsworth certainly among them. The one had given voice to that lofty patriotism that inspired him. The other had understood as well as he what it was "to scorn delights and live laborious days." Having three brothers, with all of whose careers he keenly sympathised, one a sailor, another a physician, another in

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 235.

civil employ, he had no temptation to any narrow professionalism. Having nevertheless along the special path of life of a soldier himself scented the fragrance¹ that treads in the footing of duty, he had there heard a voice, loftier even than that of patriotism. It called him on, always to the verge of death, through wounds often nearly mortal, through deadly illness, brought on again and again by his expenditure of all the physical energy of which his splendid frame was capable, through exposure in all climes, to fulfil to the utmost of his power the task before him. It led him to train himself under the best masters by perpetual seeking of opportunity to do service to his country wherever he might perfect himself by a long apprenticeship to lead her armies with safety and honour. Sir Gilbert could in some measure understand this in the case of Nelson, not in that of a soldier, and he turns from the sketch he has given of Moore with loathing, and enters upon a tirade against all such men. To me it certainly seems that Sir Gilbert, who had undoubtedly heard, and sometimes obeyed, the "timely mandate" of the "stern daughter of the voice of God," did in Corsica defer the task "in smoother walks to stray." I do not know the man who had more completely than Moore, here as elsewhere throughout life, an answer to the poet's prayer in all its three clauses :

"The spirit of self-sacrifice ;
The confidence of reason give ;
And in the light of truth thy bondman let me live." ¹

1st April.—Different officers have been reconnoitring the enemy's position. Lieutenant-Colonel Weymes has reported

¹ "Ode to Duty," from which also the allusion to "Fragrance in thy footing treads" is taken.

that nothing is so easy as to dislodge them from the heights, &c., and has offered to take Gardiola with 400 men. He proposes, I understand, to do this by marching in the night and surprising the enemy. Marching in the dark over this country I deem impracticable. If it were not, we have no reason to believe that the enemy are not vigilant. Upon the whole his proposal is so absurd that I believe even D'Aubant perceives it. The other day the General was determined to reconnoitre himself; all the field officers, engineers, staff, &c., were warned, and a party of Corsicans as an escort. We proceeded in form a mile up the hill, but a thick fog coming up, we returned. Yesterday it was again intended to be undertaken, but put off. Kochler called upon me in the forenoon. The air was particularly clear, and we walked up together. We met Lieutenant-Colonel Wauchope on the mountain, and ascended to the place from whence we had formerly viewed the most advanced position of the French. I am confirmed in my opinion of the strength of it, which does not proceed from any works they have erected, but from the difficulty of approaching it. The approach must be made over excessively rough ground constantly under fire. With the whole of the force, as originally landed, it might have been attempted, but since the marines are embarked it is by no means advisable. General D'Aubant should either have undertaken the attack of Bastia himself or positively refused every assistance of ordnance, artillery, men, &c. As it is, he has crippled himself without giving what was necessary to Lord Hood. Without more good luck than can be expected some misfortune will happen. Lord Hood has been daily expected to sail for this week past, but is still in Martello Bay.

5th April.—Lord Hood sailed three days ago. I went to Villa yesterday and was upon the ground intended for the batteries against the redoubt of Campanelli. The troops are not yet landed. The fleet are at anchor to the northward of Bastia except three sail, which are on the other side opposite to the marsh. Campanelli is a small redoubt,

having a dry wall, with only one 4-pounder and abbatiss intended originally against Corsicans. I could see them thickening the parapet and opening another embrasure. Our fire will be so superior that the redoubt must fall. As, however, Lord Hood has only about 700 or 800 soldiers with whom to take possession of it, it is possible that the enemy may lie behind the hill and prevent so small a body from advancing, especially as the ground is extremely difficult. Supposing this not to happen and that we get the redoubt, I am still of opinion that we shall not be able to move a step farther, and will even find it difficult to erect any batteries, on account of the fire to which we shall then be exposed. Our position will also be liable to attack. Lord Hood is persuaded that the townspeople will revolt the moment the fire commences and will force the garrison to surrender. Of this I am no judge. The heights seemed as well guarded as ever. Upon my return I dined with Brigadier-General D'Aubant. Paoli was there. He begins to speak with less confidence of a surrender, and scouts the idea of taking the place by mortars; till now his language had been "Show yourselves and Bastia is yours." There has been something in Paoli's conduct very singular ever since we landed. He is a politician; his ends may be good, but I am persuaded he is indifferent as to the means. When I first knew him he was so plausible I was deceived and thought him something of a soldier. I have since had frequent opportunities of observing his complete ignorance of military matters.

23rd April.—The cannonade and bombardment of Bastia still continues. We have not gained an inch. The redoubt of Capanelli, though silenced, cannot be taken possession of. It is abbatiss. I doubt if we could force it, but, if we did, we could not remain upon it. People are now persuaded of the absurdity of the attack. The report of the surrender the moment our batteries should open is proved to have had no foundation. The officers now look to the heights as the proper quarter of attack. Lord

Hood and Sir Gilbert Elliot made a most pressing application to Brigadier-General D'Aubant to make a diversion by either assaulting the heights, or even showing himself upon them. If he assaults, they assure him he will carry them with ease; if he shows himself only, the effect even of that will be extremely beneficial. If he does neither, they threaten him with being responsible to the King for the failure or any misfortune which may happen to the expedition. Two days running the General reconnoitred the heights in consequence of this application. I accompanied him together with the engineer, artillery officers, &c. The works have been strengthened since I last saw them. We happened to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Villettes and Weymes the last day. The latter conceives it would be mighty easy to take them, but cannot explain how, and talks so like a boy that little weight can be given to his opinion.

Yesterday the General assembled Lieutenant-Colonel Wauchope, Sir James St. Clair, Captain Nepean (Engineers), Captain Collier (Artillery) and me. He read to us extracts of the letters from Lord Hood and Sir Gilbert, and before he sent an answer wished to have our opinions upon the propriety of complying with their demand. I had already given him my opinion privately. I however said that nothing had happened since the council held three weeks ago to induce me to alter the opinion I had then given. I in common with others had foretold what would happen if an attack was made upon the side of Toga. It was the opinion of the council then, that with the whole of our force we were unequal to the taking of Bastia; how could we think of it now with only part of it? If we attempted the heights we should in all probability be foiled. If we carried them, it must be with such loss as to make it impossible for us to force the other posts. To show ourselves without attacking was ridiculous. Lord Hood's assertions upon this were like those he made upon a former occasion, that six or seven shells would do the business of Bastia, and would prove equally unfounded. As reinforcements were expected we should wait for them. Lord Hood

might either re-embark his marines or strengthen himself in the position he had taken, and with boats, &c., block up the harbour, which of late had been done but carelessly. This was the opinion of all the members. Captain Collier declined giving his, except as an artillery officer. The Brigadier is in consequence of our opinion to refuse the requisition. I am particularly anxious that nothing should be undertaken for some days. A general officer may daily be expected, when affairs may take a different turn. The great cause of the failure of the expedition has been the failure upon the part of General Paoli and the Corsicans. Instead of the active, warlike people I took them to be, zealous in the cause of liberty, they have proved to be a poor, idle, mean set, incapable of any action which requires steadiness or resolution, and have been absolutely of no use to us since we landed. They made a show of attacking the heights some nights ago, and began a tremendous fire about ten o'clock, which lasted till near one; they lost two or three men, but kept at too great a distance to hurt the enemy.

27th April.—I paid a visit two days ago to the *Victory*: both Lord Hood and Sir Gilbert are dreadfully displeased with General D'Aubant. With Sir Gilbert I had a long conversation, explained to him the difficulty of attacking the heights, the little chance of our succeeding without considerable loss, which might prevent the possibility of proceeding to the other attacks. If they must be attacked it had better be delayed for a few days, when in all probability a general officer would arrive from England: under D'Aubant nothing could be undertaken. He was sorry, he said, to hear me talk of the difficulty, as he thought it probable the command would devolve on me, and he flattered himself that the moment this happened all would go well. I slept at Furiana at General Paoli's quarters; he also told me there were hopes of my getting the command. I returned to camp next morning by the great road leading from Bastia, and again viewed the enemy's position. I spoke to a little girl who had just come from Bastia (she said) to

see her father, who is one of our Corsicans. I was surprised to hear her speak with indifference of the danger, and of returning to her mother in Bastia. This does not look as if the effect of our fire was so tremendous as is reported by the deserters. Yesterday I again reconnoitred the heights, and after seriously considering the situation of the town, with the small means we have to carry on a siege, I most ardently wish a general officer may arrive and prevent the command falling to me, for unless the garrison lacks provisions or ammunition I do not think we can force them to surrender. It is reported this day that St. Michel, the French commander, has escaped from Bastia.

3rd May.—Brigadier-General D'Aubant told Sir James St. Clair and me the other day that the last despatches from England did mention that Major-General Charles Stuart had received a commission, and might be daily expected to take the command. The Brigadier does not seem, however, yet to give up hopes that the command may be left to him. Lord Hood applied for two 10-inch howitzers. The Brigadier did not think he could spare them. They happen to be in a transport which is used as a store-ship. Lord Hood sent an order to Admiral Crosbie to take the howitzers out of the ship and send them to him, which was accordingly done, and they went round in the *Romney* without consulting the Brigadier further.

The commanding officers of corps were again assembled yesterday at eleven o'clock. Letters from Messrs. Wyndham and Trevor, the British Ministers at Florence and Turin, to Lord Hood were read. They stated that information through a respectable channel had been received that the French meditated a descent at Leghorn with a view to pillage and destroy that place, particularly the houses of the English merchants settled there. They requested therefore that a squadron might be sent to cruise off that harbour. Mr. Trevor's letter stated that he had reason to believe the French meant a descent at Genoa in order from thence to attack the dominions of the King of Sardinia. He requested

a squadron might immediately show itself off Genoa. Lord Hood's letter to Brigadier-General D'Aubant, which accompanied these, pressed the General to co-operate with the troops at St. Fiorenzo, either by attacking the heights or even showing troops upon them, which would undoubtedly induce Bastia to surrender in four days instead of a fortnight. He said that the speedy surrender of that place became more important from the situation of affairs in the Mediterranean, and it was probable he might soon be obliged to withdraw the naval force from Corsica. If he did so without being in possession of Bastia, the troops in St. Fiorenzo would be left in a very unpleasant situation, &c. &c.

The Brigadier said he laid these papers before us "not with a view to burden us with any responsibility," but to ask our opinions. I said it was impossible for me to come every eight or ten days and give an opinion upon what ought or ought not to be undertaken. Many things were to be considered which I had not the means of knowing; perhaps nobody had but the Commander-in-chief. I had upon a former occasion given it as a general opinion that our force was not equal to the taking of Bastia. I thought so still. With every deference to Lord Hood's opinion, I could not give any credit to his assertion that our attacking or showing ourselves upon the heights would force a surrender in four days; that even if we were to carry the heights with a trifling loss, I did not think the British force in Corsica was able to reduce Bastia in a fortnight. Lord Hood's attack had not weakened the place. The only chance of his taking it was by blockading the harbour, which might be done equally well whether the heights were attacked or not. These were my sentiments; but whether the affairs of Europe or those of the British in the Mediterranean made a desperate attack necessary or not, I did not presume to say. Much conversation then passed. It was evident from the beginning that the Brigadier was determined to do nothing, and only wanted our sanction for his refusal to act. I am anxious that *he* should do nothing. General Stuart may be hourly expected.

8th May.—Some days ago Lord Hood applied to Major-General D'Aubant for the transport containing army stores, and also the baggage of the 50th and 51st Regiments. The General represented that it was impossible to grant it, as he had no place on shore in which to put the things which that ship contained. This morning I was informed by one of our officers that our baggage was ordered to be moved to the *Fides*, another transport, as Lord Hood wanted the *Samuel* and *Jane*. When I mentioned this to the Brigadier he seemed a good deal surprised; it was a second howitzer business. I could not help saying that I thought it hard that when General Dundas had that ship appropriated for the service of the army, our baggage and stores were to be moved from it without the least ceremony, without even consulting him; in his place I should not suffer it. If it was not to be prevented otherwise, I would order a party of men on board and get the ship under the guns of the garrison. This would, he said, be too violent. I was afraid he had no alternative but to suffer the insult or adopt the method I proposed. He was nervous, and said he would write. I returned to camp and sent the Quartermaster to move the baggage.

11th May.—I went upon the 9th with Captain Collier of the Artillery to the southward of Bastia, intending to view the situation of the Fort of Monserrat. We returned by Furiana and waited upon General Paoli, who showed us a parcel of letters which had been taken from a man going from Bastia to Calvi. Several of these were from La Combe St. Michel, the Representant, accounting for his departure. He said that he was gone to hasten the succours from France which had been long promised. In the meantime he had appointed General of Brigade Gentili to command in his absence, and had delegated to him all the powers he himself had had as Commander-in-chief of Corsica. Gentili's letters state that he will be able to hold out *un mois de plus* (*ou deux* is interlined). The letter is dated the 30th April. All the letters speak of it as a blockade, in which

few men have been lost, and as if the want of provisions or ammunition alone can force them to a surrender. I saw General D'Aubant yesterday. Lord Hood has assumed power over all the vessels in which the ammunition, stores, and baggage of the army are kept, will allow nothing to be landed from them but by his order, and has refused the Brigadier's application for some canteens and powder. This is submitted to. I asked the Brigadier if he knew the reason why Lord Hood did not also take the ordnance, &c., in the store-houses on shore; either, I said, because he did not yet want them, or perhaps that he doubted if he had sufficient force to do it. I received a letter from my father, dated 15th April. General Stuart was then in London. I dread the arrival of a reinforcement before he comes to command it.

15th May.—The night before last the reinforcement arrived from Gibraltar, consisting of the recruits of the 50th and 51st, with the remains of the 18th, in all about 600 men. Yesterday morning the commanding officers of corps were again assembled. Brigadier-General D'Aubant informed us that he did not mean to wait for the troops expected from England, but with what he now had he intended to move forward and co-operate in the attack of Bastia. He had much vague conversation with Captain Collier, commanding the Artillery, respecting the different pieces of ordnance fit for use and upon the practicability of transporting 24-pounders to the heights above the French advanced posts. The Brigadier seemed to think it a business which could be easily and speedily executed; but being informed that to convey guns of that calibre would be an operation of several days, he then spoke of 12-pounders, light howitzers, &c. He was told that in order to use these he must descend from the heights, as the summit was at too great a distance from the places he wanted to batter for these smaller guns to be effective, and that, previous to the establishing of batteries below, a position must be taken for the troops, who must cover them-

selves by means of sand-bags the moment they descended. These operations evidently required combination and arrangement, qualities of which he is devoid. He seemed to give up the idea, and said that since guns required so much time, he would order the reinforcements to land immediately; that as yet the enemy could only have been informed that the expected reinforcement had arrived, not with regard to the strength of it. They would suppose it to be greater than it was; he saw no difficulty in moving the troops to the heights that night and attacking the advanced entrenched posts in the morning at daylight.

He did not explain the mode of attack, nor had he even considered the subject deeper than that the troops were to leave their different encampments and the town of St. Fiorenzo at midnight, arrive upon the heights, and attack at daylight. Lieutenant-Colonel Weymes expressed his approbation. The rest of us remained for some time silent. At last I said that the Brigadier had proposed two very different modes of attacking the enemy; the one was slow but certain, the other was rather desperate, might fail, and certainly could not succeed without considerable loss; that, before he determined which to adopt, it might not be amiss to know from Lord Hood in what situation the enemy were. If what was reported was true, they were upon the eve of a surrender from want of provisions. At any rate it would appear odd to commence any operation against Bastia without communicating with the person who had been before it for these six or seven weeks past. I then gave him a plan I had formed for the attack of the advanced posts should an assault be determined upon. General D'Aubant wrote the scrawl of a letter he proposed writing to Lord Hood, telling his lordship in general terms he was ready to co-operate with him. After we had been asked our opinion of the letter, I said I had no belief in doing business by letter; the one just read was very proper; a very proper answer would no doubt be returned to it, and affairs would be no further advanced. I conceived that to enable two officers at the head of the two services to act in

concert, it was necessary for them to communicate personally or through the medium of confidential officers, that more could be done in that way in half-an-hour than by twenty letters.

Sir James St. Clair Erskine (Adjutant-General) and I were desired to wait on Lord Hood. We reached the *Victory* about two o'clock, and I delivered to Lord Hood General D'Aubant's message, "that a reinforcement of 600 men had arrived from Gibraltar, which enabled him to co-operate in the attack of Bastia, if from his Lordship's information of the situation of the place he deemed assistance necessary. The General had ordered us to wait on his Lordship to consult and determine what movement by the troops at St. Fiorenzo would be most effectual." Lord Hood said, "If the General had advanced ten days ago when I applied to him to show himself upon the heights, I had positive information that the place would have surrendered. Now indeed I believe he need not give himself that trouble, as Bastia must, from every account, give up in the course of six or seven days at furthest. All communication between the General and me had hitherto been in writing. I wish it to continue so. Words are often misinterpreted. The whole must come to a hearing hereafter, and what has passed between us has been sent home. I therefore must decline giving any answer to your message. If the General writes I will write him an answer." Our mission being thus ended, we changed the subject. Lord Hood expressed great displeasure at Sir Robert Boyd for not having sent, besides the recruits, a complete regiment of 600 men. We stayed to dinner, and to Sir James and me he was very polite.

The night before a boat from Bastia was taken, containing wounded men and three English deserters; the letters had been thrown overboard, but were saved. They contain accounts of the scarcity of provisions, and showed that unless succoured in a few days the garrison must surrender. We returned so late that I could not make my report to the Brigadier till this morning. It was a written report, stating shortly what had passed. The Brigadier said that

he would move forward to the heights. He had hitherto deferred doing so from want of a sufficient force. Lord Hood might find himself mistaken in his hopes of an immediate surrender, as he had been before; any supply of provisions thrown into Bastia would prevent it. He would therefore take a position on the heights; his right extended as far as the present Swiss post; a body of men upon the ground the 69th formerly occupied; the left upon the top of the mountain immediately over the French posts. To this last he would bring heavy artillery, and, as it would consequently be the point of attack, the 51st should have it. He calculated he could move 1500 or 1600 rank and file, leaving a sufficient force in St. Fiorenzo. Upon all this he asked no opinion, but delivered it as his intention. Much conversation passed between him, the Quartermaster-General Nepean, the Adjutant-General, and myself, from which his ignorance of the arrangements necessary for such a movement were but too apparent. So many difficulties will be thrown in his way in forwarding provisions, ammunition, &c., that I am not without hopes that General Stuart will arrive before we can possibly strike our tents.

Captain Nepean has received orders to go to-morrow morning early to mark the encampment, and an order was issued this evening for the troops encamped and in St. Fiorenzo to hold themselves in readiness to move upon the shortest notice. I have received letters from my father dated 25th April. People at home are much surprised at Dundas's leaving his command. I own it is the part of his conduct which I always blamed the most. I remember saying so in a conversation I had at the time with Sir Gilbert Elliot; but he was of opinion that matters had come to such a pitch between Dundas and Lord Hood that one of them must have quitted. Lord Hood could not, and therefore the other was right to do it. Sir Gilbert said he was glad Dundas went, as he was determined to attempt nothing. Sir Gilbert was of opinion that it was absolutely necessary to attempt something. No importance was therefore attached to the General's opinion that our force was

insufficient to give reasonable hopes of success. Everything which has happened has tended to prove that the General was right. There is no doubt that Bastia is distressed from want of provisions only. The ammunition we have expended has been literally thrown away. Had the fleet blocked the port without landing a man or firing a shot the place would at this instant have been equally near a surrender. The ammunition expended will be wanted for Calvi.

17th May.—The Brigadier sent for me this forenoon. After a circumlocution of near a quarter of an hour to persuade me that when he accepted the command he had done it only upon condition that if a senior officer was sent out he should have leave to go home and not have the mortification, as he called it, of serving as second after having been first; he at length told me that he had received leave to go home, in consequence of which he had written this morning to Lord Hood for a vessel to convey him to Leghorn. The command would therefore devolve upon me. He told me his intentions had been to move to the heights, and from thence apply to Lord Hood for the assistance requisite to drag up the guns. He would then summon the town. He desired to know if I approved of this scheme, and wished the troops to march. I told him that, as it was probable General Stuart would arrive soon, and that my command would be but of short duration, my wish rather was to undertake nothing, but that I could not decide upon any measure till I had seen Lord Hood and knew the situation of the place. In the meantime I wished every direction he had given to remain in force, and the troops to remain as before, prepared to move upon the shortest notice. I should have it in my power to move or not as circumstances might require. I am to call upon him to-morrow morning, when he says he will give up the command to me.

19th May.—When I called upon the Brigadier he told me that Lord Hood's answer to him was that he could not spare a frigate at present. He had not therefore mentioned his departure in orders. He did not seem inclined to enter

into conversation, and I left him. I returned to dine with him. There was something extremely odd in his behaviour. I said to Sir James St. Clair that there must be something more in Lord Hood's answer than D'Aubant's vanity would allow him to acknowledge. I conjectured that the refusal of the frigate was not couched in the civillest terms. This morning, between ten and eleven, I was informed that the Royal and Royal Irish Regiments were upon their march to Titime, and at the same time I received an order to move the 50th and 51st to-morrow at daylight to the encampment marked some days ago by the Quartermaster-General immediately over the French advanced posts. I have been in town and have seen the Brigadier. He gave me no reason for the sudden movement. It was equally unexpected by every person in town. Sir James St. Clair said D'Aubant had given no other reason for it to him but that as Lord Hood could not spare a frigate he did not deem it safe to go in a tartane, and therefore could not remain here inactive.

20th May.—Yesterday evening, I was informed by two gentlemen who came from our batteries that the white flag had been flying since two o'clock on Lord Hood's flagship. The batteries had ceased firing by order, and a negotiation was being carried on with Bastia. The firing was discontinued during the whole night, but still in accordance with our orders we were ready to march at four this morning. The mules for the baggage were ordered to be with us at three, but did not arrive. I saw the 50th upon their march. I wrote to the Brigadier that the mules were not come, but from the report of two gentlemen, and the firing having totally ceased, I was convinced that the town had either surrendered or was in the act of doing so, and desired to know if, under the circumstances, he chose that I should move or wait for further information. His answer was that I should march the moment the mules arrived. We waited, exposed to the sun, till twelve, when I ordered the men to cook their victuals and pitch the tents. I wrote to the Brigadier that I had done so, because, even if the mules

did arrive, it was too late to get to our ground before dark. There had been no firing on either side since two o'clock yesterday, and there is every reason to believe that the place has capitulated, or is capitulating. Yet the road to Bastia has been crowded this whole forenoon with troops, guns, ammunition, waggons, and finally the Brigadier himself with a party of dragoons going to the heights of Titime. He encamped this evening with the troops, and means, I am told, to summon Bastia to-morrow if it has not actually capitulated. I wished if possible not to be of the party; yet he has carried out this movement with so much vigour and resolution that, if he does not receive official information of the surrender this evening, I shall be obliged to march with the regiment to-morrow morning. He never seems to have had such a desire for action.

CAMP TITIME HEIGHTS, 22nd May.—After putting the regiment in motion yesterday morning I pushed forward myself to the Brigadier. As I was convinced the place was capitulating I wished to save the regiment a fatiguing march over the mountains, and hoped to be allowed to encamp upon or near the ground we formerly occupied; but our Brigadier, who is proud of his absurd march, said that we must go to the ground marked out for us. He was in the act of writing to Lord Hood, who, in all probability, will not trouble himself to answer him. I returned to the regiment, which had reached the place where it is necessary to leave the great road. From thence to our present encampment is about three miles over a very steep and craggy mountain. Numbers of the men fell down from the excessive heat, badness of the road, &c. As we reached our ground there came on a thick fog, followed by hard rain, to which we were exposed for more than three hours before our baggage and camp equipage came up. I never recollect suffering more from cold. The men were shivering. The sudden change from heat to cold, wet clothes, &c., must have sent many to hospital. When the provisions arrived I ordered a glass of raw spirits to

each man. The rain ceased and the fog cleared up during the night. By this change in the weather I had an opportunity of posting the picquets to greater advantage. We were thrown more to the left than was intended. Colonel Wauchope had found it necessary to extend his camp more that way in consequence of our not coming up the night before. This morning was particularly fine, and I was in hopes that our poor fellows would have made themselves dry and comfortable, but about ten o'clock a thick fog again came on. We can't see ten yards from us; the truce continues; the Brigadier's zeal is not abated.

23rd May.—Yesterday afternoon an order was issued to inform the troops that the Brigadier upon taking the field upon the heights of Titime had announced to Lord Hood his situation and readiness to co-operate; that he had received for answer, that, if the enemy did not accede to the terms offered to them, his Lordship would inform the Brigadier of it. The troops were therefore to hold themselves in readiness to move against the enemy; the order also mentioned that 165 days' bat and forage money was directed to be issued. Two hours after I received this order an aide-de-camp of General Gentili, the French commander, came to our outposts and desired to see me. He said he had orders to deliver up to the English the post immediately in my front, and therefore wished I would send and take possession of it. I told him that troops would be sent from the lower batteries in the morning. We entered into conversation. He said that they had 6000 men under arms, 4500 of whom were men trained and incorporated; that they never had any fear of being forced. They knew our force was small. They had plenty of ammunition left, but from want of provisions and from having no hopes of succour from France they had been obliged to surrender.

This morning between four and five o'clock Sir James St. Clair came to me with an order for the Royals and Royal Irish to embark immediately for an expedition, the 50th to move to their encampment; Sir James said this

was in consequence of a requisition from Lord Hood, and that Brigadier D'Aubant would embark in a day or two for Leghorn. Lord Hood's drift in asking for these two regiments was to give the command of the attack on Calvi nominally to Colonel Villettes, in reality to himself. The commanding officer of the troops was not to be of the expedition nor any of the staff. The part of the army employed, being a mere appendage, would be sunk in the general name of the fleet and marines, and the capitulation would be made to Lord Hood alone. General D'Aubant had the weakness to consent to this slur being thrown upon himself and the troops under his command.

I immediately waited upon the Brigadier. I told him I had seen his order and understood that he meant to quit the place. Therefore, as senior officer, I should succeed to the command, that as such I thought I had a right to be consulted, and to give my opinion upon measures which were to affect me, not him. I conceived the situation in which I should find myself upon his departure, unemployed in Bastia or St. Fiorenzo, whilst active operations were being carried on by the fleet and part of the troops at Calvi, would be disgraceful to me and to the army. It was a situation in which he had no right to put me. If he chose to remain until the arrival of General Stuart I had nothing to say. I should then submit in silence to the disgrace I should feel in common with every soldier of the army, but if his intention was to go home I must insist upon his giving up the command to me entire. After much conversation, during which he frequently attempted to be angry, he at last said that there was some justice in what I advanced, but what could he do? He had already consented to give the regiments, and they were at that instant paraded and ready to march. He perceived that Lord Hood had much influence at home. The disputes he had already had with him had made him at times miserable, and he was afraid of encountering more. I told him the first thing he had to do was to stop the regiments and

order them to pile their arms until further orders; then to give me a letter to Lord Hood stating that as he meant to go to Leghorn in the course of a day or two, as soon as he had arranged his private affairs, the command of the troops would devolve upon me, that he therefore sent me to consult with his Lordship upon the steps necessary to take for the attack on Calvi. If he did these two things I should undertake to fight the battle with Lord Hood. He consented, and I set out with the letter in my pocket for the *Victory*.

After consulting with Sir James St. Clair I determined to be as mild as possible with Lord Hood, to represent to him how impossible it was for me to allow any troops to go to the attack of Calvi without going with them and commanding them in person, and to regret that I had lost the good opinion he had once formed of me, and upon which I had prided myself much; that I was not conscious of having done anything which ought to have made him alter that opinion; that though he might find officers of more ability, he would not find any more zealous for the service than I was, &c. &c. If by these means he was not to be softened or brought round, I determined to tell him he should neither have the regiments nor a single man or thing from the army. After waiting upon the beach six hours for a boat I was obliged to return without getting to the *Victory*, it blew so hard that the boats could not reach the shore. Upon my return to camp I met an officer of the ship, by whom I sent a message to Captain Englefield that I wished to see Lord Hood, and requested he would send a boat for me to-morrow morning early. The command falling to me is rather unfortunate. I cannot possibly retain it above eight or ten days. The ill-will of Lord Hood is probably all I shall get by it. There are situations, however, which decide a man's character. This I think is one of them, and no consideration shall induce me to yield to what I conceive to be disgraceful.

25th May.—I set out early yesterday morning for the

Victory, found a boat waiting for me, and was on board by eight o'clock. Lord Hood was at breakfast; but, to my great satisfaction, the first persons who presented themselves to me on entering the cabin were General Stuart and Sir Gilbert Elliot. They had arrived the night before from Leghorn. My mission to Lord Hood became unnecessary. I told him I need not now trouble him with the business upon which I had come to him. To General Stuart and Sir Gilbert I related the circumstances at full length. The General said I had acted very properly. For these two or three months past I have lived in hot water. I told them that I hoped that now all tracasseries were at an end, that I already felt myself the happiest man in the world in the thought that in consequence of the General's arrival the service would be properly conducted.

It will thus be seen that General Stuart arrived with Sir Gilbert Elliot from Leghorn at Bastia on 25th May 1794, after the fall of Bastia, a fact which one would have supposed must have appeared in some of Sir Gilbert's correspondence. Sir Gilbert's return at this period is duly recorded¹ at the beginning of chapter vii. of Sir Gilbert's Life. But by a strange confusion of dates his biographer thus² introduces the very able man who afterwards differed from Sir Gilbert, as will be seen, on certain important questions. "The new Commander-in-chief, General Stuart, appointed to succeed General Dundas, arrived off St. Fiorenzo in the last days of March; and the first impression made by him on those with whom he was sent to co-operate being highly favourable, for once the right man was believed to be in the right place. In council, however, he took the same view as his predecessor of the difficulties attending an attack on Bastia;

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 253.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 236.

and the *result* of this difference of opinion between the chiefs of the two services was the determination taken by Lord Hood to attack Bastia at all risks with his naval force alone." Thus, no doubt by some inadvertence, one of the ablest officers at that time in the army is made responsible for follies which he was as little able to prevent as Lady Minto was when she wrote, or as I now am. The effect is to introduce General Stuart with a prejudice against him in the reader's mind very convenient for Sir Gilbert's memory, and therefore one that Sir Gilbert's biographer should have avoided.

25th May, continued.—I came ashore with the General and Sir Gilbert. My old friend, Major Oakes, is with him. We walked through the town and citadel with General Gentili and some French officers.

31st May.—We changed our camp in the neighbourhood of the Tetime, below it and near the great road. The 50th are upon our left, the Royals and 18th near the sea within a mile of Bastia. I have walked over the ground occupied by the enemy. The advanced post upon the height called Campo Ventoso is strong; the ground between it and the mountain, from which we must have descended in order to attack, so rough, that it could only have been approached by the path in Indian file. If we had succeeded it must have been with great loss. Upon the whole I am convinced that Bastia with our force could only have been taken by famine. The land attack made by Lord Hood, though he will gain credit for it at home, was absurd to a degree. Three times his numbers could not have penetrated from that quarter. He never advanced one inch. If he had he must have been cut up. The distance of his post, together with the unaccountable want of enterprise in the enemy, saved his troops from destruction.

The General looked at the different regiments two days ago. He paid the 51st many compliments. He seems to take much pains to inform himself of everything respecting

the army. He has had the heads of the different departments with him frequently, has inspected the stores, ordnance, hospitals, &c. I expressed some surprise to General Gentili that with so strong a garrison he never made a sortie. He said a sortie would not have given them bread; that besides, he wished to do his duty, but no more; his property was in England; he found fault with us for trusting the village of Villa upon our right flank to Corsicans. It could have been attacked with success; in which case we must have retreated to our ships with the loss of our guns. The terms of the capitulation have surprised everybody. The Corsicans and Paoli are disgusted with them. Lord Hood was in a hurry to conclude it, lest the troops from St. Fiorenzo should come in for a share of the honour.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL CHARLES STUART'S COMMAND IN CORSICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

31st May, continued.—Last night the Royals, 50th, and 51st, with detachments of artillery, &c., were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for immediate embarkation. The General goes this morning to reconnoitre Calvi. I was to have gone with him; but, as Lord Hood had said to him that the ships would be ready for our reception in two days, he has ordered me to remain to embark and bring round the troops. The General himself will not return, but wait for us in the neighbourhood of Calvi. Major Oakes is appointed Deputy-Quartermaster-General, Stuart aide-de-camp.

1st June.—I reached Bastia in time yesterday to see the General embark. It is said we shall embark to-morrow. I dined with Lieutenant-Colonel Villettes, who is appointed Governor of Bastia. Lieutenant-Colonel Wemyss of the 18th is much hurt that his regiment does not go to Calvi. He complained to the General of partiality having been shown. A ridiculous idea has prevailed here, as well as at Gibraltar, that seniority of corps gives them a claim to be first employed. These claims used to perplex Brigadier-General D'Aubant. General Stuart is not so easily disturbed.

3rd June.—The General desired me to wait on Lord Hood, after his own departure. I did so this forenoon. He said he hoped the ships would be ready to receive us the day after to-morrow. There is however so much still to do, that I hardly think we shall embark for two days after that. I have written to the General. A brig has got into Calvi, and we understand that the garrison is now provisioned

for three months. The 12th Dragoons arrived this forenoon from Civita Vecchia.

6th June.—The General returned from Calvi yesterday. I dined with him. He says the place is strong, and the outpost of Mozzello a regular casemated work. We must lose men. I asked him if it was not possible to begin our batteries pretty near, as it would save much time. He said he intended to begin at 500 to 600 yards. There are one or two outposts beyond Mozzello, but these are not expected to stop us long.

8th June.—I went to the town yesterday pretty early. On the previous evening the transports which had carried the French to Toulon had returned. They reported that nine sail of the line were in the outward road with their topsails loose, ready to put to sea, besides a number of armed ships and transports. In consequence of this Lord Hood took measures for sailing. In the night an express arrived from St. Fiorenzo with intelligence brought by the *Juno* frigate that the French fleet of nine sail of the line, besides frigates and armed ships, had come out of Toulon. When the *Juno* left them Admiral Hotham, with seven sail of the line, was in chase of the French, both bearing for Calvi. Lord Hood with the squadron weighed anchor at six yesterday morning and put out to sea. His Lordship, when off Calvi, is to despatch to the General a frigate, which is to determine our movements. The transports are left to convey us if necessary, and we are directed to hold ourselves in readiness for immediate embarkation. All the stores are already embarked, and this morning the troops were to have gone aboard had not this intelligence arrived. The intention of the French is evidently to throw supplies of men, provisions, &c., into Calvi. It is a bold measure, by which they risk the loss of the small remains of the fleet they have in the Mediterranean. General Stuart told me that Lord Hood had applied to him for powder, which had surprised him, as the quantity on shore is small, and he had depended for the siege of Calvi upon being supplied

from the fleet. This application from Lord Hood proves how little the fleet is able to comply with any demand of the kind. The General has been since then informed that the fleet is in the greatest want. Lord Hood, though pressed by those about him to explain his situation to General Stuart, had refused, and was leading him on to engage in an enterprise without the most essential article for its success. The flank companies of the Royal Irish, 50th, and 51st Regiments, together with the remains of the 2nd Battalion of the Royals, are to be formed into a corps, which, the General was so good as to say, was for me. This day the assembly of the states of the island is to be held at Corte. General Paoli and all the principal inhabitants are gone there. Sir Gilbert Elliot left Bastia two days ago.

9th June.—Lord Hood is still absent, and no accounts have been received from him. It is certain, however, that nothing has yet been thrown into Calvi. The line of battle was put in orders yesterday. The General wishes the flank corps to be encamped together previous to their embarkation. I have pitched upon a spot for them on the other side of Campanelli. We assemble to-morrow morning at seven and march to it. Major Brereton of the 30th is appointed Brigade-Major to the new corps. This evening I took leave of the regiment and gave up the command of it to Major Pringle.

CAMPANELLI CAMP, 11th June.—The corps under my command forms the reserve in the line of battle. We assembled yesterday morning and marched to this camp. The officers of the right wing of the reserve dined with the General, those of the left do so to-day.

12th June.—This forenoon the *Agamemnon* arrived from Lord Hood. He has not seen the French fleet. No reinforcement has been thrown into Calvi. We embark in transports to-morrow morning.

MARTELLO BAY, ON BOARD THE "HELMSELEY," 16th *June*.—We embarked in transports the morning of the 13th, and sailed the same evening; and yesterday we anchored in this bay. General Trigge, with 700 to 800 recruits from England, had arrived the night before, as also ammunition of different kinds from Gibraltar. These last enable us to proceed, and we are now under way with a fair wind. General Trigge goes to command at Bastia. The recruits, who belong to the 30th and 69th Regiments, go with him. Poor Sir Robert Boyd died a few days before the convoy left Gibraltar; he was nearly ninety.

CAMP ABOVE CALVI, 19th *June*.—We landed yesterday morning early and encamped upon the heights immediately above the plain of Calvi. The camp is concealed from the enemy's posts. A rock, called Monteciesco, which they have fortified in order to command a communication with the country, as also in some degree to flank our approaches against the Fort of Mozzello, is upon the right, but much under our position. A battery will be commenced this evening against this work, within 500 yards of it. This, when finished, must drive them from it, though they have in Monteciesco three or four 18-pounders. Our battery will plunge into it. General Stuart is indefatigable. He exposes himself perhaps too much in reconnoitring; but it is a principle with him that a General should do so, in order to form the better judgment of what he may order others to perform. In going round with the field officers, to show them the places for the picquets, a shot struck amongst us. I had the picquets last night. The enemy finished a battery to their right of Mozzello. We are much in want of sailors. The listlessness of the navy is remarkable. Lord Hood, on the report of eight sail of the line having got out of Toulon, thinks proper to assemble and cruise with seventeen. I have long been of opinion that his Lordship's zeal was not for his country, but to gratify his own vanity. The difference of his behaviour now and when at Bastia shows it.

21st *June*.—It blew so hard yesterday and the day before

that little could be landed. With a westerly wind, the sea runs high upon this coast. The sailors were not sufficient to get the guns up from the landing-place. Three hundred soldiers were ordered to assist. They dragged them in a very short time. To-day a similar number are employed in bringing up the carriages; but this cannot continue. Our numbers are not sufficient both to work and do the duty. Lord Hood is returned to Martello Bay. He has left nine sail of the line to watch the French, seven in the Island St. Marguerite. Instead of coming here with the remainder to assist in the siege, he has made a demand for 140 of the 69th to embark as marines. The application was to General Trigge. He has not even written to General Stuart. The General is naturally confounded and surprised by his conduct. He has written to him in pretty strong terms. The sand-bags are filled and ready, but the battery against Monteciesco is not begun. The General means to begin his different attacks the same night. The battery to the right of Mozzello consists of five guns, and I think they intend to surround it with an abbatiss.

25th June.—Our men continue to be employed, together with the seamen, in landing and dragging up the ordnance, stores, &c. Lord Hood, without writing to General Stuart, has sent fifty sailors to act on shore. These, together with a few from the transports and *Agamemnon*, under Captain Nelson, are all we need expect. I was the whole morning with General Stuart reconnoitring in front of the Mozzello. We went within 800 yards, and were fired upon frequently. Our operations will commence to-morrow or next day, and, I am confident, will succeed. The General, I believe, keeps his plans secret from every person except myself; with me he communicates in the most confidential manner. The enemy are strengthening both their new battery near Mozzello and the Monteciesco.

28th June.—Bad weather has delayed us so much that the batteries are not yet begun. Yesterday morning the enemy attacked the most advanced post of the Corsicans

and drove them from part of it. They attempted to turn their left flank, without effect. They sent out a gun-boat to assist. The General was present and exposed himself too much. He ordered a couple of field-pieces out to fire upon the gun-boat, which immediately retired. I was with four light companies to support the guns. The Corsicans behaved very well, lost four or five men, and drove the French back. The object of the enemy was, I believe, to ascertain what we were doing. I observe this morning that they are altering the direction of one of their embrasures in the half-moon battery. Four guns from it will now bear upon our approach. The General regrets that he was obliged to order out the field-pieces. He wished to have given no jealousy on our left. The Royal Irish and flank companies of the 69th landed this morning. The latter joined the reserve.

29th June.—The General told me he had received a letter from Lord Hood enclosing a summons to Calvi, which his Lordship begged might be sent. The General has refused, saying that, as he had received so very little assistance from Lord Hood, he begged to be allowed to carry on the operations as he chose himself. Lord Hood is cruising off. Had he given the assistance he might have done our batteries might have opened long ago and the French have been prevented from strengthening themselves in the manner they have done. The General has been anxious to get a spy. He thinks this morning he has one. There was a good deal of fire this morning from the enemy upon our gun-boat without effect. They at last sent out two gun-boats and two galleys, which obliged ours to withdraw.

4th July.—Our battery of three 26's upon the right was opened against the Monteciesco this morning at four o'clock. Everything is up and forwarded to within 300 or 400 yards of where our advanced batteries are to be placed. I commanded the picquets, which covered them last night. In the morning, about daylight, I advanced with a Corsican and examined the ground we are to take up. It is, I should

think, about 700 or 800 yards from the Mozzello. This night a battery of six 26's and one 10-inch howitzer is to be thrown up on that spot. The reserve is to form the covering party. The success of this night will determine that of our attack on Calvi. Our tents are to be left standing. The men are to move with their blankets, camp kettles, and two days' provisions. Our situation this night and to-morrow will be a hot one; we parade at seven.

5th July.—I moved from camp about eight in the evening with the reserve, and a little after nine was formed in front of the ground on which the battery was to be built. A party of Corsicans made a diversion in order to attract the enemy's attention to our right by surrounding and threatening the Monteciesco. This succeeded completely, and drew a fire from the town and all their batteries. Under this fire I formed along a wall with three companies of Grenadiers in my front. They had no suspicion of our design, and everything must have succeeded to our wish; but, unfortunately, notwithstanding the pains which had been taken with the Chief Engineer, he had not made his arrangements or circulated his orders. At twenty minutes after ten the work was only begun. The General came to me. He was extremely uneasy, abused Captain Nepean, and said he was afraid the battery would not be ready by daylight. I said, in that case it had better be stopped altogether; "for God's sake decide at once either to retire and give up the attempt for this night, or make every exertion and carry it on." Upon consulting with Captain Nepean and finding him uncertain and wavering it was given up, the materials carried back, and the reserve ordered to retire. I left three companies of Grenadiers on the ground where I had been the night before, and got back to camp about two o'clock this morning. The 50th and 51st Regiments were to have been employed at the battery; the 18th were ordered to show themselves in movement towards the Monteciesco till dark, and afterwards to cover the camp. Had the Chief Engineer done his part every-

thing would have succeeded, and a lodgment have been made within 700 or 800 yards of the Mozzello.

6th July.—The enemy do not seem to have any conception of our intentions. They seem alarmed for themselves and are enclosing their half-moon battery. Yesterday was given up to forwarding stores, and a strong working party was employed all night in moving sand-bags, shot, shells, &c. &c., to a rock within 50 or 60 yards of the place where our lodgment is intended. It is evident that it would have been impossible to have finished the battery and carried the things necessary to it in one night. I am sorry that many more stores are not forwarded to the rock where these were placed last night. The Engineer is quite incapable. The Commanding Officer of Artillery is also a man without method or arrangement. A grenadier of the Royal Irish (a German) deserted yesterday. It is hoped that he has not gone to Calvi. The General, not being very well, desired me to post the picquets. Lieutenant-Colonel Wemyss was field officer. I advanced them near to the wall where the reserve was the other night. The Corsicans were still more forward. The Monteciesco is not yet abandoned, but two of the guns are silenced. The third, a field 6-pounder, fires but seldom. The battery against this was thrown up by men of the *Royal Louis*, and manned by the Marine Artillery of the *Commerce de Marseilles*. The orders are given for the advance, and everything is so well detailed that there can be no doubt of our establishing ourselves. I cover the attack with the reserve the same as before. We march in an hour hence and shall be on our ground about nine; we have from that time till half-past three to get the battery ready. It is to be hoped that we shall open upon them at four to-morrow morning.

9th July.—A diversion was made by the Corsicans upon the right near the Monteciesco on the night of the 6th. The 18th Regiment was ordered to show itself in that quarter in the evening, and the reserve and working parties advanced to the intended place upon the left. The atten-

tion of the enemy was completely taken up by the Corsicans. They seemed to dread a general attack, surrounded themselves with light balls, and threw but little of their fire towards us. One man only was wounded by a grape-shot. The reserve drew up behind a wall in front of the intended battery; the 50th and 51st and seamen, by great exertions, constructed the battery, forwarded the ammunition, &c. Part of the reserve, laying down their arms, covered themselves with an entrenchment. About 4 A.M., when the day began to dawn, the last of the guns were being dragged into the battery. It was armed with six 26-pounders. The enemy did not perceive it as early as might have been expected. Their attention was taken up by a battery of two 26-pounders and one mortar constructed upon the heights considerably in our rear. About six o'clock, however, they opened upon us from Mozzello, the half-moon battery, and St. Francesco, with grape, round, and shells from a howitzer. For two hours we could only answer them from three 13-inch mortars and the 26-pounders upon the heights. Captain Serigold of the navy was killed in the battery, and a man's thigh shot off, both close to the General, when I was speaking to him. Seven or eight more were killed or wounded. When our battery opened at eight o'clock the enemy's fire was considerably checked. I sent Major Brereton with half the reserve to a place of safety in the rear, and remained with the other half to guard the battery and trenches. At sunset the Major with his half relieved me. The men were ordered to lie down under arms. I went to report to the General, and returned with him to the trenches, where I remained the whole night. We went forward 300 or 400 yards to reconnoitre. The enemy were perfectly quiet. At daybreak they began a very sharp fire. The sun was in their favour, and their fire was extremely well directed. Our battery was hit almost every time. A shell fell in the middle of us, blew up some cartridges, and set fire to some live shells, and yet nobody was seriously hurt. The General got a knock with a splinter on the back.

The fire of the enemy in the course of yesterday was better directed than ours, and if anything they had the advantage. Two of our guns were damaged, three were hit. They fired from two mortars and two 10-inch howitzers. Our armament is as follows: at the advance, four 26-pounders and two 24-pounders; on the heights, two 26-pounders and one Gomere mortar, two Gomeres on the left, and also three 26-pounders at the French battery, originally constructed against the Monteciesco. Thus we had in all eleven guns and three mortars. The Monteciesco was evacuated on the evening of the 7th. Yesterday evening the part of the reserve under Major Brereton was relieved by the 50th, and the whole of the reserve returned to their camp. They were much fatigued, having been exposed to shot and to the sun for two days and two nights. Last night the advanced battery was repaired and traverses thrown up. The enemy's fire has been kept under. Their half-moon battery and the Mozzello are considerably damaged. The enemy fire from the town and Mozzello upon the Monteciesco. To encourage them to continue their fire upon it I have, by the General's direction, pitched three tents in it. The General does not spare himself. He slept at the battery again last night.

10th July.—The enemy's fire was trifling yesterday. The General returned to the battery in the evening. He desired me to accompany him, and we remained at it the whole night. He showed me a place about 200 yards nearer the enemy, where he intended to place a battery of four heavy guns. Our fire, during the night, was regular. The enemy only returned a few shells. At daylight we began a brisk fire. The enemy's guns seem completely silenced. We shall soon be in possession of the Mozzello.

13th July.—The day before yesterday the enemy withdrew from the half-moon battery. The guns in the Mozzello were silenced, but the breach is not yet practicable. They have opened five or six guns from the town, which they fire *en ricochet* upon us. I was in the trenches with

the Grenadiers all yesterday and the night before. We were fortunate enough to have but three or four men touched. Captain Nelson was wounded by stones in the face. It is feared he will lose one of his eyes. My batman was knocked down by my side by rubbish and a good deal bruised; the ball struck a heap of stones close to us. The General and everybody is eager to advance. It is evident that the closer we are to them the less troublesome we find them.

15th July.—The breach in the Mozzello is not yet practicable. It is expected to be so this night or to-morrow. They have been so successful with their ricochet firing as to dismount two guns. We, however, lose but few men. The town has been on fire once or twice. The duty in the trenches is done by regiments; the reserve is considered as two regiments. The right wing goes with me, the left with Major Brereton. Lord Hood continues to hover round us eager to have his name in the capitulation. General Stuart, by his firm behaviour, keeps him in order. Several of his actions prove him to be a mean fellow.

18th July.—Last night I returned from the trenches, where I had been the day and night before. The breach in the Mozzello is practicable: one man only was killed during my twenty-four hours, though the fire was pretty constant. The General was down for several hours with me. He complains with much reason of the heads of the Engineer and Artillery Departments, who have retarded him in his operations. I have been with him this whole day. The attack on the Mozzello is fixed for to-morrow at daylight. I am to storm it at the head of the Grenadiers; the whole arrangements are so good that the business must succeed. We move from our camp at eleven, *i.e.* in half-an-hour. A battery is now being built considerably nearer the town. It is to open upon the left of the town at the same time that the troops advance.

19th July.—The different corps were assembled at their

rendezvous about one in the morning. Lieutenant-Colonel Wemyss, with the Royal Irish and two field-pieces, was to attack the half-moon or *sans-culottes* battery. I was to attack the Mozzello with the reserve. The 50th and 51st, in the rear of the new battery, were to support wherever it was necessary. I advanced with the reserve to a field within two or three hundred yards of the Mozzello, but covered from its fire. I there formed the Grenadiers and Light Infantry in a column of companies, and sent the Royals to draw up in the rear of two field-pieces which I sent forward to a height in my front: each Grenadier carried a sand bag, and we had a sufficient number of ladders (fourteen in all). Here we waited for the signal, which was to be a gun from the new battery. The General came to me about half-past three. About this time some of the enemy's sentries or picquets fired upon the 18th upon our left, and soon afterwards the signal to advance was given. The General kept for some time at the head of the Grenadiers. A party of artificers a little in our front began to cut the palisades, but we were upon them before they could effect it. Captain M'Donald, who commanded the Royal Grenadiers, and I got through the palisades first at an opening made by our shot. The men instantly followed, and giving a cheer, ran up to the bottom of the breach. We were annoyed both by shot, hand-grenades, and live shells, which the enemy had placed on the rampart and rolled over upon us. Luckily neither sand-bags nor ladders were necessary. The men threw them down. The Grenadiers advanced with their bayonets with such intrepidity, that the French gave way and ran out of the fort. One of them was bayoneted in the act of firing a field-piece. Captain M'Donald and I, with a few men, attacked the breach upon the left, and, in going to it, I was wounded in the head by the splinter of a shell. It turned me round and made me senseless for a moment. I recovered and went on.

Moore makes so little of this, his first wound, that

it may be as well to say that, after the surgeons had examined it, he reports in a letter on the 11th August, "You have heard that the thickness of my skull saved my life. The last of the plasters fell off to-day," *i.e.* it had to be dressed for three weeks. However, it did not keep him from duty for a day. He could not be spared.

Within a yard or two of the top Captain McDonald was severely wounded in the face and obliged to retire, and four or five of the men fell dead. With the rest I got on, and in a moment the place was filled with the five companies of Grenadiers. Two companies of Light Infantry had been ordered to move quickly round the foot of the fort and get between the enemy and the town, but the Grenadiers stormed so briskly that the Light Infantry could not arrive in time. By this means most of the enemy escaped. Major Brereton, with the rest of the Light Infantry, the Royals, and two field-pieces, formed with his left to the Mozzello fronting the convent of St. Francisco, to support me if necessary or to prevent the enemy coming upon my flank. The General, who had been close to us the whole time, ran up and took me in his arms. The 18th had met with little resistance. They immediately began to entrench themselves. I sent everybody out of the Mozzello except one company, who were employed in making a traverse. The fire from the town began to open upon us. The wound in my head became troublesome. The General desired that I would return to camp with the Light Infantry, who had been out for two nights. I don't believe the loss exceeds twenty-five or thirty men killed and wounded. We have gained a strong position within 500 or 600 yards of the fortress. Major Oakes called some hours ago to tell me the General had summoned the town. The firing has not recommenced. It is, I think, most probable they will capitulate.

20th July.—The enemy have refused to capitulate, but as they have not fired a shot since the flag returned

from them they are, I suppose, disposed to do so. We are, I believe, making preparations to establish new batteries.

CAMP NEAR CALVI, 27th *July*.—Since the evening of the 19th the enemy have not fired a shot. We have been employed in forwarding every species of stores and ammunition to the rear of the Mozzello, and in erecting batteries. This can be done but slowly. Our hands are few. The soldiers are worked amazingly, but do whatever is required with great cheerfulness. Our batteries will be ready to open to-morrow or next day. The General sleeps every night in the trenches. Two days ago the reserve moved to their present camp, a little in the rear of the six-gun battery; the other corps had already moved their camps. The duty of the trenches is done by corps, and we are in them every other night; both men and officers are getting sickly. The heat is excessive.

30th *July*.—The night of the 28th the reserve went into the trenches; the greatest part of the men were employed in working on the batteries for the whole night. Soon after daylight the batteries were completed. They consisted of a battery, at 600 yards from the citadel, of seven 26-pounders and two 10-inch howitzers upon our left, one of three 13-inch mortars, one 18-pounder in the Mozzello, one 26-pounder and two 32-pounders on the right of the Mozzello in front of the Montecieseo, two 26-pounders raised by the men of the French *Royal Louis*. The old six-gun battery, erected the night of the 6th, and the three-gun battery, erected the 19th, continued with the original one of two 26-pounders and one 14-inch mortar upon the height. In all there were thirty-three pieces of ordnance. The enemy upon seeing our batteries manned theirs, but did not fire. About eight o'clock the General sent the Adjutant-General, Sir James St. Clair, with a letter to the commander of Calvi in answer to one he had received from him the day the Mozzello was taken, to assure him that he would not

fire upon the lower town, where their hospital was. He at the same time desired to know if he had any terms to propose. A negotiation then commenced, and several messages passed upon both sides. The General told me that they demanded a cessation for twenty-five days, and offered to surrender at the expiration of that time if not succoured. He thought this too long. He offered them twelve. I was relieved from the trenches at sunset and walked home with the General. Nothing is finally determined. He must see Lord Hood; but I take for granted that no more shots will be fired. The men and officers fall ill daily; considerably more than a third of our force are in the sick report; perhaps there never was so much work done by so few men in the same space of time.

4th August.—I returned to the trenches the evening of the 30th, and next day the fire against the town recommenced; it was but faintly returned; two officers were, however, killed and one wounded. Next day a flag came out, with a letter to the General. I advanced to receive it, and remained with the officers who brought it till an answer was sent from the General. I found from the officers that their letter merely contained a complaint of a shot having gone through their hospital in the low town, which had unfortunately killed and wounded three men. They hinted that their people were extremely sickly, and seemed surprised that we stood the sun so well. The town that night was set on fire in several places. The next day another flag was sent out, upon which the firing ceased, and has never recommenced. Nothing has as yet been communicated to the army. The General told me confidentially that they agreed to accept the terms he had formerly offered them. He had refused this; but agreed to give them to the 10th, in which time, if they were not succoured, they were to surrender agreeably to terms which he had sent them. Every communication between them and us is forbidden. The guard in the trenches has

been diminished, and yesterday I moved the camp of the reserve to the height in front and above our first encampment; this, it is supposed, will be more healthy. Considerably more than two-thirds of our number are in the hospital; men and officers tumble down daily in the most melancholy manner. It would have been impossible for us to have carried on the siege a week longer. The abilities of General Stuart have been conspicuous during this service. By his able conduct with a force not equal to the garrison he has made himself master of a very strong post, without even making a single trench of approach. His first position within 700 yards of the Mozzello was masterly. His attack of it, after the breach was effected, was not less so. The attack on the "sans-culottes" battery, the night the Mozzello was stormed, alarmed and distracted those who defended that work, and, together with the gallant manner in which the Grenadiers advanced upon the Mozzello, prevented the enemy from making the resistance they might have done, and was the cause of our carrying it with so little loss. Had they stood, as they did at the "Convention" redoubt, our loss must have been considerable.

7th August.—The General called upon me at the trenches yesterday; he said his letters from Mr. Secretary Dundas desired him to let Sir James Erskine go home upon condition of his giving up his situation as Adjutant-General. He believed Sir James would do so, and, if I liked it, I should have the appointment. I thanked the General very much, both for this and for the whole of his conduct to me since I had served under him. For several reasons, which I detailed to the General, I hesitated to accept his offer. From the complexion of affairs there was but little probability of any further service in this part of the world. Of course General Stuart will go home; and to be Adjutant-General upon a peace establishment in Corsica, under a person with whom I am unacquainted, is not a situation so respectable as being at the head of a regiment. The additional pay is not more

than sufficient to support the additional expense attending the situation, and I should be tied by the leg in Corsica. The General said he would tell me fairly his opinion, that to be Adjutant-General under a person whose confidence one did not possess was not a desirable situation, as it became merely one of detail. If any service had still been expected in the Mediterranean, and he had remained, he would have insisted upon my accepting it, and he would have made it an employment I must have liked. As it was, he merely offered it to me as an affair of some emolument, and as one which might perhaps procure me the rank of colonel. We continued to have a good deal of conversation, during which I told him that I had little hopes, being so young a lieutenant-colonel, of any rank immediately; yet I should be obliged to him for the appointment, as it would mark his approbation of my conduct, which was, in the first place, extremely flattering to me, and might hereafter be the means of my procuring rank a little perhaps before my regular turn. The General, almost from his arrival, has behaved to me in the most confidential manner. This, added to the high opinion I have of his abilities as an officer, makes me regret very much that I shall no longer have an opportunity of serving under him. When he came first he had some hopes of being employed in Italy. Had this taken place, I don't know anything that could have been more delightful.

CALVI, 15th August.—Upon the 10th, at nine o'clock, the reserve, a detachment of artillery, sailors, *Royal Louis* French gunners, and Corsicans assembled in the rear of the seven-gun battery. The force, at ten o'clock, moved forward under my command and formed in front of Calvi, within 300 yards of the gate. The General here joined us, and soon afterwards the garrison, with General Casabianca, and Arena, the Commissioner of the Convention, at their head, moved out and formed in line within 50 yards, fronting us. After this they passed along our front, and laid down their arms upon our right. They went into the low town to

embark in transports provided for the purpose. I took possession of the citadel, where I have been kept ever since. It is inconceivable the destruction our fire has occasioned; there is literally not a house which has not been damaged by shot or shell. The whole is a heap of ruins. The men are lodged in a large building called the Palais, the officers in the house occupied by Casabianca. Our numbers have been much diminished by sickness. Of upwards of 600, of which the reserve is composed, only 216 were in a state to move down with us; great part of them were convalescents, most of whom have since relapsed. Some of the regiments have not twenty men fit for duty. My servant, William Hillows, who has lived with me these four years, died of the fever at Bastia, where I had sent him for his recovery; he was a most trusty, good servant. Since the 10th we have been lying on the floor, the officers with their cloaks, the men with their blankets. But the siege of Calvi, where we have had few luxuries, has accustomed us to disregard comforts. Captain Stewart left this on the 12th with the General's despatches.

CAMP, 16th August.—At nine o'clock last night I received the General's orders to return to the camp with the reserve this morning at daylight; the Royal Irish are to garrison Calvi. I therefore left their flank companies to wait their arrival, and returned with the rest. Our men continue to go down with the fever. This increases the General's desire to return with the troops with all speed to Bastia. Most of the sick have embarked this morning. I expect every moment the order for the flank companies to join their regiments and embark. I shall of course return to the command of the 51st. The 51st have fewer sick than any other regiment, owing undoubtedly to our surgeon, M'Cleish, who is a diligent and intelligent man; but also, in a great degree, to the good regulation of our regimental hospital for these three or four years past. This was one of the first things to which I attended on getting the command of the regiment. It has remained in good order ever since then.

I am now rewarded by having three times the number of duty men of *any regiment here*.

ON BOARD THE "HELMSELEY" TRANSPORT, 20th August 1794.—I embarked with the 51st yesterday forenoon; the rest of the troops had embarked the day before. We sailed in the evening, and are now off Cape Corse. Lord Hood and the fleet having forsaken us at the moment Calvi surrendered, it was impossible for want of hands to dismantle the batteries, or to remove the stores. General Stuart wished the prize money arising from the frigates, ordnance, &c. &c., captured might be distributed immediately, that the reward might follow the fatigues; he accordingly applied to Lord Hood to know in what manner the navy wished to share. His answer was that it must be referred to the King. This will prevent the division for a considerable time. General Stuart has given his share to be divided among the troops and widows of the men killed during the siege. This is a gift like himself, and like few others.

BASTIA, 27th August.—Owing to the contrary winds and bad weather we did not get to an anchor till the 23rd, in the evening. I disembarked the regiment next morning; above 200 of our men are sick. The barracks they are put into are bad, and the general hospital ill-regulated. In General Stuart's absence nothing has been done. Villettes is confirmed in his government by orders from home.

BASTIA, 26th September.—General Stuart wishing to take a tour round the island was so good as to ask me to accompany him. Sir James St. Clair, Captains Nepoan and Duncan were also of the party. We set out from this the 31st day of August, and returned two days ago. During this time we visited Calvi, Ajaccio, Bonifacio, Porto Vecchio, and Corte. My baggage was so circumscribed that I could not take my writing-case. I, however, wrote occasional notes in pencil. The General's wish was to gain a knowledge of the country, and also of the manners and sentiments of the people. He endeavoured to mix and converse with people

wherever he went; his manners are at all times pleasant, but he is fortunate beyond most Englishmen in being able at once to converse easily with foreigners. We went by sea in a tartane from St. Fiorenzo to Isola Rozza; but the winds were so uncertain, that it was determined to take the rest of the journey by land. During the short time we stayed at Isola Rozza I had an opportunity of visiting the family of Monticello, from whom I had received so much civility when I first landed in Corsica. They were in mourning for Signor Leonati, who died about the time we landed to attack Calvi. The General had several arrangements to make with Major Montresor at Calvi, and we remained there two days. I amused myself by walking over the ground and viewing our different positions. The ground was so favourable to the enemy that nothing but their want of spirit and talents enabled us to get possession of the town. Calvi is beyond a doubt the strongest post in this island, and had the siege been protracted but ten days longer, sickness must have obliged us to give up the attempt.

The first night from Calvi we slept in the fields, and it happened to rain the greatest part of the night, but the campaign in Corsica has hardened us. The second day, after a very long and tedious journey, we reached the village of Otta. The country through which we had passed was uncultivated and bad; part of the route ran through woods of evergreen oak. As we approached Otta everything wore a more favourable appearance. The General's servant, who had gone on beforehand to prepare supper, had spread the alarm, and we were met by a party of the inhabitants about two miles from the village, and were received by repeated shouts of "*Viva il Generale, nostri Inglesi.*" We were taken to the house of Signor Benediti, the chief person of the village, there being no inns, and entertained by him and his wife with the greatest hospitality. This family have long been adherents of Paoli. The father of the present possessors had been driven from his house in 1769 and much harassed by the French. The

situation of Otta is very romantic; the mountains which surround it are particularly magnificent. The hill upon which the village stands is, by means of supporting walls, planted with vines, olives, fig-trees, &c., and it proves how much might be done in other parts of the island were the inhabitants industrious; but they prefer living upon little and carrying a musket. The Corsicans all live in towns. There is no such thing in the island as a simple country house. It would be unsafe to live in one. A man is esteemed and his alliance courted in proportion as his family is numerous. In this proportion only do they conceive themselves safe from insult and oppression.

Upon leaving Otta you ascend a steep mountain called Spelunca. Afterwards we passed through several villages. The country between this and Vico, where we stopped for the night, is very tolerable. It abounds in chestnut trees, and is reckoned by the inhabitants healthy. It is, I dare say, more so than the coast, but the pallid countenances of the majority of those we met prevents my thinking this or any part of Corsica healthy. The race, in general, is small, and both men and women uglier than I believe in any other part of Europe. We took up our abode at a convent close to the village of Vico, and were entertained in a very kind manner by the fathers. Whilst supper was being made ready we walked to the village and paid a visit to Captain Rocca, who had served with us at Calvi. The French constantly kept a detachment of troops here; and the people are eager to have a British garrison. We were surprised at this; but we afterwards found the wish universal. The arbitrary government of the French, supported by means of the troops, has not caused the people to feel any disgust of the profession, or a wish to carry their laws into execution themselves. They all are convinced, I know not with what truth, that they are incapable of doing it. The sentiment which pervades the country is that they must be under some foreign Power. The country round Vico is full of vines. The wine is remarkably good, and we all

agreed in thinking it the best spot we had then seen in Corsica.

By leaving Vico early the next morning, we reached Ajaccio about 5 p.m. The Gulf of Ajaccio is beautiful, and the harbour, I am told, better than that of Martello. The town and citadel are extremely neat, the country fertile, and less mountainous than any we had met with. No place in the island can be compared to Ajaccio. I cannot conceive why the French did not prefer it to Bastia and make it the seat of their government. The present commandant of Ajaccio is Signor Peraldi, who was formerly a delegate to the National Assembly of France and one of the three Commissioners sent to La Fayette's army. He is an acute, sensible, open man. He entertained us during our stay, and at his home we met with all the principal people of the place. Every evening we danced. The manners at Ajaccio are perfectly French, the women handsomer and better-bred than I had met with. The town of Ajaccio is enclosed with a wall, and the citadel is fortified; but as it is commanded, and has no water but what is contained in cisterns, it is impossible to make it a strong place. The barracks, magazines, and storehouses in the citadel are very fine, and must have been erected at considerable expense by the French. Ajaccio is well situated for trade, and the country very capable of improvement; the chief culture at present is the vine; the wine is excellent. I find many sensible people of opinion that a military government is the only proper one for Corsica at present. The people, they think, will submit to no other. Sir Gilbert is supposed to be much influenced by Pozzo di Borgo, who is universally disliked and generally thought to be a scoundrel.

From Ajaccio we went to Bonifacio by water in a gondola. It was represented to me as a second Gibraltar. It is not, however, a very strong place, unless against storm or *coup-de-main*. The neck which connects it with the mainland is commanded. It is a very curious place, but I should imagine a most disagreeable one to live in.

The country in the neighbourhood is rocky. The French had always a battalion quartered in it, and there is a very good barrack for such a garrison. Colonel Querza commands it at present with about a hundred Corsicans. The General rode to Porto Vecchio, but I had hurt myself and could not go. This is, beyond a doubt, the best harbour in the island, but so unhealthy, that it is uninhabitable six months in the year. The families retire to the mountains. After staying three days at Bonifacio we returned by land to Ajaccio. The country we passed to Sartene was bad, but from thence to Canale and Ajaccio it is fertile, and well inhabited. We passed two days with our friends at Ajaccio, and then took our departure for Corte. We stopped to breakfast at Bugognana, a village in a wood of chestnut trees, on the side of a mountain; above the village is the tower of Bugognana, formerly a state prison, but destroyed at the commencement of the revolution. From thence the road to Vivario leads through forests of pine, chestnut, and birch; here we lay, and reached Corte next day early.

Corte is situated in the centre of the island, has always been considered as the capital, and is the residence of the *conseil provisoire*. It is a small town, built upon the side of a rock. It is surrounded by three rivers. The soil is bad, but the town has a cheerful appearance. The barracks and House of Assembly are the principal buildings. We dined with the members of the *conseil provisoire*. They were originally the creatures of Paoli: the choice does him no great honour. They seem to be a set of vulgar, low-minded men without talent. The country is already much dissatisfied with them, and looks with impatience for the return of the deputies from England, and the organisation of the new government. The road from Corte to Bastia is so good that, though upwards of forty miles, we rode it in a day. The French made this road, and were continuing it on to Ajaccio. Having secured this communication between their stations on two sides of the island, they would probably not have troubled them-

selves about opening others. This one was necessary, and must have been made and preserved at great expense. We arrived here (Bastia) the evening of the 25th. I am sorry to find little alteration in our sick list; the number of deaths was considerable.

BASTIA, 5th October.—A courier from England arrived two days ago; it was reported he had brought Sir Gilbert Elliot's appointment as Viceroy. A proclamation announcing it to the public was accordingly issued yesterday. I understand from General Stuart that the commission of Viceroy has not come, but only a letter from the Duke of Portland desiring Sir Gilbert to take upon himself the office. The commission will be sent as soon as it is made out; difficulties have no doubt occurred with regard to the powers to be given to the Viceroy. The situation is novel. The title seems to import more than "Governor." It cannot, however, be conceived that the Viceroy of Corsica is to have the same power and patronage as the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. Sir Gilbert is rather inclined to make the latter his model. The General told me that in a conversation he had with him yesterday, Sir Gilbert mentioned his wish to visit the hospitals. The General, a good deal surprised, said, "Somebody has perhaps informed you they are not in good order." *Sir Gilbert*.—"No, but I like to visit hospitals." *General*.—"Why have you not done it, then? You have been long very near them." *Sir G.*—"I should like to visit them with you, and even to have returns from them." *G.*—"If as Sir Gilbert Elliot you have a curiosity to see the hospitals and to have information respecting them, I shall be extremely happy to give it to you; but if you mean that as Viceroy you have any authority over them or any part of the army, and that this is to be the first act of your reign, I shall not consent to it. You have no authority whatever over the army." *Sir G.*—"I am totally of a different opinion." *G.*—"I do assure you you have none; my commission is not only to command the troops in Corsica, but to be Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean; and you

should rather consider it as a fortunate circumstance that it is so. As a friend, I advise you never to interfere with the army till such time as your powers are explained to you by your commission; you will otherwise involve yourself in endless difficulties. The number of British subjects now in Corsica are amenable to no law you can institute. Martial law is the only one which now exists. Over that I alone, as Commander-in-chief, preside. I am at present responsible for the conduct of the army and for the military operations in the Mediterranean, and, till such time as your commission gives you the powers of a Commander-in-chief, you will do well not to attempt to interfere in military matters." Sir Gilbert agreed that these were difficulties he had not foreseen.

It might have been as well, perhaps, if the name of Viceroy had not been mentioned without first consulting the administration at home. This would probably have been the case had personal considerations not interfered. Peraldi and some others at Ajaccio said that they were surprised when it was inserted in the constitution; that the idea had not originated with the Corsicans, who were all as much surprised as he (General Stuart) was at it. Government will find out perhaps when too late how much they have allowed themselves to be committed from the confidence they have reposed in the good sense and moderation of Sir Gilbert; qualities which perhaps he does not possess in so great a degree as is imagined. He has been infinitely dazzled by the splendour of aides-de-camp, general ushers, &c. &c., and I fear he will involve his country in difficulties. It is particularly fortunate that a person of General Stuart's manly, liberal understanding happens to be at the head of the army. He will undoubtedly prevent much mischief. I dread his departure.

BASTIA, 9th October.—This day is fixed upon by the municipality for a public rejoicing upon Sir Gilbert's appointment as Viceroy. *Te Deum* is to be sung in the churches at six o'clock, and in the evening there is to be a ball. It was also fixed as the day for the presentation to

the new "Viceroy" of the principal officers of the army. Commanding officers of corps, heads of departments, &c., accordingly waited by appointment on the General at half-past ten this morning. We attended him to Sir Gilbert. After waiting in the antechamber for a quarter of an hour we were introduced. The General made a speech, claiming for the troops under his command the protection of the Viceroy, and, if ever his Majesty should give him power over them, that he would make it his business to inquire into the merits of the officers and men of the army and reward them accordingly. Sir Gilbert made a short reply, and the General a rejoinder, and he then introduced us.

BASTIA, 18th October 1794.—Within these few days General Stuart has shown me a correspondence he has had with Sir Gilbert. It began by an elaborate letter from Sir Gilbert again asserting his rights to the command of the army; that it was incompatible with the constitution just established that any armed force should remain in the country over which he had not the complete control; that, though for the present from prudential motives he yielded, he wished it to be understood that he did not give up the right; that though this had been pretty well explained in the conversation they had had, affairs of such importance, he thought, were best reduced to writing. Amongst all this were intermixed many high compliments to the General. Upon the whole, I thought Sir Gilbert's letters tediously long, mean, from too much forced flattery, but artful. The whole of the argument went upon the supposition that Corsica was to be considered in exactly the same light as Great Britain or Ireland—a wonderful assumption in the case of a country which cannot defend itself, nor even pay its civil establishment. The General's answer was extremely polite, manly, and concise, positively denying to the Government of Corsica the smallest power over the British troops. This drew from Sir Gilbert another, another, and another letter, extremely childish, cavilling upon words, &c. Sir Gilbert's object in bringing on the correspondence

was evidently to send it home; but, as far as I could judge, he had the worst throughout both in argument and composition. Good sense, openness, and upright intention, couched in extremely good language, are conspicuous in the General's letters. They altogether get the better of Sir Gilbert's little low art, and make it appear despicable. The high footing upon which he puts Corsica will surprise and stagger people at home. It will appear evident that he can have no motive for it but his own aggrandisement. How little are people known whilst in the private walk of life!

26th October.—It was considered expedient to raise a body of Corsicans, and General Stuart drew out a plan for this purpose. The force he proposed was to consist of three battalions, each of 500 men; the proposed battalion to be of five companies, the whole under an English field officer or inspector. The General proposed that one of these battalions should be quartered at Bastia, one at Corte, and one at Ajaccio, under the command of different British field officers, who should have the superintendence of their discipline, &c.; great care to be taken in the appointment of the officers, attending to character and merit only. The General showed me two letters this morning from Sir Gilbert from Corte, by which it appears that he has already named the principal officers; that he has altered the plan in some respects with a view to more patronage, making the battalion consist of ten companies of 50 instead of five of 100, and reducing the pay of each rank in order to make up for the increase of officers. Sir Gilbert's letters are full of his management in order not to disoblige; instead of taking care, as General Stuart recommended, to make these corps useful from a military point of view, he seems to wish to use them only as a means of forwarding political views. This is unfortunately too much the case in Britain; the abuse has crept in by degrees, and must perhaps now be submitted to even by those who lament the necessity; but why we should voluntarily put ourselves into such a situation

in Corsica, instead of assuming that tone of authority to which we are entitled, and by disregarding all little cabals, enforce with dignity whatever may be considered most useful, this is difficult to understand, and can only arise from the character of Sir Gilbert. It leads him to carry everything by intrigue and management, instead of by bold, open, and manly conduct. I suspect Sir Gilbert to be a very unwise man, with a considerable share of ingenuity and art, art which, however, must often defeat itself from want of sufficient sense to manage it. Instead of a useful military body, I am convinced these Corsican corps will be as little serviceable as those we have hitherto had with us. *The General had proposed that the Commander-in-chief should be the colonel of the three, but now that he knows the scheme likely to be adopted, he will decline having anything to do with them.*

Thus began the rift between Sir Gilbert and Moore, and, as it will be seen in the sequel, it was the fact that Moore was General Stuart's friend, and had shared with him his views, that ultimately led to the preposterous accusation that Moore was intriguing in Corsica and taking part in the politics of the island in order to get General Stuart made Viceroy in place of Sir Gilbert. The real issue was very different, and one of far more than local or temporary interest. The original question between General Stuart and Sir Gilbert, as to the necessity of Sir Gilbert's having authority from home that would legally entitle him to deal with British subjects in Corsica, before he assumed his powers, was one of passing interest, on which Sir Gilbert necessarily yielded in order to avoid complications. It was obviously easier for him to leave to the man who, by right of conquest and by the fact of war, was for the time being able to exercise an authority that could not be disputed, the many difficult

questions that might arise. What in regard to this part of the question is strange is that Sir Gilbert's difficulties with General Stuart are thus, and thus only, explained by his biographer: "With the most eminent members of the sister service Sir Gilbert formed, during his stay in Corsica, relations of close and lasting friendship; and if his footing with the military was less uniformly satisfactory, though among them too he found cordial friends, it must be remembered in how many other parts of the world facts bore witness to the opinion formed by him of the English army officer, as he was at that time. Too many of them were equally remarkable for their dread of personal responsibility and their great personal pretensions."¹ Now that there were army officers to whom this description most accurately applies, no one bears stronger testimony than Moore, both in this part of his Diary and, as will be seen hereafter, at a much later date. This comment is specifically applied by the biographer to Sir Charles Stuart, and if one may judge from the previous paragraph, to Moore and all who did not become courtiers to Sir Gilbert. I leave any fair-minded man to judge whether, when Sir Charles Stuart proposed that, until such time as Sir Gilbert was able to act, he himself should exercise the powers conferred on him by his position, it was "dread of personal responsibility" that he displayed.

What is much more generally important is the point that while his biographer tells us that he was "desirous to give no opinion on military matters, which were beyond his province," Sir Gilbert was, as we here see him, interfering in every military detail, substituting for a sound military scheme, submitted by an able

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 335.

soldier, a system designed solely to give him more patronage; selecting all the officers, not only without reference to any judgment as to their military ability, but in the teeth of the advice of his able Commander-in-chief. We shall see this system pursued into every section of military command, whether organisation, discipline, or fortification. We shall see what, alack! in such a case always happens, that he found among soldiers what he calls "cordial friends," that is to say, men who were ready to cry "ditto" to whatever he might say. Everywhere these were the incompetents or the self-seekers and the place-hunters. We shall see in consequence every scheme that he devises breaking down, by his own admission, in his hands. We shall see the very Corsican regiment for which he had selected the commander, and for the whole organisation of which he was solely responsible, becoming for him a cause of exaggerated panic because of its indiscipline, and because of this his selected commanding officer who in his own belief was plotting against him. We shall see all principles of military discipline upset by him, and terror in his own mind the only determining cause of action. We shall see him amidst the applause of flatterers talking drivelling nonsense about the defence of the island, and offended because Moore, with complete military knowledge, submits to him what every soldier here or on the Continent will recognise as the clearest common-sense and right judgment.

Is it wonderful that under these circumstances Sir Gilbert should have found it easier to get on with the navy than with the army? Even he recognised that he was not competent to command Lord Hood's fleet or Nelson's ship. Would he have found his relations

with Lord Hood so pleasant if he had undertaken to select over Lord Hood's head the officers to command his battleships, or to dictate to Nelson the organisation and discipline of his crew? Yet this is exactly what he did in regard to the army. The reason is plain. It was a severe satire on Lord John Russell to say that he would be willing at any moment to command the Channel Fleet. Every one recognised the absurdity. It would be easy to pick out by the dozen any number of men in England who fancy they could to-morrow take command of an army in the field. Nobody would laugh at them. Only it is thus that, as happened in this case, island fortresses and much more important things are lost to Britain.

He told me that Lord Hood had said to General Trigge that he, General Stuart, had ordered only sick men and invalids to embark as marines. General Stuart has written to Mr. Secretary Dundas fully respecting Lord Hood. He tells me he has also sent home very minute statements of what would be necessary for the defence of this island; giving the different methods which might be adopted, without, however, giving any opinion as to which was the best. The expense in ordnance, ammunition, &c., is immense. One month's fire for the different guns actually mounted in the different posts in this island requires no less than 11,000 barrels of powder!!

6th November 1794.—My friend, Captain Tourle, of our Light Infantry, was seized with fever towards the end of the siege of Calvi. He has continued more or less ill ever since, but a few days ago he was taken with an inflammation in his stomach, of which he died this morning. I have been occupied all day in giving directions for his funeral, which is to-morrow, and I am just now returned from one of the last offices of a friend, seeing him placed in his coffin. When I reported his death to General Stuart and

asked his orders respecting the funeral, he said he would walk as chief mourner. The General, who is full of heart, thinks this tribute due to a person he had remarked as a gentlemanly, spirited officer. Tourle was undoubtedly that, as well as a worthy, cheerful companion. We all feel his loss, but nobody more than myself, as from my first coming into the regiment we had lived on the most cordial and friendly footing. The fleet, under Admiral Hotham, came into St. Fiorenzo Bay yesterday, the French fleet which he had been attempting to blockade having escaped to Toulon. The French fleet in Toulon, it is said, now consists of sixteen sail of the line, which, I believe, is superior by two to ours. It is reported that they mean to come out and attempt a descent on this island. It is singular that under such circumstances Lord Hood should take the *Victory* home, when he might be conveyed equally well in a frigate.

BASTIA, 6th January 1795.—A courier arrived from England yesterday morning. General Stuart took me into his room after parade and showed me different letters he had received, by which the powers of the Viceroy are explained to be similar to those of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. The General, of course, departs immediately. It has been with difficulty that, for some time, he has persuaded himself to stay, so teased has he been by Sir Gilbert's dilatory proceedings. His departure is a blow which the army feel severely; never had a general gained more deservedly the affection and confidence of his troops; his absence will be most sensibly felt if ever the French attempt a landing in this island. From a pretty general acquaintance among the Corsicans I have many opportunities of knowing the high esteem they also have for General Stuart. My appointment as Adjutant-General came from England some weeks ago, but was only put in orders yesterday, as Sir J. St. Clair still continued here; he will now accompany the General home. The 51st will march to Corte in a very few days; I shall march with them, see

them settled in their barracks, and then return to my duty here as Adjutant-General.

17th January.—It was General Stuart's intention to have retained the command till he had finished his arrangements for the troops and the general defence of the island, and had once more visited the different garrisons; but in consequence of a correspondence which took place between him and Sir Gilbert yesterday and the day before, he resigned the command and issued the following order:—

“G. O. BASTIA, *6th January 1795.*—The King having invested his Excellency Sir Gilbert Elliot, Viceroy of Corsica, with the command of the British army, the Lieutenant-General's power over it ceases from this instant; but while he announces to both officers and men a more favourable change, his mind is too deeply impressed with their valour and eminent services to take his leave without the warmest assurances that their prosperity, welfare, and happiness will ever be considered amongst the warmest wishes of his heart.”

The next day there appeared in orders a long address from the Viceroy to the troops, which concluded by appointing Major-General Triggo Commander-in-chief. A few days afterwards he was appointed by the Viceroy a Lieutenant-General. The power to make such appointments has hitherto been supposed to belong to the King alone. General Stuart had promised to pay another visit to Ajaccio before he left the island, and determined to do it notwithstanding that he had given up the command. Colonel Oakes, Sir James St. Clair, Colonel Wauchoppe, Dr. Robertson, the General's two aides-de-camp, and I were the party. We reached Vivario the first night, and the next reached Ajaccio. Peraldi called upon us immediately. His daughter was to be married, and he invited us to the dinner. The General was seized in the night with the gout, and could not go. The Parliament was summoned to meet at Corte on the 15th. Several members set out for Corte; Peraldi and one or two who went first, got on:

the rest were forced to return; a very heavy fall of snow had rendered the mountains between Bogognana and Vivario impassable. It continued to snow for several days. As long as the General was ill he did not mind it, but when he began to get better he became impatient to return to Bastia. The inhabitants declared that to travel by Bogognana was impossible. The other roads by Bonifacio or Calvi were very long, besides the danger of finding the rivers swollen. These considerations detained us a day or two longer; but, there being no appearance of a change of weather, General Stuart determined to try the passage of Bogognana, hoping that Englishmen might, by an effort, effect what Corsicans deemed impracticable.

The first night we reached Bogognana, at the foot of the mountain. We left next morning at nine, in spite of everything the inhabitants could say. We were soon forced to dismount and to lead our horses. We at length did reach Vivario between six and seven o'clock, but after undergoing as much fatigue as I ever experienced. The snow was everywhere from five to six feet deep. The Curé at Vivario received us with his usual hospitality, and, as far as his means went, supplied the party with dry stockings. He is a sensible, worthy man. He told the General that the Corsicans in general were very sorry he was going away; they had a high opinion of his military talents; they had a great idea of his justice. They had also acquired the belief that he had not any blind veneration for what were called the great, but was a man who liked the people (*il popolo*). From such a character they expected much assistance in forming their new Government. He told us he had persuaded his people to disarm, and, from the pulpit, had endeavoured to urge them not to trouble themselves with politics, but to labour; for, said he, "Should the devil himself come to govern us, what fault could he find with people who had cultivated their lands and supported themselves and their families." He said General Paoli had passed that way at the beginning of the revolution; they went some distance to meet him with sticks on their shoulders. General Paoli

expressed surprise at their not being armed, and asked if they had no muskets. The Curé answered, "We have spades and pickaxes." Paoli offered to supply them; he begged he would not. "When you want any of us for war, you shall have more than the number you require, and to these you will, of course, give arms; but, for God's sake, send no arms here! They may render the people idle, and prevent them from cultivating their lands." We found the parishioners of this worthy clergyman equal rogues with the rest of the Corsicans. Their extortion for everything we got from them was astonishing. It is the same throughout Corsica. Honesty is unknown, and it never enters the brains of one of them to consider what is just, but only what it is likely you will pay.

We reached Corte next day, and the day following Bastia. The Parliament had been adjourned on account of the bad weather, and it was now fixed to meet at Bastia, the 6th February. This change from Corte to Bastia causes, I find, great discontent. They conceive that Corte, as the centre of the island, is the most proper, and that the Viceroy in changing it to Bastia is actuated more by motives of private convenience than by considerations for the good of Corsica, or the convenience of the individuals who compose the Parliament. There are indeed but too many reasons why the Parliament should be held at Corte. The General fixed upon Saturday, 7th February, for his departure. The officers of the garrison gave him a dinner, and he gave them two balls. On Saturday morning I accompanied him to St. Fiorenzo, where Sir James St. Clair and he embarked in the *Juno* frigate. It will be long probably before I serve under an officer for whom I have so much esteem and attachment.

On leaving Corsica, General Stuart wrote to Paoli a letter (now in the Paoli Correspondence, British Museum) which is interesting, as showing the fact that he had hardly had any communication with Paoli whilst he was in Corsica. He writes, on 31st January 1795,

from Bastia: "It being my indispensable duty, both as a soldier and an Englishman, to obtain every possible information respecting Corsica, the whole of my time has been employed in pursuits to this effect, and I have consequently been prevented from showing you that attention which on every account you merit." It will be seen that Moore took the same view of his duty. He was, as his Diary amply shows, anything but an unqualified admirer of Paoli, and it was simply for the purpose of carrying out the duty recognised by Stuart and him, "to obtain every possible information respecting Corsica," that he made those successive tours throughout the island which will be recorded in the next chapter. These appear to have excited Sir Gilbert's alarm, because, in the course of them, it was impossible that Moore should not hear how deadly unpopular among the people the Government of Pozzo di Borgo had become.

Moore's view (p. 132, *ante*) of the two appointments of Trigge was taken at home. These were cancelled and re-made by the King. The censure drew from Elliot a reply of melodramatic contrition. As to his command, he told Ministers that it was settled in the New Constitution, as the Corsicans wished, and an irrevocable pledge to them. The evidence therefore on p. 124, *ante*, and p. 178, giving Paoli's statement at a later date to Moore, are important. Sir Gilbert received the command under a promise not to deal on his personal judgment with Army detail.¹

¹ Public Record Office, "Corsica," letter of 28th February 1795, cancelling Elliot's appointments. His reply, 25th April 1795. Also letter of 16th October 1794, applying for "the formal and nominal" command.

CHAPTER V

SIR GILBERT ELLIOT AS VICEROY OF CORSICA

ON Monday, the 9th of February, the field officers, heads of departments, &c., were directed to meet the Commander-in-chief at ten o'clock to attend the Viceroy to the Parliament. The troops lined the streets, and the procession proceeded from the Viceroy's. Everybody uncovered but he. He read his speech in Italian. We then returned in the same state, and the principal officers dined with him. The Parliament next day proceeded to the election of their President. General Paoli, who is absent in the province of Algagliola, was chosen by acclamation. This is supposed to be rather unpleasant to the Viceroy and his party, who for some time past, it is thought, have altogether neglected Paoli. General Paoli is extremely popular in Corsica, and has a considerable party in the Parliament attached to him. The day after Paoli's election the baggage of the 51st Regiment, which was packed on the waggons and ready to set out for Corte, was suddenly stopped by a message carried to the officer commanding from the Viceroy by one of his private secretaries, who was directed if it had set out to follow it and bring it back. The sudden order, as well as the unusual manner in which it was communicated, created much surprise. I was told next day by General Triggo that in consequence of Paoli's election and the opposition which had been observed in Parliament, the Viceroy was afraid of allowing the troops to depart from Bastia. If his government can only be supported by 1500 or 2000 British troops, the sooner he and they depart the better; but at any rate it was absurd to stop the baggage, as no day had been fixed for the march of the regiment. It might have been detained under various pretexts without causing suspicion.

Nothing would have a worse or more dangerous effect than if this affair was known by the Corsicans: it is no secret among the British. A deputation was sent to Paoli to announce to him his appointment, and the Parliament adjourned to Tuesday, the 17th February, to wait his answer.

The deputies returned this day (*i.e.* 16th February). I understand Paoli has declined the honour on account of his age and infirmities. The particulars will be known to-morrow when the Parliament meets.

17th February.—Paoli has declined, and an old man called Giafferi is chosen. I was told by a Corsican, one of the Council of State, that nothing could equal Sir Gilbert's alarm upon Paoli's election; that he was upon the point of quitting the island; he conceived that Paoli's presence in that situation would reduce him to be a mere pageant without authority.

Not a word on this vital point appears in Sir Gilbert's biography, except the mistake of speaking of Paoli's candidature for the Presidency. He was no candidate, but elected in his absence by acclamation. The dates in this part of Sir Gilbert's biography are hopeless.

The Corsicans were so alarmed at Sir Gilbert's fright, that the person who gave me the information, who is the particular friend of Paoli and adverse to the Viceroy's measures, wrote to Paoli to beg he would decline the chair and not come to Bastia, lest Sir Gilbert should be made quite desperate. Affairs have, I believe, since then gone on pretty quietly. However dissatisfied the country in general is with the present measures, they are afraid of showing it too much for fear of disgusting the Viceroy and losing the protection of Great Britain, without which at present they are sensible they could not exist. The troops lately again lined the streets, and we were again called upon to attend the Viceroy to the Parliament upon the inauguration of Paoli's bust.

After he was seated on the throne the President uncovered the bust, amidst the applause of the whole House. Three of the members spoke upon the occasion; after which the Viceroy rose, stopped opposite the bust which was in the middle of the hall, read the inscription, and made some remarks upon it to those immediately about him, smiled, and seemed mightily pleased with the figure, took off his hat, made it a low bow, and walked on. This was applauded. Wherever state and consequence is attended with no expense the Viceroy seems fond of them, but his house by no means contributes either to the brilliancy or amusement of the town. It is open twice a week; lemonade is handed about, and there are cards; it is a mixture between a drawing-room and a *conversazione*, not much to the taste of the English. In public affairs it is said he is entirely guided by Pozzo di Borgo.

This man was originally an attorney in some village on the other side of the mountains. He rose in the revolution, and was chosen a deputy to the first National Assembly. When at Paris he is said to have been bribed by the Court party, and that he was actually a pensioner on the *liste Civile*. Upon his return to Corsica he attached himself to Paoli. When I went to Morato with Sir Gilbert, we found him Paoli's most active counsellor; there commenced Sir Gilbert's acquaintance. When the troops landed, and for some time after the taking of St. Fiorenzo, he was almost constantly in camp with me; he received money for the Corsicans, and had the total management for Paoli. He executed this business extremely ill, and discontented the Corsicans, with much reason, for he allowed them to be in want of everything. They accuse him of having pocketed the money intended for the public use; he is a low, mean-minded man, with some cunning and intrigue, but totally devoid, in my opinion, of talents. The Viceroy, whose friendships are passions, is completely blinded by this man, who has already led him into several scrapes. Pozzo has entirely broken with Paoli, and the airs he gives himself to the Corsicans are perfectly disgusting.

The avowed plan of Sir Gilbert's government is that of bribery. A Corsican gentleman of my acquaintance went to him lately to solicit a post. The Viceroy told him that there were two parties in the country, one of them adverse to government; that if he were of that one he could expect nothing. When he first came to the country he endeavoured to know everybody in order to make a choice. He had made one, and had every reason to be satisfied with it. It was the friends of that person only (Pozzo di Borgo) who could be served. If he became one of them he might obtain his wishes. The gentleman said he was not averse to the English government, but he would not court Pozzo di Borgo. A young man who had a cause to solicit found means of speaking to Miss Congleton, Sir Gilbert's niece. He endeavoured to interest her in his favour. She asked, "Are you a friend of Pozzo di Borgo? If you are, you may expect some favour; otherwise, none." In short, no man who does not court this fellow, who is of no personal importance in the country, and is in general despised as a mean dog, has the least chance of employment. Any person who opposes his views in Parliament, however scandalous, is damned for ever. Several have told me that Sir Gilbert's government is the completest despotism ever exercised in Corsica. I expect daily a revolt in some part of the country.

"G. O. BASTIA, 21st February 1795.—His Excellency the Viceroy having been pleased to appoint Major John Drinkwater of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st or Royal Regiment of Foot to be Secretary to the Military Department of the kingdom of Corsica, all orders and instructions communicated to the British army and to the different heads of departments by Major Drinkwater are to be considered as proceeding from the Viceroy and obeyed as such." When the General gave me the above order I could not help asking him if it was the intention that any other order should be communicated to the army through any other channel than that of the officer commanding the troops.

He seemed a little confused, and said he did not suppose that Major Drinkwater would issue any order which was not first communicated to him, but if he did it must of course be obeyed; that the reason of his employment was chiefly to make out warrants. The reason is very different. It is to establish an intermediate person between the Viceroy and the Commander-in-chief, and to lessen the importance of the latter as much as possible. Where there is a Commander-in-chief with a proper staff a military secretary is perfectly unnecessary, and is a mere multiplication of offices. The Viceroy wishes to direct in everything. General Trigge does not feel his situation, or is averse to dispute any point whatever. The Viceroy directed that a party of the Corsican battalion, lately assembled here, should be ordered to clean the streets of the citadel. It was represented that they might object to it, and that cleaning the streets of a town was not altogether a fit duty for soldiers. General Trigge had taken the pains to walk himself through the streets with the Governor the day before, was eager upon the subject, and insisted upon the party being ordered. This was accordingly done; the party assembled, but the moment the men were told what they were to do they threw down their shovels, dispersed, and said they were enlisted for soldiers, not scavengers. This was passed over, and the battalion, which was pretty troublesome before, is become much more so.

10th March.—The evening of the 8th an express arrived to the Viceroy that the French fleet were off Cape Corse. In the morning of the 9th this was confirmed by a report from the master of a transport which had sailed the day before in company with the *Berwick* 74, bound for Leghorn to join the fleet under Admiral Hotham. The master stated that they had fallen in with the French fleet. Two ships had immediately engaged the *Berwick*, and had, he believed, taken her. He, being a great way astern, though fired upon by a frigate, had time to make the shore of Cape Corse, and escaped. The *Cyclops* frigate arrived yesterday at St.

Fiorenzo from Gibraltar with the news that a large convoy for this place and the Mediterranean had arrived there from England, and was to sail immediately under the convoy of the *Blenheim* and *Bombay Castle*, which have been detached from Lord Hood's fleet to join Admiral Hotham. Despatches have been sent to Leghorn to Admiral Hotham and to Gibraltar to stop the convoy. To-day it is reported that both fleets have been seen, but were not in sight of one another. The Viceroy is, I understand, much alarmed. The General is perfectly quiet, so much so that I can hardly conceive that he considers himself as in any way responsible; between them I see no effectual measures taken for a defence. No country requires them more. The general defence of the island has hitherto been neglected, as if it were impossible we should ever be attacked. I fear if ever we are so we shall cut a disgraceful figure, though, were proper measures taken, the island is capable of a considerable defence, and of adding much to the reputation of the officer who conducts it. Where everything else is neglected it is not surprising to find a total want of intelligence; it is evident we had none of the state of the fleet in Toulon. On the contrary, the General told me the Viceroy's intelligence from Toulon was that the fleet in general was unfit to put to sea. The few ships that were fit for sea had begun to dismantle. Whatever be the object of the French, it is clear that they conceive it of sufficient magnitude to risk a naval engagement. They must be perfectly acquainted with the strength of our fleet, and of course, I suppose, conceive themselves at least equal to it. An action to be of any use to us must be very decisive indeed, for if our ships are much disabled without utterly destroying those of the French, the effect will be almost equal to a defeat, as we shall be forced to go down to Gibraltar to refit, and for a couple of months leave this part of the Mediterranean open to whatever operations they choose to undertake.

16th March.—There has been no account as yet from the fleet; the French have probably got into Toulon with

their prize, the *Berwick*. The designs of the French are against Italy; a considerable body of men, stores, &c., were embarked in 140 transports, and, I believe, sailed with the fleet. They are supposed to have gone into some port to the westward of Genoa. The Grand Duke has ordered a fortnight's quarantine for ships from Corsica. This, as we receive almost everything from thence, will put us to much inconvenience. This day a soldier of the 69th Regiment is to be executed, in accordance with the sentence of a general court-martial; he committed a house robbery. The Viceroy, before ordering the trial, declared, I am told, that if he was sentenced he should be executed. The day the president brought the proceedings to General Trigge, the General sent to me that he was going with them to the Viceroy, and he desired that I might be in the way when he returned, as he should have some orders to give out. He returned in half-an-hour. It was hardly possible the Viceroy could have read the proceedings; he had, however, signed and approved the court-martial, and the General desired me to put it in orders. He said a day could not be fixed for the execution as the hangman was at Corte, but the Viceroy had sent for him. I remembered having been president of a general court-martial in General Stuart's time. Several prisoners had been tried; one was sentenced to death, the others to corporal punishment. When I carried the proceedings to the General he detained me nearly an hour whilst he read the court-martial, asking me questions as he went along. A few days afterwards he sent for me, and told me his determination respecting the different prisoners. From his conversation it was apparent that he had been reading and reflecting much upon the subject, and had made himself perfectly master of every part of it before he had arrived at his decision. It was then given in orders.

It is perhaps illiberal to impute motives to persons without at least very good foundation. That poor soldier, I dare say, deserved to be hanged; but I cannot help thinking that other motives than his deserts were the cause of his being hanged. The first was, that the theft was com-

mitted upon a Corsican (everything yields to what is Corsican); the second, to give the highest proof of his power over the military. I may be wrong, but I am convinced that these reasons, more than those of justice, were the cause of this man's being executed. The fleets have had an action. We have taken the *Ça Ira* and *Censeur*. Two more are supposed to be sunk. The rest of the French fleet is dispersed in every quarter. The *Illustrious* and *Courageux* are dismasted; this is the chief loss we have sustained. Our fleet put into Port Spozzio in a gale of wind. The convoy, with the two line-of-battle ships from Gibraltar, has gone to Leghorn, where the whole of our fleet is again to assemble. The captain of the *Ça Ira* says that their intention was to have landed a body of men in St. Fiorenzo Bay.

25th March.—Yesterday, Pozzo di Borgo delivered a message to Parliament from the Viceroy, to announce Admiral Hotham's victory. After this, he proposed that the House should return their thanks to the different officers who had been instrumental in delivering the island from the government of the French. He began by Lord Hood, then General Dundas, Colonel Villettes, and Admiral Hotham for his late victory. When he sat down a member rose and remarked that Mr. Pozzo di Borgo had forgotten General Stuart, and delivered a panegyric upon that General. Pozzo di Borgo rose the moment General Stuart's name was mentioned, and, with confusion, said it was true that he had forgotten him. As this was not possible, it was an evident lie. But it is hardly conceivable that Sir Gilbert has so little sense as to imagine for a moment that such an attempt could succeed; he has only discovered by it his own folly and meanness, and brought more honour upon General Stuart by having him named by the House and not by his agent. Had the French thrown ashore a body of 4000 or 5000 men, with their arms only, there was nothing to prevent them from being masters of St. Fiorenzo, Bastia, and the heights without firing a shot. So unprepared

were we for any defence, that the utmost we could have done was to escape to Corte, leaving everything behind us. The French would have found in Bastia plenty of provisions and ammunition, and all our cannon. The alarm lasted two days, and yet nothing was done. The General did not even go over to St. Fiorenzo, though he is totally ignorant of the *locale*. I could not think otherwise than that the Viceroy had determined to escape to Corte, and there to capitulate. Ajaccio was without provisions. The only step taken against a future alarm is a two-gun battery which is ordered to be built on a rock on the other side of Martello tower, to defend a bay where we first landed. We shall, in six months, be in exactly as disgraceful a state as we were when the French fleet were off Cape Corse. The French officers belonging to the two captured ships are sent to Corte. The captain of the *Ca Ira* dined with the Viceroy as he passed; he said that a considerable body of men had been embarked in transports at Toulon, that their destination was the bay of Rozza, and from thence to lay siege to Barcelona; that the fleet had come out without the transports with a determination to fight the British fleet; that when he was engaged he expected every moment the French fleet to bear down to his assistance, and he can't conceive now why they did not do it. He believes that the transports are gone to the bay of Rozza. No attack was intended against Corsica. The *Ca Ira* had artillery, camp equipage, and a quantity of small-arms on board.

7th April.—When the French officers, taken in the two captured ships, went from this to Corte, the Viceroy sent an express after them to bring back a Mr. Saliette, a Corsican in the French service; he was brought back and put into the dungeon. There is no reason for treating this gentleman differently from the other officers and prisoners but that he was born in Corsica. He had been many years an officer in the French service. When the Revolution broke out he attached himself to the Republic, as did the greater part of his countrymen; he continued in his attachment,

and was taken in Bastia as an officer when it surrendered. Agreeably to the capitulation he was sent with the other prisoners to France, and now, happening in the course of service to be in the *Ça Ira*, he is again taken prisoner. It is difficult to see why this gentleman should be treated so harshly. The French would be justified, in my opinion, if they were immediately to put Admiral Bligh, General O'Hara, and every English officer they have into close confinement. If the Viceroy thinks it dangerous to allow Mr. Saliette his liberty in Corsica, he should send him back on board ship. I am certain Admiral Hotham would be much displeased if he knew that any officer he took was treated in the manner this gentleman is. The fact is, that the Viceroy, led by Pozzo di Borgo, allows himself to be actuated by the little, mean, illiberal, revengeful passions of that fellow and his adherents. I can hear of no action of the Viceroy that is not subject to criticism. There is, too frequently, a degree of harshness and want of feeling in what he does, such as one would not expect if one had only a superficial acquaintance with him.

A Mr. Caffori, belonging to one of the principal families of this country, was at the Revolution a Royalist; he was an officer, and had been bred in the French service. He and his family, consisting of a wife and a great many children, passed into Italy, and his property was confiscated by a decree of the National Assembly. This gentleman, with some others under similar circumstances, was recalled by the present Government, and arrived in Corsica a short time before the departure of General Stuart. Mr. Caffori's property has not yet been returned to him. He cannot therefore trim his vines—of course they will produce nothing next year; his land in corn will be pretty much in the same situation, and as to his house at Corte, the Viceroy had pitched upon it for himself, made some alterations in it in Mr. Caffori's absence, and is now in possession of the keys. This gentleman and his family are in the greatest want; the little ready money he had was spent during his banishment. He lost his military appointments at the

Revolution, when he was a general officer in the French service. He has now nothing to depend upon but his estate near Corte, which is withheld from him in the most cruel manner. What use was there in recalling him if it was not meant to give him his property? But he is perhaps a proud, honourable old officer who cannot bend the stubborn knee, where thrift may follow fawning.

It is, of course, impossible to imagine that Sir Gilbert was aware of this. It is equally impossible to believe that Moore can be mistaken as to the fact. What it suggests is, that Sir Gilbert was easily imposed upon by those around him.

20th April.—It was reported some days ago that the French fleet at Toulon had been reinforced by five or six ships from Brest. This intelligence is credited, and has caused considerable alarm here. This reinforcement gives the French such a superiority at sea as will enable them to carry on any operations they choose in the Mediterranean. Since our last alarm nothing has been done; but as there are many reasons for thinking that the intentions of the French then were against Corsica, there is still more reason to apprehend an attack now; and it is found necessary, at least, to do something. The General, the other day, spoke to me very seriously, and in a very confidential manner consulted me upon the steps I thought necessary to be taken. He asked me whether, since St. Fiorenzo and Bastia were posts which could not be held, it would not be better not to attempt to defend them. I told him I thought it of the greatest consequence to endeavour to prevent, as long as possible, a landing in the bay of St. Fiorenzo. Though the enemy would probably come in such force that ultimately they would succeed in landing, yet if they saw the different posts guarded they would be more cautious, would delay, and, if in the execution they committed blunders, we should be at hand to take advantage of them, and might thwart them altogether. At

any rate we should gain time. When they had landed, positions might be taken to prevent them for some time from penetrating to Bastia. I then took the liberty of mentioning to the General that the Corsicans, seeing that no steps were ever taken for their defence, except in the moment of alarm, and that, when that was over, everything was neglected, had lost all confidence in us. This I had many opportunities of knowing from my general acquaintance among the Corsicans, who spoke more freely to me than they would to him or to the Viceroy. Without the confidence and cordial support of the inhabitants our force could do little. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance to regain it. This was to be done, not only by taking every measure for the real defence of the island, but by his showing himself to the Militia when assembled, by his conversing and making himself known to them, and giving, in their presence, general directions to their chiefs. The people of this country looked up to military men, and would think themselves secure, and give their support in proportion as they saw the person at the head of the military active. Whatever opinion they might have of the Viceroy's abilities in other respects, they had none in his military talents, and did not like to see him interfering and taking the lead in these matters. With regard to the immediate defence of the Gulf of St. Fiorenzo, it was absolutely necessary for him to examine the ground and acquire a thorough knowledge of the country. From description, he would have but an imperfect idea of it.

We then entered into a conversation upon the most likely points of attack, the posts the most proper for the Militia, those for the British, &c., and he fixed to go with me two days after that and examine the ground in the neighbourhood of St. Fiorenzo. The points I wished to impress on the General were, first, the necessity of his acting from himself, without allowing himself to be so much shackled by the Viceroy, as, by a contrary policy, he had lost the confidence of the Corsicans, upon whom his chief defence must depend; and, secondly, the necessity of

his gaining a general idea of the country, and a minute one of particular posts, without which he would never act to advantage, but must follow at every turn the directions of others. The General and Viceroy went to St. Fiorenzo on the 17th April by desire of Admiral Hotham. I followed on the morning of the 18th. I found the fleet under way. The General told me that the Admiral had determined to go off Toulon. If the French were reinforced and came out, it would still be in his power to avoid an action. He would be more *à portée* to join any reinforcement which might be coming from England, and whilst at sea he would puzzle the enemy and be a much greater check upon their plans than by remaining in port. The Viceroy, Colonel Green, Captain Nepean, and several others breakfasted with Major Brereton, the Commander of St. Fiorenzo, and I found that, instead of the quiet plan proposed by the General at Bastia, we were to go accompanied by the Viceroy and the whole breakfast party.

We embarked two boats full and rowed to a bay beyond the one at which we disembarked when we attacked the Martello Bay in February 1794. A battery is being erected to command the bay we then landed in. When we got ashore much absurd conversation took place, as is always the case in these sort of field councils. The Viceroy was for erecting more batteries for commanding the other bays along the coast, and many of the party confirmed him in this idea. Being of a perfectly different opinion, I said, "You may in this manner go from bay to bay till you get to Calvi; for you will no sooner have erected batteries in one, than you will find another two miles farther on; but, with the force we have, considerable detachments cannot be risked at such a distance from the main body. There is, therefore, a point at which our defence must end; I think it will be sufficient for us to guard the bay of St. Fiorenzo and the hills which command the towers of Martello and Farinole, the 'Convention Redoubt,' &c. Those hills are detached from the rest, are extremely inaccessible, and may be defended with ease by the Militia of the country. If

they should land on this side of Martello tower, the intention of the enemy can only be to gain the Martello Bay for their shipping; but the heights which command it are, as I have already said, so strong, and the enemy may be opposed to such advantage, that I do not think they will attempt it. I therefore rather think that they will endeavour to land on the eastern side of the gulf, somewhere between the tower of Farinole and the town of St. Fiorenzo. I think that we should pay particular attention to that line, without, however, neglecting the heights about which we have been talking. The heights ought, the moment the enemy appears, to be occupied by a large body of the Militia, to whom a British officer of trust should be attached."

This and much more I delivered in a very firm and decided tone; none of the party offered to contradict it; few of them were sufficiently acquainted with the country to have any distinct opinions upon the subject. Nepean, of the Engineers, assented, and Colonel Green, who had been looking very wise the whole morning, began to look more so than ever. The Viceroy was not over pleased that anybody should deliver their sentiments without the smallest deference to his; upon the whole, the scene was rather diverting. We walked up to the signal-house, and dined upon cold meat as we returned. We reached St. Fiorenzo before dark, not much edified by the day's excursion. The next morning I rode back to Bastia with the General. We turned off and examined part of the eastern coast; he complained of having been disturbed yesterday by the crowd, and said he would return with me in a day or two.

I had a great deal of conversation with the General. He is a worthy, easy-tempered man, but seems never, in the course of between thirty or forty years' service, to have thought upon his profession beyond the mere details of his regiment. The scene he is now engaged on is perfectly new to him. He has no confidence in himself, and is so unused to action, that he cannot even execute the ideas suggested to him by others. He also wants firmness;

for, though he feels the bad consequences and disapproves of the interference of the Viceroy, he has not the manliness to tell him so. I fear therefore that, though the island is capable of considerable defence, we shall, between the two of them, cut a very poor figure in case of an attack.

30th April.—The report of the reinforcement from Brest is one day contradicted, the next confirmed. What is extraordinary is that the Viceroy should have no direct intelligence from Toulon. The measures for our defence are being carried on with languor; our only safety, in fact, is in a reinforcement to our fleet. Neither the Viceroy nor General is capable of forming or executing a plan of defence. Either the French fleet is not reinforced, or it is prevented by some internal commotion in the country from coming out; for otherwise their object must have been to fight either our fleet, or the reinforcement we expect with Lord Hood, before these form a junction. Lieutenant-Colonel Wemyss, of the 18th Regiment, is appointed by the Viceroy governor of Calvi. This appointment was made without any communication with the General. This I observed from an accidental circumstance.

10th May.—Colonel Oakes and I accompanied the General a few days ago to St. Fiorenzo. After examining for two days the coast of that gulf we went to Morato, and from thence by Lento to Ponte Noro. We were absent from Bastia three days. It is impossible to be a more worthy or honourable man than General Trigge. He has much good sense, but no military talent. His view was to make himself acquainted with that part of the country, lest the enemy, having landed, and becoming masters of St. Fiorenzo and Bastia, it should be necessary to take up a position to cover Corte and the Algagliola district. It was in consequence of some conversations I had had with him that he took this tour, but I found he had formed no opinion of his own. He went implicitly wherever I directed him. We passed one night with my old acquaintance, Signor Murati, who is lately married to a very pretty woman, whose mother was

formerly a great friend of General Paoli. The Corsicans receive strangers everywhere with much hospitality, and are extremely easy in their manners. The next night we went to Signor Circaldi's at Vicinato, one of the most romantic villages I have seen. I have since returned with Major Collier, of the Artillery, to the same ground as I went over with the General. He is an officer of great zeal and judgment. We agreed that the country about Morato was that by which an enemy would choose to penetrate. It was there the French penetrated in 1769 and 1770. Major Collier examined an iron foundry with a view to having balls cast for the artillery. The ore is brought from Farinole, near St. Fiorenzo, where the stone is found in great quantity.

16th May.—General Paoli left this yesterday; he had been here some days; he was closeted twice with the Viceroy. They differed entirely, and Paoli now speaks openly against him. Paoli told me that he had written home. The other has, I am convinced, written often enough, misrepresenting Paoli. A motion was made in Parliament to ask for Lord Hood's portrait to be hung in the hall. It was made by Pozzo di Borgo, but negatived by the House; a manœuvre of Sir Gilbert's to flatter Lord Hood.

This public snub inflicted by the Assembly on Lord Hood and the Viceroy is very significant, because it no doubt shows the continuance in the mind of Paoli and his friends of those feelings towards Lord Hood which Paoli had displayed in the first interview with Sir Gilbert, already recorded.¹ What makes it the more striking is that the letters from both Sir Gilbert and Lord Hood to Paoli, contained in the collection in the British Museum, can only be described as flattering and unctuous. Hood's subscription to Paoli is latterly represented by that of 27th May 1794, which is "Your Excellency's very faithful friend and affectionate humble

¹ See *ante*, p. 29.

servant." Similarly, Elliot's letters are subscribed, "Your Excellency's most obedient and affectionate humble servant," and the letters bear the same stamp. When it came to deeds Lord Hood ignored the Corsican commander of the troops in signing the convention for the surrender of Bastia, and Sir Gilbert acted towards Paoli as here disclosed. They evidently both expected to hoodwink him as to their real feelings towards him, and they did not succeed; whereas Moore, speaking with his usual blunt veracity, and showing his habitual self-devotion to the common cause, gained Paoli's confidence. I believe this to have been the main origin of the Viceroy's unfounded suspicions of Moore.

16th May, continued.—The fleet sailed the 9th from Leghorn, and are now supposed to be off Toulon.

27th May.—The fleet continue to cruise; they keep near Minorca. The French were out with eighteen sail, but went in upon hearing that our fleet was out. Two fast-sailing gunboats sent by them to reconnoitre were taken by our frigates. Colonel Oakes having business at Isola Rozza, I accompanied him there; we afterwards went to Calvi, and returned by Pietra Alba and the mountains. We returned here last night. Calvi is in much better order than when I last saw it. The cavalier in Mozzello is repaired and strengthened. The breaches are being repaired; the rubbish is cleared from the ramparts in the town, and the batteries are in tolerable order. All idea of an attack upon this island has now ceased. This is, of course, the time to make preparations; we shall again be in danger when the sickly season is over. The last alarms have been of some use, though they have not done us all the good we might have hoped.

By the last messenger I had a long letter from General Stuart, in which he mentions that on looking over his despatches in the Secretary of State's office chance brought to his hand a paper to this effect:—

“‘VICTORY,’ OFF CALVI, *the 11th August 1794*.—A person (whose name I forget) going with Arena to France voluntarily deposed that after the Mozzello was taken there were only 180 barrels of powder in Calvi; that a day and a half’s firing would have forced them to surrender; that they were under the greatest obligations for our General’s forbearance; that the whole of their military force, including sick, did not exceed 300 men; that, including seamen and Corsicans, they did not exceed 900.” Was anything wanting to confirm me in the opinion of Lord Hood’s infamy and meanness it would be the above, which he had the stupidity and villainy to send to the Secretary of State. It is odd how at times men gain reputation. Lord Hood is looked up to in the navy; his mind is *borné* and illiberal to a degree, and all his actions in the Mediterranean have been unwise. His stupid obstinacy prevented the French fleet from being destroyed in Toulon, risked his own, and forced the troops to retreat in the most scandalous manner in confusion and with the loss of everything but the clothes upon their backs. We have just heard that he does not return with the reinforcements. I am glad of it, for he is so false and so unmanageable, that it is impossible for any General to carry on service with him.

17th June.—I returned on the 14th from a fortnight’s tour through the island with General Trigge. We visited the places where I had been so often before, Corte, Ajaccio, and Bonifacio, but returning by Ajaccio we crossed the country from Sartene to Corte, and passed through Oli, Zievo, and Ghisoni. By this means we had an opportunity of visiting some of the most interior parts of the island. Nothing can be more romantic or magnificent than great part of the country through which we passed. Mountain, wood, water, and rocks are beautifully intermingled. The trees are chiefly pine, evergreen, and white oak, and the chestnut. The produce of the latter is the chief food of the inhabitants of those mountainous regions. We were everywhere received with great hospitality, though we had no

recommendations. In the middle of the day we stopped to refresh ourselves and our horses at the village, riding up to the house to which the guide directed us, generally that of the podesta or curate. In the evening we did the same, and had everything the houses or villages could afford produced for us. It consisted sometimes of a little mutton, oftener of cheese, milk, bread, wine, and excellent water. The good air and water are the things on which they seem most to pride themselves. They never fail to tell how much better these are here than in the towns or lower parts of the island. Their greatest want is corn; very little grain is produced in the mountains; but the villages of the interior parts have all, in the plains upon the coast, twenty-five and thirty miles off, properties which they descend to cultivate. They also visit these possessions for the harvest, and return with the produce to the mountains to pass the summer. It is impossible to give a greater proof of the scarcity of population. This want of hands, together with the natural indolence of the inhabitants, is the great cause of the island's being so unproductive. It remains to be tried what effect peace and security will have in remedying these evils. The case of Corsican manners is remarkable. In the most remote parts of the mountains we never saw them the least disconcerted; they conversed with us with the same ease as they did with one another.

It was thought that an enemy landing in the Gulf of Valinco might attempt to penetrate to Corte by this route. I was therefore anxious to examine it. I am now convinced that such an attempt could not succeed. The country in general is extremely difficult, but, every here and there, there are places where a very small number of men could stop any force whatever. The same difficulties occur for any movement towards Ajaccio from Valinco. Upon the whole, I am convinced that an enemy wishing to make a serious attempt upon Corsica would choose the bay of Ajaccio or St. Fiorenzo as their place of debarkation, perhaps both. A square redoubt is being erected near Ajaccio on Point

Apiesto, intended for a hundred men and two guns, 18-pounders. The inside is of masonry, the outside riveted with fascines. It is intended to defend the approach on this side of an enemy who had landed in the bay of Valinco, or on the side of the bay opposite to Ajaccio. In conjunction with the tower of Capanella it will defend the anchorage of the upper harbour. A tower with a battery would have answered both purposes better, as being less liable to assault, requiring fewer men to defend it, and, from its height, commanding a greater range of country, and searching the ravines better. A body of troops could be within 100 yards of the redoubt and yet covered from its fire. A square redoubt, from the want of flanks, is of all others the work most easily assaulted.

In the most remote parts of the country the people inquired for General Stuart, and asked when he was to return. These inquiries could not be very pleasant to General Trigge. The attachment they all have to the former is astonishing. Upon our return to Bastia we found the Viceroy prepared to set out on a tour to Corte, Ajaccio, &c. He takes an escort of troops, &c., and means to show himself in state to such places as Pozzo di Borgo may think it safe to introduce him.

This is unquestionably the Viceroy's tour which is described on pp. 300-310, vol. ii., of Sir Gilbert's Life; but Moore did not accompany him, and after noting, as above, Sir Gilbert's departure, he now continues his description of the country as seen on his own tour.

From Sartene the road runs for the distance of ten or twelve miles along the banks of the Rizzanese (the Valinco), a very beautiful river, having the village of Tasso on the side of the mountain, to the right, Loreto on the left, Carigiaci Zerubia on the right. The land on each side of the river is tolerably cultivated, and produces grain of different kinds. Aulla, where we dined, is fifteen miles from

Sartene, and is surrounded with chestnut trees. The village contains 400 men fit to bear arms. We stopped at the curate's, the Abbé Chiarone, whose brother, Michel Antoni, recollects me. He had served as a sergeant at Calvi, and was discontented that he had not been made an officer in one of the battalions. The road from Aulla to Lacera winds along the side of the mountains. From the neighbourhood of Aulla you see the countries of Istria and Ornano as far as the sea. The road is through woods of chestnut, oaks, pines, and myrtle arbutus, and other beautiful shrubs, magnificent rocks, water rushing down them. In the evening we reached Zievo, a considerable village, and most delightfully situated. Abbatucci, a principal leader who took the part of the Republic, is from Zievo. From Zievo our route led to Ghisoni through the Foco di Verde, and from that over the mountain of Sorba to Vivario, where we stopped with my old friend the curate Pantalucci.

At the commencement of the Revolution Abbatucci assembled a force at Zievo in favour of the Republic. This caused great alarm; a body of men marched from Ajaccio to Ornano, and letters were despatched to all quarters to collect a force there to march against Abbatucci. The curate Pantalucci, among others, was directed to send the Militia of his village to Ornano. Instead of obeying this order he took upon himself to send his brother with 100 men over the mountains, which we crossed by Ghisoni, at a time when from snow they were deemed impassable. This small force, appearing suddenly from so unexpected a quarter, while the attention of the enemy was turned another way towards Ornano, alarmed Abbatucci's party so much that they dispersed, and he himself was obliged to fly. Had Pantalucci obeyed literally the orders sent to him, the event might have been exactly the reverse. The country by Ornano is so difficult, that Abbatucci would most probably have defeated any force attempting to approach that way. With a regular army, an officer commanding at Vivario would probably not have been sufficiently acquainted with the country to have thought of moving as

Pantalucci directed, but if he had, he would still have been afraid of taking upon himself to act contrary to his orders. The good sense of that curate, and that independence which men acquire when acting in times of revolution, gave a complete turn to affairs and perhaps saved the party.

5th July.—I accompanied the General the other day to Calvi. As it was the first time of his being there he was curious to be shown all our operations. We began at the landing-place, and fought the battle regularly over. Upon our return to St. Fiorenzo we found Admiral Hotham and the fleet, reinforced from England by six sail of the line. The 100th Regiment (Gordon Highlanders), under the Marquis of Huntly, had also arrived. The Admiral reported to General Trigge that a lieutenant of the 11th Regiment, serving as marines on board the *Diadem*, had behaved so ill to the captain (Tyler), that he had been obliged to order a court-martial upon him. The General informed me of it upon our return to Bastia, and next day he received a letter from Lieutenant FitzGerald informing him that he was under arrest, and to be tried next day by a navy court-martial, claiming therefore the General's protection, and requesting that his conduct might be investigated by an army court, the only one, as he conceived, to which he was amenable. This question has never been decided, whether officers of the army, when serving as marines, are liable to be tried by naval courts-martial. We have never yet considered ourselves exactly as marines when serving in that situation, and have always expected, and generally experienced, a greater degree of attention from the officers of the navy than what they conceived themselves obliged to pay to the marines. It has, however, been the source of endless disputes between the two services. Those disputes were, perhaps, never higher than at present in the Mediterranean fleet, which is supplied with marines almost entirely from the army. Three duels have taken place between officers of the navy and those of the army serving on board, and there is hardly a ship in which some disagreeable altercation has

not taken place. From everything I have heard, I am apt to think the behaviour of the captains of the fleet has been a little too haughty. Their manners at best when on board of their ships are not the most amiable.

The General sent to the Admiral to endeavour to stop the court-martial, as he thought it would but foment the ill-blood which already subsisted too much between the two services, and would besides force Government to a decision which in the present circumstances they would rather not have brought before them. The Admiral said he had done all he could to prevent the affair being brought to this point, but the young man was headstrong; that now the order for the court was issued, and could not be revoked. I found from conversation with several other captains that it was their wish that this point should be decided.

I slept on board of H.M.S. *Captain*, Captain Reeves, and went with him in the morning to the court-martial. Lieutenant FitzGerald gave in a paper very ill-composed, the purport of which was to deny the legality of the Court, and therefore to decline pleading before it. The Court, notwithstanding this protest, proceeded to call in witnesses for the prosecution. I left them, as it was necessary for me to go back to Bastia. Next day the General received a letter from the Admiral enclosing the sentence of the court-martial, which was to dismiss Lieutenant FitzGerald the ship, and render him incapable of holding any military employment. The Admiral, therefore, desired an officer might be sent to replace him. The General's answer was, that he could not send another officer, as there were none belonging to the 11th Regiment who were not particularly employed; that he knew of no law, order, or precedent which authorised naval courts-martial to try officers of the army; he therefore could not consider Lieutenant FitzGerald as dismissed the service, and ordered him to join his regiment, and he should transmit the whole proceedings home.

CHAPTER VI

MOORE'S EXPULSION FROM CORSICA

3rd August.—The Viceroy returned a few days ago from a tour of the island. When at Ajaccio, the officers of Colonel Colonna's battalion of Corsicans determined to give him a ball. The hall of the municipality, in which was placed the bust of General Paoli, was chosen for the purpose. Captain Colonna, aide-de-camp to the Viceroy, when some of the officers were assembled to consult about decorating the room, &c., pointing to the bust said, "What business has that old charlatan here?" He took it down and threw it into a small closet. Some struck their stilettoes into it and destroyed it. This was known next day, and made considerable noise in the town and country. This bust was replaced by another in the possession of Mr. Peraldi, and Mr. Pozzo di Borgo wrote, by order of the Viceroy, to General Paoli, to assure him that no affront whatever had been offered to his bust; the report was a mere calumny. It, however, gained ground in the country, and was the more firmly believed, that it was authenticated by a *procès verbal* taken on the spot and circulated. It gave daily more and more umbrage to the people to see that not only was no punishment inflicted upon a person guilty of an action which they felt as an affront done to the whole people of Corsica, but that he was allowed to remain about the person of the Viceroy. The discontent was increased because of a disagreement which was supposed to exist between General Paoli and the Viceroy. People, I understand, thought it their duty to wait upon him from Rostino, from every part of the country, to express their displeasure at what Captain Colonna had done and at the countenance he continued to receive from the Viceroy.

Paoli's answer to Pozzo di Borgo was, that they would do well to clear their conduct to the people of Corsica; that as for himself, he laughed at it. In the meantime the Viceroy returned to Bastia. I found that those who had been with him affected ignorance of the whole matter, though it had been the subject of conversation and correspondence for a fortnight over the whole island. I had long promised to pay General Paoli a visit, but had been hitherto prevented. I set out upon the 30th July (two or three days after the Viceroy's return to Bastia) with Lord Huntly, Colonel Oakes, and Colonel Giampietta for Rostino. We passed two days very pleasantly with Paoli, who received us with great kindness and politeness. We heard, when there, that Pozzo di Borgo and Colonna had been burned in effigy in all the different villages of the Casinca and the neighbourhood of Rostino.

Paoli spoke without affectation of the impropriety of the Viceroy countenancing a man who had been guilty of so ungentlemanly an action as that of the bust. He also, with great moderation, reprobated many other parts of the Viceroy's conduct; he regretted the Viceroy's want of judgment as a misfortune to his country. We returned to Bastia yesterday by La Porta, where we dined with Signor Galuicci. We were here informed that on the previous night, the people of the village had burned Pozzo di Borgo in straw in front of Signor Frediana's home, which was being prepared for the reception of the Viceroy, who intended passing the summer months in it. They also gave Frediana to understand that as to the Viceroy, they would be happy to see him; but if Pozzo di Borgo came, they would burn his (Frediana's) house or any other that received him. We also heard here that orders had been given on the previous day in Bastia for the guards to load, and patrols were kept going during the whole night; that the Viceroy had called the officers of Giampietro's battalion together, had taxed them with disaffection and of having made use of improper language, and told them that if any were disaffected they might resign. The Major answered

that he was surprised to hear his Excellency speak to them in that manner. He believed they could not be accused of disobedience to orders, or any disaffection. If any officers had made use of improper expressions, he wished that his Excellency would name the persons.

The people of La Penta received us with shouts of "Viva gli Inglesi," and gave no signs of insurrection or discontent against the English, though every person in the country with whom we conversed declared their dislike to Pozzo di Borgo and Colonna. After dinner Messrs. Galliani and Frediani, who were summoned to attend the Council, accompanied us to Bastia. I find this morning that what I was told at La Penta was true, and that the garrison has been in great alarm. General Trigge has been ill for some days. I talked to him of the impropriety of showing any diffidence of the people. At present they were perfectly quiet; their great veneration for Paoli made them feel every affront that was offered to him. They were so incensed against Pozzo di Borgo and Colonna that, did not Paoli endeavour to restrain them, they would probably ere now have put these gentlemen to death. But as to the Viceroy and the English they were perfectly well affected, and the Viceroy would have acted more wisely had he dismissed, instead of supported, Colonna after his mean behaviour to the bust. I did not see the use of what the Viceroy was attempting, that of making a party against Paoli. He would have done better to have governed through his influence. It was with him that the original agreement was made by the Viceroy himself, and through him we were received into the country, and to break with him seemed to me perfect folly. If we had not his goodwill and that of the people, the sooner we made our retreat the better. Some of the Corsican battalion, about twenty-five of them, had got out of their barracks last night and got drunk; in returning home they called out "Viva Paoli," were taken up by the patrol, and some of them confined. I advised the General to take no further notice of it than to speak to the Lieutenant-Colonel Giampietri, and direct him to be more careful to keep his

men in their quarters at night. The General had intended to give some public order, but in consequence of what I said he desired me to speak to Giampietri.

The Corsican battalion is suspected of disaffection. I am just come from the citadel. I was passing the evening with some ladies there about nine o'clock, and I was surprised to see the 100th Regiment getting under arms. I went out and happened to meet Lord Huntly, who told me he had orders to keep a picquet of 100 men under arms, and to be ready at a moment's notice to turn out with the regiment; that the 18th were actually under arms, and five pieces of cannon loaded with grape and canister were ready at the dungeon barracks; that he had seen the Governor, who was mightily agitated and full of an insurrection. In walking up the streets with him they had passed some children, who had made a straw fire. The Governor, with great violence, dispersed the fire and the boys. One of the latter, frightened, fell a-crying, and his father came out of the shop to see what was the matter. The Governor, still upon stilts, told him not to say a word, or he would order his house to be burned. I walked home about ten o'clock with Oakes; the town was perfectly quiet; we met the Governor, who assured us that the Corsican battalion was disaffected, and meant to come out and burn Pozzo di Borgo; that Giampietri was a great scoundrel; that guards were at all gates to fire upon any body of men coming from the country. Major Murati, of the Corsicans, has just left me; he came to ask me what was the matter; they are afraid, he said, of our battalion, and "all the English are under arms against us. Our people are asleep in their barracks!" I told him it was impossible to account for such folly; that the Viceroy, &c., were behaving like children; that I hoped that the Corsican officers would behave like men, keep quiet, and take no notice of what they saw.

4th August.—The General this morning gave me orders to direct the Corsican battalion to march to Corte; they are to march accordingly to-morrow evening. If they do so quietly, they will give a great instance of forbearance and

obedience. Few corps would have suffered their barracks to be surrounded as theirs were with sentries, more especially as they knew that if they had sent out into the country they would have been supported by whatever number of men they chose. This night the precautions are not to be so great; picquets only are to be ready to turn out, and patrols to go every hour. The lieutenant-colonel and major dined with us to-day; they saw and had a conversation with the Viceroy, who, they said, was confused and agitated; he rather softened matters, and asked them to dinner, but said he was determined to support Pozzo di Borgo at all risks. Had the Viceroy, in the first instance, dismissed his aide-de-camp, Captain Colonna, for a very foolish, mean action, he would have prevented all this uproar. By a series of rash, absurd actions he committed the troops as far as depended on him. Had the Corsicans been equally intemperate, and one shot been fired, we must have been driven out of the country. The fact is, that the people in general have great goodwill to us individually. Paoli's party, the one Sir Gilbert has quarrelled with, wish to be united with us as a nation, and dread the misconduct of Sir Gilbert as most likely to bring about a rupture.

6th August.—The battalion marched last night without the least disturbance.

11th August.—The Council have advised the Viceroy to dismiss Pozzo di Borgo, and to call Parliament together as the only means of quieting the people. He said he would rather die than give up his friend. Rostini and the Casinca have already petitioned for the removal of Pozzo di Borgo and calling the Parliament. Other districts are expected to follow their example. It is thought by the counsellors (I have spoken to several of them) that the Viceroy will stick to Pozzo di Borgo at all events. He is, they say, directed by him like a child. They dread a disturbance and the loss of the British connection and protection. The *Dolphin* sailed last night to Civita Vecchia for Mr. North, the Secretary of State.

In order to present the full facts of the incident of the bust, I here give what is said on the other side in the biography of Sir Gilbert Elliot, vol. ii. p. 319. Sir Gilbert writes to Lady Elliot:—

“BASTIA, 2nd August 1795.—General Paoli is playing the D—— with a vengeance; the pretence is an absurd lie, which was invented whilst I was at Ajaccio. The Corsican battalion gave me a ball. It seems there was a plaster bust of Paoli in the room where we were to dance; it was necessary to remove it in order to make rooms and to put up some ornaments and devices for the occasion. I never knew of the bust existing, or heard one syllable about it, till ten or twelve days afterwards Pozzo di Borgo received letters from Cortò saying that information had been sent to Paoli that his bust had been insulted, broken to pieces, &c., by Captain Colonna, my aide-de-camp. The fact is, that Colonna had not been in the house *at all*, and that on my return to Ajaccio I saw the bust with no visible damage but about the thickness of a wafer rubbed off the nose, which appeared like an old sore.

“Pozzo di Borgo wrote to Paoli to contradict the story; Paoli's answer treated it as true. Colonna then wrote to deny it on his word of honour. Paoli declared his intention not to answer, and wrote the original story all over the country; he has had Pozzo di Borgo burnt in effigy in several villages, and a petition is being signed asking me to remove him. Of course all this is mere pretext, nothing in the world shall induce me to move one inch; if this island is incapable of bearing a good government we had better give it up; it is not worth a bad one, even if we were capable of attempting such.”

Now that this is what Sir Gilbert with his whole heart believed, there cannot be a question. But the point is, that even in this letter to his wife he changes the purport of Paoli's answer to Pozzo di Borgo. What Paoli had said was, "that they would do well to clear their conduct to the people of Corsica." I submit that, from the point of view of Sir Gilbert's duty to the King, in the preservation of our authority in an island very important to us, this was the essential thing; seeing that, by Sir Gilbert's own showing, our hold on the island depended on our having the Corsicans heartily with us. There was only one way to do it. Pitt's mode of meeting Moore when accused (p. 179) may serve as model. The right thing to do was obviously for the Viceroy to hold himself haughtily impartial until the facts had been established by an inquiry as independent as fearless, as free from any imaginable taint of influence by him or by Pozzo di Borgo as he could devise. He appears to have been aware that Colonel Moore had become exceedingly alarmed at the course things were taking. He knew that he was much liked by the Corsican people, and trusted by Paoli. He knew also that he was a man who, whatever his previous impressions had been, would have been incapable of finding a verdict against Colonna, or against Pozzo, if, when the evidence was fairly sifted, it proved that the story about the bust was, as Sir Gilbert thought, "an absurd lie." Obviously he would have been one of the men who, both in Sir Gilbert's interest and in that of the British Crown, ought to have been appointed on a commission of inquiry to sift the evidence, and it could not have been difficult to select others above all suspicion who would promptly have stamped out "an absurd lie." What Sir Gilbert, by the account of his biographer, did do

was to look at a bust which was shown him as being the bust that had been broken in pieces, and to obtain from Captain Colonna the assurance that he had had nothing to do with the matter.

The difficulty in accepting this evidence as conclusive is, that it did not meet the charge which had been preferred. In two serious official documents, one a *procès verbal* drawn up by the "podesta" of Bastia, the other by the procurator, both of them well-known Corsican officials, the general charge had been made. What was averred, as will be seen by Moore's contemporary Diary, was that, after the original bust had been smashed by the stilettos of Sir Gilbert's Corsican staff, another was substituted for it to show to Sir Gilbert and the public. That new bust was obtained from a man well known to both Sir Gilbert, to Moore, and to the Corsicans. Signor Peraldi's name appears often in the Diary before any question of the kind had arisen. It appears also in the Life of Sir Gilbert. When Moore first met him (Peraldi) he was commandant at Ajaccio. He had been, like Pozzo, a delegate to the National Assembly of France. He was one of the three commissioners sent by France to La Fayette's army during the War of Independence in America. He was one of the few deputies to the Corsican House who managed to get through to Corte on its first meeting there. Altogether Signor Peraldi was a man from whose house it could hardly be falsely alleged that a bust had been removed without its becoming known, at least to the English officers, that the charge was untrue. He appears to have allowed it to be taken by Pozzo expressly in order to avoid scandal. To Moore and the other English officers the question whether it was so substituted for the smashed bust or not, could hardly be

a matter of doubt, and the fact that Moore in his private Diary records it as a fact certainly implies that he had ascertained that it was so from M. Peraldi, whom he knew well.

On the whole, I think that there can be little doubt that the only supposition, which reconciles all the various evidence, such as it is, is that the old bust was destroyed; whether, as alleged, by the stilettos of the officers of the Viceroy's staff, or by some carelessness in removing it for the purposes of the ball, it is impossible to say; that another, belonging to M. Peraldi, was substituted by Pozzo or by some of those who were conscious of the seriousness of the matter after the event and wished to screen themselves. But then, if that is so, the fact, which Moore also records, that the officers of the Viceroy's staff who had been at the ball pretended never to have heard about the question at all, gives a more sinister turn to the suspicion. Some of them at least, if not Pozzo, had deliberately deceived the Viceroy. It is quite inconceivable that none of them should have ever heard about a matter that was agitating the whole country. The fact that they pretended this ignorance makes on the whole for the presumption, even in the beginning of the twentieth century, that substantially the story as believed by the Corsicans was true. The expression attributed to Colonna, "that old charlatan," whether he used it or not, is, as shown by Lady Elliot's own letters a little later, exactly what she and her husband said privately of Paoli at the very time that the Viceroy was loading him with flattery. At all events, the vital point was not whether the story was true or false, but that, if it was false, the Corsicans should have had its falsity brought home to them; that if it was true, Colonna, or

whoever else had deceived the Viceroy, should have been, at whatever sacrifice of personal feeling, dismissed. It cannot be just to make it, as Sir Gilbert Elliot's biographer does,¹ a crime against Paoli that, in spite of the disclaimers of Pozzo and Colonna, corroborated by the Viceroy, he continued to treat it as true, and to assume that it was so in writing to his friends. It was the inevitable consequence to be expected from this failure to meet his point that they "would do well to clear their conduct to the people of Corsica." As he believed that the Viceroy had been imposed upon, and as, in fact, it is manifest that he was, the Viceroy's corroboration could not affect the question.

For Pozzo and for Colonna the one clear course of honour, and the only one, was to demand an independent inquiry into the facts. Moreover, it is evident² that the Home Government assumed that Sir Gilbert had of course made such an inquiry. As this was beyond all dispute the first serious event which excited universal feeling throughout the island, leading up to the ultimate revolt, it has been very necessary to make the facts clear. Nevertheless it is an entirely gratuitous assumption that the excitement was due to any action on the part of Paoli. The two *procès verbaux* were drawn up in Bastia, and were immediately circulated throughout the country, Paoli being far away in his own house at the time. It appears that Sir Gilbert's assertion that Paoli *had had* "Pozzo di Borgo burnt in effigy in several villages," merely represents what Pozzo wished him to believe. Moore's direct evidence, from intimate knowledge of the Corsicans, that it was only Paoli who restrained them from

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii, p. 321.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 327 note.

greater violence, appears to be more entitled to our credence.

From the point of view of conciliating the Viceroy, which it was very much in Moore's interest to do, it was certainly a most rash act to pay a visit to Paoli at this moment, but it is to be observed that it appears to have been a mere accident that it took place just then. The visit had been long promised, and duty had prevented Moore from fulfilling his promise earlier. Moreover, the Viceroy and Paoli were ostensibly on the best of terms, and it was an avowed object of our policy to maintain the friendliest possible relations both with Paoli and with the Corsicans generally. Moore's whole effort at each point was to keep them on good terms with us. It will hardly be believed that this friendly visit is at least one of the strongest points in an accusation subsequently made against Moore, and apparently also against Lord Huntly, Colonel Oakes, and Colonel Giampietri, who accompanied him, that they contemplated becoming *Frondeurs*, as Sir Gilbert's biographer phrases it. It appears that about this date Paoli wrote, or was alleged to have written, some extravagant letters, in which he declared that he was in correspondence with the King, who was about to put him in place of Sir Gilbert at the head of affairs, and Moore in command of the troops.¹ The summary of the letters suggests forgery or mere gossip. They are utterly unlike anything else known to have been written by Paoli, and are contrary to the whole tenor of his life. Both Sir Gilbert and Moore had been struck at an early stage by Paoli's political capacity, and these are the letters of an ignorant imbecile.

¹ "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 322.

Even if they were genuine letters, it was extravagant beyond words to assume that Moore could have had part or lot in them. Moore, as Sir Gilbert was aware, had been a member of Parliament, had seen the formation of Sir Gilbert's party in the House, and knew well its importance and strength. It is therefore incredible that he should have imagined that he could cause Sir Gilbert's removal from his position as Viceroy by any means whatever, even if that had been his wish. But supposing even that absurdity, it is utterly ridiculous to suggest that he could for a moment have fancied that Sir Gilbert's tenure of office would be imperilled as a consequence of any action of his in Corsica. Moore had many friends of much influence at home, and had been very popular in the House. Had he been given to intrigue, it would have been through his English friends at home, and not through Corsicans, that he would have worked against Sir Gilbert. It is clear enough from this Diary that he felt the most profound anxiety as to the consequences which must follow, and in fact did follow, from many of Sir Gilbert's actions; but, though in it he records these point by point, and we may see as in a glass into his mind, there is throughout the whole of it only one sentence which shows him to have ever said a word to any Corsican in disparagement of the Viceroy. It was certainly a rash expression, but the provocation was extreme, and it was given forth in a moment of great danger, to prevent actual collision between the British and Corsican troops. When Major Murati came to him and said, "All the English are under arms against us. Our people are asleep in bed," Moore, who had been watching the panic-stricken action of the Viceroy, and had heard from the Viceroy's own mouth the

statement that "guards were at all the gates to fire upon any body of men coming from the country," told Murati that "it was impossible to account for such folly; that the Viceroy and the rest of them were behaving like children," certainly a case of *lèse-majesté*, hastily and in my judgment, probably in Moore's also on calm reflection, wrongly uttered, all the more so because it was the exact truth. It was a thing to be thought, not said. But men who speak so openly are not of the stuff of which intriguers are made. Nevertheless the very fact of its being written down at once in the Diary tends to show that in no other case had Moore let any Corsican know his thoughts touching the things he saw.

It is expressly alleged by Sir Gilbert's biographer that it was because Paoli had written that "Moore was to be put at the head of the troops," that Sir Gilbert told the Government at home that Moore had been taking part in the politics of the island and acting with the party opposed to him. Seeing that the Corsican deputies to England had actually suspected Sir Gilbert himself of having stolen a portrait of the King set in brilliants which had been sent as a special present to Paoli, and lost in transit, and that Paoli had suspected that the English Minister had stolen it, one almost fancies Sir Gilbert might have been more cautious in being influenced by such March madness.

1st October.—The General informed me this morning by the Viceroy's direction that my connection with the people of the island who opposed his measures, the countenance and support I gave them, helped to thwart his views, and made it impossible for him to carry on the government if I remained in the island; that he had represented to the

Secretary of State at home that I was an exceedingly good officer, who might be employed to advantage, but, as my conduct in those other respects did injury here, he wished I could be promoted or employed elsewhere; that the Secretary of State's answer empowered him to send me home. The Viceroy desired the General to communicate this, to say that as he conceived it impossible for him and me to remain in Corsica, unless I broke off my connection with the people who opposed him, and in future, as far as I could, supported his government, that he should be obliged to make use of the power given to him. The General delivered this in a very handsome manner, said he was extremely sorry for it, and assured me that he knew nothing of the matter till last night. I expressed much indignation at the Viceroy's conduct. I said that he had taken upon him to represent to the Minister and the King what was utterly false, and had thereby done what he could to injure me. His recommending me for promotion and employment elsewhere by stating my misconduct was absurd. The General recommended me to think upon the subject before I gave him my final answer. After considering the matter for some hours I called upon the General. I am just returned from him. I told him to say to the Viceroy that the message he had sent to me had surprised me very much; that I felt myself much injured by his having given such a representation of my conduct to the Secretary of State and to the King; that it was unfounded, and that I should have expected that, before he had taken so decided a step, he would have mentioned his intention to me personally or through the General. As to the last part of the message, being conscious of no crime or impropriety of conduct, I could promise no change; but I expected before he took any final determination that he would point out more distinctly what he meant or alluded to, that he would allow me an interview, and before the General hear what I had to say.

2nd October.—I went this morning with the General to

the Viceroy at nine o'clock. Mr. North was in the room. I said I could not but be surprised at the message I received yesterday by General Trigge; that I had since I was in Corsica and during my whole service endeavoured to do my duty to the utmost of my power; that my ambition had always been to distinguish myself and to establish my character as an officer. I was not sensible of ever having acted in any manner that was improper or unbecoming. I could not but therefore be surprised to find that he had represented my conduct to the King's Ministers and to the King in such a manner as to induce them to give him power to dismiss me from the situation I held in the army in Corsica; that he must have been misinformed, for his misrepresentation was unfounded. With regard to the alternative that he gave me, of either quitting the island or promising to break off the connection I had with those who opposed his government, and in future to give his government my support, I was at a loss to understand what was meant, and hoped he would be more explicit.

He said that I had for a considerable time past appeared to have a degree of personal enmity to him, for what reason he knew not (here he paid me some compliments); that I had taken a decided part against his measures, and the influence this had upon the Corsicans was great; that he had felt the effect of it severely, and found it did such injury that he had conceived it incumbent upon him to represent it to the Secretary of State, and to beg that I might be removed from the island. That he had orders so to do, but would take it upon himself to postpone the execution of them if I would promise no longer to be connected with those who opposed him, or express any sentiments disapproving of his measures, but, on the contrary, give his government my support. I said I could give no promise to approve of measures till I was made acquainted with them, and it must then depend upon my opinion at the time; that as long as I executed my military duty, I conceived I was at liberty to give my opinion of different measures, either of his or any government, as

often as these measures happened to be the subject of conversation; that I always had in common with other officers given my opinion upon what was going on, sometimes approving, sometimes disapproving; that neither he nor any other man had any right to exact from me a contrary conduct; and that I would not allow any private interested motive to extract from me a promise which I thought it was unbecoming for me to give.

He said that he should, in that case, feel himself obliged to execute his Majesty's orders. I said I might be sent home and others might follow, but, till he had sent away every officer of the army, I did not believe he could carry his point; that officers would continue to avow their opinions of his measures; that as long as these did not affect their actions, they would consider he had no business to check them; that his conduct to me was, in a high degree, arbitrary and oppressive; that the army, I was certain, would think it so, and that they would not be so abject as to express their approbation of, perhaps, the most unjustifiable act of his whole government. I denied his assertion that I had ever taken any part in the politics of this country, and defied him to point out any specific action of mine which authorised the representations he had made.

The above is the substance of what I said, but the conversation lasted upwards of half-an-hour; during which my feelings were so strong, and my indignation such as at times to bring tears to my eyes, and for moments to stop my speech. I repeated, however, with much force how unjust and arbitrary his proceeding was, and how little it was calculated to gain the approbation and support he wished; that, hitherto, officers had conceived themselves as much as any other individuals at liberty to express their sentiments upon every subject; that to attempt to deprive them of this, was a degree of tyranny till now unexampled; that as to my personal dislike to him, which he had stated, I owned that his behaviour to me had given me offence, that I was ignorant of what had occasioned it, but I had felt it. This had actuated me no otherwise than to prevent

me from being so much with him as I otherwise might. I confined my visits to those of respect which were due to his public situation, as I never chose to force myself upon people who seemed cold to me. He read to me part of his public despatch, which stated that I had taken part in the politics of this country; that he disapproved of my taking any part, but still more against himself, and therefore, &c. &c. I denied the fact, and told him that it was impossible for him to give a single instance. I got up, saying that I supposed he would communicate through the General his determination. A few hours after I left him I received two letters, of which the following are copies:—

BASTIA, *2nd October*.—SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you, that I have received a despatch from his Grace the Duke of Portland, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, commanding me to intimate to Lieutenant-Colonel Moore "that it is his Majesty's pleasure that he should quit the island in eight and forty hours, or as soon after as a passage can be obtained for him, and that he should come directly home, when his Majesty's further pleasure will be signified to him." I am, therefore, to request that you will communicate the same to Colonel Moore in order to his compliance therewith.—I have the honour to be, &c. (a true copy),
(Signed) GILBERT ELLIOT.

THOS. TRIGGE, Lieutenant-General.

BASTIA, *2nd October 1795*.—SIR,—I enclose the copy of a letter I have received from his Excellency the Viceroy. I have only to say that I am extremely sorry that anything should have occurred to deprive me of so able, and so pleasant an assistant in my military business.—I have the honour, &c. THOS. TRIGGE, Lieutenant-General.

To Lieutenant-Colonel MOORE, Adjutant-General, &c.

FLORENCE, *4th October 1795*.—I settled my business in Corsica with as much despatch as I could, paid a visit to my regiment at Corte, and sailed in the *Vannean* the

morning of the 9th. The attention I received from almost every individual of the army showed the sense they entertained of Sir Gilbert's conduct. I received also many marks of friendship from the Corsicans. The battalion at Corte waited upon me in a body, as also the Supreme Council. Upon my return from Corte I received a letter from General Paoli to inform me that he was also going to England, and proposing to me to accompany him. This I declined. His departure surprised me much; it is, I believe, in consequence of a letter from the King. The great object of Sir Gilbert for this long time has been to bring this about, but I fear the consequence will be the reverse of what he expects. I think General Paoli's presence curbed his countrymen and prevented their acting with the violence to which they were inclined from their dislike to the Viceroy and his measures. I think it probable that upon Paoli's departure there will be immediate confusion.

I landed at Leghorn the 10th, and set out for this place the 11th. I dined at Pisa, a very handsome town, but thinly inhabited. The road to Florence is excellent, and the country in higher cultivation than any part of England, covered with houses well built. Everything bears the appearance of the most and longest civilised country of modern Europe. Upon my arrival here I found Colonel Oakes and Dr. Robertson. They set off this morning for Rome. I am detained for a carriage and upon account of Mr. Barnes, who is not very well, and who has agreed to travel with me to England. I have visited the gallery, Palazzo Pitti, museum, &c., all of which I had seen about twenty years ago.

CHAPTER VII

MOORE V. SIR GILBERT AS JUDGED AT HOME

CUXHAVEN, 10th November.—Mr. Barnes continued so ill as to be unequal to the journey. After waiting for him for several days I left Florence on the 16th October with Captain Shield of the navy. We travelled to Bologna in the night, but from thence through Modena and Mantua to Verona is a continued plain in the highest cultivation. The people as you approach Verona are more lively and the women handsomer. This continues as you advance into the Tyrol, which you enter somewhere about Roveredo, and from thence to Inspruch is one of the most delightful countries I ever passed through. The inhabitants are industrious, cheerful, and happy, not a beggar or even an ill-built house to be seen. The road runs along a river with hills and mountains on each side. The Tyrolese appear to particular advantage after the Italians, who are really the most roguish people I ever met with. The country continues well cultivated, and the inhabitants preserve the appearance of ease, through Germany, by Augsburgh (a very fine city), and as far as Nurembergh. The women in particular are well dressed, and walk with a peculiar smartness. We stopped once or twice to see them dance the valse, which they do with much grace; but from Nurembergh everything changes. The roads are bad, the villages wretched, and the peasantry ill-dressed and dirty. We stopped at Cassel for some repairs to the carriage. I went to the parade; the Landgrave was there; he found fault with the ranks not being correctly dressed; he walked along the line and corrected them pretty much as an adjutant does with us. He ordered the major to make them perform several motions of the manual exercise. He

was so eager as to call out several times to the men when they were not sufficiently exact. His troops, however, appeared to me to be in but indifferent order, and moved in a slovenly manner. The Landgrave is much of the size and make of his father, but not so good-looking. He is pretty equal to him, from what I have heard, in point of abilities. The town of Cassel is much improved since I remember it. The streets are broad, well-paved, and lighted, with *trottoirs* for foot passengers. It is become one of the handsomest cities in Germany. We only changed horses at Hanover, and proceeded to this place through roads which were next to impassable. The packet sailed an hour before our arrival on the 8th. Cuxhaven is a dirty little fishing town, in a low, wet country. The river is here twelve or fourteen miles broad. Ships are eternally sailing up and down to Hamburgh. This morning a large convoy of transports, with part of the British cavalry, several *émigrés*, and foreign corps in our pay, sailed for England.

CUXHAVEN, 18th November.—I have been detained by contrary winds. General Paoli arrived last night, and I have had two long conversations with him. He represents Sir Gilbert Elliot as the meanest of mankind, and supports it by instances and anecdotes. I asked him why he had agreed to the Union and a Viceroy. He said he had reason to suspect that our Ministry at that time wished merely to make a convenience of Corsica and to abandon it at the peace. Sir Gilbert, from vanity and interest, wished to be Viceroy. Paoli, by flattering those two passions, made Sir Gilbert commit England by assuming the government as Viceroy and afterwards forming the Union. Paoli fears Pitt will give up Corsica. He says Dundas¹ is a man without morals, and from Pitt's intimacy with him he suspects also his principles. Sir Gilbert threatened to abandon Corsica if Paoli did not leave it. This, however, must have been a mere threat, for undoubtedly Corsica at present is of importance to us. Paoli instead of going to Bastia went directly to St. Fiorenzo, having applied

¹ i.e., Mr. Secretary Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville.

to Admiral Hotham for a frigate to convey him to Leghorn, and wishing to have no communication with Sir Gilbert. The latter nevertheless came over to him twice, showed him the most servile attention, forced his aide-de-camp upon him to attend him on his journey, and paid him the most abject flattery. Paoli said he did not think an Englishman could have had so little pride.

LONDON, 4th December.—I sailed from Cuxhaven the 20th November, landed at Yarmouth the 24th, and arrived at my father's house the 25th. I have been ever since employed in waiting upon Ministers and seeing people to whom it was of importance to me to have my conduct explained. Mr. Pitt said that it was impossible for Ministers not to acquiesce in my recall from the strong statement made by Sir Gilbert Elliot. Nobody had acquiesced without regret, and he should be happy to hear that I was able to justify myself, that no officer's character had stood higher. I represented the hardship of being recalled and deprived of my situation in Corsica without trial. Corsica was the place for me to have justified myself; that now I had nothing to offer against Sir Gilbert's representations but a complete denial, and to assure him that he had been instigated by private malice to represent what was utterly false; that unless I was employed immediately, or received some mark of his Majesty's favour as a proof to the army that my conduct was not disapproved of, I should feel myself injured; in fact, little more could have been done to me than to deprive me of my situation in Corsica had I been tried and found guilty of that of which Sir Gilbert accused me. I explained the conversation I had with Sir Gilbert previous to my leaving Corsica, and spoke with great warmth, provoked both by the injury done to me and by Mr. Pitt's stiff and cold manners. Among other things I said that if I had associated with those only who approved of Sir Gilbert's measures I must have lived alone, for I knew no persons, whether British or Corsicans, who did approve of them, except those in his immediate pay. Mr. Pitt told me to wait upon the Duke of Portland, whose immediate business as

Secretary of State it was to express to me his pleasure. He advised me not to speak to his Grace the language of passion, but to say calmly everything which would tend to my own justification.

When I waited upon the Duke I gave him the order for my return, and said that I was come in consequence of it to receive from him his Majesty's further pleasure. He said that what had occasioned the order by no means affected my military character, which stood as high as ever; my merit as an officer was acknowledged, but, from the confidence necessarily reposed in a person in Sir Gilbert Elliot's situation, it was impossible for Ministers not to comply with his requisition. He could not but officially suppose him to be in the right. The Duke's manner was kind and obliging. I observed to him that, though what happened did not, he said, affect my military character, it had essentially affected my military situation; it was difficult for the world to make the distinction; that it was treating an officer of my rank rather cavalierly to dismiss him on such general grounds and without trial. I felt the insult, and did expect immediate employment as a reparation for the injury done to me and a mark of the King's approbation. I argued the different parts of the accusation. His Grace was either silent or repeated what he had at first said. Upon the whole he was embarrassed, and I retired perceiving that nothing was to be got out of him. Notwithstanding this manner in the Ministers, I have reason to know that they do not mean to oppose my being employed. On the contrary, the Duke of York has written to Sir William Fawcett that he is surprised at Sir Gilbert's behaviour, and is determined to speak to the King about me and to employ me immediately. General Trigge wrote to Sir William in very handsome terms of me. Sir Gilbert's character is not altogether unknown in this country. General Stuart and some others of my friends assist in justifying me. Upon the whole, he will find he could have done nothing less politic than to send me home.

A few days after I had seen the Duke of Portland I

waited on Mr. Dundas, who received me well and spoke out like a man. He said that as I was on bad terms with Sir Gilbert, it was impossible not to recall me. He heard all I had to say and asked several questions, and at last frankly said that Sir Gilbert upon several occasions had displayed a degree of jealousy he had not thought him capable of; that what had happened did not affect my character in any respect, and that if I wished it I should be employed. A few days afterwards I was appointed Brigadier-General in the West Indies, and attached to a brigade of foreign corps assembling in the Isle of Wight. I went after this to pass a few days at Bath with the Duke of Hamilton. I found him greatly altered, and in a most deplorable state of health. I waited upon the Duke of York, who received me very well. He did not enter into any conversation about Corsica, but told me he meant to send me to St. Domingo with my brigade. Upon my return to town I had again occasion to see Mr. Dundas. In my first conversation I had complained to him of Mr. Pitt's cold manner. He now told me that I must have mistaken Mr. Pitt, as he had spoken very favourably to him of me, and had said that he thought I had been very harshly used, and had expressed a wish that I should be employed. Mr. Dundas told Mr. Pitt that he was surprised to hear him speak thus, as I had complained of the manner in which he had received me.

NEWPORT, 29th January 1796.—I left London on the 21st or 22nd December to take the command of the foreign corps to be assembled upon the Isle of Wight. At Portsmouth I waited upon Sir William Pitt, as I had received directions to put myself under his orders. I crossed to Cowes on the 23rd, and came on the 24th to Newport, where I fixed my quarters. Two regiments of my brigade were on board transports in Cowes Harbour. I ordered them to be landed and quartered. The York Fusiliers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hardy, are in Cowes. The regiment of Choiseul (Hussars) are in New-

port. The latter is a regiment of French *émigrés*. The personnel both of officers and men is extremely good. They are commanded by the Baron de la Chassague, an old officer bred in the service, diligent, active, and knowing his business perfectly. A few days later I ordered the Uhlans Britanniques to be landed. This is a corps of light cavalry commanded by Comte Louis de Bouillie, son of the Marquis. The officers of this corps are a set of the handsomest and most gentlemanly men I ever saw. I have now lived above a month with these two regiments. I could not have been so happy with any British regiments. The Uhlans do not belong to my brigade. They marched this morning for Lymington, and I have every reason to regret their absence. Lord Cathcart was appointed about a fortnight ago to superintend all the foreign corps assembled here and at Southampton. He came to Cowes for a day, and I afterwards waited upon him at Southampton. Most of those corps are engaged under certain capitulations, which do not admit of their being employed on the service for which they are now wanted. His Lordship's chief business is to settle the new capitulations. In Newport there is little society. The Lieutenant-Colonel and Major Comte des Vieux and one of the captains, Comte de la Rochefoucault, and I dine at the inn. I invite generally some of the officers to join-us. Captain Thomas Hamilton of the navy is married to a pleasant, genteel woman, and lives within a mile of the town. He has been extremely civil to both me and the French officers. We have had two or three balls, which the families in the neighbourhood have attended. The women in the Isle of Wight are generally handsome. The young French are so extremely polite, gay, fond of dancing, and withal so good-looking, that, as though few of them speak much English, all can talk a little, I believe the women never found their balls so pleasant.

LONDON, 21st *February*.—Lieutenant-Colonel Brownrigg told me that the Duke of Portland had mentioned to the Duke of York that he had received despatches from Sir

Gilbert Elliot with accusations of a very serious nature against me. The Duke had given H.R.H. the despatches, which H.R.H. told Brownrigg he had not read, but to which he was determined to give a very impartial perusal, and he hoped to find nothing in them sufficiently against me to prevent me from continuing in my command. The next day the Duke of York came to Brownrigg's office and read the despatches, and handed each sheet to Brownrigg as he read it. When he had finished them he said he saw nothing that could affect my character in any respect; that they displayed much malice upon the part of Sir Gilbert. The papers, independent of an elaborate explanation from Sir Gilbert, contained affidavits signed by different Corsicans of conversations I had carried on and expressions I had used, tending to prove that I had attempted to make a party in the country against Sir Gilbert in the hopes of getting him removed and General Stuart appointed in his place.

It is curious that no suggestion of this amazing charge appears in Sir Gilbert's biography other than the significant expression "Frondeur." I can only treat it, for the reasons already given, as an illustration of the kind of madness of which some Corsicans were capable and as showing Sir Gilbert's readiness to believe what he wished to believe.

Sir Gilbert, after bringing forward and urging everything that could tend to ruin me in the opinion of those who were to see his despatches, took pains to state that his information was of so confidential a nature, and obtained under such promises of secrecy, that it would be impossible to bring it forward in a public trial. Brownrigg told me that the Duke of York was shocked at Sir Gilbert's ransacking for and bribing people to discover the private conversation of an officer. Brownrigg himself said the whole despatch displayed ingenuity and art, but much meanness and bad judgment. Sir Gilbert had no doubt

heard of my reception in England and of my immediate employment, was hurt by it, and took this dirty method to injure me.

Here ends Moore's connection with the affairs of Corsica. There is in an autograph case of the British Museum a letter from Moore to Paoli, in which the prominent sentence is one protesting against the charge made against him by Sir Gilbert, and challenging him to justify his own conduct, but its contents are not otherwise interesting. It was written at the moment of his leaving the island. Sir Gilbert's version of the reception of his affidavits in England is thus given in the biography:—"The next letter he received from Mr. Elliot contained the following passage: 'Your despatch has produced a profound impression on Dundas (*i.e.* Mr. Secretary Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville), who says that had he received it before promoting Moore he should never have done so.'" Further, when Sir Gilbert returned to England we have this report:—

29th June 1797.—"I had my audience of the Duke of York yesterday, and it terminated as pleasantly and satisfactorily as all the former discussions on the same subject. We sat together from three till six o'clock, and the Duke entered into every part of the case with perfect attention and patience, reading most of the despatches and letters himself. He assented distinctly to my assertion that Colonel Moore had taken part in a faction against me, saying frequently that nothing could be more clear, and using other expressions of assent and conviction. I showed him General de Burgh's testimony concerning the harmony that had prevailed between us, and showed him the list of officers I could refer to as friends. Our sitting concluded by his assenting to the conclusion I drew from the inquiry, that the imputation of disagreement with the

army, provoked by me, was totally false, and that there really existed the faction which I have accused, that Moore was the head of it, and while such a faction was acting against me I could not be responsible for the appearance of differences with the few individuals who composed it. He has promised to set me right with the King.”¹

As to which there is this remark to be made, that we are all of us apt to lend ready assent to the man at our elbow, or to leave on him the impression that we do so; that we all of us are apt to ignore the absent, and that this applies equally to Moore’s conversations and to Sir Gilbert’s, not so clearly to the reading over by the Duke of York of Sir Gilbert’s own despatches and to the Duke’s comments when he was alone with his secretary (p. 183). There is only one principle by which truth can be reached, viz. by bringing a man and his accusers face to face, but we all are prone to prefer the easier method of avoiding it. Take, for instance, one concrete case. Would it not seem conclusive if we assume Sir Gilbert to have said: “You will see here that Moore actually believed that absurd lie about the bust, though I myself saw the bust practically whole.” But suppose Moore had been there to reply, “I have no doubt that Sir Gilbert saw *a* bust whole, but it was Signor Peraldi’s bust which had, in order to deceive him, been substituted for the one that was smashed by the stilettoes.” That is a simple illustration of the dangers of judging by *ex parte* statements, and it applies to the whole case. It is on that account that I have endeavoured to place fairly together the statements on both sides in order that they may be weighed together. To sum up: Captain

¹ “Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot,” vol. ii. p. 410.

Mahan¹ has well said, "Not to form an opinion is pushing the principle of subordination to an indefensible extreme, even for a junior officer, though the caution not to express it is wise as well as becoming to the modesty of youth. Lord Howe's advice to Codrington, to watch carefully all that passed and to form his own conclusions but to keep them to himself, was in every respect more reasonable and profitable." Sir Gilbert wished Moore not to form an opinion, and, though in some sort he *knew* that Moore's opinion was more weighty than his own on the military defence of an island which for us had no other value than as a military defensive port, he yet never consulted Moore or any one else whose opinion was worth a rush. He sought only the opinion of the feeble and the sycophants, because they always applauded what he said. Either Stuart or Moore would have loyally supported him in applying military force to any objects which in his political opinion were desirable, but when he, in matters of which he showed himself grossly ignorant, to which they had devoted their lives, laid down the law, they held that it would be self-seeking treachery to their country to pretend that he was right when they knew that he was wrong. Stuart's order in giving up the command of the army into Sir Gilbert's hands represents their feeling. That Moore, seeing and knowing that disaster was by Sir Gilbert's acts being brought upon the island, may have sometimes talked more openly than was wise, is exceedingly possible. Sir Gilbert had the whole responsibility, therefore it was essential that he should have the whole power; but for his abuse of that power, in case after case here recited, he cannot, having had the

¹ "Life of Nelson," vol. i. p. 10.

power, be now acquitted of the responsibility. Moore's words and actions were, at all events, whether sometimes too open or not, those of a man who loved his country and her service first, and his own personal advantage "nowithers." So far as the verdict at home on the whole Corsican matter was concerned, "honours were easy." Sir Gilbert himself was, of course, made a peer. Lord Hood, his beloved Admiral, had to haul down his flag, and was never again employed. We shall meet again with General Duncan, the first of the hated Generals, for he commanded the central division of the army at the Helder, and had, in the meantime, won against very superior numbers of French the battles of Geldermalsen and Tuyl, in the latter driving the French across the Waal. I have already (chap. i.) given Bunbury's description of him, but I may note here that his system of organisation and drill became the firm support of the one subsequently perfected by Moore. It was the work of both of them that was welded into a splendid whole and carried to glorious success by Wellington throughout the Peninsula campaigns. Ultimately Sir David Dundas became the Commander-in-chief of the British Army. We shall also more than once meet with Sir Charles Stuart, as he afterwards became. He remained throughout his service one of the most brilliant soldiers of the British Army. Of Sir John Moore's further career these volumes are the record. All these were the objects of Sir Gilbert Elliot's contempt and rejection. Of those whom he selected for favour the record is very different. They sank into the obscurity from which they had for a moment been raised by the favour of a Viceroy who could only regard as merit conformity to his own utterly worthless opinions on military questions.

Here, as elsewhere, Moore was a man in advance of his time. Of all men, as we shall see throughout his life, he was the most averse to intrigue, and it is beyond question that he never entered into any intrigue against Sir Gilbert. But he did most clearly see that what was wanted for success in Corsica was not a dose of the British Constitution, applied as a Morrison's pill to a patient in the condition of Corsica, but the introduction of British fair-play, of British justice, of British sense of the broad principles of right and wrong, and, above all, of British truth, and withal a sympathetic understanding of the people to be dealt with. No one knew their faults better than he, or has exposed them as he saw them more bluntly. But he knew their devotion to Paoli, well as he knew and freely as he has set forth the faults of that patriotic statesman. Therefore he felt that, for success in English administration, it was necessary, in order to lead them on to a higher civilisation, to work through the man they trusted. Since those days we have applied Moore's principles under far more difficult circumstances with a race far inferior to the Corsicans, dealing at the same time with a ruler far inferior in all respects to Paoli. We have not applied the British Constitution. We have worked through the native rulers, and with the forms to which the people were accustomed. It has only been the new spirit that has been infused into them that has changed everything. Let Egypt in 1903 speak for the soundness of Moore's political judgment in Corsica in 1794-95. For Sir Gilbert's, the year 1797 must make answer, for from that date we as a nation knew Corsica no more

CHAPTER VIII

THE WEST INDIAN EXPEDITION. CAPTURE OF ST. LUCIA

CAPTAIN MAHAN has devoted a very striking chapter of his great work upon the influence of sea power to the subject of "The West Indies, 1793-1810."¹ He has vindicated the policy of Pitt with a logical force that has been shown in an equal degree by none of Pitt's biographers. He has demonstrated that the pressure which Britain was exercising upon France and the Continent under her influence depended largely upon the free and practically exclusive command which British merchants had of products such as tea, coffee, sugar, which had become virtually essential conditions of life in almost every European family. Therefore, when, partly by revolutionary propaganda among the blacks, partly by actual privateering and buccaneering, the French Revolutionary Government had completely upset our trade in the West Indies, this was in fact an attack upon the very base from which our campaign against France was carried on. It became necessary at any cost to recover the islands. Furthermore, he has shown that, having supreme command at sea given us by the destruction of the French naval power, which had been consequent upon the indiscipline generated in their fleets by the more insane aspects of the Revolu-

¹ "The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," vol. i. chap. iv.

tion, it was not possible for the French to prevent Pitt from carrying out his project. Pitt's action was mainly determined by the universal demand of our merchants for a restoration of trade in and with the West Indies. It was a very appropriate and a very effective form of war which was thus waged by the great Peace Minister, who, much against the grain, had to spend his life in carrying on the most gigantic struggle of modern history. But there is a side of the question which Captain Mahan has wholly ignored, and unless it be brought into focus with that which he has so admirably portrayed, the picture of the struggle between Britain and the power of the Revolution, whether before or after the advent of Napoleon, is one-sided and incomplete. The essential condition of the exercise of the sea power consisted in the facilities which it conferred upon Britain of transporting an army, of maintaining, of reinforcing, and of feeding it, without let or hindrance, wheresoever she pleased. But the wisdom of the place selected for the delivery of the stroke was all-important, and when the army was transported it depended on the qualities, on the strength, on the exertions, and on the sacrifices of that army whether the result was attained or not. India has been spoken of as "a gift of the sea power," and the saying is true if by that it be meant that we should have lost India had we lost the command of the sea. The saying is utterly untrue if it be meant that without Clive, without Wellesley, without Wellington, without the heroes of the Indian Mutiny, without the great soldiers and statesmen of India, the possession of sea power alone would have given us India, or enabled us to retain it. Throughout Captain Mahan's great volumes, which have been welcomed by English

soldiers more eagerly than by any of their countrymen, because those volumes appeal to their patriotic pride in the greatness of Britain, it is, alas, true that the same false note is everywhere struck. It becomes an appeal not to the admiration for heroic achievement, whether by sea or land, to the thing that is noble in itself, but to a mere narrow and meagre professional pride, when the fact is ignored that while the navy indeed opened the door into the treasure-house, it was the army that had, across poisonous fens, over deserts or snow-capped mountains, to gain access to and to strike down the dragon that guarded the treasure within.

Pre-eminently is the false note struck in regard to the West Indies. Here I present the proof of it. The man who cannot recognise the heroism that went to the winning of St. Lucia by land is no fit admirer of Nelson. He applauds the cloth he wears himself, because *he* wears it. He does not admire noble deeds because they are noble. Very necessary, therefore, is it to realise what sort of task it was that awaited the few men who, like Sir Ralph Abercromby, like Moore, like Stuart, like Lord Cornwallis, like grim old Dundas, were those on whom England had to rely in her hour of need by land, as she had on St. Vincent and Nelson by sea. Captain Mahan has admirably brought out the undoubted fact that up to the advent of St. Vincent the navy was in a thoroughly unsound condition, and that it was by the "band of brothers," as Nelson loved to call them, whom St. Vincent and Nelson gathered round them, that the great reform was achieved. It is difficult to imagine anything more dramatic than Sir Gilbert Elliot's return from Corsica, where every one who wore a sailor's epaulettes

was *ipso facto* a hero, to the mutiny at the Nore. Moore's criticism on the captains who dallied between Gibraltar and Toulon, whose neglect Hood ignored, is the criticism of one who loved his brother's service and hated the men who were unworthy of it.

Mr. Fortescue has conclusively shown that as Pitt was largely responsible for this condition of the navy, so he was also for that of the army, as to which I must refer to the description by Sir Charles Bunbury already given (p. 13, *ante*). The points on which at present, in relation to the whole contest with France, I am anxious to insist, are : First, the importance of the expedition on which Moore was now to be employed under Sir Ralph Abercromby. It was designed for the reconquest of the West Indian Islands, partly from the French, but mainly from the insurgent negroes whom they had armed and made enthusiastic in their cause by the proclamation of universal and immediate emancipation, with consequences such as the Diary will disclose. Secondly : the frightful loss of life to the army involved in these wars must be realised, necessary as the restoration of order was. Bunbury has shown from Parliamentary returns that in the two years with which we are now immediately concerned, 40,639 were discharged from the army "on account of wounds or *infirmity*," irrespective of the deaths. That loss fell upon an army which could in 1792, at the beginning of the war, barely muster 17,000 men for service abroad. Moore's Diary will largely disclose the causes of this frightful mortality and sickness.

PORTSMOUTH, 26th February.—I left London and arrived at Southampton on the 23rd. Yesterday Lord Cathcart ordered me to come here and take charge of and embark with Brigadier-General Perryn's brigade. Perryn had him-

self unexpectedly sailed in the *Vengeance*, 74, leaving his brigade behind. I did not expect to embark for three weeks, and have nothing with me but a portmanteau. I have, however, come in obedience to the order. His Lordship is also hurrying on the embarkation of the foreign corps at Southampton. They were to have remained with me, and are in no state for service, as they ought to have been on land for at least a fortnight. If they arrive before the fleet sails I shall go also; if not, I shall remain and command these corps, originally intended for me, and leave Perryn's to proceed by themselves. The confusion of this place is beyond anything that could be believed; everything is in disorder, and the expedition will sail in as bad a state as ever expedition did sail from this country.

ON BOARD THE "JOHN AND JAMES" TRANSPORT AT SEA, the 4th March 1796.—On the evening of the 27th Colonel Nesbitt arrived at Portsmouth, and delivered to me from Lord Cathcart the Duke of York's order for me to proceed with Brigadier-General Perryn's brigade. The fleet was to sail next morning; I had nothing prepared, and did not even know in what ship I could get a passage. Upon my mentioning the Duke's order and my situation to Captain George, one of the commissioners of the transport board, he told me that the *John and James* was a good ship, and had only a few men and three artillery officers on board. The master was a decent man, and Captain Lecky of the navy, principal agent, was to sail in her; he was an old acquaintance of his, and he would recommend me to him, and I might share his and the master's mess. It was not pleasant, when I was going upon the King's service, to be obliged thus to solicit a passage and to allow myself to be forced upon people with whom I had no acquaintance, but I was determined to make no difficulties and not to give a handle to any people whatever to accuse me of backwardness. The West India service is not popular. My baggage had not arrived; I immediately bought bedding and a few ready-made shirts and stockings, and ordered a boat to be ready at daylight

next morning. In this the Count de Maleissige, whom I had at Nesbitt's recommendation made my brigade-major, embarked with me. We at last found the ship after cruising in search of her for four or five hours. As soon as we were on board she immediately got under way; most of the fleet had already passed down nearly to St. Helen's. We passed through the Needles and joined them. The wind was perfectly fair and blowing very fresh.

Captain Lecky and the master very politely offered to let me join their mess. They said it would not be sumptuous, as they had not till that morning known of my going, and had even themselves been hurried off sooner than they expected and had laid in but little. There was, however, plenty of wine and salt beef on board. I said I should be satisfied with whatever they had, and only regretted putting them to any inconvenience. Notwithstanding Lord Cathcart's endeavour, ships could not be got ready for either the "Royals Étrangers," "Hompesche," or the Dutch Artillery. Not one regiment, therefore, of my brigade is in the fleet. Upon my arrival in the West Indies I shall find myself without a command. General Perryn will, of course, take the command of his own. Both Colonel Nesbitt and I had frequently represented to Lord Cathcart the impropriety of embarking several of the corps lately arrived from Germany. They had been four or five months on board ship, and were in no state for service; but Government was eager to send out with this convoy as great a number of the foreign corps as possible. Lord Cathcart wished to have the character of forwarding this service, and hurried them on board instead of representing their real situation. The "Royals Étrangers," "Hompesche," and Dutch Artillery are fortunately detained; consequently they will join us, in six weeks or two months after our arrival, in good order. Admiral Cornwallis carried so much sail all the 29th that in the night he lost us. We have since fallen in with the *Undaunted* frigate and nineteen or twenty of the convoy, with whom we are proceeding with a fair wind. We left Portsmouth with about 100 sail. The captain opened the sealed orders at sea, expecting to find a

rendezvous. It contained only a word to be given in case of separation and falling in with a ship. The paper is not even signed. It is therefore only upon supposition that we are proceeding to Barbadoes, but should be justified in returning to Portsmouth or steering for any other part of the globe.

BARBADOES, 15th *April*.—We made the land the 13th at 9 A.M., and anchored in Carlisle Bay at 3 P.M. I waited immediately on Sir Ralph Abercromby. Twenty of our fleet were already arrived, and 300 to 400 men came in yesterday. Admiral Cornwallis' ship received a little damage, and he returned in her to Portsmouth. The transport carrying Lowenstein's Jägers was sunk, and above 100 soldiers were drowned. An equal number were saved. General Perryn has been here for some time. I explained to Sir Ralph the circumstances which had occasioned my being ordered with the brigade intended for General Perryn. I dined with him yesterday, and had some more conversation with him. He said he had always understood that General Perryn was very anxious to remain in the islands, and, as he was my senior, he did not know how to refuse him. I said I had no wish to express upon the subject. I wished to be employed, and should be satisfied to be so in any manner he thought proper. Sir Ralph said I might depend upon it I should be employed. The Marquis de Bouillie was at dinner. Colonel Maitland (Lord Lauderdale's brother) is here. He and General Howe have given me a room in their house. The confusion here seems at least equal to that at Portsmouth. Sir Ralph asked me if General Stuart was not coming out. He said that he had been very desirous that he should come.

17th *April*.—Major-General White sailed yesterday with 1200 men, said to be for St. Domingo, but supposed to be ordered to some other island. The army for St. Domingo is ordered to hold itself in readiness to sail immediately, under Brigadier-General Howe. The regiments of infantry of the foreigners are attached to the army of the Windward and Leeward Islands. The two regiments of Hussars are

attached to the St. Domingo army, under Brigadier-General Perryn. My name is not mentioned in the general orders of the army; but Brigadier-General Howe, in his orders to the troops going to St. Domingo, has named me as commanding the foreign cavalry. He told me he was desired to do so by General Abercromby. I believe there is some mistake, at least from what the General said to me. I rather think he does not intend me to go to St. Domingo.

17th April.—I called upon Sir Ralph yesterday morning. He told me it was a mistake of Brigadier-General Howe, as he did not mean that I should go to St. Domingo. He afterwards told Colonel Hope (Adjutant-General) that he intended to send me as second in command to St. Vincent, where Brigadier-General Hunter now commands. That General is now confined to certain points, and pretty closely invested in them by the enemy. He must continue to be so until the army under Sir Ralph has carried out the expedition they are about to undertake. I called again upon Sir Ralph this morning. I thanked him for his intention to employ me, but told him I was extremely desirous of serving under him immediately, with the body of the army. I conceived it would be more useful to me, as an officer, than going to St. Vincent, and my sole object was to serve and gain experience; if, therefore, he could appoint me to a brigade under him, I should be infinitely obliged to him. He answered that his view in naming me to St. Vincent was to assist General Hunter, who had been unwell, but principally to gain a knowledge of the country before his arrival with the body of the army. But since I was anxious to go with the army he agreed to it, was happy, and always should be to do whatever was agreeable to me; he should go to St. Lucia, and after taking that should divide the army between St. Vincent and Grenada, in order to reduce those two islands also. The General behaved to me with great politeness and kindness. I have named Captain Anderson my brigade-major.

ON BOARD THE "VALENTINE" EAST-INDIAMAN, AT SEA, 23rd April.—On the 19th I was sent for to the Commander-in-chiefs. I found with him the different Generals, to whom he was communicating his dispositions and instructions for the attack of St. Lucia. I am attached to the division which is to land first, under the command of Major-General Campbell. The whole force go to St. Anne's Bay, Martinique, where the final arrangements are to be made, and from thence we are to sail for St. Lucia. The Quartermaster-General, Brigadier-General Knox, was so good as to invite me to go with him in the *Valentine*. I accordingly embarked on the 20th with Brigade-Major Anderson. A signal for an Admiral to windward was made just as the fleet was getting under way. It proved to be Admiral Christian in a frigate. He sailed from Portsmouth on the 21st March with troops under his convoy; ten days after he sailed he shifted his flag to a frigate, and came on.

The ships of the fleet continued to get under way, and the whole were at sea the night of the 21st; both Admirals Laforey and Christian are with us. It was hoped that the arrival of the latter might have occasioned a change in the disposition, and that we should have at once sailed for St. Lucia. The officers in general seem to think that going to Martinique is a loss of time, that every arrangement could have been equally well made at Barbadoes. It has been publicly known for some time past that Guadaloupe was not to be attacked, but that St. Lucia was the object.

CAMP NEAR LONGUEVILLE, ST. LUCIA, 26th April.—The fleet anchored in St. Anne's Bay on the evening of the 23rd; an ordnance sloop was lost, and the *Minotaur*, 74, ran ashore; some ships, missing the bay, were carried to leeward. These are the consequences to be expected from going to St. Anne's. I understand Admiral Christian disapproved of the measure as much as General Abercromby; if so, he should have changed it the moment he arrived and had power to assume the command. The arrangements which might have been

made at Barbadoes were made in the course of the 24th and 25th. The evening of the last we sailed. I moved to the *Ganges*, 74, Captain M'Dowal, in order to be with General Campbell. The Grenadiers, 14th, 42nd, and 48th Regiments, about 1900 men under Major-General Campbell, were to land at Ance le Cap, to advance to Longueville House with two light guns and a howitzer, from thence to move in two columns, one along the coast by the village of Grosplat, the other to the left by Juassot, Mathieu de Casse, and Balman. The columns are to unite at Grinando on the Chemin Royal, and attack the batteries of Trouillac and Brellotte, which command the anchorage in Choe Bay. The object, therefore, of this landing was to turn those batteries and destroy them, to enable Sir Ralph to land the body of the army in Choe Bay. General Morshead, with 1800 or 1900 men, was to fall down to the southward of the island, and, upon hearing that the landings at Ance le Cap and at Choe Bay were effected, was to land his corps in Ance le Raye, occupy the heights to the northward of the river Mascarrès, reconnoitre the country, and, if possible, establish himself on the Morne Petit. The divisions of ships containing Major-General Campbell's corps were under way first. The evening of the 25th we worked to windward the whole night, and at daylight, on the morning of the 26th, stood into the bay of Ance le Cap and came to an anchor. The *Hebe* frigate and a sloop, anchored close with the land, were immediately fired upon from Pigeon Island, but were at too great a distance to have effect. The ships containing the 14th and 42nd Regiments were the only ones then arrived. The rest were still at a considerable distance; but as no enemy appeared upon the coast, it was determined to land these two regiments immediately, lest by delay the enemy should have time to assemble. Major-General Campbell desired me to get the 42nd into the boats and land with them.

I reached the shore about eight o'clock, and took a position almost immediately upon the coast extremely favourable for defence and covering the landing of the rest of the

troops. I ordered Longueville House, a quarter of a mile in my front, to be occupied by 150 of the Jägers of Lowenstein. It was strong and well adapted for an advance post. Parties of the enemy now appeared and skirmished for several hours with the Jägers, one of whom was killed and six or seven wounded in the course of the forenoon. By this time General Campbell had landed; he said the Grenadiers and 48th from the distance they were still at could not possibly be ashore before the evening. The artillery would also be late in getting ashore. He therefore saw no possibility of moving this day. He has just received a letter from Sir Ralph, stating that the Admiral was not ready to co-operate, and he therefore wished the landing to be deferred. It was already in part executed; to re-embark was impossible; to put off the march to Trouillac till next morning, dangerous. The enemy was already apprised of our descent; they might therefore assemble, attack, and tease us upon our march, perhaps completely impede it. From all accounts the country favours such attempts. We are certain of being joined this evening by the Grenadiers, 48th, and artillery. I have therefore given it strongly as my opinion to General Campbell that we ought to post our picquets at sunset as if we intended to pass the night, but that we ought to have everything ready to begin our march when the moon rises, about eleven or twelve o'clock. The General had written to Sir Ralph for orders. I prevailed upon him to get Captain Hay, who was to carry the letter, to propose the night march to the General.

CAMP AT MORNE CHASSEUR, *the 29th April*.—Captain Hay returned from the Commander-in-chief late on the night of the 26th with authority for General Campbell to march at whatever hour he thought best. General Campbell was extremely ill, and begged of me to give the necessary orders for the march. The different corps had landed and joined us in the night. The march began at three in the morning. A company of Grenadiers led, followed by the howitzer. I remained in the rear with the 14th Regiment and some

Jägers. We had every reason to expect a harassing march. About a mile beyond the post at Longueville House the company of Grenadiers fell in with a small party which fired and fled. These were the only shots fired at us till our arrival at the heights of Choc. About eleven o'clock, when on the march, we were informed that the Trouillac and Brellotte batteries had been abandoned. The fleet stood into the bay. The Admiral and General landed immediately, and part of the troops were brought ashore that evening. We perceived that the enemy were assembled at Angiers House. General Abercromby ordered the Grenadiers and a gun to advance, upon which the enemy retired. I accompanied the Commander-in-chief to Angiers, where the staff and many of the principal officers assembled. I went forward with him to reconnoitre, and by his orders posted some picquets on the heights in the evening. Soon after I returned Brigadier-General Hope (Adjutant-General) put into my hands the following order:—

“G. O. ANGIERS HOUSE, 27th April 1796.—A detachment of 500 rank and file of the 53rd Regiment including their two flank companies, 280 of the 57th including the light company, 100 of Lowenstein's corps, 200 of Malcolm's, will be ready to parade this night at twelve o'clock. One division, consisting of the 53rd Regiment, 50 of Lowenstein's, and 100 of Malcolm's, under the command of Brigadier-General Moore, to march as soon as they are ready after twelve o'clock. The 2nd division, consisting of the 57th, 50 of Lowenstein's, and 100 of Malcolm's, under the command of Brigadier-General Hope, to march half-an-hour after the first. The object of this attack is to drive the enemy from Morne Chabot, and as any communication between the columns in this country is difficult, the column under Brigadier-General Hope will not begin to act till the attack on the left has commenced; when the troops are masters of Morne Chabot 500 men will be posted there, and the remainder of the force will extend themselves towards the left of La Feuillay's, or farther if possible. Messrs. La Feuillay

and Babinet will accompany the first as guides, Bravet and La Force the second.

(Signed) JOHN HOPE,
Adjutant-General."

I was fatigued with the business of the day before and the march of that forenoon. It was late. I had to see the Commander-in-chief, to converse with the guides, give any orders to the different officers, and take some sleep. The different corps were assembled in the order in which I had directed that they should march by half-past eleven. The Grenadiers and light companies of the 53rd headed the column; the battalion followed, then the Jägers and Malcolm's blacks. We were in motion by twelve. Lieutenant-Colonel Ross of the 21st Regiment, acting as aide-de-camp to the Commander-in-chief, had the General's order to attend me. I agreed with Brigadier-General Hope that I should attack just as day began to dawn. The road, or rather path, was so narrow that we could only march in single file, and so broken, that I was obliged not only to march extremely slowly, but to halt the front frequently to prevent the column from separating. The moon was bright, and the night was fine. From the description the guides gave me I was to expect in getting out of a wood some clear ground at half a mile distance from the Morne Chabot; from thence they described the country to be more practicable, and near the Morne to be quite smooth. Upon this information I had formed my plan, which was that after we had arrived close to the edge of the wood we should wait for the approach of day. A little before four in the morning, when in a narrow path in the wood, two men only abreast, a small party of an officer and six men, whom I kept twenty yards in my front, was challenged and fired upon by an advanced sentry. Immediately afterwards five or six voices challenged and the sentries fired. My advanced party fell back, as they had been directed to do. Lieutenant-Colonel Ross and Lieutenant-Colonel Abercromby were with me at the head of the Grenadiers. I considered it

a misfortune to have thus unexpectedly fallen in with the enemy's picquets. It prevented the intended combination with Brigadier-General Hope; but, as we had been observed, I thought that I could not wait in file in a wood in a country of which I was ignorant and with which the enemy were acquainted. I had therefore no alternative but instantly to push on and attack. I accordingly gave, without hesitating, orders to advance and attack. As we advanced the path widened a little, and six or eight men formed up. The body of the picquet, about forty or fifty men, here fired upon us. Some men fell, but we advanced and drove them back. The ground upon which this picquet had stood was at the entrance to the wood. I ordered the Grenadiers to form to the front, the Light Infantry to cover them in the same order; and I desired Lieutenant-Colonel Ross to remain and form the other companies as they came up.

The guides had left me upon the first fire. I sent for them whilst the Grenadiers were forming up. I was at a loss to know the ground I was to attack. The guide was brought up and pointed it out. The ground was tolerably smooth in my front, and sloped gently to my left; close to my right was a thick hedge: I feared it might be lined with infantry. Exhorting the Grenadiers not to fire but to use the bayonet, I ordered them to advance again. We followed the direction of the hedge for a couple of hundred yards. A wood then appeared in my front, a fence in the hedge to the right. The guide said that beyond the fence was the road. I directed the men to pull it down, but it was too strong. I then ordered them to leap over it, and upon their hesitating showed them the example by getting over myself. They immediately followed and formed. The enemy were at this time drawn up crowning the hill. They fired upon us with great effect, and, notwithstanding every effort, I could not prevent our men from firing or induce them to advance with the bayonet. They received repeated discharges within twenty or thirty yards. Those in our rear began also to fire, so that no situation could be more distressing. The two companies were much broken. The

obscurity of the night and perhaps the fears of the enemy prevented them from seeing our real situation. Our men were always rather gaining ground, though not in the order nor with the rapidity necessary. I was hoarse and exhausted with calling to them.

We at last reached the summit, and put to the bayonet such as had not had time to escape; three or four prisoners were taken. Our loss was seventy or eighty officers and men killed and wounded. Among the latter was my brigade-major, Anderson, who had exerted himself very much, and was shot as we gained the summit. The loss fell upon the Grenadiers and light companies; no others were touched. Seventeen or eighteen of the enemy were found dead, as many more wounded, and it is probable many more were wounded, who contrived to crawl into the woods. The roads by which they escaped were covered with arms. In this attack the men showed no want of spirit; no man ever offered to turn his back, but they showed great want of discipline and confidence in their officers. Against an enemy of experience we must have failed. A failure would have been destruction; through such a country there was no retreat. The men of our regiments are mere recruits, the officers young, and without either zeal or experience. With such troops success must ever be doubtful, and, upon this occasion, only the great exertions of a few officers at the head of the column caused the attack to succeed. I don't know that I ever felt more satisfaction than upon gaining the height. I had almost despaired of it. The consequences of a failure were strongly imprinted on my mind; besides, it was my *coup d'essai* in an army where I was unknown, and by its success my character would be judged. I do not think I ever made greater efforts or ever ran more personal danger. A grenadier was shot in my arms, as if Providence had thrust him there at the moment to receive the ball levelled at me.

As the men came in I formed them. I sent people forward to warn Brigadier-General Hope that we were in possession. Upon hearing the firing he had endeavoured

to push forward, and by the time we had carried the hill he had nearly arrived at the bottom of it. The firing having ceased, he was doubtful what steps to take; till I ordered a drum to beat the Grenadiers' march, upon which they gave a cheer. Day now began to break, and General Hope joined me. My orders were to place 500 men upon the Morne Chabot, and with the rest to extend to the left; but Brigadier-General Hope and I observed a hill called the Morne de Chasseur, extremely commanding; it seemed to us likely to give a communication with Major-General Morshead on Morne Petit, and also to facilitate the approach to the Morne Fortuné. I determined to possess it immediately, before the enemy recovered their panic, or saw the importance of it. I requested Lieutenant-Colonel Ross to return to Sir Ralph with the report of what had happened, and to explain to him the reason of my attacking before the time agreed upon, and of my determination to move instantly to Morne de Chasseur. I left Lieutenant-Colonel Abercromby with the 53rd and some Jägers at Chabot, and with the rest I moved to this place. I requested General Hope to accompany me. The distance is not more than three miles, but the roads were so bad, that we took as many hours to march it. The situation has turned out much more advantageous than I had conceived it. I occupied the Morne de Chasseur with Colonel Malcolm's corps, but under it a ridge extends towards the Morne Fortuné, having on one side the Valley du Grand Cul de Sac, on the other part of Castine. I established the rest of my corps upon this ridge, and threw my advanced posts to within 1200 yards of the Morne Fortuné. The enemy in the evening placed theirs within 600 or 700 yards of me. The possession of this post is of infinite importance. It secures a communication with General Morshead, and is the place from whence alone we shall, I believe, be able to approach Morne Fortuné.

CAMP DE CHASSEUR, 30th April.—Notwithstanding the fatigue of these four days I was obliged to be up the whole

night, the officers are so little to be depended upon. I found the picquets asleep, and General Hope and I were obliged to patrol the whole night. Being so close to the enemy as we are, our safety depends on our alertness. Yesterday morning I received the following note from General Abercromby:—

“CAMP AT ANGIERS, 28th April.—DEAR GENERAL,—Colonel Ross brought me your report. My best thanks are due to you for the judicious decision you made on falling in with the advanced post of the enemy; any hesitation would probably have defeated your purpose. Your determination has given us success; our loss, however to be regretted on account of individuals, is not more than might have been expected on such an occasion. On the whole the conduct of the troops is commendable, and I beg you will return them publicly my thanks. General Morshead having effected his landing, I have nothing to apprehend from your having determined to occupy Morne de Chasseur; and, to render your situation more secure, I have ordered the 55th and part of the 42nd Regiments to march this evening to Morne Chabot, there to receive further orders, and to-morrow the remaining parts of the 53rd and 57th shall join. I shall advance part of my force, and put it in communication with Morne Chabot by placing it at Grons, and the advanced posts at Chambon. I shall endeavour to open a road to Morne Chabot for a few light field-pieces, and shall take the first opportunity of removing the wounded on board the hospital ship. I beg to receive a daily report from you. R. ABERCROMBY.”

The enemy upon the Chabot were 500. Among the killed were two whites, the rest blacks and men of colour, but chiefly the former. With the above note I received a message from Sir Ralph that he was at Chabot and desired to see me. When I met him he took me by the hand and repeated pretty much the contents of the note. At my desire he accompanied me back to my post. I was desirous he should see it. On our arrival we could make

out Major-General Morshead's troops on the Morne Petit. The General expressed some dissatisfaction at General Morshead's dilatoriness, and seemed extremely anxious to destroy the enemy's batteries which command the bay of the Grand Cul de Sac, in order to procure anchorage there for the fleet, and by this means complete the investment of the Morne Fortuné. Captain Hay, the Commander-in-chief's aide-de-camp, was despatched to General Morshead to offer him more troops if necessary, or co-operation for the destruction of the batteries on that side.

2nd May.—My men are in wigwams, which screen them from the sun, and in some degree from the wet. They find plenty of vegetables, and can procure no liquor beyond the Government allowance; they are hitherto perfectly healthy. We have generally alarms, and are obliged to stand to our arms during the night. My post is strong, but liable to be attacked in several quarters. Everything therefore depends on vigilance. The officers and men are, unfortunately, so bad, that little dependence is to be put on them. I am therefore obliged to be the whole night on my legs. The enemy occasionally fire at me from Morne Fortuné, both shot and shell; two Jägers have been killed by the latter. Brigadier-General Knox called upon me this forenoon. This is found to be the post from whence the Morne is to be approached; he has undertaken to make a road for guns. The hill upon which my right is placed is higher than Morne Fortuné, the buildings and guns of which are much exposed, because the ground continues to rise within their works. The distance is 1800 yards. The Morne commands all the other ground round it except this. Captain Hay passed this on his return from General Morshead, whom he found wavering and uncertain; the Commander-in-chief has in consequence gone over to him. The Grenadiers posted at Grons had this morning rather a long skirmish, brought on by accident and maintained with no object, but several officers and forty or fifty men were killed and wounded.

7th May.—The 3rd and the 42nd Regiments joined me, and I received at the same time an order to hold the light company of the 57th, and 200 of Colonel Malcolm's corps, in readiness to march. In the evening Brigadier-General Hope, who had left me a day or two after my arrival here, came to me. He informed me that a combined attack was to be made that night on the enemy's batteries on the side of the Cul de Sac. He, with the 42nd and the troops above mentioned, was to attack the battery Seche and spike the guns. General Morshead, in two columns, was to attack the battery Ciceron, &c., and if successful the whole were to join and take up a position between the Morne Fortuné and the sea. Hope moved from my camp at twelve at night; at three I commenced a fire on the enemy's picquets to attract their attention. I passed a very anxious night. At daylight I saw our troops retreating through the valley of Cul de Sac, attacked on all sides. Our people seemed, however, to move with great regularity, though the country was woody and exposed them to be much harassed. General Hope reached his point before daylight, and sent Colonel Malcolm to attack the battery. He was killed, poor fellow, before he reached it. The men, however, got in, and even turned the guns against the enemy, but they had no spikes, and were driven from it with loss by the guns from the Fortuné. Colonel Riffel, who commanded one of General Morshead's columns, gained one of the batteries he was ordered to attack, but, daylight coming on, he, being unsupported by the other column, which had never crossed the river, was attacked and obliged to retire with loss. General Morshead had the gout, and had entrusted his column, which was to have supported the other two, to Brigadier-General Perryn. This latter, I understand, found his men fatigued with their march to the river which runs through the Valley de Cul de Sac, had not crossed it, and left Colonel Riffel and General Hope in the lurch. The whole retired to General Morshead's camp, with the loss of above 100 officers and men killed and wounded. The Commander-in-chief is, I understand, infinitely displeased. General Graham is, by yesterday's

orders, sent to command at Morne Petit, which is called the left wing. General Hope commands the right of the right wing; I, the left of it; and General Perryn is ordered to hold himself in readiness to sail with the foreign troops to St. Domingo.

8th May.—The failure in the attempt upon the batteries is unfortunate. There does not seem to be any intention to renew the attempt at present. My post is fixed on as the one from which the Morne can be most effectually approached and annoyed. Large bodies of seamen and soldiers are employed in making roads, forwarding mortars, &c. Batteries for ten pieces of ordnance are being constructed on different parts of the ground I occupy. One or two mortar batteries are erected elsewhere. It is supposed that with this quantity of ordnance constantly playing upon them, though at so considerable a distance, they will be induced to surrender, or at least be so worn out that an assault may be attempted. Lest they should escape to the woods it is wished to surround them by a chain of posts. Sir Ralph came here yesterday morning. I reconnoitred with him to my left, and ground was pitched upon, which I am to occupy in that quarter, towards General Graham, across the valley of Grand Cul de Sac. General Graham is, in the same manner, to extend to his right, in order to form a junction. These operations cannot take place until the troops lately arrived from England are landed. They are hourly expected from Barbadoes. Sir Ralph is very short-sighted. Without a glass he sees nothing, but with it he observes ground quickly and well. He has the zeal and eagerness of youth, and for his age has much activity both of mind and body. It is remarkable that though we have been on shore a fortnight, not one individual from the enemy has yet joined us. The plantations are universally deserted, or occupied by women only. The parts of the island I have seen are very beautiful, mountainous, but covered with wood. The ground produces spontaneously, or with little culture, a variety of vegetables of the potato kind, also greens as delicate as spinach. Fruit,

particularly the pine-apple, is in great abundance. The situation of my post is very romantic, and, from its height, is much cooler than I could have expected in these latitudes.

11th May.—The 27th and 57th Regiments landed from Barbadoes the day before yesterday; the first, with a small detachment, immediately marched to La Feuillage upon my right. Yesterday I moved them to my left and posted them from Dejons to Dubrossais. The 52nd moved forward and occupied the ground at La Feuillage which the 27th had left. Sir Ralph called here yesterday. I was out reconnoitring in hopes of finding a line of communication with General Graham shorter than that by Du Crossais. It may be done from my advanced post, but not till our batteries are erected and the enemy dislodged from the post they hold immediately opposite them. Sir Ralph waited my return; he told me that he would send me the regiment of "Royal Étrangers" and part of Lowenstein's this day to post in the plain to the left of the 27th, and that he had directed General Graham to move a regiment to the right rear of Corte's. The howitzers arrived here this morning, and are forwarded to my advance, where batteries are being erected for them. The enemy have a 6-pounder at their advanced post from which they occasionally fire grape; one man lost his leg yesterday.

CAMP DE CHASSEUR, 14th May.—I have advanced the "Royal Étrangers" as far as Ferrando, with strong picquets to their left on the river and great road. If a road was cut straight across to the end of the ridge which General Graham occupies, and General Graham would move the 42nd Regiment, which is of no use where it is, to the lower part of that ridge, the investment on this side would be complete. The enemy skirmished yesterday with the post at Ferrando, but at a distance; the nearer we approach the quieter they are; but I note that the place for a Commander-in-chief is his advanced post. If he is not there numberless opportunities are lost. The labour to the troops

is great, but the guns are up, and the batteries nearly completed.

16th May.—The General came here the day before yesterday; he was displeased that the communication was not completed with General Graham. This surprised me, as I had examined the ground and reported that all that was necessary was a working party under proper direction. He found fault because the "Royal Étrangers" were, he said, huddled in the plain. In short, he was out of humour. He is blind, and, never having been in the plain or crossed the country, he has no conception of the impenetrable stuff which covers it. I went with Captain Hay to General Graham's post. I found him discontented and hot and full of arguments not at all applicable to the case against coming lower with his force. The conversation was public at his table upon subjects which should only be discussed in private; in short, the worst *ton* prevailed. Before I set out I ordered that the sugar-canes should be burnt. The road was commenced yesterday, and will, I hope, be finished this day, but even now the communication from the Morne Fortuné with the country is completely stopt by the "Royal Étrangers" and patrols. Some prisoners taken yesterday said they could no longer get provisions on that side. They tried the other towards Chabot. We sent parties who drove them and killed several. The batteries were finished last night, and are expected to open this morning.

17th May.—The batteries opened yesterday morning at eight o'clock. At first the enemy seemed much alarmed. They soon recovered, and commenced a fire from three mortars and seven guns. Our batteries are distant, our fire ill-directed; it has had no effect. A 9-pounder, at their advanced post within 600 yards of us, without breast-work or embrasure, is allowed to exist, and to plague us. There is talk of our advancing. The Commander-in-chief has not been here since the fire commenced, and affairs go on as ill as possible. Scaling ladders are being prepared—

the resource of those who want genius; but before these can be made use of, surely some impression must be made upon the works. The enemy fire very little.

18th May.—The 9-pounder at the enemy's advance continued to tease us and insult us, and though uncovered within 500 yards of our battery, it could not be dismounted. The men, however, were driven from it, and obliged to hide themselves on the reverse of the hill. I took advantage of this, at the request of Captain Hay, the General's aide-de-camp and chief engineer, to send fifty men by a path leading to the front of the enemy's advanced post, in moving along which they could not be seen. I supported them by 100 more. Captain Hay begged to lead them. I continued at the battery, making a 12-pounder fire till I saw the party at the foot of the hill. They ascended by this means unperceived. The enemy, to the amount of fifty, being surprised, threw down their arms and ran off; our men bayoneted twelve or fourteen of them. The gun was spiked and thrown over the hill, and the party returned without firing or losing a man. It was done in sight of both the enemy's and my camp at 4 P.M. I immediately went out to decide upon the propriety of establishing myself forward. The ground upon which the gun had stood was advantageous, but it required more men than I could spare; a trench would have been necessary. It was getting dark. I determined to leave it, being convinced that we could retake it under the fire of our cannon without loss whenever it was necessary, but I established a post of 200 men upon a height 200 yards in front of the advanced batteries. To this we are now making a road, and batteries are to be constructed.

I had directed Colonel Count d'Heilgmer to endeavour to spike and overturn a gun on the ridge of the Morne opposite to his post at Ferrando. This gun had become extremely troublesome. I ordered some guns to be directed against it, and desired the Count under cover of this fire to slip forward some men close to a wood near. He

managed the business very dexterously; whilst one party went through a wood directly to the gun, another drew attention to another quarter. We succeeded with little loss; but, being anxious to reconnoitre the ground near the Morne Fortuné, he advanced very close to it, and fell in with a strong party, who killed and wounded four officers and eighteen or twenty men. His zeal induced him on the same night to do a thing which caused some of his people to be hurt, and might have been attended with worse consequences. I had desired him to direct the picquets on his right to communicate with one that I had placed on the height in our front. He not only did that, but ordered a company to take possession of the height on which the 9-pounder had been, the one which I had not thought fit to retain. When we had retired after capturing the gun the enemy had placed a strong picquet on the height. This picquet fired on his company when they approached about midnight. The shot came upon the picquet I had placed. They, knowing nothing of the approach of the "Royal Étrangers," conceived the firing was at them. Major Inglis, a steady, good officer, fortunately prevented his men from firing from a wish to reserve his fire until they came nearer, otherwise the company of "Royal Étrangers" sent by the Count would have found itself between two fires. The French were driven back, and the company gained possession of the height. At the commencement of the fire I had gone to the picquet, and was with Major Inglis about the time the firing ceased. We heard a great deal of talking and movement, and thought it was the enemy who meant to make an attack. I left the major some time afterwards, but it was not till four in the morning that an officer of the "Royal Étrangers" came to report to me what had happened. They had six men wounded, and three of Major Inglis's men had been so. I regretted the Count's officiousness; it had been in my power to have the ground the evening before. I, however, went forward to see if it was possible to retain it. Day was beginning to break. I saw it could

not be held without the loss of eighteen or twenty men. The enemy were then moving down, and would have begun a skirmish which would have prevented the making a trench. I had not sufficient men. I therefore ordered the Étrangers to retire before any fire commenced.

General Abercromby came to the camp for the first time since the opening of the batteries. He was in low spirits because an attack made on the Vigie by the 31st, supported by the Grenadiers, had failed the night before. The 31st lost about 170 men. They went on, I understand, in great disorder, began to fire, and attracted the grape-shot of the redoubt on the top. This killed and wounded great numbers; the rest ran off. The attack was planned in a hurry, and executed without spirit or judgment. The regiments in general are extremely bad; it is hard to say whether the officers or men are worse. The greatest exertion was required to prevent the attack on Chabot from having a similar end. I informed the Commander-in-chief of the particulars of that incident that he might be on his guard; he does not seem to have profited by the information. It is to be regretted that the Vigie was not carried. Sir Ralph ought, I think, to have carried it at all risks, and have advanced regiment upon regiment till it was done. The loss of the enemy in that case, and not ours, would have been known to them. The Commander-in-chief is likewise hurt and surprised that the effect of the artillery has not been greater. Those about him are equally disconcerted. When it is determined that a post cannot be assaulted, but must be reduced by cannon, a certain time is required; that time, according to circumstances, must be greater or less. In a country so mountainous and difficult as this, it must be long. I told Sir Ralph that at the siege of Calvi the difficulties of the country were greater than here, that the siege therefore lasted upwards of two months, but the ordnance used there were 13-inch mortars and 26-pounders, and 10½-inch howitzers. The difference in the labour of bringing such ordnance up instead of those of less calibre was trifling, but the difference of effect was considerable. If

he would take the proper means, the way into the Morne Fortuné was plain. The enemy had the advantage of position; we had to overcome that difficulty by labour and by superiority of fire. I took the liberty also of telling him, for I saw that nobody about him would, that his presence at this post, which was become the most important one, would infinitely forward the service. It would inspire zeal, and he would be ready to observe and take advantage of events on the instant. He assured me that it was not from personal convenience that he had not fixed himself here; it had been to be near the Admiral; he should, however, come immediately to this neighbourhood. I said that the taking of the Morne being the great object, every other consideration should yield to it. It was a combined operation, but the only service the Admiral could render was by landing 1000 or a considerable number of sailors, and keeping his frigates to cruise and prevent the entry of supplies.

19th May.—A road under cover has been made from the advanced howitzer battery to the post I took the day before yesterday. The General arrived about eleven o'clock. He took me aside and said that Captain Hay had told him I wished Brigadier-General Knox to join me; that he could not think of superseding me, but that I might naturally be fatigued and require some rest. I told him that I was by no means fatigued and by no means wished to be relieved, but that as a lodgment was intended to be made to the left, it was necessary an officer should be appointed to direct it; that it was impossible for me to be both here and there. Brigadier-General Knox was a man of sense, and had the character of being a good officer; the operation here and on the left must go hand in hand, and in order to forward the service I preferred having a man of ability who was my senior to a junior of less talent. These reasons induced me to mention General Knox to Captain Hay; that I had none of the jealousy he suspected; that my sole wish was to forward the service, and see it terminated successfully. He paid me some compliments. I then accompanied him round the works.

20th May.—The 53rd and the 57th Regiments, and the part of the 27th which have been under General Graham, joined me this morning.

21st May.—Brigadier-General Knox appeared in yesterday's orders to command these advanced posts. This appeared singular to many, who cannot conceive that anybody could apply to have an officer put over them; but zeal and talent are now more than ever rare in the army. General Knox possesses both. I could not hesitate when the alternative was to lose his services or to serve under him.

23rd May.—General Knox and I now understand one another perfectly, and the service, as far as we are concerned, is carried on with harmony. It was hoped that everything would have been ready yesterday, and that early this morning we should have attacked the enemy's outpost and lodged ourselves on it. The orders and distribution of the troops were made out, but the batteries were without powder; the attack was therefore postponed. The day was excessively rainy. The rain destroyed the road and made it impossible to forward the 24-pounders.

25th May.—Yesterday morning at daylight the two new batteries at the advanced post and all the others opened upon the Morne. About six o'clock a few of the guns were turned upon the enemy's advanced post, and particularly upon a *flèche* to the right of it. When these had fired a sufficient time to dislodge whatever troops were supposed to be in and about it, the Light Infantry and Grenadiers of the 27th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond advanced. I placed myself between the two companies when we reached the top. We were fired upon by thirty or forty men from the *flèche*. No resistance had been expected. The General's orders were not to advance to the *flèche*, as the road to it was exposed to grape-shot from the fort, but to lodge ourselves on the reverse of the height we had gained till such time as a covered road

could be made to the *flèche*. I immediately perceived that without the *flèche* and the ridge on which it stood the possession of the first height would be of no use, and that the fort would not dare to fire upon us for fear of hurting their own men. I therefore ordered the two companies to attack it. They advanced briskly, and the enemy abandoned it; we lost two men. The *flèche* stood upon a narrow ridge which ran to within 500 yards of the fort. The top of it was tolerably clear, but the sides much encumbered with brushwood. The enemy began to fire grape, but, taking advantage of the *flèche*, which the workmen began to reverse, and of the nature of the ground, I contrived to put under cover both the flank companies and several of the others which came up under Lieutenant-Colonel Gilman to our support. Other workmen were employed in clearing a road for cannon to the knoll we first reached and from thence to the batteries in the rear. The chief engineer came forward and found the situation extremely favourable for batteries. I observed that much was wanting to make the post secure; all could not be done in daylight exposed to the enemy's fire, but from some mistake the working parties had not arrived to do what was possible and absolutely necessary.

After a short time the enemy ceased to molest us, and I went back to make my report to the General and to hurry on the working parties. I found him in one of the batteries. Whilst I was speaking to him we observed a body of men marching out of the fort and advancing towards the post I had just taken. Orders were immediately sent to the most commanding batteries to fire upon them. I ran to the post, which was attacked almost immediately. The ground and some houses in our front favoured the enemy's approach. I sent a detachment to reinforce a party I had posted on the left flank, but they were never able to form so as to occupy the ground I directed. The fire from the enemy was brisk and well-directed. They had the means of covering themselves, and they were clever in availing themselves of it; our men

were falling fast. I ordered the Grenadiers and Light Infantry to advance and charge them. Colonel Drummond headed them, cut down an officer with his sword, drove them with the bayonet, and followed them some way; they suffered on their return from grape-shot. Drummond had scarcely returned when the enemy were reinforced and returned a second time. I ordered another company to advance and line a hedge to my left. This order was, however, only very imperfectly carried out. The fire from the hedge would have swept a valley, or rather a dip, by which the enemy could advance under cover within twenty yards of me. This second attack was more spirited than the first. The enemy took advantage of the hedge not being properly lined, and advanced close to us with great boldness. The front I could present was small. Many officers and men had been already knocked down; more were falling every moment. The regiment showed great spirit, but the enemy's force was superior to ours. The ground was so confined that the whole of our men could not be brought into action or to support each other, and if the men continued to fall so fast, it was to be dreaded they might give way.

I knew the General was looking on at no great distance, and expected every moment a gun to be forwarded or a movement of troops from the left. I was surprised to hear of neither. I begged Brigadier-General Hope, who happened to be at the post when the attack commenced, to go back and represent to the General the critical situation we were in, and to beg he would order the regiment of "Royal Étrangers" in the plain to move up and at least show themselves on the left. After General Hope's departure things became more serious. The Grenadiers and Light Infantry had already suffered too much to charge again. I turned to Colonel Gilman and told him that, if two companies did not advance instantly and charge, the post was lost. Two were ordered forward, and showed great gallantry. They were obliged to advance in file and form under fire. Captain Dunlop, who headed them, was

wounded and fell almost instantly. Major Wilson was killed when in the act of making them charge; the enemy, who were superior to us in firing, could not stand the bayonet, but set off. I took advantage of this interval to order Lieutenant-Colonel Gilman in person to take two companies from the rear where they had not suffered and line the hedge on the left, desiring him to send back the companies which had been previously ordered to do it. These had been cut up. The Lieutenant-Colonel did it completely. I then called in those who had charged. They had performed the duty on which they had been sent, and were now exposed to the guns of the fort. The enemy retreated to the fort. They left many killed, but dragged away many, and most of their wounded. This post, which was of the utmost importance, was saved by the good conduct and regularity of the 27th Regiment. They laboured under every disadvantage. I ordered the houses in front to be instantly burnt, and begged of Captain Hay to take advantage of the present moment to make the entrenchment and abattis which were necessary to make the post tenable. Everything was to be deroaded if the post were attacked in its present condition.

The grape from the fort gradually slackened. At last I observed parties coming from the fort with biers for the killed and wounded, and therefore judged that they had no thoughts of another attack. I went back to report to the General, and to enforce the necessity of entrenching and securing the post before they turned their thoughts to the batteries and guns which were to be placed on it. The General thanked me for my exertions, and said he could never sufficiently repeat his obligations to me. I told him we owed the post to the gallantry of the 27th Regiment. Their loss in killed and wounded was 120, amongst whom were eight officers, viz. two majors, two captains, and four subalterns. In the course of yesterday the post was secured and two 6-pounders placed in it. At dusk an officer with a flag came from the fort with a letter from the National Commissioner and the commander of the troops to the

officer commanding the outposts and batteries, stating that they had written to the General and Admiral, requesting a cessation of hostilities till next day at twelve, to give time to assemble a council to take into consideration the situation of their affairs. Some days ago a flag was sent from them to know what way they might expect to be treated. The answer I understand was, that men regimented and in arms, of whatever colour, should be treated as prisoners of war. The cessation was granted. An officer was sent to them this morning; he is not returned. The General and Admiral are waiting with impatience. The attack upon the post yesterday was, I believe, a last desperate effort; as it did not succeed and batteries may now be erected so close to them, *they will, I suppose, capitulate.* |

FORT CHARLOTTE, ST. LUCIA, 1st June.—The negotiations ended in a capitulation, and the General did me the honour to order me to take possession of the fort on the 26th at the head of the 27th, 14th, flank companies of the 53rd, detachments of the Royal Artillery, Navy, and Lowenstein's Jägers. We formed a lane from the gate, and the garrison, to the amount of 2000, marched out, laid down their arms, and were conveyed to the Vigie, and from thence on board transports. The garrison consisted chiefly of blacks and men of colour. I have been frequently since then in company with the General Cottin and the Representant Goyrand. The former seems a hot-headed, insolent blackguard. He was formerly a saddler in Guadeloupe. The latter, a plain, honest man, has been always a military man; I suppose he was a sergeant, but he rose to be a lieutenant under the old Government. He is a man of humanity, did good, and is much liked by the Colony.

Sir Ralph, the day before we took possession, sent Brigadier-General Knox to me. He told me the Commander-in-chief intended to recommend strongly to his Majesty such officers as had exerted themselves on the expedition, and me in particular; that he was much at a loss for a proper officer to leave in command at St. Lucia, and would

take it as a particular favour if I would remain: to this were added some flattering speeches, and that he would give me 3000 troops. I had suspected for some days previously that this offer would be made to me, and I had mentioned it to General Hope, begging that if it was proposed he would prevent it and state how disagreeable it would be to me. Of all things I dislike a garrison. I saw there would be much to arrange that would plague me. It is not my wish to remain after the war in the West Indies; to attend the army is more to my taste. I stated all these things to General Knox. He said he was sure Sir Ralph was so eager for my remaining, that he would be disappointed if I did not. I took for granted that it was in vain to refuse, and therefore accepted. When I saw Sir Ralph he thanked me. He has granted all my requests, and has even given my brigade-major, Anderson, a company. My appointments are 30s. 6d. a day; but he said I should be recommended for whatever was intended for Sir Charles Gordon. I am involved in a most disagreeable scene; a considerable number of the negroes are in the woods in arms. The work in the Morne, called Fort Charlotte, is quite open, with no cover for officers or men. Everything military or civil is in the greatest confusion, and the rainy season has commenced; whilst it lasts it is almost impracticable to do anything. Captain McDowal of the navy, with two line-of-battle ships and some frigates, are left with us. The army is embarked, and I remain with the 31st, 44th, 48th, 55th York Rangers, O'Meara's black corps, one hundred Royal Artillery, two engineers, assistants, &c., making in all 4000 or 5000 men fit for duty, besides officers, sergeants, and drummers.

CHAPTER IX

MOORE AS GOVERNOR OF ST LUCIA

FORT CHARLOTTE, *4th June*.—The General and Admiral sailed last night, leaving not only all the batteries mounted against this place, but even a considerable quantity of ammunition and ordnance on the shore intended to be embarked for the use of the army. The ammunition and provisions for the post are still in Castries, and to be brought up. There is no cover on this hill for two-thirds of the troops. Vicux Fort, from accidents of currents and contrary winds, is not yet in our possession. A considerable number of blacks are in the woods and in arms in different parts of the island. Added to all these circumstances, the rainy season impedes the strengthening of the post, prevents forwarding provisions and ammunition, or doing any one of the many things which are absolutely necessary. The men begin to fall sick, and we have no hospital room. All the prisoners taken in the island remain in the Carenage embarked in transports. The General and Admiral think they have cleared themselves from all trouble by running away from it. They have, however, hurt their character as military men. The moment the fort had surrendered large detachments under proper officers ought to have been detached to different parts of the island to encourage and support the proprietors and disarm the blacks. A week or ten days would probably have done this; in the meantime the rest of the army might have been employed in dismantling the batteries we erected, destroying roads, and embarking the stores and artillery with method. All this could have been done, and the expedition to Grenada and St. Vincent not retarded ten days. These ten days would

have secured a conquest which it took an army of 11,000 men a month to make. As it is, the island is left in the most precarious state. I wrote to the General before he went, describing the situation in which he had left me. I said that I should not be deterred by difficulties, but, should any misfortune happen, I desired he would recollect my situation and shame me only in proportion to my deserts.

I have issued a proclamation offering pardon to the people of all colours and descriptions who would come in with their arms. I give passes and encourage everybody to return to their habitations, and have assured them of indulgence and protection if they remain quiet and attend only to their private affairs. I have warned the *émigrés* not to cast any reflections upon those who have been republicans; if they did so they might expect to be punished. They had claims, and should find favour from Government; but either in aspersions against republicans or ill-treatment to negroes they could not be supported. I endeavour to inculcate how much it is the interest of all proprietors to prevent disturbances; that, however beneficial war might be to me, it was destruction to them. It was better to leave it for negotiation at the end of the war to decide to whom the island should belong, than for me now to endeavour to decide judicial questions to the best of my ability. I had no object to serve but the prosperity and welfare of the colony; that a man having been formerly royalist or republican should neither be a merit or demerit with me. I should inquire whether he was now a quiet citizen and attended to his family affairs. I don't know what effect these sentiments may produce. I am certain that if I once gain the proprietors the negroes will soon be brought to submit. The Government remains military, and the administration of the civil and criminal justice of the country is vested in the commandant.

OSTERIS, NEAR DENERIE, 2nd July.—The multiplicity of business I have had has prevented me from setting down

anything in my journal. The force I have is great, but is so crippled from the want of proper people either to command the different regiments or direct the departments, that the number of troops rather tends to cause embarrassment. It has never ceased to rain since the army left us. The troops, partly on that account, partly from want of proper accommodation, but chiefly from the want of regimental care and economy, have become so sickly, that the three regiments on the Morne can only furnish between 600 and 700 men for duty. I was so worn and vexed from seeing no prospect of my situation being better, that I wrote some time ago a private letter to the Commander-in-chief giving him my opinion fully respecting my situation and the character of those under me, showing the necessity of a change in the departments; that in particular the person immediately junior to me, instead of being an assistance, was a man so completely absurd and wrong-headed that I dreaded leaving the fort, though my presence in the country was necessary. The reports of the devastation done by the negroes in the woods on the side of Souffriere and Vieux Fort increased daily; the inhabitants were demanding troops; I had no confidence in the officer who commanded in those parts; I thought he increased rather than diminished the apprehensions of the inhabitants. I was displeased with the proprietors for leaving their habitations and assembling in the towns on the coast, because I was convinced that those in arms in the woods were few, and that the proprietors by remaining upon their estates and treating their negroes kindly would more effectually prevent their joining those in arms, than I should by dispersing the troops through the country. I also suspected that the proprietors wished for troops in order to overawe and tyrannise over the negroes, a system I was determined by no means to countenance. The reports of the number of brigands and their acts of violence came from all quarters. The village of Mioud was burnt.

I determined to visit these quarters before I came to

any resolution respecting the troops, and thought I must risk leaving the person immediately under me in charge of the Morne in order to do so. I was absent for about a week, visited the whole coast and country from Souffriere to Vieux Fort. The country is less mountainous and infinitely more beautiful and fertile than on the side of Castries. The four towns of Souffriere, Choiseul, Laborie, and Vieux Fort upon the coast are neat and healthy. I had an opportunity at those places of conversing with all the country people whom fear had driven from their habitations. I encouraged them, and assured them of protection. I said that I should post the troops so as to protect their plantations, that they must then return to them with a determination not to quit them. I said that something must be risked to preserve their property, and that, above all, it was become necessary from policy, if not from humanity, to treat their slaves not only with lenity, but even with kindness; that men after having been told they were free, and after carrying arms, did not easily return to slavery and labour. It would require management. Kind treatment and good feeling could alone do it. When those in the woods saw the others comfortable and happy, they would naturally join them. The troops should be employed to catch such as did not, but I would not permit the masters to treat their negroes with harshness. That, for my part, I saw no reason why a man should be treated harshly because he was black or of colour. All men were entitled to justice, and they should meet with it from me without distinction or partiality, whether white or black, republican or royalist.

These sentiments, which I expressed at the public meetings as well as in my private conversations, were by no means pleasant to many, particularly to the *émigrés*. I professed no preference to them; on the contrary, I wished to curb their insolence. I observe that those people, instead of profiting by their misfortunes, seem only to have increased their prejudices, and in their banishment pant for the moment to gratify their revenge and tyrannise over

their fellow-creatures. The terms of *canaille*, *coquin*, &c., are ever in their mouths, and applied to every person in the lower ranks of life.

At Vieux Fort I found that one Rupez Roche had been arrested on suspicion of communicating with and supporting the brigands. I have long had information of his doing so, and have wished to get hold of him. He is a man of property in the island, is reckoned clever, but is of a restless, ambitious temper. He was a principal agent of the Republic, but was permitted with many others to remain after the capture of the island. He had been put on board an armed vessel. I sent for him; he entered into an explanation and justification of his conduct. I saw he depended much upon his eloquence, which consisted in declamation and protestations of innocence. His manner was theatrical. I told him what accusations had been made against him, and that he should be tried. I sent him to the Commodore at Castries to remain as a prisoner in his ship.

I detached Major Lindsay of the 55th with seventy or eighty men to endeavour to surprise and fall upon the brigands assembled near Praslin. I regretted it was not in my power to go with them, but I expected at Castries answers to letters I had sent to the Commander-in-chief. In coming to Vieux Fort I kept to the Chemin Royal along the coast. In returning I took roads close to the mountains, that I might judge of the proper places to establish posts to cover the country. The country from Souffriere to Vieux Fort is called "a plain," in general four or five miles in breadth from the sea. It is "a plain" when compared with the mountains beyond it. The ground is, however, irregular, and runs in ridges which are separated by deep ravines. The ground is in general fertile, and the produce, which consists of sugar, cotton, coffee, and cocoa, can be conveyed with tolerable ease to the coast, which abounds in small bays fit for embarking it. The habitations extend to the foot of the mountains, which are covered with wood, from whence the negroes in arms sally to pillage and

murder. By keeping detachments at certain points in the line of the habitations nearest the mountains, by patrolling from post to post, and even sending small parties into the woods, the plantations and the whole country from thence to the sea is protected. I marked out the situations, and have since ordered detachments to occupy them. I divided the country into two separate commands. Major Lindsay, with five companies of the 55th, has charge of the quarters of Vieux Fort and Laborie. I have sent Major Wilson of the 44th Regiment to command Souffriere and Choiseul. He is a brother to Wilson of the 27th who was killed when with me on the day of the attack on our advanced post at De Chapeau. Major Wilson has the other five companies of the 55th and a detachment of the black corps. Their orders are to guard the plantations from the depredations of the brigands, and the coast from the landing of boats with people from St. Vincent with arms and ammunition.

As I passed through Souffriere four men were brought in who had been taken in a boat coming from St. Vincent; there had been eight of them, four had escaped. I ordered the four prisoners to be shot. I returned to Castries extremely well pleased with my tour, having gained information both with respect to the country and the character of the inhabitants. I ordered several people, who could give no reason for remaining in the island, to be shipped off. I made the investigation in public to prevent the influence of the malice of individuals. Party feeling has been so long rampant in the country, that it is impossible to believe the reports they spread of one another. The vessel I had despatched with my letter to Sir Ralph returned without finding him. This perplexed me much. One of my letters was the one (see p. 223, *ante*) giving an exact statement of the situation. The other was an answer to one Sir Ralph had written to me with orders to send O'Meara's black corps to St. Vincent. In it I stated my reasons for detaining it here till I received his further orders. I had received his letter the day before I set out for Castries. I had already given them

orders to march across the country to this place whilst I took the circle along the coast. Upon receiving Sir Ralph's order I was obliged to defer their march that they might be at hand to embark should he persist in wishing them to be sent to St. Vincent. The interval would, I thought, be usefully employed in visiting the ports I have mentioned. It is much to be regretted that Sir Ralph's letters prevented the execution of my first plan. A whole tract of country which has been since burnt would have been saved, as well as many lives. I again despatched the vessel with my letter to St. Vincent, and ordered them, if Sir Ralph was not there, to search for him till they found him.

In the meantime accounts came in of the depredations of the brigands on the side of Grosislet, Dauphin, &c. &c., and a letter from Major Lindsay stating that upon his arrival with his detachment at Praslin he had been attacked three times by the brigands, who were 300 in number, 150 only being armed; that he had repulsed them, and killed and wounded twenty or thirty of them, with the loss of two men wounded. I feared the landing of men and arms from Guadeloupe, and it was necessary to quell this species of insurrection before it gained more head. I sent 190 men, consisting of the grenadiers and light companies of the 31st and 44th Regiments, and grenadiers of the black corps, to Grosislet. I sent vessels to Dauphin and Denéric with provisions. I joined the flank companies at Grosislet the forenoon of the 25th June. I marched in the night with them by the Chemin Royal to Acquarts's estate near Dauphin, having left orders with Major Campagne with 200 of the black corps, to march by a shorter road along the heights and join me at Sergenton, or Acquarts.

I reached Acquarts about seven in the morning. Some few brigands were in the huts. Only one was taken and hanged. The house at Acquarts had been burned the day before. The negroes would give no information till the prisoner was hanged and they were threatened with the same. The manager then offered to lead us to their camp, which was in the woods not far off; the men were tired with their

march, and it was evening before they gave us the information. Major Campagne came upon them from the heights, whilst I moved from the plain. The camp, which consisted of bowers in the heart of the wood, had been abandoned upon our arrival; they are, it is supposed, retired to Mountain la Sorciere. I was obliged to remain two days at Acquarts, because the provisions vessel was not arrived. I employed three days in visiting the country and gaining information. The country abounds in good provisions; the negroes both on Acquarts and Ostia's estates are in league with those in the woods. I pardoned several, but ordered one man to be hanged, against whom there was strong proof of guilt. I left Major Campagne with 100 of his black corps to establish himself at Ostia's, to keep a detachment at Dauphin, to guard the bay, another at Acquarts, and to patrol the woods continually, protect the country and planters, and attack the brigands wherever he could hear of them. I marched here with the corps I had brought from Grosislet. The country is wild and barren till you approach this place, which abounds in habitations. Upon our appearing on the heights the whole country was set on fire; upon our approach to this house we could see a few fellows running off. The men were too much fatigued to follow them. Soon after our arrival some women came to us for protection; they said they had been in the woods; their houses were burnt, and they themselves had narrowly escaped with their lives. I went with a detachment to the bay of Denérie to make the agreed signal for the provisions vessel to enter. She was not to be seen. Captain Holland with ten or twelve men on mules went another way to collect some cattle. Forty or fifty brigands sallied from the woods, attacked him, wounded one man, and forced him to retire.

I went a few hours later with the greatest part of the detachment to the same place, where they had much provision and cattle collected; they ran off in different directions upon our approach. The negroes, male and female, of the estates who refuse to follow or join them are obliged to escape into the woods to avoid being put to death. The

houses all around are burned; they have spared the sugar houses and mills alone, and these form both good barracks and posts for the troops. Negroes, chiefly women, come in daily. They were told we should put them to death. This fear will, I hope, gradually wear off, and as they find they are sure of protection they will come in. The brigands have retired with a considerable quantity of booty to the Sercien. Their numbers by all accounts are inconsiderable; the burning of the negroes' houses and the cruelties they have committed will, I think, make the negroes less attached to them. I have sent Lieutenant-Colonel Hay to Castries for the 31st Regiment, which I mean to establish here. *The bay of Denérie must be particularly guarded.* A vessel full of men, and probably arms, was returning into Dauphin, and put out to sea upon seeing our people. I have received particulars of Major Lindsay's conduct at Praslin. Such an opportunity of destroying the brigands will probably never occur again. He has himself returned to Vieux Fort, leaving a detachment at Praslin to act on the defensive, and leaving the enemy between him and that post at liberty to commit what devastation they please. He knows I am here, yet has neither made any combination nor sent me the least intelligence. I intend to take seventy men from this and march to Praslin this evening. The brigands, I understand, display colours, and are posted near Praslin.

5th July.—I marched last evening for Praslin, but met a detachment from thence a few miles on the road, with letters stating that Captain L'Aureal, with a detachment of the black corps, had attacked and dispersed the brigands near that place. I returned immediately, and sent at 2 A.M. this morning two detachments in different directions into the woods to attack two camps, of which I had information. These detachments have just returned, having seen nobody. Letters which I received from Major Lindsay by the detachments yesterday show that he is frightened and does not know what he is about. He treats the poor

brigands, ill led and unarmed, with as much respect as if they were a regular disciplined body. His communication from Vieux Fort to Praslin is stopt, and the country devastated. In order to remedy these evils and to spirit up the inhabitants, whom he allows to despond, I shall set out for Praslin this afternoon, from thence to Vieux Fort, and return and join the troops. I leave here as soon as possible.

FORT CHARLOTTE, *8th July*.—I arrived at Praslin before dark. Nothing could, by all accounts, have been more miserable than Major Lindsay's conduct. He allowed himself to be attacked, and repulsed them three times; but had he attacked them he would have behaved more consonantly to the character of an officer and to that of the British troops. The effect upon the minds of the brigands would have been threefold. The house of Micaud, where the detachment is lodged, is healthy and commanding. I stayed till after dinner next day in order to examine the post and neighbourhood, and set out for Mr. Rigby's plantation with an escort of twenty men. About half-way, on passing a river, we were fired on by a party of brigands from a height in our rear. I formed the men on the opposite side, but having a village on my flank in which more brigands might be placed, I continued my march. I also, as it was late, dreaded being detained till dark. The brigands took the continuation of our march for a flight, and began to follow us with loud shouts. I saw ground at a little distance which was open and favourable. I therefore continued my march, wishing to encourage them to approach. When, thus encouraged, they came pretty close, I ordered the men to halt and front; we gave them a fire, and charged them with bayonets. They ran off, leaving the box with their ammunition. We emptied that and continued our march unmolested. Their firelocks did not exceed twenty-four or twenty-five, but there were above a hundred, some with pikes, some quite unarmed. Some of our servants when the firing commenced had run off to

give the alarm to the detachment at Rigby's, and we met an officer and forty or fifty men coming to our support.

I left this in the morning and arrived at Vieux Fort early. The people at Rigby's and Vieux Fort were in the greatest consternation. Wherever Major Lindsay has been this is the case. He is nervous himself, and makes every one else so. After making some arrangements at Vieux Fort I went in a sloop to Souffriere, where I arrived in the evening. Major Wilson was with his outposts. I found them active, and his arrangements judicious. The difference between this quarter and that under Major Lindsay was remarkable. I ordered a detachment of the blacks to move and meet Captain L'Aureal at Micaud in order to act in the heights. It was my intention to have returned to Vieux Fort, as the brigands seem now to be in that quarter; but hearing that Sir Ralph was at Morne Fortuné, I came here. He had been here for a few hours, but, not finding me, he returned to Martinique. I have also missed the letters he wrote to me. They were sent after me. I was infinitely disappointed at not seeing Sir Ralph, and I cannot but think him most inexcusable for not sending to me or waiting for my arrival. I have written to him my opinion fully. I wrote that the situation was as follows: The negroes in the island are to a man attached to the French cause; neither hanging, threats, or money would obtain for me any intelligence from them. Those upon the estates are in league with and connected with those in the woods. Any disembarkation from Guadeloupe of ever so few men and 800 or 1000 stand of arms, will force me to abandon the country, retire my posts, and concentrate everything in the Morne Fortuné, where the want of cover and convenience of every kind, added to the natural unhealthiness of the spot, will soon so reduce the numbers of the garrison as to make the possibility of our having to surrender a thing to be feared. If the island is a desirable acquisition an immediate stop must be put to the present troubles by sending a body of 800 or 1000 blacks to scour the woods, whilst the British, whom I find from experience incapable of acting in the interior, occupy posi-

tions on the coast. I repeated to him my want of assistants at the heads of corps and departments. The fact is, I have hardly an officer capable of taking care of his corps, far less of commanding a district; but such as they are I am forced to trust them. Nothing could be stronger than my statement to the Commander-in-chief. If he does not attend to it I fear the island will be lost. But our commanders now seem to think of nothing but a flourishing Gazette and then to get off.

Sir Ralph is said to be going home. Admiral Christian is already superseded. Upon the whole, since I have been in the West Indies I have observed so little system, such neglect in the higher orders, and such relaxation in the lower, neither zeal nor spirit anywhere, that I am convinced that the sooner we make peace the better. Against the spirit and enterprise of the Republic we have no chance. The troops are so infamous, that even the other evening it required every exertion in myself and the officers with me to get them to charge the brigands, who were already more than half beaten the moment they were faced. The composition of the officers is horrid. However flattering command may be to a military man, I would give the world to get quit of mine, or even to get home. I may lose my life and reputation without a possibility of doing good. With such instruments it is impossible to work.

MR. RIGBY'S PLANTATION, 11th July 1796.—I left the Morne on the 9th and returned to Souffriere. I saw as I passed the Canarie and Ance la Raye, burning. Next day I came here. I had arranged an attack on one of the brigand camps before I went to the Morne. Owing to bad execution it only partly succeeded. They were, however, dispersed to the number of 700 or 800, one-half women, ten or twelve only killed. I have intelligence of another camp in the Sorciere, and have written to Major Campagne to attack it.

This day I received a letter from Sir Ralph in answer to mine of the 8th. He refuses me any more blacks. He either avoids answering the things I have represented, or

misunderstands them. He deals in general advice and observations; his letter is a put-off. I answered his letter immediately, and after pretty strongly representing the situation of the island, the impossibility of my restoring tranquillity to it, I put him in mind that it was at his request, against my own inclination, I was appointed to the command of the island. The assistance, at that time promised, had not been granted, and I found myself in a situation the reverse of what I had been led to expect. I requested, as the greatest favour he could do me, to be relieved of the command, which I could no longer retain with the hope of credit to myself or advantage to my country. I am extremely dissatisfied with Sir Ralph, whom I believe to be a worthy but a weak man. With the reputation of having taken three islands he has not secured one, and the great force he brought to this country has dwindled without securing one possession. If we keep St. Lucia it must be by the greatest accident; my situation is irksome to a degree. I have not one officer upon whom I can depend to command a district. I am obliged to go from post to post myself, and have the constant dread of arms being landed from Guadeloupe. A vessel under American colours attempted to land a cargo at Esperance. I had fortunately a detachment there, and she was prevented.

VIEUX FORT, 21st July.—I received an answer from Sir Ralph. He is displeased with my letter. His answer is short, complains of my impatience, says it is my duty to struggle with difficulties, and desires to hear no more from me on the subject. He speaks of the possession of the Morne as securing the sovereignty of the island, &c. I continue my endeavours to quell the disturbances, conscious of having done everything in my power for the good of the service. Sir Ralph's displeasure gives me no uneasiness. I shall write to him when I return to Castries, and have nothing else to do. A sovereignty which affords no protection is but a disgraceful one for England. Independently of that the idea is absurd. Were the troops withdrawn from the country, and the coast left open to succours from

Guadeloupe, we should instantly be blockaded on Morne Fortuné. I have been in constant motion since I left the Morne, and, had I been fortunate, must have totally routed and dispersed the brigands. One detachment failed in surprising a considerable number in the Sorciere from a musket going off accidentally. The people were, however, dispersed, twenty or thirty killed, and the camp burned. A body of brigands attacked and carried a post which I had at Angiers plantation. Eight soldiers were killed and wounded. The officer commanding at Choiseul, though he heard the firing, did not move to support the post, and Major Wilson allowed the brigands to remain at it for thirty-six hours unmolested. Two other detachments, which I had directed to move that way, marched at 4 P.M. instead of 4 A.M. Had the one set obeyed my orders, or the other been commonly intelligent, the brigands who carried the post at Angiers must have been destroyed. It is in vain to be angry. I have ordered the negroes' houses in the wood and on the heights to be burned, and the ground provisions to be destroyed. If this is carried out effectually the brigands cannot remain in the interior. I am waiting for intelligence to attack them.

Their attachment and fidelity to the cause is great; they go to death with indifference. One man the other day denied, and persevered in doing so, that he had ever been with them or knew anything of them. The instant before he was shot he called out "Vive la république." The actions they commit are shocking; they murder in the most cruel manner even women and children. This I attribute to the people, black and white, who have hitherto directed them. These have been vagabonds from France, of the Robespierre faction, or blacks and men of colour devoid of principle, but with a little education, and some more cunning than the rest. These people have led them to commit every excess, and have succeeded in making them perfectly savage; but the blacks have naturally many good qualities. The cause in which they fight is praiseworthy did they not disgrace it by acts which are a shame to human nature. These acts make us feel less remorse in ordering them to be put to death. I

do it, however, with pain, being convinced the poor fellows are misled. The blacks who have taken the royalist side, and have remained faithful to their masters, are equally attached to their cause, and inveterate against the others and against the republican party. A body of these men, taken by Victor Hugues at Guadeloupe, were immediately put in irons, treated as galley slaves, and half starved. Victor Hugues has repeatedly offered them their liberty and rewards to enlist with him and fight against us. They have persevered in rejecting with disdain his offers, and many who have outlived the harsh treatment they have received are still in irons and work as galley slaves at Guadeloupe.

FORT CHARLOTTE, 11th August 1796.—I returned here last night after an absence of five weeks, during which I have traversed the island in every direction. A fortnight ago Sir Ralph sent me a reinforcement of 300 black troops, with a very kind letter, previous to his departure to Europe. He had, I suppose, repented of the former letter he had written me. Wherever I received intelligence of the brigands being assembled, I immediately moved and attacked them; and during fourteen days have so tormented them, that many have returned to the estates and have delivered themselves to their masters. I continue to destroy their provisions, and I depend upon this being effectually done for establishing tranquillity. I have much to complain of the officers. I have few who execute my orders, and the regiments are literally dying for want of care. One has not a man fit for duty. Two others are little better. The want of zeal for the service is dreadful. I really believe many of them wish their men to die that they may get home. The little assistance I receive, and the impossibility of doing everything myself, distress me to a degree. I am sure I have undergone more fatigue and hardship these last five weeks than most officers suffer in as many campaigns. I have been marching continually in this hot country, where no European ever was before, sleeping almost constantly in the open air, and without tent or any convenience beyond

the common soldier; but even this activity, unassisted by those under me, will not serve the purpose. The brigands are, however, for the moment quiet, and I have taken the opportunity to return here to inspect affairs which in my absence have been neglected.

FORT CHARLOTTE, 31st *August*.—From every account the brigands are disheartened; one of their camps was lately attacked by Captain L'Aureal and the Black Rangers. Above 100 of them were killed and wounded. Their whole dependence now is, I believe, on succours from Guadeloupe, and the navy, in spite of every representation I can make, will not keep cruising to the windward side of the island. It is too extensive, and the country too rugged and intersected to be effectually guarded by troops. The disturbances of this island, from the activity and perseverance which have been employed, are nearly at an end. The intercourse with Guadeloupe intercepted for three weeks would ensure it, but if succours are thrown in from thence the consequence will be fatal. Cruisers alone can prevent them. The sickness among the troops is dreadful. The deaths upon the *Morne Fortuné* alone are from sixty to seventy a week. This proceeds undoubtedly in a great measure from the climate, but also, I am sorry to find, from a total want of discipline and interior economy in the regiments. The discipline of modern times, which consists of parades, fire-lock exercise, &c., is easy to the officer, as it takes up but an hour or two in the day. The machine is in other respects conducted by the commanding and staff officers. The discipline of the ancient consisted of bodily exercises, running, marching, &c., terminated by bathing. The military character of sobriety and patience would completely answer in this country; but the officers and men, in following them, would be completely occupied with their profession, and could pursue no other object. The military spirit is now, I think, gone. The officers wish to be advanced, to get more pay and have less duty. I see none, or at least very few, who have the smallest ambition to distinguish them-

selves. Little can be expected from men formed and led by such officers. They neither look up to them as officers, nor do they respect them as gentlemen. I see this so strongly, that I fear if the war continues much longer in this country we shall be beaten by equal numbers of the blacks. The following is a letter I have just written to Sir Ralph Abercromby. When at Vieux Fort in July he wrote me a very short letter in answer to the representations I had made to him of the state of the island. I was at the time I received it making exertions to quell the brigands which I believe few officers in my situation would have done. I was so provoked that I determined not to answer it, but to continue my exertions. Some days later his very kind letter announcing that he had sent me a reinforcement of 300 black troops, and was about to depart for England, disarmed me, but I have not till now had time or opportunity to write to him.

“FORT CHARLOTTE, ST. LUCIA, *2nd September 1796.*
(Private.)—DEAR GENERAL,—Your letter of the 13th July made me very uneasy. I was not conscious of having deserved, and I was extremely sorry to find I had incurred, your displeasure. I can assure you that my exertions to fulfil the duties of my station were unremitting. It was my ambition to execute your orders, and to restore tranquillity to the island you had entrusted to my care; but the little attention which I thought was paid to my representation, the shameful ignorance and want of zeal in the principal officers under my command, of which fresh instances provoked me daily, made me despair of success, and perhaps was the cause of that impatience which appeared in my letters, and of which you complain. So many circumstances at that time combined to irritate and vex me, that a temper less warm than mine might have yielded to them. Had you been present I think you would have been more inclined to pity than to be angry with me. I soon after received your letter of the 20th July, and I can never forget your attention in writing thus kindly to me immedi-

ately previous to your departure. The arrival of Druault's corps, which your letter announced, was not a greater cordial. From that time to within this fortnight I continued absent from the Morne; I directed the destruction of the ground provisions, and, taking every means to find out the camps and retreats of the brigands, I ordered them to be attacked, and generally attacked them in person. In order to inspire some activity and zeal it was necessary, I found, to show a great deal. The brigands after having been extremely insolent, frequently approaching and even attacking our posts, soon became less enterprising. There have been upon the whole, I suppose, between 300 and 400 of them killed, wounded, and hanged, and they are, from every report, much disheartened. Many have returned to work upon the estates, driven by fear and hunger, but these are still equally disaffected. The greater number, however, continue in the woods, and are encouraged to bear with every inconvenience by the hope of being soon succoured from Guadeloupe. They have lately had communication with that island. I do what I can to guard the coast with troops, but it is too extensive and too rugged to be guarded effectually by other means than shipping. Every representation has been made to the Admiral, but hitherto the windward coast has been completely open.

"The brigands have been so driven, and must be so much distressed for provisions, that I am convinced that could all communication be interrupted for three weeks, the business would be over and tranquillity restored to the island; but any succour from Guadeloupe will throw everything back, and may be attended with serious consequences from the dispersed and sickly situation of the troops. I have lately arrested many individuals who had remained in consequence of the terms of the capitulation and of the first proclamation. There was every reason to suspect them of having assisted the brigands with provisions, ammunition, and intelligence. I have been forced to adopt other violent measures which at first I had flattered myself would not have been necessary; but true republicanism seems, at least in this country, to be

an excuse for every species of treachery, want of faith, and even common honesty, and I begin to think that harsh measures to which the Republic has accustomed them can alone be efficacious. Whether I shall succeed or not in finally restoring tranquillity I cannot say. It depends so much on accident and the efforts of others. As far as my abilities go I think I have and shall contrive to exert them. I have undergone a degree of personal inconvenience and fatigue which circumstances rendered necessary, but which few constitutions are equal to; mine has hitherto resisted, and I am perfectly well. I wish I could say as much for the officers and men under my command; they have suffered severely. The sickness is so much greater upon Morne Fortuné and its immediate dependencies than at the other posts, that I detain upon it a number only sufficient for the daily duties. The troops, I observe, which have been most active are the most healthy, a proof that the sun is not the cause of the sickness. There are local situations in these islands—Morne Fortuné is unfortunately one of them—which are so unhealthy, that perhaps no care and management could altogether counteract the evil effects; but in general the greater part of the sickness proceeds from the want of interior discipline and economy in the regiments.

“Great attention should be paid in this country to the cleanliness and even neatness of the soldier’s person, to the regularity of his diet, an addition to the eating part of the ration instead of rum, sea or river bathing, constant activity and movement. In short, General, excuse the pedantry of the expression, but with a Roman instead of a modern exercise and discipline the troops in the West Indies might, I am convinced, be kept healthy. A parade twice a day, consisting of a mere inspection and exercise of arms, is easy for officers—it leaves them what they call more time—but it leaves the soldier also to lounge the whole day in a barrack where the air cannot be good, and where from indolence his body becomes enervated and liable to disorder. The army you left in this country has almost entirely melted away. The officers and men are dispirited, the former thinking only of getting

home, and framing excuses, in many instances the most shameful, to bring it about. I fear the same fate (should the war continue) will attend whatever troops are sent out, unless great attention is paid to get proper officers to put at the head of regiments, who will re-establish discipline and inspire those under them with some of that zeal and ardour which I am not too young to have seen, but which you must recollect so much better to have existed in the service. Such officers, I am sure, still exist in the British Army, though they are not to be found exclusively amongst those who have most money or most political interest.

“In this country much may be made of black corps. I have had occasion to observe them of late; they possess, I think, many excellent qualities as soldiers, and may with proper attention become equal to anything. Even as they are at present they are for the West Indies invaluable. I ought to apologise to you for this long discussion into which I have been led insensibly. What I have observed of the state of the army since I came to the West Indies has made an impression upon me, and I much fear lest, if strong remedies are not applied, the British Army will lose even that character for spirit which has hitherto distinguished it. I write to you with a degree of freedom to which I am not entitled, but which I hope you will excuse. We have had no intelligence from England this long time; the 18th and 19th June are the latest.”

FORT CHARLOTTE, *17th November* 1796.—Soon after writing the letter to Sir Ralph I was under the necessity of returning to the windward of the island. They were alarmed in that quarter by a report of some supplies having been landed for the brigands. I believe the report was well-founded. I received intelligence of the brigands' camp, and sent detachments in different directions after them. I visited the different posts. I was at last seized with the fever at Vieux Fort, occasioned, I believe, by the fatigue I had undergone. This weakened me so much that it was a month before I was equal to business. I had removed to

Souffriere for change of air. From thence, after having been three weeks without any return of fever, I came by sea to this place, where I relapsed the very day I arrived. I believe I was very near dying; I have, however, recovered, though I am by no means so strong as I was, and cannot yet bear to be exposed to the sun. The mortality among the troops has been dreadful, and still continues. When I was ill Major-General Hunter wrote to me that Marin Pedre, the commander of the Caribs and brigands of St. Vincent, had surrendered upon terms, and had brought in most of his men, so that tranquillity was nearly restored to the island. As Marin Pedre is an inhabitant of St. Lucia, and has great weight with the blacks here, I wrote to General Hunter that I should restore to Marin Pedre his property if he would undertake and succeeded in bringing in the brigands of St. Lucia. The General had informed me that since his surrender he had employed him repeatedly to return to the woods to negotiate with those who refused to surrender, that he had executed everything he had undertaken, and in every transaction with him had behaved with great honour.

His character in this island is extremely good. Before the war he was an industrious, honest man, and since the troubles he has behaved with moderation, and was the means of preserving numbers from the guillotine. He first took up arms because of the oppression of Sir Charles Gordon, who embarked about 300 people without cause, and then sent emissaries to agree with them for their release upon their paying certain sums according to their means. He and another black (Marinier) commanded the negroes in the woods till the arrival of Goyrand from Guadeloupe. Upon the armed force being organised he became Captain of Grenadiers, and served as such until General Stuart evacuated the island. Goyrand, soon after he was in possession of this island, sent considerable reinforcements to St. Vincent, among the rest Marin Pedre, whose influence among the negroes here they say he dreaded. Upon Pedre's departure he was appointed a colonel, and

has served as such ever since. I asked him why he had not surrendered with the rest of the armed force at St. Vincent to Sir Ralph. He said that Marinier, who was taken at the Vigie (their principal post), had made no capitulation for the Caribs, that as they had put their trust in him, and had appointed him their chief, he would not abandon them. He therefore retired with them to the woods, where he hoped that, if he was not succoured, he would be able to obtain terms for them. He said he would be happy if he could persuade the blacks who were in the woods here to surrender upon the same terms as those of St. Vincent, and he thought he could if I would promise them their pardon. He wished of all things to see tranquillity restored to this island, where all his relations were. Marin Pedre is a plain man, with great apparent goodness of heart; he can neither read or write, but possesses good sense and shrewdness. All the negroes are perfectly acquainted with him. He assumes no airs, and though dressed in his national uniform with two epaulettes, he shakes hands and speaks kindly and familiarly with them all. He shows great attachment to and anxiety for his relations. They as well as he are in general free blacks and mulattoes; his brother is a boatman at Grosislet. The brigands have received lately some supplies of ammunition and provisions, and this has raised their spirits. I therefore do not think this the moment to negotiate. I wish first to give them a drubbing. A detachment attacked them lately, killed several, and took some arms and a quantity of cartridges; but the officer who commanded the detachment was wounded, the other fell sick. The detachment was, therefore, forced to return without following them.

FORT CHARLOTTE, 8th January 1797.—Soon after the 17th November the brigands were attacked and defeated by different detachments, their deposit of ammunition was discovered and destroyed, and detachments of black troops placed along the coast between this and Souffriere to prevent communication with Guadaloupe. I then allowed Marin

Pedre to commence a negotiation with them, keeping at the same time detachments constantly in the woods. On the 19th December I received a letter from La Croix, "commandant," as he signed himself, "of L'Armée française dans les bois," offering to treat, and wishing to know the terms I would give him. I answered that upon surrendering with arms and ammunition he and the armed force should be treated as prisoners of war. The negroes, male and female, who had quitted the estates must return to them, and should be treated with humanity. He asked a month to assemble his people, during which hostilities should cease. I gave him forty-eight hours. He wrote that he should immediately set about assembling his different detachments, consult the chiefs, and send me an answer in eight days. During this time Marin Pedre had seen La Croix frequently, and assured me that his wish was to surrender. At the expiration of the eight days, however, no message was sent. A young French officer, employed in the Quartermaster-General's department, and who lived in my family, Le Comte de Vibraye, had, during the cessation of arms, imprudently gone shooting too far into the woods. He fell in with a party of brigands and was murdered by them. This, Marin Pedre told me, had frightened La Croix, and was the cause of his not approaching our posts to communicate. I have been led to hope from day to day that I should hear from him, but am now convinced that the brigands have deceived me, and have no intention to surrender. Marin Pedre is now in search of them; if he does not succeed in bringing them in this day I shall send detachments into the woods and recommence hostilities. The confidence I have in Marin Pedre, and the assurance he has given me that they would finally surrender, has induced me to defer acting till now. It is eight days since the truce expired. I rather think still that La Croix and the principal chiefs were sincere in their wish to surrender, but they have since been frightened and persuaded by disaffected people not to come in. These persons, who have always communicated with them and assisted them, are averse to their coming in, lest

they should then be discovered and punished. The *Pelican* brig arrived yesterday from Fort Royal with letters for me from Sir Ralph Abercromby; he is just arrived, and wishes to see me immediately. I defer leaving this till I know positively whether the brigands are to surrender or not.

FORT CHARLOTTE, 15th January 1797.—I directed the detachments of black troops to enter the woods, and embarked on the 10th on board the *Pelican* for Fort Royal, where I arrived in the evening. Sir Ralph received me in the kindest manner. I was glad to see both him and my friend General Hope so well. Next morning Sir Ralph took me into his room. He told me that his reason for sending for me was not only to know from me the situation of the island, but also my views, and to forward them if he could. He made use of many kind and flattering expressions. I had been kept long at St. Lucia, a post of anxiety and fatigue; it was but just that I should be relieved from it, though he was at a loss who to send in my place. The government of Grenada was vacant; he could not say it was in his gift, but he was sure that Mr. Dundas was so well inclined towards me that, if my views were to remain in the West Indies after the war, I might have it. The barrack department was to be thrown into that of the Quartermaster-General. The latter would be a permanent situation, as Government were determined, even in time of peace, to keep up 10,000 men in this country. If I liked to be Quartermaster-General he could appoint me immediately. I expressed my sense of Sir Ralph's friendship for me; my wish, I said, was not to remain in the West Indies in time of peace. I was, therefore, indifferent about the government of Grenada; that I wished to be useful to him and to my country; that St. Lucia was an island which, if not particularly attended to, would be lost; and, as I was already acquainted with it, I was perhaps more equal to the task than anybody he could at present find. The employment of Quartermaster-General was one I did not understand, and had no turn for it. I begged he would give himself no

uneasiness about me. I was completely satisfied with having his approbation. I was not ambitious of money. If at any time there was any military situation in which he thought I could be of use, I wished he would appoint me to it, without regard to any other consideration. I was perfectly willing to return to St. Lucia if I could be of most use there; I only begged that if any active operations were to be carried on he would take me with him.

Sir Ralph told me he thought I was right not to remain in this climate in peace, that he had spoken much of me to the Duke of York, that he had represented me as an officer who should not be left to linger unemployed, or merely as a lieutenant-colonel in time of peace, that either employment should be given me or the means furnished to me to travel and improve myself as an officer. The Duke of York had listened to him with attention, and was, he was sure, inclined, and would serve me, that he knew this to be the case. He felt it incumbent on him to offer me such situations as he had in his gift. He was ashamed to ask me to remain at St. Lucia when I had already undergone so much; he was obliged to me for offering to remain; he would have really been at a loss to know whom to send. He had settled my appointment at £1200 a year, and should give me a warrant from the beginning. Government wished something to be undertaken in the West Indies; but he had represented the impossibility of our doing more than preserve what we had, unless a large body of troops were sent from Europe. Offensive operations would, therefore, depend on what troops were sent out. Three thousand five hundred were coming immediately; more were promised in March; if anything was undertaken I should be employed. The kind and friendly manner in which Sir Ralph has uniformly behaved to me since the attack on Chabot is such, that, unless to General Stuart, I know no person to whom I am so much obliged. They have both, in their wish to serve me, gone far beyond the ordinary testimonies of friendship.

In the night I received letters from St. Lucia that the

post of Praslin had been surprised and carried by the brigands. The captain and most of the men had been killed. The country was in alarm, and my presence absolutely necessary. I communicated this to Sir Ralph in the morning. I represented the necessity of troops. He said he saw it, and would send me 200 or 300 if they were absolutely necessary; that he did not know whence he could take them. I sailed from Fort Royal in the morning and arrived here before dinner. Marin Pedre had asserted so strongly that it was the wish of the brigands to surrender, while it now appears they never had any such intention, that suspicion fell upon him. Moreover, the attack on Praslin was a bolder measure than the brigands had ever attempted, and was more suggestive of the advice of Marin Pedre than of any one who had hitherto directed them. The post consisted of seventy men of the Guadeloupe Rangers, commanded by a captain. His negligence was shameful; he was surprised at three in the afternoon; he fortunately was killed, for it is better for an officer not to survive such disgrace. Fifteen of the men also fell, twenty were wounded. The brigands have obtained by this means some additional arms and some provisions. I have sent strong detachments to discover and attack them, but to do this I have been obliged to take the troops from the coast, which consequently leaves it open to succours from Guadeloupe.

FORT CHARLOTTE, 18th *January*.—The particulars of the surpriso have been more detailed to me. The captain was asleep in the house, most of the men at the river below the post washing themselves. The men on guard upon the height above were either asleep or drunk. They were bayoneted without resistance. The captain had just time, because of some halt the brigands made, to get part of his men under arms. Some of the men ran off, as might be expected, when surprised. This enraged the captain so much that he lost his head, and was incapable of giving orders. He exposed himself much, was wounded twice,

and when he saw his men giving way, and that a retreat with the rest had become necessary, he drew out his pistol and shot himself. He was a man between forty and fifty, who had been long in the French service, where he had acquired method and detail, but having always been in peace garrisons, and never served in war or in the field, he was perfectly unfit for the service of light troops, or indeed for any actual service. Captain de Marchay was, however, an amiable man in society, and had a strong sense of honour, as he proved by his last act, being determined not to survive the disgrace he had brought upon himself. A detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel O'Meara, two days ago surprised and took the brigands' camp, to which they had carried the provisions they took at Praslin. Twenty-seven stand of arms were taken, some ammunition, and twelve or fourteen of the brigands killed; the rest threw themselves into the wood in every direction and escaped. They have now little advantage from having taken Praslin.

11th February 1797.—The detachment which I have constantly kept in the woods have beaten and dispersed the brigands, and have taken above seventy stand of arms from them. Attempts have been made by vessels upon the coast to communicate with them, but by our vigilance have been prevented. I heard of preparations being made at Martinique for an expedition. I was in hopes of being employed upon it, and threw out a hint to Sir Ralph. I yesterday received a letter from him to inform me that with about 3000 troops and the fleet he was going to attack Trinidad. The Spaniards there had four sail of the line and a frigate, which it was an object to seize. It is also the key of the settlements on *terra firma*, and the place where they could most conveniently assemble to attack our possessions. He regretted that it was impossible for him to take me from St. Lucia; he had nobody he could trust with that command; he feared that in his absence Victor Hugues would make an attempt either on St. Lucia, Dominica, or Antigua. It is mortifying to be

deprived of active employment, where alone reputation is to be gained. The trouble I have here is infinite, but it goes for nothing, and will never be heard of. The General will, I am sure, be in want of some active officer if he meets with resistance. I know those about him pretty well. Hope is the only man among them who will put himself forward. If the expedition succeeds it will give reputation to our arms, and assure to us the ascendancy during the rest of the campaign. I see the impossibility of my being removed from this, but would give anything to go on the expedition.

21st *March*.—Trinidad surrendered without firing a shot, so I have no reason to regret that I was not of that expedition. Some supplies of arms and ammunition were landed for the brigands about a fortnight ago. I have been in constant motion myself, and have kept the black troops equally so, in order to prevent the brigands from assembling, and to beat them in detail. The detachments were not able to find them. At last I had intelligence that they were assembling to windward. I left the Morne early on the 17th for Grosislet. From thence I set out for the post of Marquis. On the road I met an express to inform me that Denérie was attacked. I was then six hours' march from it. I found that the officer at Marquis had despatched an officer and thirty-eight men to the support of Denérie. I left my escort, who were tired, with him and took twenty fresh men, with whom I pushed on, and arrived near the post at nine o'clock at night. Several houses near the post were on fire; this and other things I observed made me doubt whether or not the post was still in our possession. The precautions necessary to ascertain this took up two hours. It was eleven before I entered it. The officer who commanded was a young emigrant of Guadeloupe. He had behaved with great spirit, and had repulsed the brigands, though ten times his number. They had attacked him at daylight in three divisions. The action lasted three hours. They retired,

leaving fifteen dead on the spot and thirty stand of arms. They were seen taking away as usual their killed and wounded during the engagement. Their loss must have been at least sixty. We have three killed and twelve wounded; the post was very commanding, and surrounded with a palisading. I had, before I left the Morne, directed different detachments to march to the heights and neighbourhood of this post, near which I suspected the brigands to be. Had any of them arrived during the attack the brigands must have been destroyed, and tranquillity at last restored to the island. Unfortunately none arrived till next day. I was still in hopes that by scouring the woods they might fall in with them in their retreat. I find they have not done this. After thanking the officers and soldiers of the detachment for their gallant conduct, and settling matters relative to the post, I set out again for Marquis, and next day got to the Morne. My constitution is pretty well inured to the West Indian climate; I have ever since my arrival accustomed myself to exercise. Upon this last excursion I walked from the Morne in the forenoon to nine at night without stopping, thirty miles; I lay down on the ground in my clothes about one in the morning and slept till six. I was upon my legs giving orders, &c., till twelve, when I set out for Marquis, where I arrived at five, about twenty miles; the next day to the Morne, twelve miles.

21st March.—My secretary, Mr. Duthrie, returning a few days ago in a boat from Souffriere, put into one of the bays. Some people who appeared to be Chasseurs having called to him from the shore, he did not perceive that they were brigands till he was close to the shore. The moment he ordered the boat to be put about fifty or sixty brigands got up from the bushes and fired. A negro woman was killed, and Mr. Duthrie wounded in the neck. The wound is bad, but not dangerous. Detachments of the Chasseurs were instantly sent after them, found their camp, killed a very few, and took thirteen muskets. Sir Ralph Abercromby arrived here yesterday at daylight from Martinique

with General Hope. They dined with me, and sailed again in the evening. The General viewed the fort and different works; the principal object of his visit was, I believe, to reconcile me to being left here and not taken upon the expedition. He told me he wished of all things to take me, but he did not know to whom he could entrust the island. He told me, in confidence, that the object of the expedition was Porto Rico, in consequence of orders from home; that he himself feared the consequence of taking so great a part of the force so far to leeward; that Porto Rico was a place of considerable strength; and that except General Hope he had not an officer on whom he could place dependence. In his absence he thought Victor Hugues might make an attempt upon St. Lucia. He wished to be able to spare me, before he went, part of his force to completely finish the troubles of the island; but he was afraid of being detained, and therefore must postpone it till his return, when he was determined to give me such a force as would exterminate the brigands before the hurricane months. In the meantime it is agreed he should send me the 38th Regiment, consisting of not quite 300 men, as a reinforcement. The General spoke to me in such kind and flattering terms, and represented my continuing in St. Lucia so much as a measure of necessity, that I could not oppose it. He has assured me that I shall have my option of going home after the campaign.

The probability is that I shall be attacked as soon as Hugues knows the destination of the expedition. My situation is infinitely unpleasant. A small force if landed will force me to withdraw my outposts and expose the inhabitants to be murdered, the country to be plundered and devastated. If the officers commanding detachments are not alert, they will risk being cut off from the Morne.

8th April.—The 38th Regiment, about 200 fit for duty, landed the other day. A small detachment of foreign artillery was also landed. We have had no sickness for some time, and the weather has for these two months been very pleasant.

12th May.—About a week after Sir Ralph sailed for Porto Rico I was seized with the fever, which reduced me in a very few days to a low state. An abscess began at the same time to form in my right hip; the inflammation now became violent and the pain excruciating. It was at length opened, and a great quantity of matter was discharged. I was confined to my bed upwards of three weeks, and it is only within these three days that I have been able to sit up. I am extremely weak, and am more shaken by this than by any illness I have yet had. As soon as I was able I represented my situation to General Hunter. I told him that from long habit I could with the assistance of the officers about me continue to carry on the common business of the island, but if anything further should be required I was incapable of it. The General sent over immediately Colonel Drummond of the 43rd Regiment to assist me, and to command should I quit the island, which he recommended me to do immediately. I answered that I was obliged to him for sending Colonel Drummond; as to leaving St. Lucia, I was determined not to do it, unless I relapsed and it became absolutely necessary to save my life. Sir Ralph had entrusted the island to me; was I to quit it and any misfortune to befall it in his absence I should never forgive myself. In case of any attempt from the enemy, though the active part must fall to Colonel Drummond, yet from my knowledge of the country and situation my advice might be of use. I should therefore remain till Sir Ralph's return, when I requested he would represent my situation to him that I might obtain his permission to go to Martinique. The doctors were of opinion, and I myself felt, that a change of air was absolutely necessary for my health. As a soldier I feel it my duty to remain at the post entrusted to me by Sir Ralph. If we are attacked I shall be able, it is true, to do little, but I shall at least have the satisfaction to reflect that I have done all I could do. But as I find my constitution is hurt by the different attacks of fever, occasioned by the great fatigue I have undergone, I am determined to remain no longer in St. Lucia, and if possible to get to

England this summer. It is reported that Porto Rico has surrendered. It is also said that six sail of the line with 8000 men have arrived at Guadeloupe from France. This I do not believe. It is too late in the season.

13th May.—I have just received a letter from Sir Ralph from Fort Royal, dated yesterday. He landed at Porto Rico the 18th April and advanced immediately to within a league of the town, which he found in a state of defence, and both from natural situation and from fortifications a place of considerable strength. The General says it would have been wisdom not to have made any approaches, as his force was inadequate to the undertaking. He persevered, however, till the 1st of May, when, finding a regular siege out of the question, and a bombardment at 2000 yards of no effect, he determined to withdraw the troops. We lost about 100 men killed and wounded. It is to be regretted that we ever made the attempt, but I doubt if our not getting possession of that island is a misfortune. Government seem inclined to keep but little force in this country. Therefore such numerous and extended possessions must ever be in danger. The General regrets my illness, but hopes I shall be able to continue in the command of St. Lucia. He has been endeavouring to select a proper person to relieve me, but he has seen nothing but difficulties. He is able now before the troops return to give me a force to enable me to reduce the brigands, and desires me to send him my ideas on the subject. An opportunity having offered suddenly I wrote to Sir Ralph that I was much reduced by my late illness, which had been severe and had given my constitution a shake. It had been brought on by the fatigue I had undergone, which was unavoidable in the situation in which I had been placed here; that I doubted if I should ever be equal to much fatigue again in this country. It was my duty, and I should do everything in my power to be of use. I should never repine when complying with any wish of his. If he sent troops I should place them in the posts along the shore, in order to leave the black

troops as much as possible at liberty to enter and scour the woods. The navy should at the same time make a show and multiply as much as possible the cruisers to cut off supplies and communication. I should be able to oversee but little the execution of this plan, but I should use all the exertion I was equal to. Colonel Drummond was gone round the island to visit the different posts. I should give him every information respecting the colony, but that it must depend finally (should he command) upon his own good sense to alter or confirm the regulations I had established according to circumstances.

MARTINIQUE, *22nd May 1797*.—I felt that in my weak state of health business annoyed me. The General had twice, after promising to take me from St. Lucia, retracted when it came to the point. I am afraid he might be tempted to do so again. I was convinced that if I remained at St. Lucia during the hurricane months I should ruin my constitution and be of no use to the service. I wrote to Hope upon the subject fully. He showed my letter to Sir Ralph, who immediately sent me leave to come to Martinique, and deliver over the command to Colonel Drummond. This I had not expected; all I wished was to be relieved before the hurricane months. I was, however, glad to avail myself of the leave, though I was much recovered and gaining activity, and it fretted me to find that I could not oversee as heretofore the execution of my orders. It was for the benefit of the service that I should leave to Colonel Drummond the responsibility and execution of what I could not do myself. He would, of course, act with more activity than when employed under me. He seems to me to be a sensible man, and to like the service. I should, therefore, hope that he will do well. The island is left to him in a very different situation from that in which I found it. The works are nearly finished, and the defences in a better state than I believe they ever were before, and a certain degree of regularity is established in the different quarters. The brigands are in a very low state, so much so, that I believe if the cruisers can prevent

for a short time supplies and communication from without, they will be forced to surrender. The officer who commands in St. Lucia must be vigilant and active. If he sets himself down to eat and drink in the Government House on Morne Fortuné he will probably get into a scrape, but activity more than talent is what is required. The Admiral sent the *Beaver* sloop of war for me. I embarked early yesterday morning, and arrived here in the afternoon. Major Anderson remained to settle my affairs. I expect him here this evening or to-morrow.

I had this morning a long conversation with Sir Ralph respecting Colonel Drummond, the situation of St. Lucia, &c. I told him I was recovering daily, and made no doubt but in a fortnight or three weeks I should be perfectly able to serve, if he wished to employ me, anywhere but in St. Lucia. In that case I had no wish to go home; but if he had no employment for me, and the campaign was over, I should be glad to return to Europe. I was sure my health required it, and if any service was to be carried on next year, I should return with pleasure. He told me that nothing more was to be done; the regiments were gone to their different quarters, and he thought the best thing I could do was to go home; that he himself was against further conquests in the West Indies, and had written so to Ministers. I told him that I was convinced that Victor Hugues was either not a man of enterprise, or that he had not the means of acting offensively; that I was convinced the French would never send any force to this country; that it was their interest to leave the islands in our possession at present. They were sure of them at a peace, and in the meantime they were cultivated; regularity and order were kept up, which, for them, would be extremely difficult to preserve after the promises they had held out to the negroes. If Victor could have done anything, it would have been during the last hurricane, when St. Lucia in particular was a perfect hospital, and it would have been impossible for me to make the smallest resistance. He said that he knew this as well as I did

CHAPTER X

BETWEEN WEST INDIAN WAR AND IRISH REBELLION

ST. KITTS, 4th June 1797.—I remained at Martinique until the 30th May, when I embarked in the *Cygne* sloop of war, Captain Manning, which the Admiral sent with his despatches to overtake the packet. We landed here on the 2nd, in the morning, and sail to-morrow to Tortola. The President, Mr. Thomson, and many other gentlemen of this place, have been remarkably civil to me, in particular Mr. McLachlan, at whose house we live. Everybody here seems ruddy and healthy. The President, who has resided in the island for forty years, has a complexion more common in this neighbourhood than in the West Indies. I have had an opportunity of visiting Brimstone Hill, a position which Nature has rendered almost inaccessible. Our engineers have, however, thought it necessary to bestow on it as much labour as they might have done on a plain in Flanders. Casemates for the troops, storehouses, and cisterns were almost all that were necessary. The situation is cool and healthy, the troops suffer as little as they would do in Europe. In the works that are executed the engineers seem to have had more in view opposition to distant fire which may be brought against them, than the immediate defence of the hill. The number of guns mounted is prodigious, but were they doubled they could not prevent an enemy from establishing batteries upon ground nearly upon a level with the hill, at a distance of 1000 or 1100 yards, a distance too great to breach. To approach much nearer is almost impossible, and even a breach in works placed on ground so commanding would be of no avail. The garrison

may be annoyed by distant firing, and starved out by blockade, but not assaulted. When attacked last war by the Marquis de Bouillé, General Prescott offered to join and reinforce the garrison with 700 or 800 men if Lord Hood would land him near Charles Fort at the bottom of the hill, or if he would give him a couple of frigates to land him at the back of the island. Such was his knowledge of the country that he expected to reach Brimstone Hill from thence by by-paths over the mountains, unknown to the French army. Both these proposals Lord Hood rejected, and proposed to the General to land at some distance from Basseterre, as he said, to make a diversion. General Prescott endeavoured to show the absurdity of this. His Lordship, as usual, was deaf to reason, adhered to his opinion, and told the General that if he did not choose to land the troops he would land the marines. The General submitted. As soon as he was ashore 3000 French were detached against him. He attacked and defeated their advanced guard, but the main body coming up, he was overpowered and forced to re-embark. Lord Hood remained at anchor for three weeks after this, until the garrison surrendered. The island of St. Kitts is perfectly different from the French islands. It is entirely cleared of wood, and is cultivated nearly up to the top of the mountains. This is more beneficial to the proprietors, and is conducive to health, but takes much from the beauty. In those islands, where cultivation is so general, the situation of the blacks is far less comfortable than it is in the others. They are here fed on salt provisions by the master. In the others they have lands given them, which they cultivate on Sundays and at the hours allowed for rest and meals, and by this means raise a subsistence more healthy, and a sufficiency not only for their nourishment, but also for sale. They are in general much better clothed, and are a handsomer and stouter race.

ON BOARD THE PACKET, TORTOLA BAY, 8th June.—We left St. Kitts, under convoy of the *Cyane*, on the evening of

the 5th, and arrived here next morning. As the packet was to remain here forty-eight hours I immediately went on shore. Major Anderson and I were kindly received by Mr. Dougan, a merchant of the place, whose brother, a physician, had been educated at Glasgow under my father. On Tortola there is no flat land; the hills are cultivated to the top with care. The inhabitants have their houses on the tops of the hills, where the air is pure and remarkably cool. I dined yesterday with Mr. Leonard, the President of the island; his house is in one of these situations. I breakfasted with him this morning, and rode round the different hills; the roads are traced along the side of the hills, and are good. The views were delightful, and the air more cool than I have experienced in the West Indies. Besides the clusters of islands under the jurisdiction of Tortola you see St. Thomas's and St. John's, Santa Cruz, and even Porto Rico. Tortola, like St. Kitts, is too much cultivated for beauty. Fields of cane without a tree give satisfaction to the owner alone. The West Indies, perhaps, is the only country where industry and cultivation do not contribute to the happiness of the inhabitants. All tends to the profit of the master, nothing to the comfort and convenience of the negroes; they have hardly room given to them to raise a miserable hut. The whites in Tortola are computed at about 5000 or 6000, the blacks at 7000 or 8000.

No troops are kept here: the free blacks and people of colour, with the whites, form a Militia of about 300. In St. Kitts, besides the Militia, there are two corps of 500 each of negroes embodied, composed of the trustiest and best slaves. Necessity forced the whites into this measure, but they are afraid and jealous of them. These corps are only called upon occasionally. At other times they work upon the habitations. The officers are the different proprietors. This is, I believe, a bad mode; whatever blacks are armed should be enlisted and made completely military. They should have no master but the King and their officers, with the promise of a retreat and of their liberty at the end of their service. The anchor is up, and we are under sail for

England. The *Babette* frigate, Captain Mainwaring, convoys us clear of the islands.

We landed at Falmouth the 9th July, after a passage of thirty-one days. Anderson and I struck out of the common road in order to get rid of our packet companions, and went to Plymouth, where we stayed a day. We had heard much in the West Indies of the misery of England; we could perceive no trace of it. The country was highly cultivated, the inhabitants healthy and well clothed; everything bore the mark of the greatest wealth and ease. I arrived in Clifford Street on the 14th, and was happy to find my father and mother in perfect health.

LONDON, 4th August 1797.—I saw the Duke of York soon after my arrival; he received me very kindly. I had called several times upon Mr. Dundas without seeing him. I met him at the levée; he desired me to call upon him next day; he asked many questions about St. Lucia, with respect to the utility of it, the force necessary to garrison it, &c. &c., and begged me to put my ideas in writing. He made no mention of the manner in which Sir Ralph Abercromby had represented my services in his despatches, nor did he say a word to me personally civil or flattering. Two days later I sent him the following paper:—

“St. Lucia when fully cultivated may become an island of value. At present it derives its importance from its harbours and military position with respect to other islands, particularly Martinique, St. Vincent, and Grenada. The Carenage is a harbour where ships of war can moor during the hurricane months in safety. The bays Choc and Gros-islet are stations where fleets may anchor and be able at all times to put to sea. During the late war, from those bays our fleets were enabled to watch those of France in Fort Royal; during this war the inferiority of the French naval force in the West Indies, together with our possession of the Martinique, renders St. Lucia of less importance than formerly, but still it is of considerable use from the injury we might suffer if it was in the hands of the French. It

was from thence that they fomented the troubles in St. Vincent and Grenada, and that they kept Martinique in constant alarm. The conquest of St. Lucia has deprived the French of the only harbour they had in the West Indies for ships of war, and has secured tranquillity to the islands just mentioned. The principal post of the island is that on Morne Fortuné, which, with its immediate dependencies, protects the harbour of Carenage. It is a post of strength, but of such extent as to require a considerable body of men to defend it, and is besides extremely unhealthy; from its height and distance from the sea the carriage of provisions and stores is attended with much difficulty and expense. On account of these inconveniences it has been proposed to abandon the Morne Fortuné, destroy the harbour of the Carenage by sinking ships at the entrance of it, and to confine our defence to the protection of Grosislet and Choc Bays, by strengthening Pigeon Island and fortifying certain points upon the coast, particularly that of Trouillac and Morne Pimar. To maintain the possession of those posts a moderate garrison would be sufficient, and the troops would be in healthier situations, and the chief utility of St. Lucia to this country be preserved, because our fleet would still have a safe anchorage. The adoption, however, of this plan will be more properly a subject for consideration at the peace should the island remain in our possession. The time and expense which would be necessary to carry it into execution must preclude for the present all thought of it.

“In former wars as soon as the chief military posts in any of the West India islands were reduced the island was conquered and its quiet possession secured, the white people alone being then considered as inhabitants. They were few in number, and always ready to purchase security by submission. The negroes were entirely under their control, and as passive as any other part of their property. As no assistance could then be given to the enemy by the inhabitants, no attempt was to be dreaded by the garrison but from an

armament prepared at some other island, and provided with every necessary for a regular attack. At present the case is entirely altered; by giving freedom to the blacks the French have inspired that large body with energy, and have excited them against us. In an island, therefore, like St. Lucia, where the white inhabitants are dissatisfied and the negroes have been accustomed to the republican system, the post must not only be guarded as heretofore, but the white proprietors must be awed, the blacks kept in subjection, and both must be kept from communicating with or receiving succours from the enemy. Detachments for this purpose are necessary in different parts round the coast, whilst others are occasionally employed in scouring the woods. By these means the commander may always have a perfect knowledge of the state of the island and of every occurrence within it. Insurrections and combinations will be prevented which might prove destructive to the island, and even fatal to the troops and posts.

"St. Lucia requires a garrison of 1500 to 1800 effectives, two-thirds of which ought to be Europeans: particular circumstances must direct the manner they are to be distributed, but in general there should be five or six hundred Europeans on Morne Fortuné, one hundred at Pigeon Island, the rest divided between Souffriere and Vieux Fort. The blacks should occupy the other posts along the coast, particularly on that to windward, and they alone should be employed in patrolling the woods and interior parts of the island. The officer who commands will of course adopt measures to facilitate the communication between the posts; he will also make arrangements to ensure the retreat of the different detachments to Morne Fortuné in case of the landing of a superior force by the enemy or of any serious attack. In such event every consideration must yield to the immediate safety of his Majesty's troops, and of the stores and magazines entrusted to their charge. Pigeon Island must be reinforced, and the rest of the force, being concentrated on the Morne Fortuné and the Vigie, &c. &c.,

will be able, perhaps entirely, to baffle the attempts of the enemy, or at least to resist it till such time as succours can be sent from some other island.

“JOHN MOORE, *Colonel*.”

“CLIFFORD STREET, 30th July 1797.”

LONDON, 24th October 1797.—I left London on the 3rd October with Major Hay of the Engineers. He is employed under Sir William Howe, who commands the district, which includes Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk. The Major's intention was to make a tour of the district, and I was curious to attend him. I returned from it only two days ago. An enemy having London as their immediate object might attempt to land on the coasts of Essex or Suffolk. The distance from the capital is nowhere greater than sixty or seventy miles, without any considerable river to cross. Several great roads communicate, and there are other circumstances which it is supposed might tempt an enemy to prefer them to the coasts of Kent or Sussex.

Rochford Hundred.—The coast from the Thames to Harwich is the most vulnerable; to the northward of Harwich the distance from London is too great; this may be subdivided as follows: From the Thames to the Crouch or Burnham River, called the Rochford Hundred, a position might be taken protected on both flanks by those rivers, including the heights of Raleigh; the march to London might be made on the left by the Thames, but would be opposed by the heights called Horndon Hill.

Dangey Hundred.—From the Crouch to the Blackwater or Malden River, called the Dangey Hundred, the landing would be in the Blackwater below Malden; a position protected by the Blackwater and Purlcigh heights would oppose the march to London. Between the Blackwater and the Colne River lies the Mersea Isle. The island would, in this case, be the position, the ships entering the Colne to the north-east of Mersea. It is proposed to defend this entrance by a floating battery and guns upon the mainland below St. Osyth.

Clacton Beach.—From the Colne to Handford Water is the Tendring Hundred, the coast of which is called Clacton Beach, the whole of which affords anchorage. This coast, though open, affording no bay, is covered by the sands. Its extent is fourteen miles. It is about twelve miles from Colchester. An enemy landing anywhere on this beach must march immediately towards Colchester, where the great road to London joins, and where the country narrows, and a position might be taken, covered on the flanks by the Stour, or Manningtree River, and the Colne. Three roads lead from Clacton Beach and join near Colchester.

Harwich.—Beyond the Handford Water is Harwich, on the Stour River. The entrance of the harbour of Harwich is defended by Landguard, on a neck of land opposite to the town, at the distance of one and a half miles. Within this neck are two rivers: the Stour, which passes Harwich, coming from Manningtree; the other from Ipswich, called the Ipswich or Orwell River.

Hollesley Bay, &c.—Ships may anchor upon any part of the coast from Harwich to Yarmouth. Hollesley Bay, below Woodbridge, Aldeburgh, Southwold, Lowestoft, and Yarmouth are the principal points. Upon whatever part of the above coast an enemy lands, the country is so very much enclosed, that it is supposed he would penetrate only by the great roads.

Encampments have been little used in England during this war. Barracks have been substituted, and are erected wherever it has been thought proper to station troops. These stations in the Essex and Suffolk district are upon the great road leading from London to Yarmouth; it runs parallel to the coast, and is nowhere more than thirteen or fourteen miles from it. Stations—Chelmsford, Romford, Colchester (headquarters), and Ipswich. There is a small supply of provisions at each of these stations, but the dépôts are in a rear line of Braintree, Indbury, and Thetford.

On the 3rd October we left London at about two o'clock, and slept at Ingatestone, twenty-eight miles. We passed through Ilford, thirteen miles from London. This has been

proposed as a position to protect the approach to London from Suffolk or Essex, the right protected by the Thames, the river Roding in front. An enemy must either force the passage of the river at or near Ilford, or endeavour to turn it by moving by his right to Epping. This would procure delay, and involve him in a difficult country. On the 4th we proceeded through Chelmsford to Colchester. To the right of Chelmsford are the Danbury and Purleigh heights. The country from London to Colchester in general is flat. I saw nothing like feature except at Chelmsford and Colchester, but the whole is extremely enclosed; the enclosures are strong, and to observe anything you must get upon the top of the churches. On the ground it appears like a continued wood. I dined with General Balfour the day I arrived at Colchester. Next day (Thursday), the 5th, I waited on Sir William Howe, and dined with him. He is still stout, and takes a great deal of exercise; his manners are plain and unaffected; he has the appearance of being, and I am told is, one of the best-tempered men possible. On the 6th (Friday) we rode to Major Hay's house at Claydon, a small village near Ipswich. I remained there till Monday with Hay and his wife, a cheerful, sensible woman; they have six daughters, the education and forming of whom is Mrs. Hay's employment and amusement. This family is a picture of virtue and domestic happiness. On Monday we proceeded to Woodbridge, and dined with the officers of the Mounted Artillery. On Tuesday, Major Judgeson, who commanded them, took out the troops to exercise; they have seven pieces of ordnance, viz. one 12-pounder, four 6-pounders, and two 5½-inch howitzers. This was the first mounted artillery I had seen. I can conceive of nothing in higher order than this troop. It is a great improvement, and great advantage may be derived from the celerity with which they move.

On Tuesday night we slept at Saxmundham, and on Wednesday proceeded to Lowestoft and Yarmouth. The road from Ipswich gradually draws nearer to the coast till it drops down to it near Lowestoft. It presents no feature but enclosure, except from Woodbridge to the coast at

Hollesley Bay, which is a continued heath. Lowestoft is at the south end of the peninsula called the Lowthing, land formed by the Waveney and Yar Rivers. The Lowthing land has been thought a position for an enemy who came with a view to conquest. Its greatest length is from Lowestoft to Yarmouth, five or six miles, its breadth from three to four. The neck at Lowestoft is narrowed by a marsh or lake issuing from the Waveney. The two other entrances to the Lowthing land are St. Olave's bridge and Yarmouth. A sod redoubt at the south end of Lowestoft partly defends the neck of the peninsula, partly the anchorage in Lowestoft road. There are also two batteries to the northward of the town; one upon the beach, the other upon the cliff above it, for the protection of the roadstead. From Lowestoft to Yarmouth the road is along the coast; the country is pretty open for about a mile from the shore; it then becomes enclosed; the coast is high cliff, with a gravel or sandy beach under it. It becomes flat to Yarmouth. The Yar River separates at Gorlstone the Lowthing land from the flat on which is built the town of Yarmouth. This flat is also a peninsula, formed by the sea on one side, the river Yar on the other. The distance from the river to the shore is about half a mile, or at most three-quarters. The Yar is navigable for trading ships, and forms the harbour of Yarmouth, which is built upon its banks, having a broad, magnificent quay. The old walls still remain, and surround the town on three sides, terminating at the river at each end. At the entrance of the Yar, at the south end of the peninsula, opposite to Gorlstone height, is an old stone fort with tower bastions. To the left of it is a sod battery, stockaded in the rear, with furnace for heating shot, magazine, barracks, &c. On Gorlstone height is also a battery, which, in conjunction with the old fort and sod battery, command the entrance of the harbour; the distance across is not more than 600 or 700 yards. The other redoubt batteries, one to the northward of the town and one intermediate, are supposed to protect the roadstead of Yarmouth, and to prevent the landing of an enemy upon

the coast. These batteries are at about 2000 yards' distance from each other, a distance too great for co-operation. They are in good repair, but can answer no other purpose than to protect the town and shipping from the insults of privateers. Too much money has, therefore, been expended for such a purpose only; they are inadequate to any of greater magnitude. The town of Norwich, about twenty-two miles from Yarmouth, had been thought to be an object to an enemy coming with a view to plunder, from the wealth it contains. Of late it has been considered as an object from the supposed disaffection of its inhabitants, and from the resources in men and money, &c., it might therefore afford to an enemy coming for conquest. In either case, Yarmouth as a post would be a desirable possession. With a view to prevent this the works at Yarmouth were erected, but they are completely inadequate for such a purpose.

On Thursday we proceeded to Norwich. The country continues enclosed and flat. One or two commons and a marsh of considerable extent through which the road passes might be taken advantage of to impede the progress, or give trouble to an invading enemy. A battery erected on the coast of Norfolk induced us to go on Friday to Cromer, a little fishing town. The battery is upon a cliff, erected at the request of the inhabitants for the protection of trading vessels. Thirty of the inhabitants, formed into a company of artillery, man the battery. This coast, as well as that of Suffolk, is a high cliff, with a broad beach under it. Every here and there, as at Cromer, the cliff lowers and forms a kind of gap. On Saturday we returned from Norwich to Claydon, where we remained till Tuesday. Hay's youngest daughter was to be christened, and he had asked me to be godfather. The neighbourhood of Claydon and Ipswich is very pretty. We reached Harwich in the evening, and crossed to Landguard Fort next morning. While Hay was occupied with the business of his department I walked round the works. The fort is the only protection to the harbour of Harwich; it is placed at the extremity of

a low neck or tongue of land of 2000 yards in length, and, in general, from 800 to 900 yards in breadth. The sea across to Harwich is about a mile and a half broad; but the channel for ships is close to the fort. Small craft only can pass elsewhere. The position of Landguard Fort is strong, but the works erected upon it are injudicious. The fort, which is the original work built in the time of James the Second, is of masonry, a pentagon, with bastions, ditch, and covered way. The latter is imperfect; it contains houses for the governor and other officers, and barracks for soldiers, magazine, storehouses, &c., all of which seem in good repair, towards the sea. Batteries have been erected this war upon the covered way, and two considerable sea batteries have also been added upon each flank of the fort. During the last war lines called "The King's" and "The Princes'" were raised to cover the fort and defend the approach by the neck. A redoubt upon the right is the only part of these which has been completely finished. The rest remains imperfect. The plan of them is much too extensive, and I think in other respects injudicious. What is required is a work for 800 or 1000 men, capable of resisting a regular attack for a fortnight or three weeks, and I think the ground is such as to render this practicable. It has been proposed to fortify Harwich. The ground is favourable for defence, as it is narrowed by the Stour River and Wandford Wash; within a mile and a half of the town it is not above 600 or 700 yards across.

The evening we left Harwich we slept at Thorpe, and next morning early proceeded through Kirby to Walton Gap, six miles; it is the left of Clacton Beach; an enemy would not land. To the right of Clacton Wick, on the right of the beach, the ground is marshy and unfavourable for descent; the line favourable for landing is therefore supposed to lie between Walton Gap and Clacton Wick, a distance of eight miles. Upon this line four batteries are erected for three or four 24-pounders each, with furnace and guard-house. The batteries are barbette, intended for guns in high traversing carriages. The guns are not yet

mounted. All this line affords anchorage for shipping. The coast is high cliff, such as already described, falling gradually to a flat at particular places. These places have been chosen as the situation for the batteries. The first is on the left at Walton Gap, one is placed at each end of Holland Marsh, and the fourth at Clacton Wick. The batteries are distant from each other, and could only be of use when supported by a considerable body of men. A road runs parallel to the coast at the distance of half a mile. Between it and the sea the enclosures are few and tolerably large; other communications could easily be made along the coast. The three roads leading from the coast which join at Wivenhoe Heath, near Colchester, strike off at Walton, Holland Marsh, and Clacton. Four thousand men with mounted artillery detached from Colchester might undoubtedly prevent a landing upon Clacton Beach. To prevent the progress of an enemy marching to Colchester when landed would require a great superiority of light troops. I had no opportunity of examining the country minutely. It is much enclosed and flat. The three communications ought to be carefully reconnoitred. I arrived at Colchester on Thursday, and on Saturday took leave of Major Hay and returned to London.

CHAPTER XI

THE BREWING OF THE IRISH REBELLION

I do not think that Moore's career in Ireland, as recorded in his Diary, can fail to be of value and interest for the man who knows best the history of the Irish Rebellion. As will be seen, Moore was in intimate personal relations with the two men, Sir Ralph Abercromby and Lord Cornwallis, who were most concerned in dealing both with the practical military problem and with the underlying causes of disturbance. He gives, from within Lord Camden's cabinet, evidence as to certain facts which have been much discussed. His own evidence is of the most direct and frank character, and can scarcely be suspected of prejudice in these matters. On the other hand, I hardly fancy that any one who comes to read the story here told without other knowledge of the facts, will want any outside light in order to understand the part that Moore played in these events. There is only one point on which I ought to warn him against possible mistake. In the course of his career Moore had to serve with many Stuarts, sometimes the same man's name being alternatively spelled Stewart. Notably there were Sir Charles, Sir James, and Sir John. We have already met with Sir Charles Stuart in Corsica. His name will appear again at the end of the chapter on the French invasion, and it was for his employment that Sir Ralph Abercromby and Moore

were hoping in vain when they were in the West Indies. The Sir James Stuart with whom Moore served in Ireland was a very different person. As his career does not otherwise concern me, I need not discuss it further than to draw attention to the distinction between the two men, Sir Charles and Sir James. Sir John Stuart was the Victor of Maida. With ^{him} we shall be concerned at a later stage of Moore's life.

DUBLIN, 8th December 1797.—Upon Sir Ralph Abercromby being appointed Commander-in-chief in Ireland, he desired that I might be put upon the staff of that country as a brigadier, which was accordingly done. I attended Sir Ralph to the levée on the 15th November, and kissed hands. On the 24th we left London, arrived at Holyhead on the 28th, sailed the morning of the 1st December, and landed in Dublin the 2nd, after a most boisterous, disagreeable passage. An aide-de-camp from the Lord-Lieutenant was ready to receive Sir Ralph, with a message that apartments were prepared for him and his suite at the Castle, where the Lord-Lieutenant hoped he would remain till such time as the Commander-in-chief's house was vacated by Lord Carhampton. Sir Ralph did not feel himself at liberty to refuse this offer. Rooms were also, by Lord Camden's order, offered to me; but I declined them, and came to the Kildare Hotel, where I thought I should be more my own master. My stay in Dublin will be probably short. I shall soon be detached to some of the provinces. The day after our arrival we dined with Mr. Pelham, the secretary, and the day following with the Lord-Lieutenant at the Park, where I was introduced to him by Sir Ralph. The company was all military—the different Generals and staff. It is now nearly five months since I landed from the West Indies. Had there been any prospect of service in Portugal I should have preferred going there, but as I suppose our troops will immediately be recalled

from there, and the West Indies presents no service, there was no alternative but Ireland or idleness at home, of which I was already tired. The north of Ireland is at present quiet; it is said to be so because of the strong military force kept in it. In the south there have of late been some disturbances, but throughout the kingdom, it is supposed, the lower class of inhabitants is disaffected. In spite, however, of this belief Government has armed a considerable part of the people under the heads of militia and yeomanry. These have, I understand, been embodied without much discrimination. The military force of Ireland is nearly as follows:—

Regular and Fencible Cavalry . . .	5,805
Infantry	1,803
English and Scotch Fencible Infantry . .	10,993
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Regulars and Fencibles . . .	18,601
Militia	21,590
English Artillery, two companies . .	200
Irish Artillery, about . . .	1,400
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	41,791
Yeomanry computed	35,000
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	76,791

Of which it is thought that from 18,000 to 20,000 are cavalry.

CORK, 10th January 1798.—Sir Ralph Abercromby invited me to his house during my stay in Dublin, and he detained me there till he had made his different arrangements. Sir James Stuart, as Lieutenant-General, was appointed to command the southern district, extending from Limerick across to Waterford and the whole country to the south of these ports. I was appointed to command, under Sir James, the forts of Cork harbour, Kinsale, and Middleton. As Sir James had not arrived from England Sir Ralph gave me the different papers to read respecting the defence of the south, to take notes from them to com-

municate to Sir James upon his arrival. During the month I remained in Dublin, this was my morning's occupation. I left Dublin on the 6th instant, and arrived here the evening of the 8th. To-morrow I shall proceed to Cove. I had opportunities of hearing from Sir Ralph whilst I remained with him the very defective state in which he found every military preparation. No artillery were in a condition to move, even the guns attached to the regiments were unprovided with horses. No magazines were formed for the militia regiments, little or no order or discipline, and the troops in general dispersed in small detachments for the protection of individuals. The situation of Commander-in-chief in Ireland is subservient to the Lord-Lieutenant, to whom every application, even of the most trifling kind, must be made, and by him directed. In quiet times a Commander-in-chief has been little attended to, and the army has been considered little more than an instrument of corruption in the hands of the Lord-Lieutenant and his secretary. So much has this been the custom that even now, when the country is undoubtedly in a very alarming state, both from internal disaffection and the fear of invasion, it requires, I believe, all Sir Ralph's temper and moderation to carry on the necessary business, and to obtain that weight which his situation and the times require. The mode which has been followed to quiet the disturbances in this country has been to proclaim the districts in which the people appeared to be most violent, and to let loose the military, who were encouraged in acts of great violence against all who were supposed to be disaffected. Individuals have been taken up upon suspicion, and without any trial sent out of the country. By these means the disturbances have been quelled, an apparent calm produced, but the disaffection has been undoubtedly increased. The gentlemen in general, however, still call out aloud for violent measures as the most proper to be adopted, and a complete line seems to be drawn between the upper and lower orders.

BANDON, *1st February*.—I remained at Cove till the 22nd January, during which time I inspected minutely the state of the forts and defences of Cork harbour, together with the troops of my district. The harbour of Cork is one that admits of being strongly fortified. In all wars it has been a point of jealousy, and large sums have at different times been expended on its defence, but with so little judgment that it still is in a precarious state, and upon the whole the works in Cork harbour are a disgrace to the country. Sir Ralph arrived at Cork on the 22nd, where I met him. After inspecting that garrison he came to Cove and visited the forts. He spent two days in doing this, during which time I had an opportunity of communicating all that I had observed. The command at Bandon was become vacant by the removal of General Coote to England. The General named me to it, and I was succeeded at Cove by General Hope. I attended Sir Ralph to Bandon, where I took over the command from General Coote. I then went with him to Bantry, which is in my district. He continued on his tour towards the Shannon and Limerick, and I returned to my station. My command consists of upwards of 3000 men, amongst which are twelve companies of light infantry of the Militia, very fine men indeed; it is considered as the advanced corps of the south. Sir Ralph told me before I left Dublin that he should take the first opportunity of naming me to it. The batteries erected at Bantry since the French were there would throw some impediments in the way of an enemy, but nothing but a considerable corps of troops could possibly prevent his landing. The bay is too extensive to be defended by batteries. The difficulty which an invading enemy has here to encounter is, after he has landed, in penetrating through a very wild, barren country devoid of resources; and undoubtedly, if the troops in the south were assembled and advanced without delay, an enemy might be prevented from penetrating, and even beaten, in the country between Bantry and Dunmanway. Whilst at Bantry we stayed at the house of Lord Bantry, late Mr. White. It is situated

upon the sea, opposite to where the French ships lay. The situation is beautifully wild and romantic. As soon as I have settled matters here I must return and examine the road to Bantry, as well as all the coast, more accurately than I was able to do in the last short tour.

BANTRY, 16th February.—Different arrangements have prevented my moving from this garrison. A conspiracy was discovered among the Militia last summer to murder their officers, seize the cannon, and march to Bantry; several soldiers were shot for it. I hope no more of that spirit exists; the men are upon the whole well-behaved, but they have, I observe, no sort of respect for their officers; I am more afraid of this than of their disaffection. I am convinced the same men if transferred might be perfectly depended upon; but there must always be danger, and more particularly in these times, of armed men who are not subordinate. Sir Ralph has gone back to Dublin. I had a letter from him yesterday. He mentions that the Shannon affords the easiest means of debarkation to an enemy, and is tempting from its immediate communication with a fruitful country. He suspects that the Shannon and Galway will be the points. I have written to him upon the necessity of insisting upon immediate steps being taken to complete the old regiments. It is melancholy to think that we have only the Militia with which to encounter an enemy inured to war. When the Militia were first formed, had pains been taken to select proper officers and to introduce discipline they might by this time have been respectable troops; but, like everything else in this country, the giving of regiments was made an instrument of influence with the colonels, and they made their appointments to serve electioneering purposes. Every sort of abuse has been tolerated, and it is, I fear, now too late to amend them. The officers are in general profligate and idle, serving for the emolument, but neither from a sense of duty nor of military distinction. In the management of this country there appears to have been a great want of probity and talent. If there ever was a time when

such an officer as a dictator was required, it is the present. If a man of sufficient character and talent was to be found to fill it, he might still save Ireland. It was an office admirably imagined, and adapted to situations of difficulty and danger. It gave to a free country all the advantages of a despotic one; it gave strength and energy to the Government, without debasing the people.

4th March.—Some attempt to excite disaffection in the Sligo Regiment at Macroom has been discovered; three men deserted, but eight or nine were taken up. I went myself to Macroom the moment it was reported to me. I examined the different persons concerned. It was impossible to make more out of what could be extracted from them than that several meetings had taken place, improper toasts had been drunk, such as "The French Republic," "Hell to the King and Duke of York" and "their well-wishers." It appeared also that an oath of secrecy had been tendered, and taken by some. I am inclined to hope the discovery was made in time and before the plot had gone far; it is, however, evident to what it tended. A soldier, who was formerly a Dublin 'prentice, is supposed to have been the instigator. I directed them all to be tried by a regimental court-martial, and intend after they are punished to get them sent abroad. The Militia of Ireland were only raised to serve a certain number of years, and not during the war. The consequence is that the time of enlistment with most of the men has lately expired, and now not only are the greatest part of the Militia recruits, but recruits from a mass of people who are supposed to be disaffected. The advantage of four years' discipline is lost, and also that which I believe was intended at their formation, the advantage of keeping them apart from the other inhabitants and giving them a separate interest from them. An attempt has been made when too late to remedy these evils, and an Act has been passed to enlist the Militia in future for the period of the war. The officers of the Militia are in general Protestants, the men Roman Catholics. The hatred between these different

persuasions is inveterate to a degree, and the officers have so little sense or prudence as not to conceal their prejudices. The plots which have been hitherto discovered among the troops have been confined to the Roman Catholics. The argument used by the Chancellor of Ireland in a late debate upon Lord Moira's motion seems to me very weak. He says that "Conciliation (meaning with respect to the Roman Catholics) had already been tried, and instead of contenting them, it had only created discontent; that on each new concession the people professed themselves contented and grateful, and yet, within a month or two afterwards, their discontent and turbulence returned with increased vigour." But is not this perfectly natural? They are pleased with *each concession as with one step advanced towards their final object*; but must not their demands continue till all is granted, and they are put on exactly the same footing with the rest of the inhabitants? Those of the Roman Catholic persuasion were perhaps with propriety put under certain restraints; they were then enemies to the liberty and constitution of these kingdoms, but this for many years has been no longer the case. Can it then be sound policy in a Government to favour one part of its inhabitants against nineteen that are oppressed? Every man is oppressed to whom the privileges of his fellow-citizens are denied. That so much has been granted to the Roman Catholics is a bad argument for withholding from them the little that remains.

16th March.—Some days ago I went to Cork to meet Sir James Stewart on his arrival. I was sorry to find him with a return of his nervous complaint, which I found completely unfitted him for business. He complained of himself for undertaking what he said he was unequal to when well, much more when under the influence of this complaint, to which he was ever subject, and seemed determined upon resigning. I attempted to reason with him, and persuade him that he magnified his difficulties; a little time would render his business easy, and was more likely,

from occupying both his mind and body, to cure his disorder than any other scheme he could fall upon. I urged him not to plague himself at present, but amuse himself with making a tour of his district. My reasoning had little effect; his disorder being nervous, incapacitated him from being influenced by it. I then proposed a walk. We talked over past scenes. He got into high spirits, and returned to his dinner with an appetite, and we passed a very pleasant evening; next morning he was again low. He agreed to take a tour to Waterford and the Blackwater if I could accompany him. He said he had asked Sir Ralph's permission to take me. I was averse to quitting my district at that moment. I however consented, hoping to be of use to him, perhaps to be instrumental in removing his distemper; at any rate, to judge how far it would be proper to encourage him, whether on his own account or on that of the public, to retain his command. I parted with him under a promise to return in two days, when we were to begin our jaunt. Upon my return to Bandon I wrote to Sir Ralph a full account of Sir James and what had passed between us, and promised to write to him again from Waterford.

I went early next morning to Macroom to see Lieutenant-Colonel Cooper again about the men of Sligo. I found they had received their punishment, and had consented to go abroad. I spoke to the regiment upon their past and future conduct, and came back to Bandon in the evening, meaning to join Sir James Stewart in Cork the next day; but I received letters from Skibbereen and Bantry, and was afterwards waited upon by the high sheriff of the county, to inform me of outrages which had been committed in those neighbourhoods by the people, who were all *united men*, and that a general rising of the people was expected. The high sheriff, who seems to be a well-educated man, was under great apprehension. I endeavoured to encourage him by stating the improbability of a general rising unless the French landed, or if they did attempt it, the certainty of its being immediately crushed. I said that he should

not disgrace his countrymen by supposing that the Militia were not faithful. I was convinced the majority of them were, and they had never refused to act when called upon; but I told him, which seemed to give him more satisfaction than all I had said, that I should postpone going to Cork. I would set out next day for Clonakilty, and be with him at Skibbereen the day following. At Clonakilty the people were apprehensive, though they allowed the lower class had been quiet immediately about there. I was informed that several of the respectable inhabitants were disaffected. I found upon inquiry the persons to whom they alluded were "Democrats," but they were clever, and in private life good men.

I inspected the three companies of the Westmeath Militia. I received from them two anonymous letters, complaining of injustice from their officers in retaining from them money that was their due. I ordered the regiment to parade next morning, formed the circle, and told them when they had complaints of any kind to make they should not make them in anonymous letters, which was a mode unbecoming soldiers. They should make them in a decent, manly manner, either by memorial delivered openly or by deputing a man to speak, that men who were conscious of doing no wrong need not be afraid. The articles of war directed soldiers to complain when they thought themselves aggrieved, and it was the duty of general officers to inquire into the nature of their complaints, to explain to them if they were mistaken, and to order justice to be done to them if they were wronged. After adding something more to the same purpose I desired them to pitch upon two men from each company to come to me and explain their grievances. I directed the captains of companies to attend with their account-books. The men deputed were decent, intelligent men. I found their demands to be just, and I ordered a regimental court-martial to state them. It was not the fault of the private officers, but of the colonel, Lord Westmeath, who undoubtedly has detained their money from them. When

I receive the proceedings of the court-martial I shall forward them to Sir Ralph Abercromby.

Having finished this I proceeded to Skibbereen. The gentlemen of the neighbourhood were convened to meet me. All were alarmed and in fear of a rising. They represented that the whole country was disaffected. I found, however, that no outrage had been committed except that a few trees had been cut down. They said that the trees were to be used as pike handles. I rather fancy they were cut down for fuel, for want of which the people are in great distress. Some were cut down for works of husbandry. The alarm, however, of the gentlemen did not seem to prompt them to take any steps to exert themselves, either by fair or other means, to remove the evil; they seemed to have no reliance but on the military. I told them I could do nothing for them; we could not fight phantoms. If they could obtain information of improper meetings we might prevent them, or if there was a rising we should quell it. As they had a conviction that mischief was intended, I should establish such vigilance as to be ready to meet it. I knew not what more as a military man I could do; we could not act till something appeared for us to act against. I then encouraged them to unite, to show a joint resolution to oppose whatever was unlawful, but at the same time to be just themselves; not to judge by what they imagined was in the people's minds and to treat them accordingly, and not, when armed for the support of good order, to be themselves the first to infringe it. By these means they would do more than we could do towards the restoration of tranquillity. A soldier of the Westmeath Regiment came to me in the evening, and said he could make me great discoveries; that some people of the country had asked the men to drill them. The man was heated with drink. I gave him some encouragement, and told him to come next day to his officer. Nothing that he said seemed sufficiently important to detain me from visiting the rest of the coast. I desired the officer to examine him, and I set out next day along the coast to Crook Haven.

I had in the course of the day before revisited the bays of Castle Haven and Baltimore. The country to Crook Haven is wilder than anything I have seen out of Corsica. From thence I went by Dunmanus Bay, and so returned to Bandon. I found everywhere the people of the country quiet and at work, but everywhere equal apprehension.

I have, since my return, received the deposition of the soldier at Skibbereen. He accuses thirteen or fourteen inhabitants and above forty soldiers of the two companies there with being "defenders," and sworn to join the French. The deposition is incoherent, and, unless more is made out, I shall doubt the whole of it. I have, however, sent a detachment of cavalry to reinforce the post and overawe disaffection, and have desired the major of the regiment, who is just arrived, to go and command there. I shall go myself as soon as I can leave this, but so strong a conviction exists that a rising is to take place on the 17th, that I cannot absent myself from my headquarters.

17th March.—The guards were reinforced, and patrols were kept going all last night. I saw no reason to apprehend danger, but information was given me that something would be attempted. I myself visited the different guards at 3 A.M. this morning. The town never was so quiet; this day the market was full as usual, and nothing appears to give cause of suspicion. The same precautions shall, however, be taken this night; I have also instructed the different officers commanding the out-quarters to take every precaution against surprise. I made a speech yesterday to the troops. I reprobated some meetings of *Orange boys* (Protestants), which, as I heard, had taken place. I said that if by such meetings they intended to form a union to defend their country, they were unnecessary, as every good man was already determined in his heart to do so, and they, as soldiers, had already sworn to do it; but if it was to create a distinction and separate interest from the Catholics, it was wicked, and must be punished. Ireland was composed of Roman Catholic and Protestant. The Government had

entrusted both equally with her defence. A union of both was necessary for this purpose. Distinctions of this kind were illiberal, and for a man to boast or be proud of his religion was absurd. It was a circumstance in which he had no merit; he was the one or the other because his parents were so before him, and it was determined for him before he had a choice. Any man might fairly pride himself upon being just and honest, but not on his religion. If they followed the doctrines of the one or the other they would be good and upright. I then told them that they, like everybody else, must have heard the reports of disturbances and of risings which were said to be about to take place; that I did not see much reason to apprehend them; I had everywhere observed the people to be perfectly tranquil, but that it appeared that much pains were taken by ill-disposed persons to excite alarm, and to make every person jealous of his neighbour; that people had even gone so far as to say that amongst them were many ready to join the enemy. I could give no faith to such reports; their conduct did not entitle me to pay them so bad a compliment as to suspect them of such villainy. Every man had been taught from his cradle to look upon any one who joined the enemies of his country as a traitor and a villain. I had no thoughts that they were such; and in spite of every report, I was convinced that they would do their duty when called on in support of the laws of their country, either against a foreign enemy or against whoever might be wicked enough to attempt to overturn them.

I said that I was as much at my ease amongst them as I ever had been amongst any soldiers whatever. Amongst so large a number bad men might no doubt be found, but the majority were, I was convinced, good. Let these therefore not listen to or trouble themselves with idle rumours, but determine solely to do their duty. By this means they would probably prevent all internal rising or commotion, and undoubtedly repel invasion if attempted, and beat their enemies as their countrymen had ever done before them. If they failed, they would still have the satisfaction of having

done their duty; or if they fell, they would die as every honourable and good man should wish to die, in the defence of the laws of his country. As, however, such rumours were circulated, it became them to be circumspect; that the next day was the anniversary of the Saint of their country, a day commonly spent in mirth and jollity, but, as it was said to be intended for different designs, it was necessary they should keep sober and be in a state to do their duty if called upon. It was melancholy to be obliged to act against one's countrymen. I hoped sincerely it would never be our case; but, as soldiers, we had engaged not only to fight the foreigner, but also to support the Government and laws, which had long been in use, and framed by wiser men than we were. If, therefore, any people were weak or wicked enough to oppose or attempt to subvert them, we had no choice, nor could we, as honest men, do otherwise than act against them, &c. &c.

22nd March 1798.—St. Patrick's and the day following, which in general is equally riotous, passed off very quietly. The garrison was perfectly orderly with the exception of one captain, who was on picquet, and who got drunk. I heard of it in the morning, and instantly put him under arrest, and reported the circumstance to the Adjutant-General for the information of the Commander-in-chief. I hope sincerely he may be broken. I understood that such things had been practised by the officers heretofore, and warned them against it as a practice so disgraceful that it would be impossible for me to overlook it. Soldiers are flogged for it. I do not see how I could look them in the face if I was not to punish it equally in officers; but still by this act of justice I shall bring upon myself much odium. It will be called harsh, &c.; I know it is the reverse. By getting a very worthless officer dismissed more effect will be produced than if fifty poor men had been flogged. I set out for Skibbereen, and saw the soldier who had before given the information respecting the disaffection in the Westmeath Regiment. He had been able to disclose nothing upon

which it is possible to act; but from the whole of what he has stated I am convinced that the regiment to a man are disaffected, and had the country risen or the French landed, they would have joined them. This is in a great measure the fault of their colonel and officers. The men have not been dealt with fairly; the officers do not act in a manner to gain their confidence or esteem. I had the day before sent a detachment of cavalry unexpectedly to Skibbereen. It had the good effect of inspiring the gentlemen with courage, and it overawed the ill-intentioned, and showed to both with what ease the force from Bandon could be upon them. The gentlemen of the neighbourhood expressed their obligation to me. They have themselves begun, and I hope will continue, to act.

My report to Sir Ralph on my return from my tour of the coast was, that Cork and Bantry were the only harbours in this district fit for the reception of a great armament. The intermediate bays of the Baltimore, Castlehaven, Long Island, and Crook Haven were excellent harbours, convenient for trade, the reception of our cruisers, &c., but not suited for a fleet coming to invade. They might be threatened by small corps to attract our attention. Small corps might even be landed to act upon our rear and force us to retire when opposing their main body. The distance from Bantry was less than from Baltimore or any of the harbours westward of it, the roads as good, and the country not worse. From Baltimore to Skibbereen the road was good; from thence there were three to Bantry, Dromaleague, and Dunmanway, and two from Skibbereen to Ross and Clonakilty. The main body once landed in Bantry might send a corps to Baltimore to favour their advance. This would be irksome to us, but at the same time dangerous to the enemy, because by turning a great part of our force unexpectedly on that landed at Baltimore it might be destroyed.

BANDON, 29th March.—Sir Ralph in his visit to the different quarters observed and received reports of the irregularities and abuses which existed, particularly in the regiments

of Militia. They had risen to a height, and were not only extremely disgraceful to those who permitted and connived at them, but were completely subversive of all discipline and order. The colonels and principal officers being members of Parliament and men of rank, no person had hitherto dared to check them. Sir Ralph's orders from the beginning have been pointed to that object; he at least exposed and reprobated the abuses which had been practised, and in strong terms forbade the continuance of them. Particularly in an order dated February 26th he expressed himself, "That the frequency of courts-martial and the many complaints of irregularities in the conduct of the troops in this kingdom having too unfortunately proved the army to be in a state of licentiousness which must render it formidable to every one but the enemy, the Commander-in-chief thinks it necessary to demand from all Generals commanding districts and brigades, as well as commanding officers of regiments, that they exert themselves and compel from all officers under their command the strictest and most unremitting attention to the discipline, good order, and conduct of their men, such as may restore the high and distinguished reputation which the British troops have been accustomed to enjoy in every part of the world. It becomes necessary to recur and most pointedly to attend to the standing orders of the kingdom, which at the same time that they direct military assistance to be given at the requisition of the civil magistrate, positively forbid the troops to act (except in case of attack) without his presence and authority, and the most clear and precise orders are to be given to the officer commanding the party for this purpose," &c.

This order, addressed to the troops, though their state loudly called for it, gave offence in proportion to its truth. The principal officers, who had hitherto been used to be complimented, could not bear the language of truth. They had the folly to call out and make public what was meant for their private guidance and correction, and they have done so with all the effrontery of innocence and rectitude. Not, however, daring to deny the abuses, they have laid

hold of that part which forbids acting without the presence of a civil magistrate. This is stated to be in direct contradiction to former orders, and to the Lord-Lieutenant's proclamation. In consequence of the disturbed state of the north the laws were extended and districts were proclaimed, but in the practice and execution the troops had infinitely exceeded what even the laws thus extended authorised, and undoubtedly enormities had been committed extremely disgraceful to the military as well as prejudicial to their discipline. Sir Ralph was determined that this should no longer be the case, and his instructions, private and public, to the general officers tended strongly to forbid such practices. But as the above conduct in the north had terrified the people into submission, the cry of the gentlemen throughout is that nothing but *strong measures*, as they are called, will do; and upon every murmur of the people they call upon the military and urge them to every act of violence. A cabal has by this means been raised against Sir Ralph for his moderation, and it is surprising to what length it has been carried. His recall has been talked of, and the whole of his conduct arraigned. In a letter which I wrote to him lately I took notice of the clamour raised against him in consequence of his order, and I hinted that should he be induced to resign I was determined not to serve. In his answer, which I received yesterday, he writes: "My orders of the 26th ultimo have caused a great fermentation, which originated here, and has been communicated to England from here. Of this I cannot bring positive proof, but it is as sure as cause and effect; I cannot as yet enter into any detail. Matters have, however, gone far; they may force me to resign, but I shall not lower myself by a compliance with their propositions." He then, in terms friendly and flattering, entreats me to take no hasty resolution with respect to myself. His resolution not to retract his orders nor to submit has afforded me much pleasure, and I have taken the liberty of writing so to him. In fact, his conduct since his arrival in Ireland has been so exemplary, the motives upon which

he has acted have been so honourable and upright, that he stands upon grounds which reflect great credit upon him, and happen what may, he must have pleasure in the reflection through life. The gentlemen of this country are so profligate that the General [here occurs a blank in the MS.]. He has already done much good; the country allows it, and should the perverseness or weakness of Government by yielding to unjust clamour force Sir Ralph to resign, Ireland will repent it I am confident, but unfortunately when it will be too late. Two soldiers of the Dublin Militia were shot yesterday in Cork. They were condemned by a court-martial for conspiracy and "defenderism." It appeared that they had been purposely sent from Dublin to enlist and to debauch the regiment.

BANDON, 30th *March*.—The order, issued by Lord Carhampton when Commander-in-chief, which that of Sir Ralph Abercromby of the 26th February is said to contradict, is as follows:—"Adjutant-General's Office, 18th May 1797. In obedience to an order of the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, it is the Commander-in-chief's commands that the military do act without waiting for directions from the civil magistrate in dispersing any tumultuous or unlawful assemblies of persons threatening the peace of the realm and the safety of the lives and property of his Majesty's loyal subjects wheresoever collected." I have read the Act of Parliament, which does not justify this order. Mr. Robert Longfield O'Connor, brother to the two O'Connors, the one in the Tower for high treason, the other in Cork gaol, called upon me yesterday and told me he had positive information that 300 pikes, some muskets, and eight hundredweight of ball cartridge were concealed in the garden of his brother Roger O'Connor, who is in Cork gaol. He said it was unpleasant for him to declare against his brother, but that he was determined to do his duty to his country. I told him if he thought his intelligence was to be depended on, it would be easy to make the search as justice of the peace. I ordered a captain and forty dra-

goons to be ready at seven this morning, and to prevent the possibility of any irregularity on the part of the troops I accompanied them myself. Mr. O'Connor's house is within sight of his brother's, and he met us in the road. I went forward to apprise Mrs. O'Connor, and to prevent her being alarmed at the sudden appearance of the dragoons. She was from home, attending her husband in Cork gaol; three or four children and a young lady, Miss Beamish, were in the house. I explained what I was come about, and begged they would not be frightened. The garden was searched, but no arms found. I sat occasionally while it was going on with the young lady and children. She seemed very sensible of the attention I had shown her, but expressed great horror at the brother being the informer.

BANDON, *5th April*.—I returned yesterday from Mallow, where I had been to receive Sir James Stewart's instructions for disarming the baronies of East and West Carbery. The disarming different baronies in the county of Cork commenced this morning; I shall be obliged to defer my operations for some days. A proclamation from the Lord-Lieutenant in Council has just been issued, proclaiming the whole kingdom to be in rebellion, and directing the Commander-in-chief to take the most effectual means to quell it. An order from Sir Ralph accompanied the proclamation nearly in the same terms as that issued formerly by Lord Carhampton, stating that in obedience to an order from the Lord-Lieutenant in Council the troops were to act without waiting for the authority of a chief magistrate. Upon this the Commander-in-chief has written to be recalled.

BANDON, *16th April*.—I returned yesterday from Cork, where I had gone to meet Sir Ralph. He explained to me confidentially all that had passed; he spoke of Lord Camden as one of the best men in the world but one of the weakest, and completely guided by a set of violent, hot-headed men. Sir Ralph told me that the proclamation and order in con-

sequence of it, formerly issued in Lord Carhampton's time, had never been acted upon ; but a special order and Act of indemnity and pardon having since passed, they were considered as thereby annulled. In one instance only since his arrival at a place in the north had an officer acted without a magistrate, and he was immediately stopt. In the south, where Colonel Manser St. George was murdered, General Johnstone wrote that he was going to burn houses, &c. His letter was sent to Mr. Pelham, and from him to the Lord-Lieutenant, and orders were instantly sent down to stop General Johnstone. When Sir Ralph issued his order desiring officers never to act without a civil magistrate he conceived he did nothing but what Lord Camden approved of. In the different councils he had always disapproved of the violent measures proposed and of dispersing the troops. His opinion was that the civil magistrates should be encouraged to act. He had already succeeded in getting them to attempt it in some parts where he had been.

The Chancellor and those of his party would never explain exactly what they wished ; but it was evident that they wished the Commander-in-chief with the army to take upon themselves to act with a violence which they did not choose to define, and for which they would give no public authority. Their approbation would therefore depend upon the success. Sir Ralph said he never chose to understand them. It was during his tour to the north that the cabal was formed against him, and it was not until his return to Dublin that he found his orders to the army had been the subject of discussion, and his character and conduct traduced and misrepresented both in this country and in England. He had done all he could with Lord Camden to show him the danger of the measures pursued. His Lordship agreed with him, but could not resist the other party. Upon the proclamation Sir Ralph issued the order he was desired to do, because he did not wish to be said to have disobeyed, but he immediately wrote to be recalled. The Lord-Lieutenant then asked him to come to the south where the disturbances were, to carry into execution the

orders which he disapproved. He told the Lord-Lieutenant that since it was his desire he should comply, but it was a sacrifice which he did not expect would have been demanded of him; he hoped it would be the last, and that upon his return to Dublin he should be permitted to quit the kingdom. The powers given to the Commander-in-chief are equal to martial law, but still they do not proclaim this, and the civil courts are sitting and the assizes are going on. Those who have the government of the country seem to have no plan or system but that of terrifying the common people; they will give you every power to act against them, but the rest of the community are to be indulged in every abuse. The troops are now so dispersed that when Sir Ralph took his pen to see what number could be assembled, supposing the enemy to appear at Bantry or the Shannon, he found that in four or five days 6000 was the utmost.

I have written in the most pressing terms to Colonel Brownrigg to be withdrawn from Ireland. The measures likely to be adopted will be most odious, and whoever attempts to execute them with lenity or moderation risks giving displeasure and being ruined. Should an invasion be attempted there will be no head to direct, and no previous arrangement made; the scene will be disgraceful, and I wish to retire from it. I mentioned this as my intention to Sir Ralph. He begged I would be cautious, both for my own sake and his; he should be sorry that anything we did should bear the appearance of party. Sir Ralph said, "I shall be blamed for what I have done in this country, but I never felt more satisfied with myself, or my conscience more clear. I meant to act well, and feeling this, the calumny of the world does not affect me." I told him I was sure that in time all prejudice would subside and his conduct would obtain the approbation it deserved. I was convinced the part he had acted would always be a source of pleasant reflection to himself.

BANDON, 27th May 1798.—I received orders in April to disarm the two Carberries, which is all the country which

lies from Crookham along the coast to Bandon. Sir Ralph issued a notice commanding the people to deliver their arms to the different magistrates or officers commanding the troops, informing them that if they did so they should be not only unmolested, but protected; that if they did not, or persevered in committing outrages, the troops would be sent to live upon them at free quarters, and other severe measures taken to reduce them to obedience. I afterwards issued a similar notice to this for my district, fixing the 2nd May as the date on or before which, if the arms were not delivered in, the troops should act; and to convince them that I was serious, I marched five companies of Light Infantry and a detachment of Dragoons throughout the country to Skull to be ready to act. I expected that upon the appearance of the troops the people would have given in their arms, but it had no effect. I spoke to the priests, and took every pains to represent the folly of holding out and of forcing me to resort to violent measures. I directed Major Nugent, with the troops quartered in Skibbereen, to march on the 2nd May into free quarters in the parish of Coharagh, which had been much disturbed; and I placed the five Light Companies in different divisions from Ballydehob to Ballydevilin, with orders to forage the whole of the country from Crookhaven to within seven miles of Skibbereen.

My orders were to treat the people with as much harshness as possible, as far as words and manner went, and to supply themselves with whatever provisions were necessary to enable them to live well. My wish was to excite terror, and by that means obtain our end speedily. I thought this better than to act more mildly, and be obliged to continue for any time the real oppression; and, as I was present everywhere myself, I had no doubt of being able to prevent any great abuses by the troops. The second day the people, after denying that they had any arms, began to deliver them in. After four days we extracted sixty-five muskets. Major Nugent in Coharagh was obliged to burn some houses before he could get a single arm.

They then delivered in a number of pikes. I then removed the troops to another part of the country, always entreating that the arms might be delivered without forcing me to ruin them. Few parishes had the good sense to do so; such as did escaped. The terror was great. The moment a red coat appeared everybody fled. I was thus constantly employed for three weeks, during which I received about 800 pikes and 3400 stand of arms, the latter very bad. The better sort of people seemed all delighted with the operation except when it touched their own tenants, by whose ruin they saw they themselves must suffer, but they were pleased that the people were humbled, and would be civil. I found only two gentlemen who acted with liberality or manliness; the rest seemed in general to be actuated by the meanest motives. The common people have been so ill-treated by them, and so often deceived, that neither attachment nor confidence any longer exists. They have yielded in this instance to force, are humbled, but irritated to a great degree, and unless the gentlemen change their conduct and manner towards them, or Government steps in with regulations for the protection of the lower from the upper order, the pike will appear again very soon.

CHAPTER XII

THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRISH REBELLION, AND ITS SUPPRESSION

BANDON, *5th June*.—On the 26th May no mail arrived from Dublin. This circumstance, though unusual, was not much noticed till next day, when none arrived either. Reports then arrived that Dublin and the country round were in insurrection. Sir James Stewart wrote to me to go to him to Cork. He had received letters from the general officers commanding at Waterford, Kilkenny, &c., all of the most alarming nature. The purport of them is that the insurgents were in possession of the country between Naas and Kilkenny, and had completely stopped the communication. It appeared, however, that the different attacks, of which confused accounts arrived, had almost all been made by the insurgents, but had terminated in favour of the King's troops and yeomen, with great slaughter of the insurgents. Seven days passed without any communication with Dublin. At last letters arrived by sea to Sir James from the Lord-Lieutenant and General Lake, stating that Dublin was quiet, and that the troops had been successful, and desiring to know the state of the south. Sir James had forwarded troops to Clonmel and Kilkenny to enable Sir Charles Asgil, who commanded at the latter, to open the communication with Dublin. Sir James Duff had of his own accord marched from Limerick with a corps of cavalry, infantry, and artillery to Maryborough. The different general officers acted for themselves according to local circumstances, and independent of each other, by which means little effect was produced. The alarm everywhere was great; in Cork a rising was feared. It was

indeed to be apprehended everywhere. I stayed a couple of days with Sir James, but seeing I would be of little use there, that no orders were sent from Dublin, and no plan adopted for themselves, I returned to my post at Bandon. My district, though quiet and recovered from the panic, still required to be watched, and I could not help, when I saw insurrection within, being particularly afraid of a visit from the French. I wished, therefore, to establish a better lookout on the coast, and to give instructions to the outposts, &c.

In a day or two I received another summons from Cork. I found the same confusion and indecision prevailing. General Fawcett, by detaching small parties from Duncannon Fort against the insurgents in Wexford, had allowed two parties to be cut off and two guns to be taken. He had retired to the fort, and feared an attack. Sir James had directed Major-General Johnstone to march immediately with a body of about 1200 men to Waterford. It was understood that General Eustace had arrived at New Ross with 800 from Dublin; but Wexford town and the whole county were in possession of the insurgents. I told Sir James my opinion, that he should himself go and direct the operations against Wexford. As commanding the south, he could order troops and make upon the spot such arrangements as he thought necessary. He said Wexford was in General Dundas's district. I then asked him to permit me to go post to Waterford. I should be there in the morning, might deliver to General Johnstone such instructions as he chose, and might otherwise assist him, particularly as he was in want of officers to lead the troops should he come to action. I should return immediately, even before I should be missed from my own post. He refused peremptorily, saying that he had already detached too much, and must keep something with himself. No instructions of any kind had arrived from Dublin, though the communication was now open. I returned again to Bandon; my mind is by no means anxious about the event. From the seizure of Lord Edward FitzGerald and other leaders the plans were at first

disconcerted, and the rising, which was to have been general, has been extremely partial. It was confined to the counties immediately round Dublin—Kildare, King's, Queen's, &c.—but Dublin, where probably the arms and stores were expected, having been itself prevented from rising, the troops had opportunities of attacking the different bodies of insurgents when in the most miserable situation, both as to arms and union, of killing great numbers without any loss, and have thereby disheartened and crushed them. The insurrection in the counties alluded to being quieted, the communication with Dublin opened, all our force can now be turned against Wicklow and Wexford, two counties little suspected, and where few troops were kept, and where the same want of system which existed elsewhere, supported by fewer troops, has caused us to be unsuccessful, but now they must share the fate of the others and be reduced. Had the insurrection been as general as it was intended, or had any French force appeared upon the coast, there is every reason to apprehend that the most fatal consequences must have followed; but the north, south, and west having continued quiet, the superiority of our force was such against a rabble not only without discipline but without arms, that the blunders, committed from a want of energy, decision, and system, have not told so as to prevent final success.

FERMOY, 13th *June*.—On the 9th I received an order to march with the Light Battalion to Cork. This, added to some accounts of bad success in the county of Wexford and of disturbances near Cork, created much alarm and uneasiness in the neighbourhood of Bandon. I arrived in Cork that day with the Light Battalion and two 6-pounders. Instead of marching on next day, as I expected, I found we were to remain at Cork. Next day Sir James received an order from Lieutenant-General Lake to send me on upon the road to Clonmel with the 60th and Light Infantry. The same letter found great fault with him for not having forwarded the troops as he had before been directed to do. Sir James had detained them, being apprehensive for the

tranquillity of Cork and its neighbourhood, as also for the magazines upon the Blackwater. In consequence of this the Light Battalion, the 60th Regiment, and Limerick Militia were ordered to march next morning under my orders to Fermoy. This was afterwards countermanded, and only the 60th and Limerick were ordered to march. I was detained in the same manner next day, after being ordered to move; but at last I got off this morning at four o'clock. As we are straitened here for quarters I have ordered the 60th on to Clogheen this evening, and thus we shall remain until I receive orders from Dublin.

FERMOY, 14th.—I have this day received orders to move forward to Clonmel, from thence to Waterford, where I shall receive orders from Major-General Johnstone at New Ross. The rebels are in considerable force in the county of Wexford, so much so as to determine us not to act until we collect a considerable body to attack them. It is said that in the different actions they have faced danger with uncommon intrepidity. We have hitherto certainly acted in too small detachments, which is rather playing the game of the enemy, who must wish to have time to form their troops. Disturbances are appearing in the north. These, we hear, are terminating favourably, but I consider that now a regular war in this country is certain. Our troops, mostly Militia, are extremely undisciplined. My whole time is taken up in attending to the Light Companies, instructing them in their duties, and inciting the officers to exertion. The march from Cork was quite disgraceful.

CLONMEL, 16th June.—We left Fermoy on the 15th at 3 A.M., and got to Clogheen at ten without leaving a man behind. The officers were made to remain close with their divisions, by which means regularity was preserved. We found a great stir in Clogheen, a man tied up and being flogged, the sides of the streets filled with country people on their knees and hats off. The High Sheriff, Mr. Fitzgerald, was, we were told, making great discoveries. He had already flogged truth out of several respectable persons, who

had confessed themselves to be generals, colonels, captains, &c., of the rebels. The rule was to flog each person till he told the truth and gave the names of other rebels. These were then sent for and underwent a similar operation. Undoubtedly several persons were thus punished who richly deserved it. The number flogged was considerable. It lasted all the forenoon. That some were innocent I fear is equally certain. Mr. FitzGerald, however, is considered as an active good magistrate, and it is universally allowed that he will soon restore perfect tranquillity. There must be persons who disapprove of such promiscuous and severe punishments. I am convinced that Mr. FitzGerald is acting conscientiously, and conceives he deserves praise; he said so to the people assembled in a long speech, which was received with shouts and "God save the King." We marched from Clogheen at three this morning, and arrived here at eight. The heat and dust are intolerable. To-morrow we proceed to Waterford.

CAMP, NEAR WEXFORD, 23rd June.—I marched to Waterford on Sunday the 17th, where I received orders to proceed next day at three to New Ross. I arrived there at about eight in the morning of the 18th. Next morning was fixed upon for the attack of the posts in the neighbourhood of Ross, Carriekburn Mountain, &c. Everything here was in confusion. It was with difficulty that I could get an idea of the part I was to act in the different attacks. I at last found that I was to lead the right column of three that were to march out. The march was ordered for 2 A.M., but from rain it was necessarily postponed till 6 A.M. I had the 60th Yagers, 900 Light Infantry, 50 Hompesch Cavalry, and six pieces of artillery. The rebels were posted on a hill about a mile and a half from Ross. We saw them plainly drawn up, I thought with the intention of fighting us. The road I marched by led directly on the left of their position; they allowed me to come within cannon shot, and then retreated. General Johnstone, with the centre, was moving at the same moment to attack them in front. The

Yagers in the pursuit killed sixty or seventy of them. I joined General Johnstone at Old Ross; he proceeded with me to Carrickburn, which we found evacuated. The Major-General then returned to Ross, leaving me orders to proceed to Fookes Mill, where he said I should be joined by the Queen's and the 24th, which had landed from England at Duncannon. I took post that evening at the house and park of a Mr. Sutton. The country through which we had passed was rich and beautiful, but perfectly deserted. The soldiers, contrary to all orders, quitted their divisions and set fire to many houses. It was shocking to see a fine cultivated country deserted of its inhabitants and in flames. I have prevented this from happening since then, and our last marches have been conducted with regularity.

On the 20th I sent out a strong detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson to patrol towards Tintern and Clonmines to observe the country, to communicate with the troops I expected from Duncannon, and on his return to forage cattle for the camp. He reported that he had found straggling parties of the rebels, many of whom his men had killed. The inhabitants were flown, and he had seen nothing of the troops I expected. My orders were to proceed that day to Taghmou, seven miles from Wexford. I waited till 3 P.M. for the troops that were to join me. Hearing then nothing of them, I determined to move forward. I had 1000 men under me; I thought this sufficient to hold my ground against the rebels; and as part of the general plan was for me to be at Taghmore that day, I did not wish to disappoint it by failure on my side. I set out at 3 P.M. We had not marched above a mile when a cloud of dust was seen moving towards us. This we immediately perceived to be a large party of rebels. I knew something of the ground from having reconnoitred it in the morning. I immediately ordered the Yagers to advance and skirmish, whilst I formed part of the Light Infantry on the right and left of the road, and then ran forward the guns to a commanding situation at the crossing of two roads.

The attack began. The companies of Light Infantry, being unaccustomed to fire, hesitated a little. I was obliged to get off my horse to put myself at their head, to jump over a high ditch and advance on the enemy; we drove them down-hill over a bridge. I directed Colonel Wilkinson to post himself at this bridge and prevent their passing it again. I ordered Major Aylmer with three companies of Light Infantry to march against a large body which were seen going round upon my left. He sent me word that they were in a wood near him, and seemed in such numbers that he was afraid to advance on them. I then sent them two more companies under Major Daniel and a field-piece, with directions to advance and ascertain the force of the enemy; to be cautious at first, but to follow them briskly if they staggered in the least. I was afraid to go from the front, opposite to which the enemy were in great numbers, and where I thought they were waiting for a favourable moment to fall upon me. The fire grew hotter upon the left, and messages for reinforcements were continually coming. I ordered the brigade-major, Anderson, to go and let me know the true state of the left. He returned, and told me that it was absolutely necessary for me to go to the left immediately. I set off at a gallop, desiring him to stay and watch the movements at the front. I met the Light Infantry, the Yagers, and some Dragoons all in the woods mixed and retreating. The enemy was following close, and firing. I succeeded in stopping some immediately, and got them to jump out of the road and make a front on each side of it. I then encouraged the rest first to halt, then to advance, and, when I saw them ready for it, I took off my hat, put my horse into a trot, gave a huzza, and got them to make a push. The tide immediately turned; we drove the rebels before us, and killed a great many.

They attempted two or three times afterwards to make a stand, but failed. The fire of the rebels was well supported. I was surprised at the numbers of muskets, which, I have since heard, amounted to 600. The numbers of the whole,

5000 or 6000, including pikes. We lost ten killed and forty-five wounded, besides Major Daniel, Captain de Villers, and Lieutenant Green. I pursued the rebels till they dispersed. Whilst we were pursuing a messenger came up to me with the news of the arrival of the two regiments under Lord Dalhousie. It was now near eight o'clock; too late to proceed. I took post for the night on the ground where the action had begun. The Light Infantry showed great courage. I was much gratified by the confidence they seemed to place in me, and the turn which my arrival gave; but, from want of officers and experience to form quickly, they fought at great disadvantage. On the 21st I continued my march to Taghmou. On the road two men, one in red with a white handkerchief in his hand, were seen galloping up to us. They proved to be persons from Wexford, one a Militia officer who had been taken prisoner some time before. They delivered a letter from Lord Kingsbury, who had also fallen into the hands of the rebels, stating that the inhabitants of Wexford offered to lay down their arms upon condition of their lives and property being secured to them, that they had delivered many arms to him and the ancient mayor. They two were in possession of the town. A paper to the same purpose was also delivered from Mr. Keogh, the rebel governor. I made no answer to the proposals, having no authority to treat, but I determined, instead of stopping at Taghmou, according to my orders, to proceed to Wexford, and, without entering it, to take such a position on the outside of it as would give me command of it until General Johnstone or General Lake arrived.

The road, a few miles from Taghmou, leads along the side of the mountain called Forth. I perceived upon the summit of it crowds of people. I began to suspect some trick, as with my glass I could perceive that they were armed. I halted for some time, and sent on a strong advanced guard, with orders to gain cautiously the top of the mountain, and to continue upon it until the main body, baggage, &c., had passed the low road. I followed with the column at such distance as to be able to support the

advanced guard if necessary. Those upon the top ran off at the approach of my advanced party, and the whole passed unmolested. Upon our approach to the town we saw crowds of people running in all directions out of it. A house on fire made me suspect the rebels meant to burn the town, and perhaps the prisoners in their possession. I therefore advanced and took post close to it, and sent Lord Dalhousie with two hundred men into it, with orders to release the prisoners and leave such a force in the town as would ensure tranquillity and protect the well-affected. The moment I had settled the different regiments I went in myself, and witnessed the most affecting scenes: fathers meeting their children, wives, &c., whom they thought to have perished. Many of the gentlemen, whose families were prisoners in the town, had attended me as guides and yeomen. Forty prisoners had been shot and piked the day before, and it was intended to have shot the rest that evening if I had not come on. They amounted to some hundred persons, of the best rank in the county. I, therefore, had the good fortune to perform one of the most pleasing services that could fall to the lot of an officer. In the morning I wrote a report of the whole of my transactions to Major-General Johnstone, and ordered the troops to move to a position half a mile in the rear, as the position I was in was bad. Just as I had taken it General Johnstone, and afterwards General Lake, arrived with their different columns from Enniscorthy, where the day before they had jointly attacked the rebels on Vinegar Hill. They had beaten and dispersed them with little loss, but killed a great many of the rebels. Our different columns are now all encamped round the town. I dined with General Lake, and met my brother Graham, whose ship lies off the town. He was obliged to go on board; we were only half-an-hour together. General Roche (a priest), who fought against me, and several other leaders, have been taken by the soldiers since we have been here; they have all been tried, or are being tried, by courts-martial. Yesterday a gentleman having £8000 a year was arrested

CAMP, NEAR WEXFORD, 25th June.—We have no accounts of the rebels; it was said they were retired to the Barony of the Forth, to the westward of Wexford. General Lake wished to ascertain the truth. I, therefore, took twelve dragoons yesterday and rode through the district for about eleven miles to a place called St. Germain's, and returned by another road. I saw no trace of an enemy; the number of inhabitants was small in proportion to the houses, but I was informed that they had all returned, though afraid to come near the soldiers. I spoke to several, and distributed the notices promising pardon if they would give up their arms and leaders. Many brought their pikes to me. They appeared sullen and dejected. This is out of sight the finest country I have seen in Ireland, well cultivated and enclosed with woods, and both the farmers' and peasants' houses good and neat. It is singular that a part which shows so much industry and comfort should have been the most disturbed. The army is being separated into different corps. I am ordered to be in readiness at a moment's warning.

CAMP, NEAR WEXFORD, 26th June.—The fugitives from Wexford, &c., have been met by Sir Charles Asgill going towards Newtown Barry and Carlow, and beaten with the loss of 400 killed. Yesterday, in Wexford, General Roche, who commanded against me, Mr. Keogh, who commanded in the town, and some others were hanged by the sentence of a court-martial. The former was a priest, a great, fat, vulgar-looking beast; the latter had formerly been in the army, and had the appearance of a gentleman; both were perfectly composed and collected. Keogh asked leave to address the people. I told him he might do so. He said that in the early part of his life he had been in the army. He had neither then nor since deviated from the path of honour. As he was about to appear before his Redeemer, it was not likely he would assert what was false. He declared that he had never been a "United Irishman," nor ever concerned in any plot or conspiracy against the

King or the constitution of his country. Previous to the rebels entering Wexford he had exerted himself in the defence of it when the King's forces retreated and the rebels to the amount of 20,000 entered. They forced him at the point of the pike to be their commander. In that capacity he had always acted with humanity. He spoke with such firmness and apparent truth that I was affected by him. I whispered to the officer who had charge of the execution to let his execution be carried out last, and I ran to General Lake to tell him what had passed. The General thanked me, and said it was very natural for me and others to be affected by what had passed; but that he had seen much of Mr. Keogh's correspondence with the other chiefs of the rebels, that it was of the most violent and horrid kind, and that he was a person perfectly known to have been a principal leader. When I returned to the place of execution I met the clergyman who had attended Keogh to the last moment. I asked if he had persevered in what he had said. He told me that he had never deviated from one word of it; that this conduct surprised him so much, that he had not offered him the last sacrament.

CAMP, TAGHMOU, 28th June 1798.—I marched here yesterday with the 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry and 60th Regiment, fifty dragoons, two 6-pounders and a howitzer. I found the 4th Battalion of Light Infantry, which is now attached to my brigade. It is commanded by Lord Blaney. The whole make between 1600 and 1700 firelocks. General Hunter commands in Wexford, having under him the 2nd and 29th Regiments. The Guards are at Ross, General Needham at Gorey, Sir James Duff at Newtown Barry. Some regiments are detached to Enniscorthy and Vinegar Hill. General Johnstone has gone back to Mallow. The Commander-in-chief with his staff started for Dublin yesterday. My corps is to be a moving one. Taghmou is a central situation, and I shall probably continue in it until some arrangement is made by Lord

Cornwallis after seeing General Lake. I endeavour to keep the troops in subordination, and prevent them from plundering and ill-using the inhabitants. I wish to show the latter the difference between troops chastising them for rebellion and living amongst them as their countrymen for their protection. General Lake's proclamation offers the inhabitants pardon upon delivering their arms and returning to their habitations. I have directed the soldiers to behave kindly to them, and to take nothing without paying for it. I rode several miles into the country this day in order to explain and circulate the proclamation. I met few men. There were, however, many who were at their habitations, but were still afraid to appear. I exhorted those I saw to persuade their neighbours to return to their families and former occupations, and assured them that the soldiers would not injure them. The country has been most populous; it is full of habitations; it is most melancholy to see them deserted, and the fields which had been cultivated overgrown with weeds. The leaders of the rebellion in this part have almost all been seized and executed, several of them men of considerable property.

TAGHMOU, *2nd July*.—No orders have yet come for me, nor have we had any newspapers or communication from Dublin by which to learn what is going on in other parts. This district is becoming tranquil. The gentlemen who fled from the rebellion have not yet returned. Their presence would do much if they were under the control of prudent military officers; but, if left to themselves, they are too apt to revenge past injuries and counteract the spirit and effect of the proclamations. It is to be hoped that Lord Cornwallis will adopt some plan to instil discipline and order into the Militia. The short specimen we have had has but too plainly proved the truth of Sir Ralph Abercromby's observation, that they are formidable to their friends only. The officers, of every description, are so bad that it is quite discouraging. Except that they are clothed with more uniformity, they are as ignorant and as

much a rabble as those who have hitherto opposed us. Our army is better armed and provided with ammunition; that of the rebels has the advantage of zeal and ardour. If the rebellion continues, or if the French effect a landing, even in inconsiderable numbers, I shall consider the country as lost unless a completely different system is adopted.

TAGHMOU CAMP, 4th July.—I rode over to Wexford yesterday and dined with General Hunter; there are reports of the rebels being assembled in numbers near Enniscorthy and other places. The General thinks that they are mere straggling parties, magnified by the apprehension of individuals from tens and twenties to hundreds and thousands, but that no formidable assemblage exists in the country. Whilst General Hunter and I are endeavouring to pacify and conciliate the minds of the people, we find that General Eustace has been sending out from Ross detachments to burn and destroy. This conduct is extremely criminal, and must be stopped. Some of the yeomen of this neighbourhood had been driven from their habitations and plundered by the rebels; their relations and friends had been murdered by them in the most inhuman manner. Some of these yeomen were beginning to vex the people by casting up against them what had passed, and threatening revenge; to burn, &c. I assembled them, and told them that it was to their interest that the past should be forgotten. Under the late proclamation it was their duty not to molest the inhabitants who now gave in their arms. I was determined to put in gaol and send in irons to Wexford any one of them whom I found acting in contradiction to the proclamation. They were not to revenge their wrongs, but to give information, and the persons accused should be proceeded against according to martial law. No person in his individual capacity had a right now any more than he had before the troubles to interfere with another. If any one of those I was addressing was to meet the man who had ten days ago piked his father or his brother and attempted to revenge himself he would be criminal, and I should punish

him. They must look for redress to the law only. Any other conduct would bring on scenes of anarchy as bad as those from which the troops had lately relieved them. Very few of the audience thought I was right, but from the tone in which I spoke they thought, I believe, that it would be prudent to submit.

TAGHMOU, *8th July* 1798.—The people in this neighbourhood and Wexford keep quiet, and are gradually returning. Lord Cornwallis's orders and proclamations all tend to conciliate. The most positive orders against burning and flogging have been issued; these were necessary. Some of the Generals were on this subject very absurd. A late promotion includes me as a Major-General, and as such I am continued on the Irish staff. The rebels have assembled in the mountains of Arklow and Wicklow. Major-Generals Needham and Sir James Duff have reported that a larger force is necessary to subdue the rebels and to prevent their carrying on a kind of brigand war, which they think is intended. Sir James Duff's health does not permit him to serve longer actively. His brigade, as well as all the troops in Arklow and Wicklow, except those at Gorey and Rathdrum, which are to be stationary under General Needham, are put under my orders. The passes to the northward and westward of my counties are guarded with troops, and about 2500 are left to act offensively as occasion offers. Two regiments joined me late last night from Waterford. I leave one of them at this post and march with the other and the rest of the corps here to-morrow to Enniscorthy, where I shall be joined by the Dumbarton Fencibles, and shall proceed to Ferns. There I expect to communicate with Lieutenant-General Lake, who has advanced to Arklow for the purpose of directing my operations.

CARNEW, *10th July*.—The Dublin and Meath Regiments arrived at Taghmou late on the night of the 7th without an ounce of provisions. They were unable, therefore, to proceed next day. I was forced to wait till yesterday. Leaving the Dublin at Taghmou I then marched with the rest of the

troops to Enniscorthy, where I arrived at eight in the morning. The town had been burned by the rebels, and plundered by us. I visited Vinegar Hill and the position held by the rebels. The town is situated on the Slaney, the country beautiful. Vinegar Hill stinks with dead bodies half buried. I encamped a quarter of a mile from the town. Here I received a letter from General Lake, directed to me at Ferns, begging to see me immediately. I wrote to explain the reason of my having been delayed at Taghmou a day longer than I expected, but said that I should see him next day. I marched from Enniscorthy this morning at four, left the Meath Regiment to take post at Scurenaalsh and Ballycarney bridges, as directed by order from the Adjutant-General, the fourth flank battalion under Lord Blaney at Ferns, and proceeded with the rest to this place.

BLESSINGTON, 15th *July*.—No certain news of the rebels has been received, but on the 11th I marched from Carnew through Finchley to Hacketstown. General Lake followed. We found here several regiments waiting our arrival. The rebels were said to be in the Glen of Imall. The whole of the troops marched the same evening, and encamped on the side of a mountain called the Gap. Colonel Campbell, with the first flank battalion and Fermanagh Regiment, advanced at the same time by Donard to Balinclay. The rebels were flown, it was said, to the Glenmalure, the Seven Churches, and the mountains near those places. A combined attack was that night concerted, and the whole were to move in four columns. General Lake, with the column under Colonel Forster, was to march round by Rathdangan to Green Anne; Colonel Campbell by Donard and Blessington to the Wicklow Gap; Lord Huntley from Aughrim to Rathdrum; and I with my column through Balinclay to the entrance of St. Glenmalure. From these different points, to which we were to march next morning, we were to move at 4 A.M. on the day following, Colonel Campbell and Lord Huntley towards the Seven Churches, and General Lake and I through Glenmalure, all to meet at Ballybog. I

reached my point next day early. It was the top of a high hill, from whence I was to descend into Glenmalure. It was with much difficulty that two 6-pounders and the baggage were brought up. I saw no appearance of the enemy. The ground except the road was everywhere a bog. The day was wet and very cold, and the ravine before me such as to enable a very few people, without risk to themselves, to stop my progress. I saw no use in remaining till next day in such a situation. I therefore determined to get through the glen before intelligence was conveyed of my situation and a force assembled to obstruct me.

My first intention was to have marched at night; but as we had succeeded in getting up the cannon and baggage, and the men had eaten and were refreshed, I set out at 6 P.M. It was eleven at night before I reached the end of the glen. I saw at nightfall a few people above me. I believe they were the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, who had left their houses. Two shots were fired at the column. In the morning I sent to General Lake a report of my situation, with the reasons which had induced me, contrary to the arrangements fixed upon, to move at night instead of waiting till the morning. He soon afterwards came up, and I went with him to Seven Churches, where we met Lord Huntley and Colonel Campbell, who had been equally unsuccessful in their search after the rebels. It was here determined that the whole should march to Blessington and attack Blackymoor Hill and Whelp Rock, whither, according to report, the rebels had retired. I had marched with little baggage. The two guns were now directed to join General Lake, who was to march by the highroad, whilst I returned by the mountain by which I had come. I returned immediately to my column, which I had left at Ballybog. At 2 P.M. we were in movement. We saw some few people on the mountain above us as we ascended through the glen. They offered no opposition.

It had rained much for two days. We had no tents. On the mountain it poured. We however passed over it, and lay for the night in the Glen of Imall. Next day we

marched by Donard to Holywood. We saw no enemy. The villages, everywhere burned, were a melancholy spectacle. As we approached Holywood some people were observed on foot and horseback, some as if they were reconnoitring us, others scattered and running up the hills. I halted the column and sent out parties to observe and feel if there was an enemy. I believe they were the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, frightened and running from the soldiers. I took my post in Lord Tyrone's park, which afforded a good position. The house was small, very neatly furnished, and had escaped destruction. I immediately placed a guard upon it, with orders to admit neither officers or men into it. I made use of one room for myself to eat and write in, but I slept at the bivouac with the troops. An old housekeeper told me that the rebels had left one cellar untouched, and that I might have wine. I refused it, though I had none, and contented myself with drinking water out of his lordship's Burgundy glasses. I paid for the milk, &c., which was furnished to me. In this army the tendency to pillage is so great, and I set my face so much against it, that I find it necessary to be extremely circumspect. Altogether, I had more enjoyment from the water than I could have had from the best wine. In spite, however, of every effort, the moment the men were allowed to pile their arms they began plundering all round, until the exasperated inhabitants took arms and killed three of them. I took advantage of this to make them fancy the enemy was close to us, and by this means contrived to keep them within the limits of the camp; but the conduct of the Militia in this respect is dreadful. The composition of the officers is so bad, that I see it will be impossible ever to make soldiers of them. Next morning I took a strong detachment out to search the woods of Lord Miltown's park on the road to Blessington. Whilst engaged in this operation I received an express from General Lake directing me to join him immediately, and to order the troops to follow. I sent back my detachment, and went on to Blessington with the dragoons who brought me the letter. General

Lake told me that the rebels had left Blackymoor Hill and Whelp Rock and were supposed to have gone towards Meath. Colonel Handfield had arrived from Dublin with orders to put under my command the following corps : first and second flank battalions of the 60th, 89th, and 100th Regiments, with the detachment of Hompesch Cavalry.

DUBLIN, 19th *July*.—The troops had suffered from fatigue, and were in want of necessaries. The vicinity to Dublin was favourable for furnishing them. I gave the necessary instructions to the officers commanding the different corps upon this head, and set out for Dublin on the 16th. I saw Lord Cornwallis next day. He received me very kindly, and kept me nearly three-quarters of an hour conversing on the state of the country, that of the troops, the service, &c. He meant, he said, the corps under me to be a moving body, ready to be detached to any quarter in which danger or commotion was threatened. He would depend upon the intelligence I might receive whilst at Blessington to keep the mountains of Wicklow and neighbourhood of Dublin clear of the rebels. In the meantime a few days should be given to refit the different corps. I dined with Lord Cornwallis that day; the style was very different from that of other Lord-Lieutenants. He and everybody were in boots and uniforms, without forms or ceremony. It was reported that the county of Westmeath had risen. It has proved false; the rebels seem to be dispersed, and I am inclined to think that by moderate conduct on the part of the Generals towards the inhabitants, and by preventing the troops from plundering and molesting them, the people will be induced to return, and apparent calm be restored.

BLESSINGTON, 26th *July*.—The weather has been so extremely bad that it has been impossible for the troops to act. Had it been favourable I should have sent detachments into the mountains, but have given them directions not to treat as enemies any parties they might see, but to endeavour to communicate with them, inform them of the

proclamation, and offer them protection. The constant rains having prevented this, the officers have taken advantage of the time given to them to refit their men; and I have endeavoured to encourage the country people by every means to come in. Above 1200 have already surrendered their arms and received "protections," and numbers are crowding in every hour. Everything bears the appearance of returning tranquillity, and I am convinced the country would again be quiet if the gentlemen and yeomen could behave themselves with tolerable decency and prudence; but I am constantly obliged to reprove their violence, which prompts them every instant, notwithstanding the orders and proclamations, to gratify their revenge and ill-humour upon the poor inhabitants. I cannot but think that it was their harshness and ill-treatment that in a great measure drove the peasants and farmers to revolt. They seem to have learnt nothing by the lesson, but are as ready as ever to commence their former usage, and from what I observe of the temper of the better sort of people I foresee nothing but discontent and ferment in the country. I hear from Dublin that there still exist rumours of forces assembled in Tipperary and the neighbourhood of Baltinglass, Hackleston, Govey, &c. I believe them to be without foundation, but that everywhere, when proper encouragement is held out, those in arms will surrender. I have proposed to Lord Cornwallis to permit part of my force to be detached to Donard, and to encamp in the Glen of Imall, so as to promulgate the proclamation and grant protections. That position, if I occupied it, would cover Baltinglass, Hackleston, &c., and appease the fears of the inhabitants in those quarters. So many reports prevailed of rebels being in the mountains of Wicklow that I detached the 100th and the 60th Regiments and Lord Huntley to the Glen of Imall. Upon our arrival I received information of the place where the rebels were assembled. I marched at 1 A.M. with fifty men, and at about five o'clock came up with them. They immediately retreated to the mountains and formed as if for defence, but upon our advancing they

fled and dispersed; their numbers did not exceed 500. I was not without hopes that by holding out pardon to those in arms and treating kindly the inhabitants I should be able to get them all to deliver up their arms and return to their work. A Mr. Byrn, who had been a rebel General, but had surrendered himself to Government after their retreat from Meath, was sent to me as a person who had influence with the people, and who wished to use it in restoring tranquillity. He had a property of from £700 to £800 a year in the neighbourhood. He lived with Lord Huntley and me ten or twelve days. He was rather a shrewd man, and well conducted; his presence was of some use, though not of so much as he himself had expected; but he acted fairly and did what he could. He said that the cause for which he and others had risen was given up; that what remained was a murdering and pillaging business, which he disapproved of as much as any man, since it was ruinous to the country. He would therefore use his influence to put a stop to it. The good conduct of the 100th Regiment (Highlanders) to the people and the affable manners of Lord Huntley did much towards reconciling them and bringing them back to their habitations. When we arrived the houses were deserted. In a short time we had the pleasure to see them filled with inhabitants, but a body of armed men still remained in the mountains. As long as I had hopes of bringing them in by fair means I prevented detachments from going after them; but when I found this would not do, I determined to order detachments to encamp in the glens and habitable parts of the mountains. It is in these parts alone that the rebels can subsist, because the mountains themselves are boggy. I went to Dublin and stated my plan to Lord Cornwallis, and next day directed Colonel Campbell with the first flank battalion to encamp at Seven Churches, Colonel Stewart with the 89th at Glenmalure, part of the 100th at Toreby, the "Dublin City" at Hacketstown, Colonel Skerrit with his Fencibles at [not filled in in MS.]. The same day on which these corps marched I moved with 500 men from the Glen of Imall, found the

rebels at [not filled in], pursued them over the mountains, and drove them upon a detachment directed to move from Rathdrum. This body drove them on the other parties. As the different detachments were directed to keep constant patrols on the mountains, whilst the rest kept possession of the glens, the poor devils were kept constantly on foot and all means of subsistence taken from them. They soon dispersed and threw away their arms, and the greatest part of them came in and accepted the protections which were still held out to them. They would have done this sooner had it not been for the violence and atrocity of the yeomen, who shot many after they had received protections, and burned houses and committed the most unpardonable acts. These, of course, shook faith in the Government, and lessened the confidence the people ought to have had in their protection. I was altogether three weeks in Wicklow, during which the country was completely quieted and the inhabitants at their work. I told Lord Cornwallis that in my opinion the country would remain quiet if the gentlemen would return to their estates and treat the people with justice; the presence of the troops was perhaps necessary for some time longer, but more to check the yeomen and Protestants than the people in general. Lord Cornwallis had made his arrangements for the troops, and was anxious they should march to their different stations; mine was to be Clonmel, with a corps of between 3000 and 4000 cavalry and infantry and a proportion of light artillery, to be ready to move as circumstances required. The fatigue and exposure to wet I had suffered in the course of the service in Wicklow brought on a fever, which confined me to my tent for a week and weakened me. Lord Cornwallis had the attention to send me a physician from Dublin to attend me. When I was well enough to travel I went to Dublin to get some respite from business, and also to accompany Anderson, who was in a bad state of health from the fatigue he had undergone in Wexford, and was ordered to Bristol

CHAPTER XIII

THE FRENCH INVASION

ON the 24th August, whilst I was in Dublin, accounts arrived of the French having landed in Killala Bay. Lord Cornwallis immediately sent for me.

MOATE, 17th *September* 1798.—Our movements have of late been so rapid that I have not been able to write the occurrences daily. I shall now state those since the 24th August from memory. I found Lord Cornwallis looking over the great map of Ireland. He immediately told me that the French had landed, and he showed me the letters he had received. The intelligence as to the numbers was not very distinct. It did not appear that the numbers were great, but their reception from the country people was very kind. The business was to assemble the troops, which were then mostly on their march to the different stations allotted to them in an arrangement lately made by Lord Cornwallis; but it was necessary, at the same time that an army was assembled to march against the enemy, to take care that sufficient troops were left in the rest of the country to protect the well-disposed and overawe and check any movement among those who might be badly disposed. General Lake was ordered immediately to Galway to assemble a force there. General Nugent was directed to assemble a corps from the troops in the north to act on the side of Sligo. Brigadier-General Taylor, who commanded at Sligo, was directed to feel the enemy; to gain intelligence, but not to risk himself. General Lake was particularly warned not to risk an action until a sufficient force had been assembled to

ensure success, as in the state of Ireland any check in the beginning might prove fatal in its consequences. The principal army was to assemble at Athlone or Longford, and Lord Cornwallis determined to command in person. Such regiments as could be spared from the interior received orders to direct their march on the Shannon; a draft from the Warwick and Bucks Militia, amounting to 750 men, including their flank companies, was drawn from the Dublin garrison. I was ordered to assemble my corps at Blessington and march to Sallins, where boats were to be ready to convey us along the canal to Tullamore, by which means the men would be fresh immediately to proceed to Athlone. I sent orders to Lord Huntley and Colonel Campbell to march immediately to Blessington, and I set off myself for it next morning.

On Sunday, the 25th August, I left Blessington at 4 A.M. with the first and second flank battalions, the 100th Regiment, and the detachments of Hompesch's Cavalry. We reached Sallins at night, but found no boats; the troops sat down with their arms in their hands. About twelve o'clock Lord Cornwallis and his suite arrived. After staying about an hour he proceeded down the canal to Phillipstown. We at last obtained boats, and having been joined by the English militia, we passed Phillipstown at from 3 A.M. to 4 A.M., and reached Tullamore pretty early. I received orders at Phillipstown to march to Kilbeggan. We arrived there in the afternoon and encamped. A brigade of British artillery joined here. The whole were put under my command. I saw Lord Cornwallis that night. The troops directed to assemble at Longford and Carrickshannon were ordered to move on Athlone. Reports were received that the French had moved no farther than Ballina; but what seemed to give Lord Cornwallis much uneasiness was that General Hutchinson had advanced with a small force from Galway to Castlebar, which, he said, was much too near the enemy. Unless General Hutchinson was very careful he would be attacked, and it was highly imprudent to risk an action with so small a force when reinforcements were so near at

hand. On the 27th we marched to Athlone, and encamped in a very bad position on the east side of the town.

During the night an express had arrived giving an account of the defeat of General Lake at Castlebar. General Lake upon his arrival at Galway found that General Hutchinson had already marched with such force as he could assemble towards the enemy. General Lake therefore took post and reached Castlebar about 11 P.M., much fatigued with constant travelling. At 5 A.M. information was received of the approach of the French. At seven the detachment was attacked. On the previous morning General Hutchinson had detached the Kerry Regiment of Militia to Foxford to watch that road, but he seems to have totally neglected the mountain road by which the French marched. There was, however, sufficient notice of their approach for the troops to get under arms. Our artillery had at first considerable effect, and seemed to check the enemy; but the Longford and Kilkenny Militia upon receiving a very trifling fire gave way. The rest followed their example; no efforts of the Generals or officers could stop them; the flight was universal and disgraceful. They reached Hollymount before they could be stopped. Nine pieces of cannon, ammunition, &c., fell into the hands of the enemy. Our force at Castlebar was about 1100 men. The fault committed by General Hutchinson was that of approaching so near to the enemy with such troops, and when he did approach them not being sufficiently vigilant. His position was, I am told, also bad. If, however, the regiments had behaved decently he would by all accounts have beaten the French, who acknowledge having lost above 100 men. Many of the Longford and Kilkenny Militia deserted to the enemy during the action; others engaged with them after being taken prisoners. Reports prevailed in the course of the day we reached Athlone that the French had advanced to Hollymount and had again beaten General Lake. No letter since the 1st has been received from him, and as the accounts of the French force or of the rebels who had joined were extremely vague,

Lord Cornwallis was not without some fear for Athlone, which he found to be a place incapable of defence. His position on the Leinster side of the Shannon was bad, and a good one could not be taken up. His foot had been inflamed for some days before he left Dublin. He could only wear a cloth shoe, and it was with difficulty that he could ride. He had hitherto travelled in his carriage. He, however, mounted his horse and desired me to accompany him to view the ground on the other side of the river. He found no situation to secure the town without encamping his whole force, and he was unwilling to do that until the arrival of the troops from Longford. He wished strong picquets to be placed. I told him I should remain and post them.

During the night the Sutherland and Red Fencibles arrived with Generals Campbell and Wemyss. On the 28th, in the morning, I went with Lord Cornwallis to choose a situation for a camp in front of Athlone. The troops moved into it that day, and on the 29th we marched to Ballinamore.¹ Here Generals Lake and Hutchinson joined us; they had been directed to fall back from Tuam. The Kilkenny and Longford Regiments had behaved so ill under them, that it was thought proper to move them to Athlone to prevent their communicating with the other troops. We could get no certain intelligence of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Crauford was sent with a detachment of cavalry to patrol towards Ballinrobe and Castlebar, feel the enemy, and procure intelligence. The army halted here one day and was brigaded. Major-General Campbell commands the first brigade, General Hutchinson the second, both under General Lake. My corps, consisting of the first and second flank battalions, the 100th Regiment, flank companies of the Warwick and Bucks, Roxburgh Fencibles, cavalry, and a detachment of the Hompesch, with a brigade of British artillery, was styled "the advance corps," and directed to report to Lord Cornwallis only. On the 31st

¹ Small place probably on the Suck just north of Ballinasloe, *not* the Ballinamore of map.

we moved forward to Newtown Mount and Bellew. I encamped on a position half a mile in front of the army. Next morning before daylight, as we were striking our tents to march, my brother James joined me. He had heard of my illness in Wicklow, and afterwards of the landing of the French, and my moving before I had quite recovered, and had determined to come over and attend me. He was happy to find me perfectly well. I gave him a horse, and he marched on in hopes of seeing a battle.

Of Moore's ordinary life on a campaign his brother, the doctor, who had thus joined him, gives a description which presents an active soldier's life from a civilian point of view. It will explain what was involved in that ceaseless vigilance which made both those under whose orders he acted and those whom he commanded feel absolute confidence in Moore. James Moore found his brother breakfasting at dawn just before the last stage of the march on Castlebar.

"When breakfast was despatched a horse was procured for me, and the march began. The day was fine, and this advanced corps was composed of light and heavy dragoons, of German hussars, whose horses were gaily caparisoned, of English and Irish infantry, artillery, and Scottish Highlanders, in all their variegated uniforms. The view of the column was very striking, now ascending the heathy hills, then descending the valleys in long array with glittering arms, and with that martial pomp and ceremony which is so captivating to the ambitious. Before the army halted I was exceedingly tired, and rested in a tent. Not so my brother, whose labours seemed then only to commence. He galloped all round the country, examined every wood and eminence, questioned the country people respecting every road and path, and compared

their different accounts with a good map. He then posted picquets and patrols to guard each avenue to the camp, and appointed the ground where every corps should form in case of an alarm by night or by day. Until these arrangements were completed he neither rested nor dined. After a brief meal he rode out again, to see that all his orders had been punctually obeyed and the camp in order; he then waited upon Lord Cornwallis, whose confidence he enjoyed, and who communicated to him all the intelligence he had received. It was ascertained that the French were still lying at Castlebar, arming and training the Irish. The reports of the numbers of the enemy were strangely contradictory; some of the country people gave assurances that they were few in number, others swore positively to their exceeding twenty thousand men. To ascertain the truth was impossible; but it afterwards appeared that only eleven hundred French soldiers had landed; that the Irish, who joined them in succession, were very numerous, but many, disheartened by seeing the small number of the French, quitted them, and that not above five thousand actually remained.

"The conference at headquarters continued late, and I, growing sleepy, wrapped myself up in a greatcoat and lay down on a blanket spread on a truss of straw. Before dropping asleep my brother arrived, wished me good night; then pulling off his boots only, he stretched himself on another truss of straw, and slept soundly. At break of day a sentinel, and the *reveillé*, broke our slumbers, when my brother started up and mounted his charger. I was warned that the tent must be struck, and was forced to creep from under my blanket and to get on horseback also. The

morning proved raw; rain poured the whole day, and the army, after a march of six hours, halted on a bleak, marshy moor. Being thoroughly wet, and shivering with cold, I found a canvas tent without a fire a comfortless resting-place; yet my brother did not allow himself that shelter, repose, or food until the soldiers were provided for, the guards planted, and all the precautions requisite for the security of the camp settled. The delusion which I had previously formed of the delights of glorious war were now somewhat damped; for I perceived that a General who exerts himself to the utmost, independent of incessant mental occupation, must frequently endure more bodily labour than a private soldier.

“While the French and rebels remained at Castlebar there was no need of precipitation, therefore Lord Cornwallis advanced slowly, giving time for the junction of several regiments who were on their march, and he detached General Lake to the little town of Boyle to keep watch on that quarter; while the principal army, exceeding ten thousand men, arrived at Hollymount. It was then resolved to march on the following morning to Castlebar, ten miles distant, and Moore was commanded to storm the town with the reserve, which would be supported by the rest of the army.”

We encamped on the 1st September two miles beyond Tuam, and were joined by Major-General Hunter with the 2nd and 29th Regiments. Nothing could be worse chosen than our position, the troops all crowded together. Lord Cornwallis' foot prevented his getting on horseback and viewing situations himself, and the Quartermaster-General's department had not much experience in this part of their


duty. Lord Cornwallis, however, came out some time after the tents were pitched, and became extremely uneasy at his position. He sent for me, complained of it, and said it was exactly one to be insulted in. He rode out, and pointed out the places where strong picquets must be placed. General Campbell was general officer of the day. Cornwallis showed him where the picquets on the right must be placed, and he directed me to take care of those in front. I never saw anybody more uneasy.

I rose next morning two hours before daylight, and sent patrols of cavalry along the different roads in front of the picquets, and I went to and remained with the picquets till broad daylight. When out I received a note from one of his aides-de-camp that his Lordship wished me to change my camp. As I did not think that I perfectly understood what was meant, I rode over to headquarters. Lord Cornwallis sent for me to his bedside. He said he had not slept a wink the whole night, and he had not nerves to remain another in such a camp. He explained in what manner he wished me to change that of my corps, and told me that the rest of the army would change their position in the course of the day. It was necessary to halt a day upon account of the 2nd and 29th Regiments, which had marched without stopping from Wexford. The army changed to a more forward position, which certainly was not good; a good one was not to be found, but it was so far better than the former, that we had at least elbow room. The corps under Brigadier-General Taylor at Boyle was considered too weak; General Lake was detached to command it, and took with him the Red Fencibles, Armagh Militia, and sixty men of the Roxburgh Dragoons. We remained here all the 2nd of September; the army was divided into three brigades.


General CAMPBELL.
2nd Brigade.



General HUTCHINSON.
3rd Brigade.



General HUNTER.
1st Brigade.



Major-General MOORE.
Advanced Corps.



The French were still reported to be at Castlebar. On the 3rd we moved to Hollymount; Colonel Crauford joined. His report was that the enemy were collected at Castlebar. Their picquets were not beyond a mile from the town; it was taken for granted that they meant to stand. About 5 P.M. I was sent for by Lord Cornwallis. He had just received a report that the French and rebels had marched from Castlebar that morning at 4 A.M. towards Swineford. As no person has followed them long enough to observe whether their route was towards Killala, Sligo, or the Shannon, patrols of cavalry were sent and persons employed to get upon their traces and bring certain intelligence. Lieutenant-Colonel Crauford was directed to proceed instantly with a detachment of dragoons to Castlebar, and from thence to follow the enemy. Information of the movements of the enemy was sent to General Lake at French Park, with orders to follow and harass, but not to risk an action.

Lord Cornwallis determined to move himself with the troops immediately under his command to Ballyhaunis. This was contrary to the opinion of the different Generals present, who would have preferred a line more northward and more directly towards the enemy; but Lord Cornwallis said he was afraid of their turning his right flank, crossing the Shannon before him, and making for Dublin through the counties of Longford and Leitrim, which were much suspected of disaffection and of preparing to rise. If the enemy meant Killala, a march or two ahead was of little importance; if Sligo and the north, it would not be of much; but if the Shannon, it was of the greatest. We marched at daylight on the morning of the 5th to Ballyhaunis. On our arrival information was brought that the French were marching on Sligo, that General Lake had followed them, and was at Balahie intending to keep close in their rear. Lord Cornwallis saw that by no movement of either General Lake or his could Sligo be saved if that was the object of the enemy. He determined, therefore, to detach me with part of my corps to support General Lake, whilst he moved to French Park and Carrick-on-Shannon. I had proposed

at Hollymount his reinforcing General Lake, who was, I thought, rather risked by being so near the enemy. I again urged it at Ballyhaunis, and he agreed to it.

At daylight on the 6th I left the army under Lord Cornwallis and marched with the two battalions of Light Infantry, 100th Regiment, and British Artillery, about 2200 men, to Tobercurry. On the road I received a letter from General Lake, dated Tobercurry, 3 A.M., saying that he was about to march towards Collooney and watch the enemy. I sent to tell him that I should follow him as fast as I could, but as my men had had long marches for the two previous days, I doubted our being able to reach farther that day than Tobercurry, which was nineteen Irish miles. I moved from Tobercurry on the 7th at daylight. On the road I received a letter from General Lake, dated Ballintogher, 5 P.M. the preceding evening, stating that the enemy had left Drumahaire that morning at eleven on the road to Manor Hamilton; they had thrown five English 6-pounders and one tumbril over the bridge at Drumahaire, and had left three more and one tumbril on the road; that he would follow them towards Manor Hamilton in the morning; and that Colonel Crauford was following them close with the cavalry and would ascertain their route. His orders to me were to follow him as fast as I could without harassing my men too much. I received another letter soon afterwards from General Lake, dated three o'clock in the morning of the 7th, that the enemy had, after leaving Drumahaire, turned to Drumkeera. It was now evident that they were pushing on for Balintra on the Shannon. I continued my march after General Lake, meaning to encamp that night at Ballintogher or Drumahaire; but after passing Collooney, an express from Lord Cornwallis overtook me with a letter from the Adjutant-General, ordering me, in consequence of the information from General Lake that the French were moving towards Boyle or Carrick-on-Shannon, to direct my march towards his Lordship's at the latter place. I sent an express to inform General Lake of this change, and

instantly ordered my column to countermarch and take the road to Boyle.

Whilst this was being carried out we were informed of the particulars of an action that had happened the day before between the French and three hundred of the Limerick City Militia, who had marched from Sligo under Colonel Vereker to attack them. The Militia were not only outnumbered, but had not taken advantage of the ground. They had been beaten, and had lost their two guns, and sixty men had been made prisoners. Wrong information of the number of the enemy had induced the Colonel to volunteer this attack. I encamped about five miles from Collooney, eight miles from Boyle. We here heard that numbers of the rebels were leaving the French, and had been seen crossing the country towards Mayo. Some of the yeomen brought in as prisoners several of them whom they had found in arms. The inhabitants in the county of Sligo appeared to be more loyal than I had observed the people to be elsewhere. The Orange faction is, I understand, strong. On the 8th I marched to Carrick-on-Shannon. The French had passed the Shannon at Balintra the day before. They had attempted to destroy the bridge, but had been prevented doing so by Colonel Crauford with the cavalry of General Lake's advanced guard. The French had marched on Mohill and Granard; Lake had followed them. Lord Cornwallis, after resting his army for some hours, had marched at 10 P.M. to Mohill. The orders he left for me were that I was to issue such orders for the regulation of the garrison of Carrick, and for the care of ammunition and stores, as I thought expedient, and then, after refreshing my men, pursue such measures and route as should appear to me best calculated for the general good. In the course of the day I received intelligence of the surrender of the French after a partial action with General Lake's advanced guard at Balinamuck, between Mohill and Granard. Colonel Crauford with the cavalry, and particularly with the detachment of the Hompesch he took from me, had hung upon the rear of the French for

two days, and had so harassed them as to be the immediate cause of their surrender; but at any rate they could not have escaped Lord Cornwallis's column, which had already reached St. Johnston at the time of the surrender.

On the 9th General Hewitt wrote to me from the camp at Johnston that Lord Cornwallis was going to Lord Longford's, near Castle Pollard, and desired to see me as soon as possible. Here my brother James left me and returned to London. I rode that night to Mohill. I was tired and not well from sleeping on wet ground the night before, and I required a good bed, which I got at Mohill. Next morning early I rode through General Lake's camp over the ground where the action had taken place; it was covered with dead rebels. I reached Pakenham Hall by breakfast time. Lord Cornwallis had at first intended to have sent me to Castlebar and Killala to settle and disarm that part of the country; but he received from the Duke of Portland information, which he showed me, of an armament being ready in Brest to sail for this country. This determined him to send General Trench on that service and to keep my corps in a central situation near Kilbeggan or Moate. The destination of the different corps of the army was decided in the course of that day.

On the morning of the 11th Lord Cornwallis set out with his suite for Dublin. I returned to Carrick-on-Shannon, where, in order not to interfere with the other troops on their march from the camps of St. Johnston and Balyna-muck, I remained till the 13th. The French prisoners passed through. Their commander, a *chef de bataillon*, was a mulatto; the officers in general a blackguard-looking set; only the regimental officers passed through Carrick-on-Shannon. The *État Major* went by another road. On the 13th I marched to Longford, the 14th to Ballymakon, the 15th to this place (Moate), and encamped a mile from it on the Athlone road. The men were in want of clothing and necessaries. The officers are employed in getting them. I have been looking out for quarters in the neighbourhood to canton the brigade, as Lord Cornwallis had some thought

of keeping us together here during the winter. I have taken lodgings in Moate, Lord Huntley has a house near the camp; this is the first time either of us have slept out of tents since we have been employed.

I had a good deal of conversation with Lord Cornwallis at Lord Longford's. He said to me: "If the business was to do over again I would patrol more carefully to the right. Crauford had a crotchet about Galway and the left; they could do nothing that way. Had we patrolled more to the right we should have been sooner informed of their march from Castlebar, and run less risk of a false movement." In fact, Lord Cornwallis was the only person in the army who always suspected the Shannon and Dublin to be the objects, and by guarding against them in time he prevented much mischief. He showed much prudence and judgment during the service. Considering the small force of the French [they were only 1100, but had brought arms for 50,000 rebels: they were joined by considerable numbers, but did not for any length of time keep together more than 5000] many persons perhaps thought he was over cautious, but he often said to me that in the present state of Ireland it would be unpardonable, for the chance of a little personal glory, to run the smallest unnecessary risk. The troops he had were bad and undisciplined, and if he had met with the least check the country was gone.

MOATE, 20th September.—General Trench has reported from Castlebar that the rebels are in force at Vallina and Killala; that a woman has informed him that some French have landed at the latter place, and that she saw two of their cannon. The Fraser Fencibles have been ordered from Tuam to join him. The Downshire go from Ballinasloe to Tuam, and the Armagh from Carrick. Yesterday I received by express from Dublin letters from General Hewitt to Trench containing the affidavits of a person at Rutland, in Donegal, stating that a brig had arrived with 250 men at Arran, twenty field pieces, and 16,000 stand of arms. As this seemed to corroborate the information of the woman, the

despatch desired him to be careful, and to endeavour to ascertain the number of the rebels and the strength of the French, &c. He was told that the Red Fencibles at Longford were ordered to report to me; that, if he wanted more force, I had orders, if he applied to me, to send him the Reds, or, if necessary, to march to his assistance with my whole force. The letter cautioned him to make certain of the facts before he applied to me, and not to give the troops at this season unnecessary marches. General Trench was also desired to send whatever information he obtained to the Lord-Lieutenant through me, and open for my perusal.

MOATE, 23rd September.—I received a letter from Trench enclosing his despatch to the Lord-Lieutenant open. He has certain information that no French have landed at Killala, and has arranged everything for marching against the rebels in four columns on Saturday, 22nd. It appears that the brig which anchored in Rutland had on board Napper Tandy. He issued a ridiculous proclamation, but met with no encouragement from the country people, and, having heard the fate of Humbert's troops, he set sail again. My brother, with the *Melampus* and *Doris*, is, I understand, in chase of them. I believe the object of the brig was merely to obtain information, and I am inclined to think we shall have no more visits from the French, unless they come in force.

MOATE, 25th September.—Information has been sent by one of the frigates cruising off Brest that a line-of-battle ship and eight frigates, supposed to be destined for Ireland, have put to sea. I have received orders, in consequence of this, to hold the troops under me in readiness to move on the shortest notice. In case of landing in the north or south my brigade, the Guards, General Hunter's brigade, the Suffolk and Gloster Militia, and Sutherland Fencibles, are to move, under the immediate orders of Lord Cornwallis, to the point threatened. The Reay Fencibles at Longford are added to my brigade, and two troops of the Hompesch Cavalry are directed to join the detachment I have already

MOATE, 14th October.—It is not yet known what has become of the squadron from Brest, but all apprehension of their coming to Ireland is over. The troops begin to-morrow to move towards their winter quarters; mine are not yet ready at Athlone. As soon as they are we shall move to them, and it is to be hoped that Nelson's glorious victory off the Nile will stop the relish of the French for naval expeditions, and enable us to be quiet during the winter.

MOATE, 30th October.—Information was received on the 15th that two French men-of-war had anchored in Donegal Bay and were attempting to land troops, and that more ships were in the offing. As this could be no other than part of the Brest squadron, so long looked for, orders were sent to stop the troops which had begun their march to their winter quarters, and all of us were directed to hold ourselves in readiness to move. Next day, however, the ships in Donegal Bay put to sea, and reports came of an action at sea between the French fleet and ours. After some days' suspense we at last received the account of Sir John Warren's victory, and the total dispersion of the squadron intended against Ireland. The *Hoche*, of 80 guns, and three frigates have been taken. My brother in the *Melampus* was in the action; he and the *Anson* were sent in chase of some frigate. The *Melampus* fell in with two of them, the one of superior strength, the other of equal strength to herself, and after twenty-five minutes' action she took the *Resolute* of 36 guns; the other, the *Immortalité*, made off, and has since been taken by the *Fishguard*. We have been again alarmed by the arrival of six French ships at Killala. They have, however, since taken their departure, probably upon hearing of the fate of their friends. I believe this last to have been the squadron from Dunkirk, which was coming as a reinforcement to the other. Had the whole of this expedition succeeded in landing they might have amounted to six or seven thousand men; they had arms and stores of every kind for the country people. They would have given us some trouble; but Ireland is no longer

to be subdued by such a force as that. Lord Cornwallis's person, as well as the force that has lately been sent over, has made a wonderful change in the situation of this country. Part of my brigade is already in Athlone; the rest I have cantoned in this and the neighbouring villages till such time as the barracks in Athlone are ready. The weather had become too bad for the troops to remain longer under canvas. Had the French landed both armies must have suffered severely from the wet climate.

ATHLONE, 3rd November.—I came here on 1st November. The first and second flank battalions were too large. I had long proposed to form another battalion from them. This was at length approved. The command of the new battalion has been given to Lieutenant-Colonel Nightingale. The battalions consist of rather more than 500 men each, fit for duty. The first, second, and fourth continue cantoned at Moate, Kilbeggan, and Clara till such time as the barracks here are prepared for them.

ATHLONE, 16th November.—I was summoned to give evidence before a court of inquiry, composed of yeomen, in Dublin on the 6th of this month. Lord Cornwallis invited me to pass the time I should remain there at the Lodge in the Park. I accepted the invitation, and stayed three days with him. Lord Cornwallis lives without ceremony with his aides-de-camp like a general officer. He breakfasts at nine, and immediately afterwards retires with his secretary. The Adjutant-General is shown in to him first, and then the different officers, civil and military, in succession; and he continues to do business and to write till two or three o'clock, when he gets on horseback and rides till six. Dinner is about half-past six or seven. When I was there it was generally laid for ten or twelve covers. He converses freely upon whatever subjects are started; the military ones are evidently those he likes best. Dinner is over about nine, when the company go into another room, and those who do not compose the family retire. The newspapers are brought in, and he continues conversing with such as

remain till past eleven, when he goes to bed. He appears to be a man of plain, manly character, devoid of affectation or pretension, displaying great good sense and observation. He has held the greatest situations his country affords without their having in any degree affected the simplicity of his character or manners. It is perhaps the effect of his always having felt himself superior to the situations in which he has been placed.

The day before I left Dublin Mr. Theobald Wolfe Tone was brought in as a prisoner, having been taken on board the *Roche* in the action of the 12th October. I endeavoured to see him, but he was conveyed to the Provost Prison before I reached the Castle. He is said to have been one of the principal and first organisers of the "United Irish." He is the son of a coachmaker in Dublin, but was educated at the college for a lawyer, and by some writings which are said to be his, he appears to be a man of considerable talent. He was tried by a court-martial at the barracks the day after his arrival. I understand that he conducted himself with great firmness and manliness. He had prepared a speech, of which he was only permitted to deliver a part, the rest being considered inflammatory. By that part which he delivered he discovers a superiority of mind which must gain for him a degree of sympathy beyond what is given to ordinary criminals.

He began by stating "That from his infancy he had been bred up in honourable poverty, and since the first dawn of his reason he had been an enthusiastic lover of his country. The progress of an academic and classical education confirmed him still stronger in those principles, and spurred him on to support by actions those principles he had so strongly conceived in theory. The British connection was in his opinion the bane of his country's prosperity. It was his object to destroy this connection, and as a result of his exertions he had succeeded in rousing three millions of his countrymen to a sense of their national debasement." Here he was interrupted by the Court, and on his afterwards going on with something similar he was

again interrupted. He then said: "He should not take up the time of the Court by any subterfuge. He admitted the charge of coming in arms as the leader of a French force to invade Ireland, but said it was as a man banished, amputated from all natural and political connection with his own country, and a naturalised subject of France. Bearing a commission of the French Republic, it was his duty implicitly to obey the commands of his military superiors. He produced his commission, constituting him Adjutant-General in the French service, his orders, &c. &c. He said he knew, from what had already occurred to the officers native of Ireland who had been made prisoners on this expedition, what would be his fate. On that, however, he had made up his mind.

"He was satisfied that every liberal man, who knew his mind and principles, would be convinced that in whatever enterprise he had engaged for the good of his country, it was yet impossible that he could have joined in approbation or given aid to the fanatical and sanguinary atrocities perpetrated by many of the persons engaged in the recent conflict. He hoped the Court would do him the justice to believe that from his soul he abhorred such abominable conduct. He had in every public proceeding of his life been actuated by the purest motives of love to his country, and it was the highest ambition of his soul to tread the glorious paths chalked out by the examples of Washington in America and Kosciusko in Poland. In such arduous and critical pursuits success was the criterion of merit and of fame. It was his lot to fail, and he was resigned to his fate. Personal considerations he had none; the sooner he met the fate that awaited him the more agreeable it would be to his feelings; but he could not repress his anxiety for the honour of the nation whose uniform he wore, and the dignity of that commission he bore as Adjutant-General in the French service.

"As to the sentence of the court-martial, which he so fully anticipated, he had but one wish, that it might be inflicted within an hour. The only request he had to make

was that the mode of his death might not degrade the honour of a soldier. The French army did not feel it contrary to the dignity or etiquette of arms to grant similar favours to Emigrant officers taken on returning under British command to invade their native country. He recollected two instances of this in the case of Charrette and Sombreuil, who had obtained their request to be shot by files of Grenadiers. A similar fate was the only favour he had to ask, and he trusted that men susceptible of the nice feelings of a soldier's honour would not refuse his request. As to the rest, he was perfectly reconciled."

Next morning it was found that he had endeavoured to avoid public execution by an attempt to kill himself. He was discovered with his windpipe cut across. His execution was necessarily postponed. A motion has since been made in the Court of King's Bench by Mr. Curran for a Habeas Corpus, directed to the keeper of the Provost Marshalsea, to bring the body of T. W. Tone, with the cause of his detention. This is so far fortunate, that it is to stop for the future all trials by court-martial for civil offences, and things are to revert to their former and usual channel.

ATHLONE, 25th November.—Tone died of the wound he had given himself. Courts-martial are not entirely stopt. By private orders circulated to general officers we are directed to report the circumstances, and have the information taken by a civil magistrate and forwarded to the Lord-Lieutenant, who will decide whether the trial is to be civil or military.

ATHLONE, 27th December.—Three weeks ago Colonel Brownrigg wrote to me that General Charles Stuart had sailed with troops from Lisbon and Gibraltar to take possession of Minorca, that troops were to be sent to reinforce him, which the General had solicited that I should command. Brownrigg's letter stated that probably General Stuart's operations would not be confined to the islands, but that Italy promised to be a scene of active operations. He wished to know how I should like the command. I

wrote in the most pressing terms to accept it. I only stated that as Lord Cornwallis had always behaved to me in the kindest and most flattering manner, I should be sorry to disoblige him, and therefore begged that the order for my removal might be sent without discovering that any communication had been made to me. I have since been waiting for my recall with the greatest impatience. Yesterday I again heard from Brownrigg. He says that the arrangement having been talked over between the Duke of York and Mr. Dundas, the latter said that Lord Cornwallis, in his private correspondence, had laid so much stress upon the esteem, &c., he had for me, that he did not think I could be removed without giving Lord Cornwallis umbrage. The intention is therefore for the present at least given up. I am extremely disappointed, as I am convinced that in this country we shall have no more action. We may be plagued as at present with rumours of insurrections, but without assistance from France I do not see how they can take place. France at present has too much employment elsewhere. I consider it as mere loss of time to continue longer in Ireland. Lord Cornwallis has behaved so remarkably well to me, and has treated me on every occasion with such kindness and distinction, that I should be sorry to do anything that could appear ungrateful or give him displeasure. If there was a chance of employment here there is no person under whom I would sooner serve. I have a high opinion of his character and talents, but I cannot help regretting that I am kept from service so much more active and brilliant. It was reported some days ago that a squadron had sailed from the Texel with troops on board for this country. Expresses were sent to us to be on the look-out; I suspect this to be a false alarm.

ATHLONE, 17th *June*.—The sailing of the fleet from Brest on the 26th April gave the alarm to this country, and every preparation was made to receive the enemy. The rendezvous of the army and the routes by which the columns were to march were fixed, whether the enemy

appeared on the south-west or northern coast; but that fleet having entered the Mediterranean every apprehension for Ireland is over. Deprived of the hopes of support from without the inhabitants will continue quiet. It will depend upon the wisdom of the measures which Government adopt whether we finally reconcile them and gain their affection. In this state of affairs I applied to Lord Cornwallis for leave to go to England for a couple of months, which he granted; but before I could arrange to set off I received a letter from his secretary, Colonel Littlehales, informing me that it was the intention of his Majesty's Ministers to employ me upon a secret expedition. It was, therefore, Lord Cornwallis's orders that I should give up the command here to Brigadier-General Meyrick and proceed instantly to Dublin. I expect Meyrick from Galway this day, and shall leave this on the 18th. The 92nd marched from here this morning for Cork to embark for Portsmouth. The Guards and 2nd Regiments have also taken that route.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE HELDER

THERE was a close relation between the offer which General Charles Stuart had made to Moore and the "secret expedition" for which he was ordered to leave Ireland. That relation was one disastrous for England and for Europe in its struggle against Napoleon. Sir Charles Stuart, as he became on his capture of Minorca, had proposed a most admirable and effective scheme for employing the sea power of Britain in the great contest against France. Had the Ministry been able to grasp its importance, it is not at all impossible that the whole of the Marengo campaign would have had a different issue from that which securely seated Napoleon on the throne of France. Sir Henry Bunbury has very ably discussed the question in the chapter called "Military Preparations, 1800," pp. 57-82, but he does not seem to be aware that Sir Charles Stuart had asked for Moore and the reinforcements with a view to a campaign in Italy as early as the last chapter of the Diary discloses, that is, in December 1798. At this time Napoleon was still in Egypt. He did not land in France till the 9th October 1799. During his absence the French armies were everywhere sustaining defeats. Suvaroff was carrying out some of his most brilliant campaigns. The Austrians, by his help, had nearly recovered Italy. Genoa and the coast-line was all that remained to the French. It is clear from the date of Brownrigg's

letter to Moore and its contents that when Stuart was sent to seize Minorca it was intended to replace the loss of Corsica, and to become for us a foothold from which we could act on the Continent. For that purpose everything depended on our throwing in, as, if the right time and place were chosen, we were well able to do, the determining balance of weight at a decisive point near the sea coast. Had the force been available in Minorca when Stuart first proposed that it should be so, the opportunities that it would have had would have been almost incalculable. It was precisely in December 1798 that war was declared by the French Republic against Russia, and by the 20th June Suvaroff had won the battles of the Adda and Trebia, hurling back in the latter Macdonald's army utterly disorganised upon Genoa, and on the 15th August he all but annihilated Moreau's army. At each of these periods there were undoubtedly opportunities for an effective English army to act with decisive power upon the coast.

Bunbury has shown that the chances of our being able to use our power with great effect in Italy were still open to us up to the very time when Napoleon was crossing the Alps for the Marengo campaign. The French corps along the coast were then reduced to a well-nigh helpless condition. It was essential for the success of Napoleon's scheme that Melas, the Austrian commander, should be occupied by the siege of Genoa and the operations of Suchet long enough to enable the great stroke from the Alps to be made across the Austrian line of communications. We could almost certainly have enabled Melas to have the preponderating power at Marengo. The subject would take too long for its full development in detail to serve my purpose, and I may refer any one who wishes to go into

it thoroughly to Sir Henry Bunbury's lucid argument. For Moore's biography this proposal of Stuart's is of importance, because throughout my second volume it will be found that Moore is continually concerned in enterprises with the British army, either undertaken or proposed, and that these depend largely on wisdom and knowledge in London. The selection of the point of application of English power in its amphibious form becomes all-important. The knowledge of what is necessary for a conjoint military and naval expedition is essential. During the period of which the "secret expedition" to the Helder was the beginning, Moore was acting as the right arm of Sir Ralph Abercromby, occupying towards him almost exactly the position of Stonewall Jackson towards Lee. During the whole of that time, which ends only with Sir Ralph's death before Alexandria, Sir Ralph, through bitter experience of what is wanting in English preparation for over-sea expeditions, is slowly working out a method of execution which at last achieves triumphant success under the most difficult circumstances, and makes possible the first conquest of Egypt. Moore, having had this experience, has further that of acting as personal adviser at home to Pitt, stopping wild enterprises that can only end in disaster, and at a later date watching from Sicily for the auspicious moment, lost when Sir Charles Stuart's proposals were refused, and not easily to be found again when Napoleon was master of Europe. Each stage, therefore, of this gradually developing history is full of interest for every lover of his country, because in Moore's frank and fearless comments there are set forth studies perennial and accurate of precisely the reverse of the shield which Captain Mahan has so brilliantly

emblazoned for Britannia. Times change, and the details for our time do not correspond with those of the eighteenth century, but the principles and the root of the matter are the same always. It is the extent to which each man in his several part, statesman, soldier and sailor, is working, not for himself and for his own part, or his own cloth, but with thorough knowledge of his own business, realisation of his limitations, and zeal for co-operation with both the others that determines his share in the triumph of the common cause. The Ministry had been induced to reject Sir Charles Stuart's scheme, and to leave him with wholly inadequate resources in Minorca, by many motives. The intrigues of Thugot, the Minister of Austria, which had already frustrated one campaign of ours in Holland, were at this time hampering seriously Suvaroff's success in Italy; and while, on the one hand, they may have made the Government hesitate to co-operate in Italy with two allies, Austria and Russia, which were on such indifferent terms with one another, they were certainly directed to divert at all cost the Russian armies from Italy, where Thugot wished to have the field to himself. The British Government also had allowed themselves to be persuaded that the Dutch were longing to throw off the yoke of the French, whereas the great mass of the population had been thoroughly infected by the propaganda of the Revolutionists and had not the least wish to restore the rule of the Stadtholder, the Prince of Orange. In any case, two distinct schemes were involved in the general programme. The one, which was purely British, was to be carried out under the orders of Sir Ralph Abercromby. It was to seize the ships in the Texel and destroy the magazines at the Helder. That

part of the programme was brilliantly successful, and was of considerable importance to our maritime supremacy. The second part, the result of a treaty with Tzar Paul, concluded in June 1799, was to be on a larger scale. It was to be carried out by 18,000 British and 18,000 Russian troops under the nominal command of the Duke of York, but all authority was given to a selected council of war. This is not mentioned in Moore's Diary. It was probably at the time unknown to him. It is therefore necessary to record it because the disastrous failure which he describes, though it befell the expedition after he had left it, was certain from the beginning. There is throughout history no known case in which a council of war has not proved disastrous. It was by the Russian treaty that Stuart was deprived of the opportunity of acting with decisive effect in Italy.

BARHAM DOWN CAMP, *5th August 1799*.—I was named one of the Major-Generals to serve in the expedition under Sir Ralph Abercromby. I accordingly left Athlone on the 18th June, leaving the command of the garrison to Brigadier-General Scott, that of the district to Brigadier-General Meyrick. I stayed but a few days in Dublin to settle my affairs. Lord Cornwallis received me with great kindness. He gave me a letter to Mr. Secretary Dundas, and the report he made of my conduct whilst under his command was extremely flattering.

The letter of Lord Cornwallis was as follows :—

21st June 1799.—"I am sure you know me too well to suspect that any selfish consideration can weigh a moment with me against the general interests of the country.

"You shall have all the troops you ask, and General Moore, who is a greater loss to me than the troops. But

he will be of infinite service to Abercromby; and I likewise think it an object to the state that an officer of his talents and character should have every opportunity of acquiring knowledge and experience in his profession."

I sailed in the packet from Dublin on the night of the 22nd, and landed at Holyhead early next morning. Captain Anderson proceeded with me through Wales to London, where we arrived on the 28th. My mother was in the country at Ham Common, but she came to town and stayed the ten days that I remained, with my father, Graham, and me. I became acquainted with James's wife. The troops for the expedition were assembling fast in the camp of Shirley, near Southampton. This made it necessary for me to join them. Three days after I reached the camp orders were received for the troops to march in four divisions by two routes to Barham Downs. The Guards, in two divisions, were directed to march by the coast by Brighthelmstone, &c. &c., the two brigades of the Line by Dandridge, Petersfield, Petworth, Horsham, Grinstead, Tunbridge Wells, Coxheath, Lenham Heath, and Boughton Lees. The second brigade of Guards and mine, which was the 2nd brigade of the Line, began our march the 17th July; we were followed next day by the other two brigades, and each of us encamped each day. The sight was unusual in England of troops moving in this manner. I dreaded irregularity and misconduct from the men, but was agreeably surprised not to have had a single complaint from any inhabitant during the whole march. The thirteenth day, Monday the 24th July, we arrived and encamped on Barham Downs. On the following days the other brigades arrived, together with the regiments which were to form the army under Sir Ralph Abercromby. It is brigaded thus—

Major-General D'Oyley commands the first brigade, consisting of two battalions of the Grenadier Guards.

Major-General Burrard commands the second brigade, consisting of three battalions of Guards (Coldstream and Fusilier).

Major-General Coote commands the third brigade, consisting of the 2nd, 27th, 55th, 85th, 29th, 23rd.

Major-General Moore commands the fourth brigade, consisting of 1st (Royals), 49th, 79th, 92nd, 64th, 25th, 69th.

Lieutenant-General Sir James Pulteney is second in command.

Colonel the Honourable John Hope is Departmental-Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable C. Stuart commands two squadrons of the 18th Dragoons.

Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther is Quartermaster-General.

[*Note by Editor.*—This was, as will be seen below, modified afterwards by leaving the 64th behind, by forming a reserve under Colonel Macdonald of the 23rd and 55th from Coote's brigade, and by transferring the 69th from Moore to Coote, so that these brigades require to be modified for reference, thus—

Moore, 1st, 49th, 79th, 92nd, 25th.

Coote, 2nd, 27th, 85th, 29th, 69th.

Macdonald, 23rd and 55th—as reserve.]

The Guards are certainly a fine body of men. The regiments of the Line are in general but poor, and few of them are formed or disciplined. The 92nd (Highlanders) are an exception. They are excellent; my next best are the Royals and 25th; the 79th are weak, but not bad. The 49th have not been a sufficient time embodied; the 64th are not fit to be sent upon service. Sir Ralph inspected the whole line yesterday. He told me we should march the day after to-morrow, and embark the next day.

RAMSGATE, 10th *August.*—The General marched from Barham the 6th, and encamped here the 7th. I marched with my brigade on the 7th, took up the ground the General had left at Sandwich, and embarked here on the 8th. It rained the whole day that we marched from Sandwich and while we were embarking, and the wind has blown so hard ever since, that it is only this morning that the ships of my brigade have been able to go out of the harbour. They have dropped down to the Downs, where the whole fleet is to assemble. General Coote's brigade left Barham Downs the same day that I did; he marched for Margate, where, as

I understand, he has not yet been able to embark. The ships for the general officers are not yet allotted; I shall go to headquarters at Deal this day or to-morrow. Some little alteration took place in the brigades previous to our leaving Barham camp. The 23rd and 55th Regiments were taken from General Coote's brigade to form the reserve under Colonel McDonald. The 69th were taken from mine and given to Coote's. My brigade therefore stands thus: the Royals, 25th, 49th, 79th, 92nd; and Coote's, the 2nd, 27th, 29th, 85th.

ON BOARD THE "BARBET," AT SEA, *Wednesday, 14th August*.—The whole of the embarkation was over on Saturday evening, and the ships sailed from Ramsgate to the Downs. On Sunday forenoon I went over to Deal, where I was invited to dine at Walmer Castle with Mr. Pitt and Dundas. They appeared to be in very good spirits, and only anxious for our departure. The original destination of the expedition was the island of Walcheren; this has since been altered; Goeree and Voorne are now the objects. The information with respect to the force upon these islands, their state of defence, &c., is extremely imperfect. The expedition has undoubtedly been hurried beyond reason, but the country having been put to the expense of assembling it, it is necessary that we should be sent to attempt something. We are now upon a voyage of adventure. The intention of Ministers is to get possession of Holland, for which 17,000 Russians and 17,000 British are assembling. Should this armament be able to establish itself the whole will then be under the Duke of York. There is a chance that the Dutch may rise in our favour; proclamations are ready to distribute both in the name of the Stadtholder and of the King of Great Britain. The island of Goeree, which commands the entrance of the Meuse, will first be attempted by General Coote's brigade. Should he succeed in landing he is to push forward to the island of Over-Flakkee and occupy the point opposite to Willemstad. Upon his success—and little opposition is expected—will depend, I believe, our

future operations against Voorne, upon which are the fortified harbours of the Brielle and Hellevoetsluis. The Commander-in-chief and all the Generals embarked on Monday evening; we sailed early yesterday morning. [See *Times Atlas*.]

ON BOARD THE "BARBET," AT SEA, 21st August.—The weather since the second day after we sailed has been so stormy and bad, that it has been impossible to approach the coast. The fleet continued to cruise off and on. Yesterday the weather cleared and was very fine, and this morning it became almost calm. A signal was made pretty early for the Generals and Captains of the fleet. When I went on board the *Isis* I found the original plan was changed. The difficulties attending the landing at Goeree and Voorne induced both the Admiral and Sir Ralph to give it up, and they determined to attack the Texel. The army lands, it is hoped, to-morrow. We are now standing for the shore, and shall anchor this night or to-morrow at daylight. The disposition is to land to the south of the Helder. Sir James Pulteney with General Coote's brigade and the reserve is to land to the southward, and form a corps of observation, the rest of the army under Sir R. Abercromby, the Guards upon the right, my brigade upon the left, close to the Helder.

HELDER, 26th August 1799.—During the night of the 21st it blew very hard. It became dangerous to continue at anchor; the fleet accordingly put to sea. The Admiral and General had sent a flag of truce in the forenoon to summon the Dutch fleet to surrender. The weather continued so boisterous as to prevent our return till the 26th, when we again came to anchor. Sir Ralph wished to have landed that evening, but it was necessarily delayed till next morning. [From here, map at end of volume.]

Tuesday, 27th August.—We landed with great confusion and irregularity. I was put on shore with not more than 300 men of my brigade, and these a mixture of every different regiment; the ground was such as to render the fire from the shipping of no avail. Had we been opposed we

must have been beaten with little resistance; but the enemy had made no disposition to oppose the immediate landing. Some few picquets in my front retired as I advanced. In the course of half-an-hour a considerable part of my brigade were on shore, and I was enabled without opposition to take my position fronting the Helder. Immediately upon my right Sir James Pulteney, with the reserve and part of General Coote's brigade, landed also without opposition; but they fell in with a body of the enemy as soon as they began to advance. They drove them for some distance rather hastily, and perhaps too far, as they at last met at the termination of the sand-hills in a plain a considerable corps of cavalry and infantry with cannon. These attacked in their turn. A very hot action commenced, and lasted till about 3 P.M. Sir Ralph found it necessary to advance with the grenadiers of the Guards to Sir James's assistance. At length the enemy retired. Our loss in killed and wounded was 452. Lieutenant-Colonel Hay of the Engineers, Sir Ralph's aide-de-camp, was killed by a cannon ball at Sir Ralph's side; so was Colonel Smollett of the Guards. Colonel Hope, Adjutant-General, was wounded in the leg, and a good many other officers were wounded. Whilst this action was passing upon the right I pushed my advanced posts forward some distance towards Kuyek-Duinen. Some riflemen came out and skirmished with them for a short time. Sir Ralph upon landing came to my post and from thence to the right, and he returned to me as the action there was over. Our situation at this moment was unpromising. An enemy was on both our flanks, and we were in a position which, however favourably it had been represented by maps, proved to be extremely bad. Sir Ralph determined that at night I should attack the Helder. A part of the Guards were to assist. It was evident that if we failed, immediate measures must be taken for re-embarking. A cutter at this time arrived with news that Major-General Don had sailed from England with 6000 men to reinforce us. This made a material change. Much, however, still depended upon the success of my attack. Many

deserters who came in to me agreed that there were 2000 men in the Helder.

In the evening, from my advanced posts, I observed a considerable movement amongst the troops at the Helder. I thought they were taking up a position for the night. I at last observed them, when it was almost dark, march off by the coast towards the Alkmaar road. It was evident that they were evacuating, and yet deserters who had that moment joined us knew nothing of it. I immediately pushed on patrols, and followed with the Royals. We met a man with a white flag from the town, who said that the enemy had spiked all their cannon, and had marched off. I continued moving on, and at ten o'clock at night arrived at their redoubts and position near the town, where I posted myself and sent a detachment into the town. The 92nd Regiment joined me in the night. At daylight, on the morning of the 28th, I took possession of the town and batteries. The Dutch ships were at anchor close to the batteries, but they got under way upon seeing us. Our fleet were not able to come in till yesterday morning. They followed the Dutch, and in the middle of last night an officer brought me a letter to forward to Sir Ralph to inform him of the surrender of the fleet without firing a shot. Thus the greatest stroke that has perhaps been struck in this war has been accomplished in a few hours, and with a trifling loss. The expedition, though it has terminated so successfully, began with every appearance against it. We were a fortnight at sea, and the enemy perfectly apprised of our design. It showed great enterprise in Sir Ralph to persevere in the attempt, and he has met with the success he deserved. The chances of war are infinite. The number which were against the success of this expedition were incalculable. The force of the enemy upon the right is supposed to have been 5000. They have been joined by the 2000 from the Helder; they have retired, I understand, to Alkmaar.

HELDER, 30th August.—Since the surrender of the Helder I have remained in it as Commandant. The army

remained upon the sand-hills we occupied the first day. General Coote with part of his brigade forms towards Alkmaar a front, which was on the first day strengthened with entrenchments. The whole of the troops are without tents, and the weather is uncommonly bad. The Commissary-General is endeavouring to procure horses and waggons to enable us to advance, which Sir Ralph is extremely anxious to do. The enemy at first occupied a position near Petten. This they have now abandoned and retired to Alkmaar, extending themselves towards Hoorn and Enckhuysen.

9th September.—On the 31st August the first line moved forward and took up a position along a canal, extending from Petten on the right to Ouder Sluys on the left. My brigade occupied the left, which, with the advice and assistance of Captain Rutherford of the Engineers, acting as a Quartermaster-General, I strengthened with field works. Sir Ralph visited me on the second or third day, and was much pleased with what had been done. The enemy have about 5000 French, 8000 Dutch. The French are posted in Alkmaar, and have posts to the sea at Camp. The Dutch are upon the right, their headquarters at Schermeer Shoorn. Our position with respect to theirs is oblique, the right advanced. Our right, opposite to the French, is more immediately threatened. Sir Ralph wished to reinforce it. I received an order in the evening of the 5th to march with the Royals and 92nd Regiments, and take post upon the left of the Guards in first line, my right on Zype Sluys, my left on St. Martin and Brug. General Don's brigade was ordered to close their cantonment to the left to make room for me. The 20th Regiment of two battalions was put under my command in lieu of the other regiments of my brigade, which I left at Ouder Sluys. A high dyke in front of the canal, and generally within cannon shot of it, is now our line of defence instead of the canal, though our cantonments are chiefly on the other side of the canal. Four bridges cross it, four more

are being made with boats, and communications are being opened from the canal to the dyke. Our picquets are upon the dyke, and command an extensive view, besides which we occupy as outposts the villages in front of the dyke, viz. Schagen, St. Martin, Groenevelt, Haring's-Karspel, Ennigerburg, and Krabbendam. The enemy occupy Camp Groet, Shorldam, and Oude Karspel. Our sentries and videttes are pretty near one another, particularly at Haring's-Karspel and Krabbendam, occupied by my brigade. We are strengthening the dyke by cutting places for guns and fortifying some of the villages, particularly St. Martin and Krabbendam. The latter is in some degree the flank of the position. From thence the dyke makes a return to Petten facing the sea. I yesterday took possession of the village Wannenuizen, close to the enemy's outposts, and threatened an attack on Shorldam. Demonstrations were made from other quarters in order to cover a reconnaissance which Sir Ralph wished to make as far as Broech and St. Pankras. He was stopped at the village of Langdyke, in front of Haring's-Karspel, where a skirmish ensued between the 11th Dragoons and some of their light troops. At about 11 A.M. I retired from Wannenuizen, and we all returned to our cantonments. I was in the village from 5 A.M. till then. The enemy did not attempt to disturb us. We must remain in our position till reinforced; upon the arrival of the Russians we shall instantly move forward.

HEADQUARTERS, BRUG, 22nd *September*.—On the night of the 9th the picquets heard the noise of carriages and beating of drums, as if there had been some considerable movement of the enemy. Between 3 A.M. and 4 A.M. of the 10th I sent forward a patrol of dragoons to the outpost at Haring's-Karspel, with orders to patrol forward as soon as it was day. I rode towards the picquets on the dyke, where I met the field officer, who mentioned the noise he had heard in the night, but that for some hours all had been quiet. I then turned towards the villages to which I had sent the patrol, when a dragoon overtook me with a message

from Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, reporting that a considerable force was marching to attack Krabbendam. I begged of Captain Anderson to go on to the outposts; I turned to Krabbendam. At this time a piece of cannon and some musketry began on the right, where the Guards were posted. Only a few shots were being fired from Krabbendam. I rode as far as Zype Sluys, and sent orders to all the regiments to move forward to their alarm posts. It was yet scarcely daylight. I found that Colonel Smith had gone to Krabbendam. A smart fire began at this moment at the picquets to which I had sent Captain Anderson. The confidence which I had in the strength of Krabbendam and in the good conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, who with the 20th Regiment was charged with the immediate defence of that post, made me less anxious about it: as yet it was not attacked. I was more anxious about that part of the dyke which was in rear of Haring's-Karspel and Ennigerburg, because a good road through those villages ran along it, and the impediments of the country made it extremely difficult for an enemy to advance except by roads. The manner in which the attack was being made on the outposts left me in no doubt as to the further intentions of the enemy. As I galloped towards that quarter which was the alarm post of the Royals and 92nd Regiments I was confirmed in my opinion that an attack was intended to be made there, as it was now sufficiently light for me to distinguish large bodies of the enemy marching towards Haring's-Karspel. By this time the regiments were nearly at their alarm posts. The picquets from the villages were falling back, but Captain Anderson had the presence of mind to get the different bridges on the canals lifted up. This gave them time to retire, and retarded the advance of the enemy. The attack on the Guards was being continued, and another had now commenced on Krabbendam. Orders came to me from the latter post from Sir Ralph for me to detach a regiment to it, and to go there myself. I sent Major Vigeroux to inform Sir Ralph that I should send a regiment if he chose it, but that the enemy were in force behind the villages,

and preparing to attack. I said that I thought that my presence was indispensable where I was, and less necessary at Krabbendam, as he was there.

A number of the enemy's Yagers and light troops, taking advantage of such cover as presented itself, commenced a fire. Some artillery also began to play upon us, and under cover of their fire a large column attempted, with shouts and drums and bugles, to charge us. Till now our men had remained concealed on the reverse of the dyke, except a few individuals who had been directed to fire upon the riflemen, but upon the column advancing the whole sprang up and threw in a fire so galling, that, being supported by some field artillery, which had been previously placed upon the dyke, it forced the enemy to give way and retire in confusion. The different attacks were repulsed nearly at the same time. The enemy appeared for some time to support a feint attack which they had begun upon the village of St. Martin, but it was merely designed to cover their retreat, which they had begun from all quarters. Their numbers, as they retired, appeared to be very great, twelve or fourteen thousand at least. Their loss, as we have since understood, amounted to 2200. Ours was very trifling, as we were protected by the dyke. At the commencement of the attack I was struck in the finger by a shot, which my spy-glass turned and prevented from going through my body. About 3 P.M. I retook possession of the villages in front; at about 5 P.M. or 6 P.M. the troops returned to their cantonments. The enemy had driven our people from Krabbendam and from a redoubt on the right of it, but were not able to penetrate farther. Colonel Smith and six officers of the 20th Regiment had been wounded, and that corps, composed of drafts from the Militia, behaved, Sir Ralph Abercromby told me, with great gallantry. That evening the Duke of York arrived at the Helder, and, in the course of the two following days, the reinforcements of Russians and English disembarked, and made our force amount to between thirty and forty thousand men. On the 14th I was ordered to march with my brigade and the

squadron of the 18th Dragoons to Barsingerhoorn and Colhorn, and to occupy the villages of Winkel and Nieu-dorp. The Guards and Russians took up my old quarters.

My new position was in front of the left of the army, and was well secured by the broad canal of Lange Keyz, which covered my front and right flank; my left flank was secured by the Zuyder Zee. The enemy's advanced posts from Oude Karspel were close to ours on the right. My patrols were pushed to the gates of Hoorn and very forward towards Rustenburg. The bridges were broken near the latter place, but no enemy was in that direction except one battalion at Rustenburg. On the morning of the 18th I moved forward my whole brigade to Winkel and Nieu-dorp to make way for Lord Chatham's brigade and the reserve. In the forenoon Sir Ralph Abercromby arrived with orders to march that evening with a corps composed of my brigade, Lord Cavan's, Lord Chatham's, the Reserve, and the 18th Dragoons, besides a considerable proportion of artillery; altogether about 10,000 men. A general attack was to be made next morning at daylight. The Russians upon the right, in two columns, were to advance by Groet to Schorel and Bergen under General Herman. The two brigades of Guards, and Prince William's brigade from Haring's-Karspel and Ennigerburg, were to attack Wannenhuisen and Shorl-dam. A third column, under Sir James Pulteney, composed of General Coote's and Don's brigades, were to attack Lange Dyke. The object of the corps under Sir Ralph Abercromby was to turn the right of the enemy and take advantage of whatever success the other columns met with. We marched at about eight o'clock in the evening, and arrived at one the next morning at Hoorn, where two hundred Dutch troops after some parley laid down their arms. The morning was extremely wet and boisterous. We, however, could hear by the report of the cannon that the attacks upon the right had commenced. Our men were much jaded, but, at any rate, Sir Ralph could form no resolution with respect to his future operations until he received some report of the success of the right. The

men were directed to lie on their arms upon the road. The roads leading to Ruenhorn and Schermeershoorn were cut up and the bridges broken. The road to Purmerend was good.

About mid-day Lord Charles Bentinck brought a letter from the Duke's secretary saying that the attack on Wannenhuizen had succeeded, that the Russians and Guards were advancing upon Shorldam, but that no report had been received from Sir James Pulteney. As according to the letter everything remained still in doubt, no resolution could be taken, and Sir Ralph employed me in reconnoitring our position for the night. About 4 p.m. another of the Duke's aides-de-camp, Captain FitzGerald, arrived and brought the account that Sir James Pulteney, after a considerable resistance and some loss, had carried the village of Oude Karspel, but that the Russians, who, though they had advanced with bravery as far as Bergen, yet had kept no order, had been repulsed; that the Guards and other troops had been ordered to their assistance, and that it was necessary for Sir Ralph Abercromby to march immediately with his corps and join the Duke. Captain FitzGerald said, when he came over, that the reinforcements had succeeded in checking the enemy, and that from the report of the fire he thought they were driving them back. The people at Hoorn had showed great goodwill to us. Sir Ralph did not think he could leave them without some protection. The 55th Regiment was ordered to remain. The rest of the corps began their march about dusk in two columns by the same roads by which we had marched the day before. A letter was received by Sir Ralph upon the march informing him that the two columns on the right had been completely beaten and repulsed. General Herman and a great number of the Russians had been taken prisoners, besides which there had been a considerable loss of both British and Russians in killed and wounded. The Duke had retired behind the dyke to his former position, where Sir Ralph was directed to join him with all despatch. He left me to bring on the column, and rode

on himself to the Duke. At about 2 A.M. we took up the position which we had occupied previous to the march.

RAGGE WEG, 28th September 1799.—Sir James Pulteney had been successful, and had carried Oude Karspel; he was, however, ordered to evacuate it in much hurry in the evening, leaving the guns and batteries pretty much in the state in which he had found them. The order which occasioned this was certainly the effect of panic in consequence of disasters upon the right. The Russians had gained the village of Bergen, but by all accounts had from the very beginning preserved no order. Two of their Generals had been taken; one has since died of his wounds. Their retreat was precipitous and as unsoldierlike as their advance. The whole attack was hurried, before the Generals perfectly understood their parts, and before those who were to lead the different columns had communicated together. The first check caused confusion, and there was nobody to remedy it. The detaching of Sir Ralph with so large a body of men so late as the evening before the general attack was ill imagined. Such a body, taking advantage of the first successes of the Russians, might have decided the day. It should have been detached, if at all, at least ten days earlier. Had that been done and the bridges and roads upon the flank of the enemy been repaired, the detachment might have given him jealousy; but even as it was, this body might still have profited by the advantages gained by Sir James Pulteney, and at least have made it possible to retain Oude Karspel. I can impute the retiring from thence to panic only. The enemy immediately reoccupied it, and have again strengthened themselves. The loss of the Russians in killed and wounded is computed at 2000, that of the British at 1000;¹ 3000 prisoners, chiefly Dutch, were taken from the enemy. The natural strength of this country is such that without a general rising of the people in our favour it is vain to hope

¹ A note in the margin of the MS. gives, "total loss of Russians, 3000; British, 1500 or 2000."

to conquer it. Government would have done well to have withdrawn the army after the destruction of the Dutch fleet, making that the object of the expedition. The arrival of the Duke of York with the strong reinforcements makes it necessary for the honour of our country and for our own as soldiers that we should make another attempt to force the enemy. If we are successful we shall probably be able to secure winter quarters in North Holland. If we are beaten we shall have no option but to re-embark.

Since the attack on the 19th the time has been employed in preparations for another attempt, and to-morrow, the 29th September, is the day fixed. Sir Ralph Abercromby, with 9000 British, is to march along the sands from Petten to Egmont, and endeavour to turn the enemy's position at Bergen, whilst 8000 Russians, by Groet and Schorcl, attack it in front. Lieutenant-General Dundas, with two columns, one on each side of the canal of Alkmaar, will protect the left of the Russians attacking Shorlclam. Sir James Pulteney, with a reserve, will watch Oude Karspel, give it jealousy, and protect the left. The information with respect to the country we are to act in is very bad; but we trust to the gallantry of our troops, and to the judgment of our Generals, to take advantage of our circumstances as they occur. Our situation is such as to make a battle necessary. No diversion can be of use to us. We must beat the French or give up the point; and, for my own part, I have not a doubt that, if the Russians do their duty, we shall prove completely successful. I forgot to mention that the day after my return to Winkel and Nieudorp from Hoorn I was ordered with my brigade to the Ragge Weg in the rear of the canal, my right on the Burgh Weg, my left to the Schagen Weg.

HEADQUARTERS AT BRUG, *1st October 1799*.—It had been intended to have assembled the column under Sir Ralph by the evening of the 28th ultimo upon the sands near Petten. They were to lie upon their arms till morning, and then to move forward; but the day was so wet and so

boisterous, that it was judged better to defer moving the troops till morning. My brigade, and the first brigade of Guards, were ordered to assemble in the Ragge Weg so as to be able to move forward at 3 A.M. on the 29th. Lord Cavan's brigade and the reserve were directed to be on a parallel road in our rear at the same hour. The artillery and cavalry were to be at Petten. We marched accordingly, and with the head of the column I had reached within a quarter of a mile of the sands when one of Sir Ralph's aides-de-camp brought me an order to return with the troops. Though the morning was fine the surf was still so high from the storm of the preceding day, that it was found impossible to march along the strand. The troops were disappointed at this counter-order. They got back to their cantonments just as the day broke, and without being discovered by the enemy. Upon the whole I was rather well pleased. I had for two days been feverish, and though I should have been able to have gone through the day, I should probably have been knocked up for the rest of the campaign. Upon my return I took some tartar emetic and went to bed; yesterday I was quiet, and this day am perfectly recovered. Sir Ralph called upon me yesterday; the plan, he said, was in some degree changed, and the attack would now be in daylight. It was found that from quicksands between Petten and Camp it was impossible for artillery to pass, except at low water and in fine weather. A body of a thousand British were to act in the sand-hills upon the right of the Russians. General Dundas's column, instead of acting upon both sides of the Alkmaar Canal, on the left of the Russians, are now to move in their rear, to act as a second line and reserve to them, extending to the right through the sand-hills, and endeavour to communicate with the column under Sir Ralph. The Russian General, Herman, who at first commanded them, despised all assistance, held everybody cheap, and certainly had too much boast and pretension for a man of sense. His action fell short of his talk as much as it generally does with men of that description. He displayed nothing but personal courage,

and was at last taken prisoner, as some suspect purposely to cover his misconduct. The present Commander of the Russians seems as cautious as the other was imprudent. Whether he is too much so for the bold undertakings our situation requires will be seen hereafter. General Coote's brigade are now passing towards Petten, and I suspect the attack will be to-morrow.

LONDON, 4th November 1799.—The attack necessarily postponed upon the 29th was fixed for the 2nd October, and the troops destined to form Sir Ralph Abercromby's column were directed to assemble at Petten at 3 A.M. Ten thousand men under Sir Ralph formed the right column, which was destined to move along the beach to Egmont-op-Zee and turn the left of the enemy. Eight thousand Russians, under General Essen, were to march by Groet and Shorel to Bergen. Lieutenant-General Dundas, with some brigades of British, was to follow the Russians and act as a reserve to them. Major-General Burrard, with the 2nd brigade of Guards, upon the left of the Alkmaar camp, was to move upon Shorlham and Wannenhuisen. Sir James Pulteney, with a reserve consisting of the brigades of Generals Don, Prince William, and Manners, was to watch the left, and particularly the enemy's position in Oude Karspel and Lange Dyke. Two thousand Russians were left at Petten as a reserve. Major-General Coote's brigade was destined to act in the sand-hills upon the right of the Russian column, support and communicate with Colonel McDonald, who was destined to act in the sand-hills upon the left of Sir Ralph Abercromby's column. The whole evidently depended upon the success of Sir Ralph Abercromby's column. The others, till such time as he had forced the enemy and turned their flank, were merely to keep them in play and prevent their detaching to reinforce their left. It was, however, very necessary for the Russian columns to advance pretty boldly towards Bergen in order to enable Sir Ralph to advance with safety. Sir Ralph's column consisted of the 1st brigade of Guards under Major-General D'Oyley; the 5th, Lord

Caven's; the 4th, Major-General Moore's; and the Reserve, Colonel McDonald's; about 1100 Dragoons, Lord Paget; and a troop of Mounted Artillery; to which were added two 6-pounders, making in all ten pieces of ordnance. Sir Ralph's disposition was as follows:—Advanced Guard under Major-General Moore, two troops of 7th Dragoons, two mounted 6-pounders, 4th Brigade; Major-General D'Oyley, 1st brigade of Guards; Major-General Hutchinson, 6th Brigade; Colonel McDonald, Reserve.

The infantry were directed to move in a column of companies from the right at half distance; the artillery upon the right of the column, opposite the proper intervals. The cavalry were also upon the right. Colonel McDonald, with the reserve, a battalion of Grenadiers and one of the Light Infantry, and 3000 Russian Yagers, had orders, after driving the small picquet of the enemy from the height of Camperduyn, to move in the sand-hills upon the left of the column, and to flank it during the march. The column itself was to move upon the beach.

The advance of this column depended upon the tide. About 6 A.M. it appeared to be sufficiently low, and, everything being ready, we were ordered to advance from Petten. The Duke of York had joined us pretty early and saw us march past. The enemy's picquet upon Camperduyn made no resistance, but Colonel McDonald, instead of keeping to his right, inclined from Camperduyn to his left, and joined General Coote's brigade and the column of Russians. The sand-hills, which separated the latter from Sir Ralph's column, were at least four miles in breadth, and of a nature difficult to be crossed. By the absence of Colonel McDonald's corps our left flank was exposed. We perceived bodies of the enemy upon the beach in our front and in the sand-hills upon our flank. Colonel McDonald's corps was not seen, nor were any tidings of it to be heard for a considerable time, when a note from him to Sir Ralph mentioned his being at Groet, a village upon the opposite side of the sand-hills. Sir Ralph ordered me to form part of my brigade so as to oppose the enemy in the sand-hills

and prevent their getting upon the flank of the column. About this time their Light Infantry and Hussars began to skirmish with my advanced guard. I had scarcely formed the 25th and 79th Regiments when they were attacked. I gave orders to the commanding officers to prepare their men to charge as soon as I should give the signal, which I did when I thought the enemy sufficiently near. These two regiments advanced with great boldness, and drove the enemy for a considerable distance, not, however, without loss. I was wounded in the thigh, but not so as to be disabled from doing my duty. The Royals and 49th were ordered out to support the 25th and 79th. The grenadier battalion of Guards was also sent some time afterwards. The enemy continued to retreat as we advanced, halting, however, and opposing us wherever the ground was favourable. The column upon the beach continued to move forward in consequence of our success, and in this manner we kept fighting and advancing for several hours, till we were within a couple of miles of Egmont-op-Zee, where we fell in with a fresh corps of the enemy, who advanced upon us with considerable intrepidity.

My brigade, as a consequence of five hours' constant movement and action in so broken a country, were dispersed and infinitely fatigued, and from the absence of some of the regiments which had not been able to keep up on the left, the enemy had struck upon the flank of the 25th Regiment, which was the most forward. The fire was extremely galling. Three companies of the 92nd Regiment were sent to their support; but, coming incautiously into so hot a fire, they suffered prodigiously, and the whole began to give way. I sent my aide-de-camp, Captain Anderson, for the rest of the 92nd, which, though belonging to my brigade, had till then continued with the column upon the beach; but, before they could come up, in spite of every effort to oppose them, the enemy advanced briskly, and my men were forced back. I saw myself on the point of being surrounded, when, turning round to get back, I was knocked down by a shot, which entered behind my ear and came out at my cheek under my left eye. Just before I received

this shot I saw the impossibility of rallying or stopping my men under such hot fire. They were falling in numbers in every direction, and I had given up the point, and had just determined in my own mind to let them go a certain distance to the rear and then to rally and bring them back. I was much stunned by the shot, and thinking my wound mortal, I made no effort to rise. A soldier, however, raised me and assisted me in getting off. Being unequal to further exertion I was led to the rear, where my wounds were dressed; after which I was put upon my horse, and, my groom leading him, I was conveyed back to my quarters in the Ragge Wey. The journey was one of nearly ten miles, and, fatigued as I was from the business of the day and weakened by the loss of blood, I sustained it with difficulty. Before I left the field I had the satisfaction of learning that, when the 92nd were brought up, those who had been retiring returned to the charge, attacked the enemy with great spirit, and repulsed them with slaughter, but not without great loss on our part. The killed and wounded of my brigade amounted to 44 officers and something more than 600 non-commissioned officers and men.

The column advanced no further after I left the field. The rest of the day was passed in skirmishing. Towards dusk the enemy, who had brought some cannon upon the beach, made a charge with their cavalry, and obtained possession of two of our guns. They were instantly repulsed by Lord Paget with a few of our Light Dragoons and a good many officers who happened at that moment to be with him. The column under Sir Ralph was too much jaded for further effort. The day was getting late, and it did not appear from the reports he received that the Russians had reached Bergen and been successful upon the left. He therefore took measures to secure a position for the night. He had exposed himself much during the day, and he passed, poor man, a very miserable night upon the sand-hills suffering both from cold and anxiety of mind. He had two horses killed under him. I had one in the interval between my being wounded in the thigh and the face. The account I have received of the movement upon our left has been

unsatisfactory. The Russian column stopt short of Bergen. General Coote's brigade, joined to Colonel McDonald's, fell in with the enemy upon the sand-hills close to the right of the Russians, and were engaged in some degree the whole day. The action cannot, however, have been very severe from the small loss they met with. When the enemy found that they could not impede the advance of Sir Ralph's column, and that their left must be turned, they took measures for a retreat upon the right; and continued a cannonade only with the Russian column and General Burrard, who with the second brigade of Guards had been directed to advance upon the left of the canal towards Shorlham and Alkmaar. In the evening of the 3rd our troops took possession of Bergen and Alkmaar, abandoned by the enemy, and in the morning Sir Ralph entered Egmont-op-Zee. Had Colonel McDonald obeyed his orders, and, instead of going to the left after passing Camperduyn, had he kept the right and flanked Sir Ralph's column, his force, 3000 men, could not have been resisted. It might, if necessary, have received occasional assistance from the column, and we should have reached without being harassed Egmont-op-Zee by twelve or one o'clock, and have turned the position of the enemy with a column of 10,000 men in a state to take advantage of so favourable an event. But from the absence of Colonel McDonald's corps the regiments were brought into action one after another. My brigade in particular was rendered completely useless, so that instead of arriving early at our point with a column fresh and ready to act, Sir Ralph was forced to stop short of it, not having 2000 men who had not been in action. Even these were jaded from having been so long upon their legs. No advantage, therefore, could be taken of the success we had met with.

I returned to my quarters on the evening of the 2nd, and, as soon as I was able to be moved, went to Helder, where I embarked on board the *Amethyst* frigate, Captain Cooke, and arrived at the Nore on the 24th. It does not appear that any plan had been thought of in the event of success on the 2nd. The right wing under Sir Ralph con-

tinued several days separated and unconnected with the left. Upon the 6th an attack of the Russians upon some villages in which the French had their advanced posts, together with a patrol made by Colonel McDonald, brought on a general action on the right which nearly proved fatal. Lieutenant-Colonel Kempt, who went from Sir Ralph to the Duke with the report, found him at dinner with several of the general officers. He told him that Colonel McDonald and the Russians were attacked, and that Sir Ralph believed that the enemy was meditating a general attack. No notice seemed to be taken of what he said, and Colonel Kempt was invited to sit down. Fortunately the enemy had no intention to attack. The action thus brought on without design on either side lasted till dark, when the troops on both sides retired, the loss being pretty equal on both sides. It fell particularly upon Major-General Hutchinson's brigade; he was himself wounded in the thigh. A battalion of the 4th Regiment was almost entirely taken prisoners.

Upon the night of the 7th the whole army retreated to their former position behind the Zype Dyke. A few days afterwards an armistice was agreed upon, which terminated by a treaty, by which the combined army was to evacuate Holland unmolested on condition of leaving the Helder in the state in which it was found, doing no further injury to the country, and returning 8000 of the prisoners then in England. Hostages were given on both sides as securities for the performance of the treaty, and Major-General Knox, who had been employed by the Duke of York to negotiate, was sent as the hostage, and is now at Paris. Upon my arrival in Grosvenor Street I found my mother and sister established in a lodging they had taken for me. By my brother James's care my wounds were completely closed in about five weeks from my arrival. I then left London and came with my father and mother to their house at Marsh Gate, where I still am this 12th December. In a few days I shall join my brigade assembled at Chelmsford. A second battalion of 1000 men has been added to the 52nd Regiment, and the King has made me Colonel of it. Major-General Don succeeds me in the 9th West India Regiment.

CHAPTER XV

WITH SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE Helder campaign had greatly enhanced Moore's reputation in the Army. Already, wherever he had served, he had become the right-hand man of the General in command, of David Dundas and of Charles Stuart in Corsica, of Sir Ralph Abercromby in the West Indies, and again in Ireland. For weaker men, such as General Trigge in Corsica, or Sir James Stuart in Ireland, he had been the prop on which they leaned. Of that fine old soldier-statesman, Lord Cornwallis, he had become so completely the trusted friend, that the Viceroy had officially claimed that to give him to Abercromby was a personal sacrifice to national duty on his own part. But the operations of the small force in Corsica had been obscured by all the circumstances which attended them, the squabbles between the two services, the quarrel with the Viceroy, and the loss of the island. The fighting in the West Indies was little known, and regarded as a mere detail of the naval conquest. The suppression of the Irish Rebellion, and the defeat of the puny French invasion in its support, had been carried out at first chiefly by the Irish and subsequently by the English and Scottish militia, so that though these different operations had in fact needed devotion, tact, skill, and military know-

ledge to make them successful, more than would have been required had the materials been better, yet they were very imperfectly known either to the nation or to the Army at large. Moore had been all through his career burning for employment on active service wherever it was to be obtained, and he had missed few opportunities, each commander being eager to get the help of so valuable a soldier.

In a letter to his father from Athlone, of December 26th, 1798, at the time when he was disappointed of the chance of joining Sir Charles Stuart for the proposed Italian campaign, he had thus described what had been his lifelong feeling:—

I cannot reconcile myself to remain here, and be troubled with the continued broils of this distracted people, when active and distinguished service is going on elsewhere. I consider myself yet as in my apprenticeship; I wish to serve it under the best masters, and where there is most business, that at some future day I may be able to direct and instruct in my turn. Our business, like every other, is to be learned only by constant practice and experience; and our experience is to be had in war, not at reviews.

But the time of "apprenticeship" was then fast drawing to an end. During the march of his Brigade through England prior to the embarkation for Holland, he had begun to apply, so far as time permitted, the principles which he had explained in his long letter to Sir Ralph when in St. Lucia. His ceaseless activity and large experience had moulded his Brigade both at Barham-Down camp and during the march. In Holland he and it had shown their efficiency among the chaos of the campaign, and his leading of it had been appreciated by the large force nominally commanded

by the Duke of York himself. In the course of the short war, Moore had been three times wounded because of the reckless example of fearlessness which he gave to his young troops. First, he had had to fight with his arm in a sling because of his broken finger, all his correspondence being dictated to his ever faithful friend Anderson. Then, being wounded in the thigh, he had continued fighting for five hours, his horse being shot also. At last, on the same day as the thigh wound, he had been shot through the cheek, the ball going out at the ear. As he says himself in a letter dictated to Anderson from his bed—

I fell flat on my face, and was so excessively stunned, probably from the man who shot me being very near, that I felt as if the side of my head was carried off. I concluded I was killed, and felt neither power nor inclination to stir. But I heard a soldier say, "Here is the General, we will carry him with us." I was raised up, and when on my legs, finding I could stand, I made great exertions and got off.

When he was thus laid up, Brownrigg, the Duke's Military Secretary, had written on October 4th, 1799:—"His conduct in the serious action of the 2nd, which perhaps may be ranked among the most obstinately contested battles that have been fought this war, has raised him, if possible, higher than he before stood in the estimation of this Army. Every one admires and loves him; and you may boast of having as your son the most amiable man, and the best General, in the British service: this is a universal opinion, and does not proceed from my partiality alone." Sir Ralph, his immediate commander, had written:—"The General is a hero, with more sense than many others of that

description." Bunbury is equally emphatic, and there can be no doubt that from this time forward Moore was generally looked on as the rising hope of the Army. Whilst he was laid up he had another narrow escape of death. He by mistake swallowed a strong solution of sugar of lead, which was used for dressing his wound, and had been placed by his servant where some whey of similar colour was usually provided for him to drink. His own presence of mind alone saved him. He asked for a feather pen, and was soon afterwards given by Anderson an oil cruet and water.

Soon after he joined the camp at Chelmsford, his appointment to which was mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, he heard that his father had been dangerously ill. His letter on the subject is representative of a side of his character which was usually kept much in the background though always present.

CHELMSFORD, *January 11, 1800.*—MY DEAR MOTHER,—I have had the pleasure of both your letters of the 2nd and 7th. I knew nothing of my father's illness until it was past, but I shuddered not a little when I knew he had been so unwell, and when I reflected on the loss we had nearly sustained. I am not yet prepared for this shock, which would not only make me very miserable now, but would have deprived me of much pleasure which I have in view hereafter. I trust he will be more careful of himself in future—if he is, he has the prospect of many years of enjoyment; it is quite a joke that old people are not happy. This world is so well organised, that there are enjoyments suited for all ages: all we have to do is to endeavour to preserve good health and a sound conscience—without these we can be happy at no age, and with them we may be happy at any. I have not the least objection

to long life, though I hope, should it be otherwise destined, that I shall at any time be able to yield it up, and to retreat calmly and cheerfully. . . .

From this time forward Moore's position, even during the short time longer when he was acting as second in command to that splendid soldier Sir Ralph Abercromby, was one of authority. He was known and recognised as being in the first rank of British soldiers, and his tone and his sense of responsibility in giving his views take their colour from that fact.

CHELMSFORD, 29th December /99.—I joined my Brigade at this place the 24th instant. A change had been made in the Brigades upon the retreat of the troops from Holland, in order to mix the regiments formed from the men who had volunteered from the Militia with the older corps. My Brigade, denominated the 8th, consists of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 52nd, the 79th, 85th, and 92nd Regiments. The whole are assembled in the barracks here except the 85th, who are detained in Norfolk by sickness. It was intended to send a body of troops to the Mediterranean under Sir Charles Stuart; and in February he wrote to me to ask if I had any objection to serve under him. My answer was that nothing would give me greater pleasure. I was soon after that ordered to London to sit as a member upon a Board of claims, and as I foresaw that this would detain me till such time as the expedition would be about to sail, I dismissed my establishment at Chelmsford. Sir Charles told me that he was to have 15,000 men from England; that the garrisons in the Mediterranean were able to spare 5000; that he should therefore have a corps of 20,000 men to act in the maritime Alps, and that by holding them we should cut off the communication of the French Army with their own country, and make a very powerful diversion in favour of the Austrians. Ministers, I believe, had hopes that we should be able to enter the South of France, where they were perhaps sanguine enough

to hope for assistance from insurgents, &c. Upon the return of the troops from Holland, that attention had not been paid to their discipline which was necessary. Their quarters had been frequently moved during the winter, and the officers had been permitted to be absent as in time of peace. When they began to collect them for service, the corps were found deficient in every equipment necessary for the field. So little attention had been paid to the recruiting, that the numbers of regiments allotted for the expedition were insufficient. Instead of 15,000, they amounted to 10,000 effectives only.

It was the middle of March before the first Division, consisting of 5000 men, were embarked under Major-General Pigot. About this time a change took place in the object of the expedition, for what reason I know not. It was said that some of the members of the Cabinet had all along been averse to it. None of them had at first been aware of the preparation requisite for an army of this magnitude; to convey it to the Mediterranean and enable it then to act. General Stuart, with the 5000 already embarked, were alone to go to the Mediterranean. Upon a report that the Spaniards were marching to the frontier of Portugal, Sir Ralph Abercromby was sent for to command there, and I was named as one of the Major-Generals to serve with him. This information with respect to the Spaniards was afterwards found erroneous. Sir Charles Stuart about this time quarrelled with Ministers and resigned his command. Sir Ralph was then appointed to command in the Mediterranean and Portugal. Major-General Hutchinson and I were named as his Major-Generals, together with Major-General Pigot, who had sailed at the end of April with the 5000 men. We embarked at Portsmouth on the 13th of May on board the *Sea Horse* frigate, Captain Foote, and sailed that evening. Contrary winds and bad weather forced us on the 18th into Portland Roads, where we were detained until the 23rd, when we sailed again and arrived at Gibraltar on the 6th June. Here the 28th Regiment and 100 Artillery were embarked.

We sailed on the 11th and arrived at Minorca on the 22nd, in the morning, nearly six weeks after our departure from Portsmouth.

“MINOTAUR,” LEGHORN-ROADS, 4th July 1800.—On his arrival at Minorca Sir Ralph found letters from Lord Keith from Genoa, stating that it had surrendered to the Austrians upon the 4th by capitulation; the terms of which were that Massena and the French were to be landed in France with arms and baggage and not as prisoners of war. They seem therefore to have gained by the surrender nothing but the mere possession of the place. Melas had no choice, as Buonaparte had crossed the Alps without baggage or artillery, and was advancing with an army of 35,000 men into Italy. It was necessary therefore that he should instantly march towards him. Melas had left 2000 or 3000 men only at Genoa, a force very inadequate to its defence. Lord Keith's letter, in consequence of Melas's representations, was extremely urgent for Sir Ralph with the troops under his command to lose no time in coming to Genoa. In the course of the 22nd the following disposition was made. The two battalions of the 35th Regiment under Major-General Pigot were ordered to embark for Malta. The troops under Sir Ralph Abercromby in two divisions, viz., 40th Regiment (2 battalions), 48th, and 90th, under Major-General Hutchinson and Brigadier-General D'Oyley to form the 1st Division. The 18th, 28th, 42nd, and De Roll's Regiment under Major-General Moore and Brigadier-General Oakes form the 2nd. In the course of the forenoon of the 23rd the whole were embarked, and in the afternoon we sailed for Genoa. We met calms and contrary winds and did not get within sight of Genoa until the 30th, when we spoke the *El Corso*, and were informed that Genoa was evacuated and Lord Keith with the fleet was in Leghorn road, where we arrived on the morning of the 1st July.

I attended Sir Ralph on shore to Lord Keith. The army which had evacuated Genoa under Massena, upon

being landed at Antibes, had immediately joined that under Suchet, and had forced the Austrians opposed to them to retire. The Austrians, commanded by Melas, had attacked Buonaparte near Alexandria, and though the action does not seem from the accounts received to have been much against the Austrians or by any means decisive, it was immediately followed by a convention by which the Austrians agreed to give up the whole of the fortresses in Piedmont and the Milanese, reserving to themselves Mantua alone in addition to what was ceded to them by the peace of Campo Formio. A certain time is given for this to be ratified by the Emperor, but in the meantime the fortresses are surrendered and Genoa evacuated. It is impossible to doubt that Melas has acted by order from the Emperor. The neutrality of Tuscany is guaranteed, but a road is left open for the French to march into lower Italy. They have already advanced to Bologna. Lord Keith regrets that we did not arrive sooner, and conceives that we might have saved Genoa. From the turn affairs have taken I cannot but consider it as a fortunate event that we were detained. Four thousand or five thousand men might have been sacrificed, but could not possibly have prevented the disasters which have happened.

Sir Ralph waited upon the Queen of Naples. On our return on board the *Sea Horse*, he told me that he had been much pressed by her to undertake the defence of the kingdom of Naples. Lord Keith had also wished this; Sir Ralph told us he had refused. His force was inadequate for such a purpose. To attempt it would be to involve Britain in an unnecessary expense, and sacrifice a corps which ought to be reserved for better purposes. A formal application in writing has since been made to him and Lord Keith by the Neapolitan Minister, to which a joint answer has been given stating the impossibility of complying.

MINORCA, 15th July.—Sir Ralph being determined not to comply with the application of the Queen of Naples

and her Court, avoided, during the short time he continued in Leghorn road, all communications with the shore. He said that if they wished to have a regiment to garrison Messina he would give it, or even if the French attempted Sicily he would undertake the defence of it, but otherwise he would do nothing until he heard further from England. In the meantime he determined to go to Malta, and to send me back with the troops to Minorca. He sailed in the *Sea Horse* on the evening of the 5th, I moved into the *Alkmaar* troopship, sailed on the 7th and arrived here yesterday. The whole of the troops have not yet arrived, but are expected daily. When I left Leghorn Lord Keith was still there, but he intended to follow Sir Ralph to Malta in a few days. Sir Wm. and Lady Hamilton were then attending the Queen in Naples. Lord Nelson was there attending upon Lady Hamilton. He is covered with stars, ribbons, and medals, more like the Prince of an Opera than the Conqueror of the Nile. It is really melancholy to see a brave and good man, who has deserved well of his country, cutting so pitiful a figure.

MINORCA, 20th July.—Lieut.-General Fox, in accordance with instructions I delivered to him from Sir Ralph, has put the troops returned and about to return from Leghorn under my command. He has moved some of those belonging to the garrison into the country, in order to keep the corps he has placed under me, compact and ready for whatever service may occur. Accordingly, the first division with Brigadier-General Doyle have the lazaretto allotted to them; the second, with Brigadier-General Oakes, Fort George, George Town, and Mahon.

On the 18th Colonel Lawson, with three companies of Artillery and the stores and ammunition, arrived from England. The officers and men are ordered to land; the stores will remain on board. Yesterday Lord Dalhousie arrived with the 2nd Queen's, two battalions of 20th, 36th, 82nd, and 92nd Regiments, in all 3800 men. They sailed from the isle of Howatt under Brigadier-General Maitland,

with the intention of attacking Belleisle. Everything was prepared for a landing when Maitland received information that the island had been reinforced. He desisted, and next day he received the order to detach the whole force under his command to the Mediterranean. The ships which brought these troops brought also despatches for Sir Ralph Abercromby, and a letter to General Fox directing him to forward the troops and despatches without delay to Sir Ralph at Genoa. Sir Ralph directed that all despatches should be kept for him at Minorca; but the *Cumelion* was instantly sent to Malta to inform him of the arrival of the reinforcement. These troops were detached no doubt upon information of the expected fall of Genoa to the Austrians. Mr. Dundas's letter to General Fox is dated the 16th June. The events which have since taken place in Italy make our presence unnecessary, and I must look daily for orders from England, to recall the whole of the troops intended to act in conjunction with the Austrians. In the meantime these regiments must continue on board ship until Sir Ralph's arrival.

MINORCA, 22nd July.—Yesterday the remainder of the troops arrived from Leghorn; they left three days after I did, but met with calms and contrary winds. By this opportunity General Fox received a letter from Lord Keith, dated the 8th July, stating that that day an application had been received from General Melas, addressed to Sir Ralph Abercromby, for the British troops to be landed in Tuscany. Lord Keith adds that he had instantly despatched a letter, to follow Sir Ralph to Malta, with this application, and that he had written to him to say that, in case of hostilities being recommenced before his return, he should send to Mahon to request the troops, but not otherwise. We may therefore expect to see Sir Ralph in a very few days, but I doubt if he will land a soldier in Italy until he hears further from England. Certainly no application from Lord Keith for troops before Sir Ralph returns will be complied with.

When I took leave of Sir Ralph in Leghorn I foresaw that some application of this sort might be made in his absence, and I begged that he might be explicit upon this head in his instructions to General Fox.

MAHON, *30th July*.—Yesterday despatches were received from Lord Keith from Leghorn. General Fox showed them to me. It appears that the application for the British troops to be landed in Tuscany proceeded from General Melas and Lord William Bentinck, not from the Council of Vienna, and in consequence of an expression in a despatch from Lord Minto, "that Sir Ralph Abercromby with 8000 troops was ordered to the Mediterranean to co-operate with the Austrian army." The news from the Danube is bad. The Austrians have been beaten near Munich, and Kray has retired within seventeen posts of Vienna. The Arch-Duke has assembled 30,000 men in Bohemia, and is advancing.

MINORCA, *7th August*.—Sir Ralph Abercromby arrived from Malta on the 3rd instant. From the information he received when there he believed that they have provisions in the place to the middle of September. The blockade by land is complete; and if by sea they are able to prevent the entry of supplies, the place will be forced to surrender about that time. Sir Ralph represents the Maltese as a hardy brave race, animated and eager in the cause in which they are engaged. It is due to their vigilance and activity more than to that of the regular troops that the blockade is so perfect. The day after his arrival Sir Ralph sent to Brigadier-General Hope (Adjutant-General) to Leghorn to proceed from thence to General Melas's headquarters. Sir Ralph is, I believe, not satisfied with the information he has received from Lord Keith of the situation of the Austrians or of their views, in case hostilities should recommence in Italy; nor does he perhaps think General Melas aware that it is to Sir Ralph chiefly, not to Lord Keith, that he must address himself for land co-operation. For these reasons he has despatched General Hope as a confidential

officer to communicate between himself and Melas. In the meantime some of the troops last arrived are landed, and measures are being taken to provide temporary cover for the rest, till such time as Sir Ralph again hears from England. I doubt if he will be able to determine upon any undertaking. The despatches he has hitherto received were written before anything was known of the Austrian Convention and Armistice. In consequence of the arrival of the last troops a new arrangement has been made. The Army forms two divisions, each division consisting of two Brigades:—

1ST DIVISION, UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL HUTCHINSON.

1st Brigade	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{2nd Battalion of Queen's} \\ \text{18th} \\ \text{1st and 2nd Battalions of} \\ \text{20th} \end{array} \right\}$	Brigadier-General Doyle
2nd Brigade	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{1st and 2nd Battalions} \\ \text{40th} \\ \text{82nd} \end{array} \right\}$	Lord Craven

2ND DIVISION, MAJOR-GENERAL MOORE.

3rd Brigade	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{42nd} \\ \text{90th} \\ \text{De Roll's} \end{array} \right\}$	Brigadier-General Oakes
4th Brigade	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{28th} \\ \text{36th} \\ \text{92nd} \end{array} \right\}$	Colonel Paget

During Sir Ralph's absence I inspected the different regiments. Since his return he has also looked at them. They are in general in better order than the troops in England. The regiments which have been some time in the Mediterranean are better than any we had in Holland. Those which have come from England, composed of the drafts from the Militia, are still unformed; some of them extremely bad. The weather is too hot at present to admit of field exercises, but means are being taken to improve interior discipline, and to adapt the equipment for light movement.

If we take the field Sir Ralph is determined not to encumber the army with camp equipage, and to reduce the personal baggage of officers and soldiers to such articles as are absolutely necessary.

MINORCA, 29th August.—A sloop of war has arrived at last with the long-looked-for despatches. Major-General Cradock brought them. In next day's orders the following regiments were named to form the garrison of Minorca:—1st and 2nd battalions of 17th, Ditto ditto of 20th, 36th, 82nd, Ancient Irish Fencibles; and the following regiments to hold themselves in readiness to embark on the shortest notice:—2nd battalion of Queen's, 8th, 18th, 28th, 40th; 1st and 2nd battalions 42nd, 50th, 58th, 90th, 92nd, Minorca Regiment, De Roll's, Dillon's, Corsican Rangers, detachments of the 11th Dragoons. This great increase of regiments has of course obliged Sir Ralph to make a different arrangement of the Brigades. The Army is accordingly formed into three Brigades and a reserve. The latter is given to me, but this arrangement is a hasty one; merely for the purpose of embarkation. Our destination is kept a profound secret; but I think it has transpired that we shall stop at Gibraltar, where we shall meet a large force which was ready to sail under Sir James Pulteney from Spithead when General Cradock left England. The force we take from this must be at least 10,000; that under Sir James Pulteney is said to be from 13,000 to 14,000. The troops began their embarkation yesterday, and in the course of to-morrow everybody will be on board. The women are ordered to be left, but the regiments take their heavy luggage. Notwithstanding all this preparation the letters from England mention peace as most probable. The Austrians have agreed to an armistice everywhere.

TETUAN BAY, 21st September.—In the course of the 29th, 30th, and 31st of August the whole of the troops embarked at Mahon. We sailed on Sunday morning, the 1st September. The fleet at first stood to the Southward, but on the 2nd, the wind springing up from the Eastward,

the whole stood before it to the West; we had then no doubt but that our destination was Gibraltar, where we arrived accordingly on the 14th. Governor O'Hara showed us the Spanish Gazette with the account of the landing under Sir James Pulteney at Ferrol; by which it does not appear that anything of importance was effected, as our troops were not opposed in their debarkation or in their re-embarkation, and were on shore only about twenty-four hours. When I waited upon Sir Ralph he told me that he would await the arrival of Sir James Pulteney, and that he believed we should rendezvous in the Tagus. I believe it was intended to have attacked Cadiz, and destroyed the Carraccas. The plague, or a fever similar to it, has raged there for some time; whether this or some other reason has induced Sir Ralph to change the plan I know not. The Spanish troops which were in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar and Andalusia are assembled at Seville. It is said that General Berthier is at Madrid, and that French troops are marching to join the Spaniards and to attack Portugal. The day before yesterday a large fleet was signalled from the West; it proved to be that with the troops under Sir James Pulteney. In the course of the afternoon and night the greater part of them anchored in Gibraltar Bay, and yesterday morning Lord Keith made the signal to unmoor, and then to sail for this bay, both for the convenience of watering and to avoid the westerly winds to be apprehended at this season. We anchored here in the evening.

“WASSENAER,” AT SEA, 30th September.—The fleet continued in Tetuan Bay, and were employed in watering until the 27th, when the *Ajax* arrived from Gibraltar and made the signal to weigh. In the course of that day the whole sailed out and steered for Gibraltar. The wind, which had been from the East, fell calm, and we remained almost motionless in sight of the rock during the 28th and 29th. Captain Cochrane of the *Ajax* and Colonel Maitland paid us a visit; from the latter I found that we were going to Cadiz. Sir Ralph and Lord Keith remain in Gibraltar, and

I have had no communication with either since the day when we sailed from Tetuan. Last night the wind sprang up from the West and is now blowing fresh. Captain Cochrane has made the signal to make again for Tetuan, and we are now standing for that bay. Whilst the wind blows from the West it is impossible to get out of the gut. In the meantime it may bring something from England to alter our destination. The season is getting late for naval operations, nor do we think that any success at Cadiz can be an object for such an armament. Our force, since the junction of Sir James Pulteney, amounts to 20,000 Infantry fit for duty, independent of Artillery, Dragoons, sick, &c. From Maitland's description of Ferrol it does not appear that an assault was possible. The town was surrounded by a high wall with bastions. It is to be regretted that this was not known before the troops were landed. Sir James is much censured by both fleet and army for not having attempted the assault, which to them appeared more practicable than I suppose it really was.

“WASSENAER,” OFF CADIZ, 5th October.—We left Tetuan Bay on the 2nd. We were next morning joined by the *Foudroyant*, with Lord Keith and Sir Ralph on board. As we passed Gibraltar the whole fleet of 140 or 150 sail stood through the Straits, with the wind fresh from the East. On the forenoon of the 4th we were in sight of Cadiz, and in the evening, the wind being light, the signal was made to anchor. During the course of the day the signal was made for general officers to repair on board the *Foudroyant*. We there received the orders for landing. The reserves, which I command, together with the Brigade of Guards, are to land first. The landing is to be made in a bay to the northward of Rolla. Sir Ralph told me his orders were to land and destroy the Carraccas and shipping, if it could be done so as to insure the re-embarkation of the troops. He has been able to obtain little information with respect to the force likely to be opposed to him or the state of preparation of the enemy. What he knows for

certain is, that a descent at Cadiz has been expected by the Spaniards for some time. The landing-place had not been reconnoitred when I saw him. My Brigade is to form the advanced guard. Sir Ralph's instructions to me were of course very general. After attacking whatever force may at first oppose us, I am to feel my way by Rota towards St. Mary's and gain intelligence. The Admiral has just weighed, and we are following him and standing towards the shore; the rest of the fleet remain at anchor. It does not seem certain that we shall land this day.

"WASSENAER," OFF CADIZ, *6th October*.—Yesterday forenoon Captain Morris of the navy and two Engineers were employed in reconnoitring the coast. We, with the Admiral, stood pretty near.

The beach seems favourable. A boat with a flag of truce came from Cadiz to the Admiral between twelve and one. I went on board the flagship and heard the letter read from the Spanish governor to the following purpose: "That at a time when the town and neighbourhood of Cadiz was suffering under so severe a calamity as the plague, he saw with surprise the force under his Lordship's command upon the coast, with a view no doubt to take advantage of their present state to destroy the town and arsenal; that a conduct so inhuman was unbecoming a nation like Great Britain; that he still hoped his Lordship would desist; that if he did not, he was not to expect an easy conquest; that the force collected was sufficient to baffle him; and that the garrison and inhabitants, however reduced by sickness, would prefer an honourable death, in defence of their country, to that which was at any rate awaiting them from disease. We should, by persevering in our unmanly and inhuman design, be held in execration by all Europe." This letter was addressed to Lord Keith. His Lordship wrote an answer, which was signed by him and Sir Ralph: "That if the governor would deliver up the ships of war in the harbour, the officers and crews should be immediately sent back and the British force should be withdrawn; if not,

as the force was sufficient for the destruction of the town and arsenal, the troops should be instantly landed."

The private information obtained from fishermen captured off Cadiz, and from an American vessel which had just left it, is, that 8000 men are collected in the Isle of Leon; two regiments of cavalry at Rota, and a corps at St. Mary's; that the fever rages as much as ever at Cadiz, and in the towns and country round it. Two and three hundred a day die in Cadiz. The fever has reached the troops, and in some regiments has carried off the greatest part of the officers.

I remained on board the flagship to dinner. In the afternoon Sir Ralph said to Lord Keith "that it was necessary to come to a determination; that he had not a doubt in his mind as to effecting a landing with the army, and of their executing fully the service required of them. It remained with his Lordship to say if, when Fort St. Catherine and the batteries were taken, his Lordship would be answerable for the communication with the fleet, and for the re-embarkation of the army. His Lordship had a copy of his (Sir Ralph's) instructions, which were to land and destroy the Carraccas, if he was satisfied in his own mind of being able to re-embark the army. This satisfaction he could only receive from his Lordship. He would be answerable for executing the land part of the operation in a fortnight, if his Lordship would assure him of a constant communication with the fleet, and of re-embarking the army." Lord Keith said he could not be answerable for the winds; that if the weather was fine he could be answerable; but that if a South-West wind blew, the fleet must put to sea. Sir Ralph had heard, Lord Keith said, the sentiments of the naval officers as well as his own. They were more averse to the undertaking than he was, but that he had no objection to try it if Sir Ralph chose. Sir Ralph said, "It is true that I heard the opinions of Sir Richard Bickerton and of the naval officers, but I do not feel myself competent to judge of them. My orders are to land if I can be assured of embarking the troops. It is for your Lord-

ship to form your opinion from your own knowledge and that of the naval officers under you, and to give a pointed answer. I do not wish to take from myself, or to throw upon others more than their share of responsibility. I shall take the whole responsibility of the land operations upon myself; I am willing to share with your Lordship half the naval. If you will say that it is an undertaking to be risked, I am willing to undertake it, and to share with your Lordship the merit or blame which may attach to the issue. If you say it is not, let us withdraw, and I am also willing to share equally the merit or blame of that; but I must have a determined answer one way or another." This, however, Lord Keith could not be prevailed upon to give. He allowed that in case, after or during the embarkation or re-embarkation, a South-West wind came on, from that instant no further communication could be held with the fleet, and that probably most of the transports would remain on shore. This opinion was the result of what he said more than any sentiment delivered at once.

When I left the *Foudroyant*, no final determination was come to. The fact is, that at Gibraltar Lord Keith said that, as soon as Fort St. Catherine was taken, the fleet would anchor in security, and upon this the expedition was undertaken. When he arrived here, Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton and the officers who were best acquainted with the coast gave it as their opinion that this anchorage was not safe against a South-West wind. Upon this Lord Keith became frightened. From the report of all the naval officers there can be no doubt that, if during our operations the weather proves unfavourable, the transports will be lost, and the men-of-war must put to sea. It is to be regretted that this was not said at Gibraltar. In that case the expedition would not have been undertaken. For my part, taking into consideration the chance of bad weather at this late season, in which case the army must have been lost or forced into a difficult retreat to Gibraltar or to Portugal, leaving everything behind them; and further, the probability, or rather certainty, of the army's catching the

fever at present raging, I have not a doubt upon my mind that the undertaking should be given up. The object is in no degree equal to the risk. No answer has been as yet returned to the proposal made yesterday. The fleet got under way this morning about eight o'clock, and seem to be standing off and on. The wind is very light.

"WASSENAER," OFF CADIZ, 7th October. — About ten o'clock yesterday morning the signal was made to prepare to land. Upon this I went on board the *Ajax* (Captain Cochrane). Captain Cochrane had the direction of the landing, and had said that he would take me on shore in his barge. The second signal was soon made for the troops to get into the flat boats. I found the different captains, who under Captain Cochrane were to superintend the landing, all on board the *Ajax* asking for directions. Captain Cochrane was extremely busy, but confessed he was as ignorant as themselves. The fleet was all this time under way, seven or eight miles from the shore. Many flat boats were assembled alongside and astern of the *Ajax*, full of troops, but not near the number that were expected. I begged of Captain Cochrane to go to the *Foudroyant* and mention to Lord Keith the great deficiency of boats; the necessity of their rendezvousing round some ship anchored inshore, &c. &c. Captain Cochrane returned soon afterwards, but apparently not better informed than when he went. The signal was made to know if we were ready to land. We answered from the *Ajax* "No." I told Captain Cochrane that my orders were to land with my whole brigade (the Reserve) and Guards: in all about 5000 men. As boats had come sufficient to hold 2500 or 3000 only, I could not take upon me to land without particular orders from Sir Ralph; the more so as the fleet was still under way so far from the shore, and there was no probability of the boats, after landing the 1st Division, being able to return and to land a second division before night. Sir Ralph had left the *Foudroyant* soon after the first signal was made to prepare to land, and had

gone inshore to the *Phaeton* frigate. I went to the *Foudroyant* to explain to Lord Keith the situation we were in. I found him all confusion, blaming everybody and everything, but attempting to remedy nothing. He made the signal for the flat boats to row to the *Phaeton*, where they would receive their orders from Sir Ralph. He said that he could not help the want of boats, and that his orders had not been obeyed. I left him, determined to go with all speed to Sir Ralph and let him know how matters stood. As I was leaving the ship I met one of Sir Ralph's aides-de-camp, who told me he had come with a message from the General to Lord Keith. I went with him into the cabin and heard him deliver his message: "That Sir Ralph understood from a Captain of the Navy that only 3,000 men were in boats. It was now one o'clock, and before they could land and return for more it would be dark. He therefore desired that the troops might be re-embarked, the ships brought to an anchor nearer to the shore, and a proper arrangement made for landing them at daylight next morning." The Admiral said it was impossible to anchor nearer the shore, so as to make a better arrangement, that the same confusion must occur to-morrow as did this day. He went on repeating much more incoherent nonsense. It was with difficulty I persuaded him to make the signal to the troops to re-embark. He would not issue it till after I had said to him more than once, with some firmness, that Sir Ralph, who was inshore, must be a better judge than his Lordship of the propriety of risking 3000 men on shore without the possibility of support for six or eight hours, perhaps till next morning; that it was the first time any person had attempted to land an army from a fleet under sail.

From the *Foudroyant* I went to the *Phaeton*, where I informed Sir Ralph of the total want of arrangement, the consequent confusion, and the state in which I had found Lord Keith. In the course of conversation I took the liberty to add the opinion, which had been expressed to me by every Navy officer with whom I had conversed, of

the danger of the fleet continuing in that anchorage, and of the impossibility of their having any communication with shore in case of a South-West wind. I begged Sir Ralph, if he could not get a decided opinion from Lord Keith, to insist upon having that of the naval officers. I returned to my own ship. In the evening an order was received to prepare to land at daylight. The fleet had anchored soon after the troops had re-embarked, but not in any order; all mixed. The order for landing at daylight stated that the ships of the first division were to anchor in the morning inshore near the *Phaeton*; but as it gave no detail, we expected that nearly as much confusion would attend the attempt in the morning as had attended that of the day before. About one in the morning the *Hector's* boat came alongside with directions to hoist in the flat boats and launches. Soon after this was received it began to rain and blow from the South-West right on shore. At daylight a signal was made to annul the landing, and to be ready to weigh. Sir Ralph has left the *Foudroyant* and has returned to his own ship, the *Diadem*, and everything indicates that the expedition is given up. Whether this is in consequence of the weather, or of any previous determination, we know not. At any rate, the surf on shore makes it impossible to land, and the officers of this ship say that if I had landed with the reserve yesterday it would have been impossible, from the weather in the night and this morning, to have afforded us any support.

TETUAN BAY, 14th October.—The fleet got under weigh upon the 7th, and the whole, though with the loss of some cables and anchors, got off. The signal was made to rendezvous in case of separation in Tetuan Bay. The weather was gloomy and the wind continued to blow from the S.W. until about mid-day on the 8th, when it cleared up. We were then in sight of Cadiz lighthouse, with scarcely any wind. It was not until the 11th and 12th that we reached this bay, owing to calms and light winds.

Orders were immediately circulated for the ships to complete their water, and they were thus employed yesterday, when a heavy swell from the eastward, indicating wind from that quarter, obliged the Admiral to make the signal to weigh. His ship, that in which Sir Ralph is, and some others that were farthest out, got off, but the rest are obliged to trust to their anchors and ride it out. The situation of the fleet is unpleasant, as there is no harbour in this neighbourhood in which they can have safe anchorage, and until they receive a supply of water and provisions they cannot undertake any voyage. They may be victualled from Gibraltar and must water here, but be at all times prepared to put to sea in case of an easterly wind. Sir Richard Bickerton and, indeed, all the naval officers I have conversed with are dissatisfied with Lord Keith's conduct. They could hardly believe from his movements upon the 6th that he intended to have carried out the landing, and they say that Sir Ralph was perfectly right in ordering the troops to be re-embarked. If they had landed it would have been late before they reached the shore, and they could not have been supported that night nor, as the wind happened to blow, even the next morning. The figure we have cut is truly ridiculous, but the shortest follies are the best, and it is lucky we did not land.

GIBRALTAR, ON BOARD THE "WASSENAER," 23rd October.—We were not able to weigh upon the 14th, but the wind continuing to blow hard on the 15th, we and some more of the ships made sail. We got through the gut that night, and next morning were to leeward of Cape Spartel, where we were sheltered from the wind. It continued to blow a gale of wind during which we continued, in company with seventeen or eighteen more ships, to stand off and on the Barbary coast. Upon the 19th, having worked to windward within sight of Cape Spartel, we saw a number of ships at anchor in Jeremie Bay. We joined them and found them to be the *Ajax*, Captain Cochrane, and about fifty of the fleet. I dined with Captain Cochrane and Sir

James Pulteney, from whom I learnt that the whole of the fleet had sailed out of Tetuan Bay the night that we did, and that Lord Keith with about thirty ships was in Gibraltar. They did not know anything of Sir Richard Bickerton or Sir Ralph. Sir James regretted Sir Ralph's absence, particularly as without him it was impossible to come to any determination as to our future movements, and it was very evident that without certain destruction the fleet and army could not be kept much longer in so precarious a situation, running between Tetuan and Jeremie Bays. The scurvy has already begun to show itself among the troops, particularly in the regiments formed from the Militia. As the *Wassenaer* had sprung her foreyard, lost her launch, and wanted calking, the captain obtained leave to go to Gibraltar. We left the fleet at anchor in the evening of the 19th, and as the wind moderated we succeeded in working through the gut and anchored here in the evening of the 21st. I dined yesterday with Lord Keith, and in the evening I saw Sir Ralph on board the *Diadem*, which had just come in. He, Sir Richard Bickerton, and a number of the transports had been blown towards Cape St. Mary's; they joined the ships in Jeremie Bay the day after we left it. It is thought that all the fleet except two victuallers are now collected either here or at Jeremie. Both Lord Keith and Sir Ralph seem to think that it is absolutely necessary for us to go to Lisbon, where the anchorage is secure and where fresh meat and other refreshments may be had for the troops. Brigadier-General Hope passed this when we were at sea and went in search of Sir Ralph. When he left General Melas the armistice was to terminate on the 13th September; but a report prevailed at Leghorn that it had been renewed; it appears from newspapers that no act of hostility had taken place between the French and Austrians; negotiations between them and Great Britain are still going on.

"WASSENAER," AT SEA, 28th October.—Sir Ralph and Lord Keith had, I believe, determined to sail for the Tagus, where

the fleet could anchor in safety, and where refreshments could be procured for the sailors and troops; it was their intention to wait there the arrival of orders from England. On the morning of the 24th a brig arrived with despatches from England, in consequence of which the armies were separated. Six battalions were named in order to serve under Sir James Pulteney, with Major-Generals Moreshead and Manners, Brigadier-Generals Fisher and Maitland. The rest are to serve under Sir Ralph Abercromby. Sir James goes to Portugal, where a body of 10,000 or 12,000 British are assembling. Sir Ralph goes to Egypt. It is judged most expeditious to sail in different divisions, which will rendezvous at Minorca. I sailed with the first yesterday. It is composed of such ships as were most ready, viz., seven troopships, eight transports, and six victuallers. Sir Ralph expects to follow with the rest of the armament in the course of a few days. We are not to land at Minorca, but to endeavour to procure fresh meat and vegetables for the men, land the sick, and, at the same time that every attention is paid to the health and comfort of the troops, to keep them in readiness to proceed upon their voyage. It appears by the letters from England that the Emperor and French have made peace, but no hopes are entertained of England being included, and it is thought to be of importance to force the French from Egypt; a force from India is, I understand, to co-operate with us, by endeavouring to dispossess them of their ports upon the Red Sea.

CHAPTER XVI

GETTING READY FOR THE INVASION OF EGYPT, 1800

MINORCA, *7th November*.—We arrived here on the forenoon of the 5th, after a passage of ten days, and with the finest weather. General Fox only knew the day before that we were to come. Upon inspecting the troops, it is only found necessary to land seventy-three sick. Means have been taken to procure vegetables for the whole whilst we remain here. From the season of the year, which is now cool and pleasant, and with the precautions which will be taken, I hope the troops will continue healthy. The French have taken possession of Tuscany, and have marched into Leghorn. There is every reason to believe that a large body of them are on their march to the kingdom of Naples.

MAHON, *8th November*.—Major-General Cradock, arrived from Gibraltar. I gave up the command of the Division brought from thence to him as my senior officer. He does not think that Sir Ralph or Lord Keith will be here for eight or ten days.

“WASSENAER,” AT SEA, *17th November*.—Upon the 15th, Lord Keith appeared off Mahon in the *Foudroyant*, and made the signal for this and three other troopships to weigh: he anchored that evening and we sailed yesterday forenoon. Sir Ralph Abercromby in the *Kent*, with a proportion of the troop frigates, sailed eight days ago from Tetuan directly for Malta. The rest of the fleet, under convoy of the *Ajax*, sailed the same day for Minorca; we saw them yesterday evening. They will be detained a few days at Minorca, and are then to follow us to Malta.

MALTA, *24th November*.—We arrived here upon the morning of the 22nd. During the whole passage it blew

hard, but for two days there was a severe gale of wind, which strained the ship and opened her seams so much that she took in water on every side. Sir Ralph had arrived four days before us. I feel amply repaid by the sight of this most remarkable place for all the inconvenience we have suffered these six months past. The fortifications, the public and the private buildings, prove the former magnificence and grandeur of the ancient Order to which they belonged. The state in which many of them now are marks the gradual decline under which the Order has been suffering for many years past—a decline not of substance or revenue, but of spirit and of morals. The money which had formerly been laid out with so much judgment and taste in strengthening and ornamenting the town and neighbourhood has, for more than half a century, been wasted in sensuality and luxury. The fortifications for many years have had no repairs, and in some places the defences have been injured and converted into gardens and orange groves; yet, even as it stands, La Vallette and its dependencies may be considered as the strongest place in Europe. The town is well laid out and paved; the houses built of a very fine stone, and their fronts handsome. Buonaparte robbed the churches and public buildings of whatever was valuable, and considerable contributions were afterwards raised upon the people by Vaubois, whom he left in command. The people who remained in the town during the blockade were not otherwise plundered; but the property of all who, from necessity or choice, left the town and joined the country party was seized by the French and confiscated.

MALTA, 28th November.—We still await the arrival of Lord Keith with the rest of the fleet; in the meantime the sick of the regiments which have arrived have been landed. Vegetables, fruit, and meat are procured for the troops, and the regiments are frequently landed for exercise. Some regiments, whose ships wanted cleaning or repairing, have been landed altogether. There is no want of lodgment for

them in this place. The *Wassenaer*, in which I came, has been surveyed and reported unfit to go again to sea; if the gale had continued a few hours longer they say she must have gone to the bottom; many of the troopships are, I fear, not in a much better state. Sir Ralph showed me an intercepted report of the Chief Engineer to Kleber upon the works of Alexandria. It is twelve months old. The works were not then in a state to resist for any time a large force. It is suspected that the French have received supplies of stores and arms, as no great attention has lately been paid to blocking the port of Alexandria. Two vessels were accidentally taken when going there with arms, ammunition, and officers. If we are able to force a landing at Alexandria, and make ourselves masters of the port, the business will be soon done; but if we are forced to land at Damietta, and to move first against Cairo, the operation will be more tedious. The season of the year is much against us. The north-west winds, which blow strong and directly upon the coast, make it dangerous with so large a fleet to approach it, and very difficult to land upon it. There is not a single port upon the coast but Alexandria.

MALTA, 30th November.—I received two days ago a note from Sir Ralph enclosing a paper which he states to contain a plan of the campaign; the following is a copy of it:—"Although it is allowed by all who are well acquainted with the navigation of the Levant, that the weather during the months from November to April is unfavourable for any naval and military operation on the coast of Egypt or Syria; yet, from the report of Captain Hallowell and Mr. Smith of the *Thescus*, it appears that many days at that season are clear and moderate, and nowise adverse to the landing of troops on the coast of Egypt. Even when it blows, ships well found may ride at anchor off the coast without any danger, and the gales in general are not very violent or of long duration. If on further inquiry and fuller information it shall be found that a landing can be effected at this season without too great risk, it certainly

will be advisable to attempt it for the following reasons. First, Alexandria is the only port on the coast of Egypt where ships can remain in safety. Second, when once we are in possession of that port all communication between France and Egypt will be effectually cut off. Third, the fatigue of a long blockade by sea will be avoided. Fourth, after a sufficient garrison has been placed in Alexandria, we shall be enabled to detach largely for the purpose of reducing Rosetta and Damietta, or to assist the Turks in expelling the French from Cairo and Upper Egypt.

“ If, however, we shall be disappointed in our expectation of getting possession of Alexandria, we have it always in our power to land at Damietta, where ships of war and transports can ride in great safety, although at a greater distance from the shore than near Alexandria. It will in that event change the plan of the campaign. We shall either singly or in conjunction with the Turks ascend the Damietta branch of the Nile, and, after reducing Cairo, descend to Rosetta, cut off all communication with Alexandria, and prevent the annual supply of water from the overflowing of the Nile reaching Alexandria, which must from that circumstance as well as other causes be under the necessity of surrendering without the labour of a siege. In acting in conjunction with the Turks we shall profit by the services of their cavalry. We shall be supplied with gunboats and other craft fit for the navigation of the Nile, and with horses and camels, and we shall experience the effects of terror and of fanaticism on the minds of the inhabitants and of the Bedouins. Although the disembarkation at Damietta must be made at three leagues’ distance from the shore, yet it will be in smooth water, and as small craft is ordered to be provided for that purpose there will be no difficulty. Greek boats, which will carry 100 men, and not drawing more than $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet water, will fully answer for this service. If the Turkish Army shall have advanced from Jaffa towards Damietta we shall meet with no opposition in landing. At any rate, the French are not in sufficient force to oppose us with any effect without abandoning Cairo

or Alexandria. Should the fleet meet with no disaster there is a reasonable prospect that the expedition will be successful. Most of the regiments are amongst the best in the service; the general officers men of high honour, with the advantage of vigorous health joined to experience. Independent of the *éclat* that will attend the defeating the most splendid project of modern times set on foot by a man of a great and comprehensive mind, we shall have the more solid satisfaction of rendering secure our possessions in the East, and of removing perhaps the only bar to general peace."

MALTA, 3rd December.—The following memoranda were yesterday sent to me by Sir Ralph:—"The winter in the Levant commences in November and ends the beginning of April. During these months there are frequent gales of wind, not violent or of long duration. The Turkish and British gunboats cruised two winters off Alexandria and met with no accident. The *Swiftsure* lay at anchor in perfect safety in Aboukir Bay great part of a winter, and cruised the remainder of the season without difficulty or danger. On shore during the winter months the weather is temperate, sometimes wind and rain. Aboukir is six leagues from Alexandria and four from Rosetta. The bay affords some shelter; there is water; the country is cultivated. There is a castle taken by the Turks last year, and afterwards reduced to ruins by Buonaparte before the Turkish garrison would surrender. The cisterns which supply Alexandria with water have been included within the line of fortification raised by the French; yet it appears that they are not well covered. The Nile, by means of a canal formerly navigable, supplies these cisterns with water. The Nile begins to rise between the 17th and 19th of June, and continues to increase for two months. From the accounts of some modern travellers, the Canal of Alexandria is never dry, though after the overflowing of the Nile the water is not so good. Rosetta, ten leagues from Alexandria, is situated on the left bank of the left branch of the Nile, which rushes with such violence into the sea that at a mile

from its mouth the water is perfectly sweet and potable, if you do not dip very deep into the water. The Eastern or Damietta branch of the Nile is protected by the projection of the Delta, because the winds blow in general from the West during the winter season. The coast of Caramania and the island of Cyprus afford good shelter for shipping. The harbours in the first are Marmaras and Makri, in the last Larnaca and Limasol, where wood, water, wine, and provisions are to be found in abundance. The road from Rosetta and Aboukir to Alexandria is heavy sand, except when you can march upon the beach. Troops must disembark at four or five miles' distance from the shore near Alexandria. The boats of the fleet will carry 4000 men, and if sufficient small craft are obtained, of which there is little doubt, 3000 more may come very near the coast. Eight artillerymen and twenty sailors must land with each piece of ordnance. Seven thousand men may be landed nearly at the same time. It will require two trips more to land the remainder of the army. With diligence and arrangement 7000 men may be on shore in three hours after the boats and small craft take their departure from the rendezvous, and in seven hours more the whole army may be landed, provided the weather is favourable during the space of ten hours. All this, however, is subject to a degree of uncertainty.

"In a country like Egypt, and in an army without cavalry, the order of battle and of march ought to be compact and the flanks protected by movable columns, composed of steady troops and commanded by judicious officers. The troops should be taught to throw themselves quickly into squares or oblongs, and when time or circumstances will not admit it, the column ought to close into a mass and face outwards. Some instructions on this head will be given. The General Officer commanding the reserve, to whom the advanced and rear guards, and the most important services of the army may be entrusted, is requested to turn his mind to the different situations in which he may be engaged."

"DIADEM," AT SEA, 22nd December.—Everything being ready, the 13th was fixed for the sailing of the 1st Division; but contrary winds detained it until the 20th. The 2nd Division sailed yesterday. Sir Ralph in the *Kent* and Lord Keith in the *Foudroyant* have left us to make the best of their way to Marmaras. We are under the convoy of Captain Cochrane in the *Ajax*. The *Wassenacr*, upon being surveyed, was found unfit to proceed to sea. The troops were moved into different ships, and Captain Larmour having been appointed to the command of the *Diadem*, General Oakes and I have followed him.

"DIADEM," MARMARAS BAY, 2nd January 1801.—We arrived here yesterday afternoon. Sir Ralph, Lord Keith, and the ships of the 1st Division arrived a few days before us. This harbour is completely land-locked and shut out from the sea. It forms a circular basin of several miles' diameter, surrounded on every side by hills covered by wood. The sight is romantic and beautiful. We shall probably be detained here at least a fortnight, until the horses, pioneers, &c., which have been ordered can arrive. The Turkish Government is friendly, and promises every assistance; the Turkish fleet is in the Gulf of Macri, where they expected us; they are to join us and are to bring with them 5000 of their best troops.

The information received is that the 600 men, whom we heard when at Malta had sailed from Toulon, had, after landing at St. Fiorenzo in Corsica, re-embarked and returned to France. Some vessels from Alexandria, which have been captured, state that the French in Egypt had received no supplies except a few arms, and that on the 14th September they knew nothing of our destination. The troops which left us at Gibraltar under Sir James Pulteney have gone from Lisbon to England. Two regiments of Dragoons, the 12th and 26th, are to join Sir Ralph.

THE "CHAMELEON" BRIG, AT SEA, 5th January 1801.—The day after my arrival at Marmaras, Sir Ralph told me that he should have occasion to send a General Officer to the

Vizier's army; he wished to send me if I had no objection. The next day he sent me different papers and letters which had passed between General Kochler, the Vizier, and himself with respect to a joint attack upon Egypt. He desired me to go to him as soon as I had read them. Sir Ralph's first idea was to have landed near and to have attacked Alexandria; whilst the Vizier should advance on the side of the desert to Cairo and keep the enemy in check in that quarter. But, in consequence of information of the strength of Alexandria, and the total want of water, in case the fleet should be blown off before we made ourselves masters of it, he has determined to prefer making his first attempt at Damietta. This is also what the Vizier wishes. His wish, and the doubt if his army could be got to act at all, if removed so far from the British as it would be if we landed at Alexandria, have had much influence in making Sir Ralph change his plan. His instructions to me are to arrange with the Vizier with respect to his co-operation upon the supposition of the British landing at Damietta. I am also to obtain as much information as I can of the situation of the French posts, the face of the country, &c., and, from an inspection of the Turkish army, to form some opinion what they are capable of doing, and how far any co-operation from them is to be relied upon. I embarked on board the *Chameleon* yesterday and sailed at midday.

“ Instructions for Major-General Moore.

“ HEADQUARTERS, H.M.S. ‘KENT,’ MARMARAS BAY, 3rd January 1801. — Major-General Moore is to proceed to the Turkish Army near Jaffa, where he will endeavour to make himself master of the real state and condition of the Ottoman Army. He will ascertain, as far as he has an opportunity, the means that army has of acting in the ensuing operations, and what resources the British Army may receive from their co-operation. A review of the whole circumstances attending the proposed disembarkation near Alexandria has led to the determination of preferring

Damietta as the point towards which the first effort of the British arms will be directed. Major-General Moore will therefore state that, influenced by this consideration, by a deference to his Highness the Vizier's opinion, and by a desire to accommodate his plans to those of the Porte, it is Sir Ralph Abercromby's intention to endeavour to effect his disembarkation at or near Damietta, form such magazines as may be most immediately necessary, and, having equipped a flotilla upon the Nile for the purpose of commanding that river and bringing forward supplies of all kinds, march directly upon Cairo. As soon as the British Army is in a situation to commence its operations, it will be necessary that the Ottoman Army should be put in motion and should advance to Katseh. Major-General Moore will therefore come to a clear understanding on this point; he will likewise propose that, when disembarkation is effected and the two armies are in a situation to move, the Vizier shall advance by the route of Salahih, and make himself master of that place, whilst the British Army on his right will so far take the lead of the Ottoman forces as to cover the head of his Highness' march and be in a situation to afford him assistance, should it appear to be the design of the enemy to make a separate attack upon the Turkish Army.

"Should these operations succeed, and the enemy retire upon Cairo with an intention of maintaining himself there, a more immediate plan of operations will be concerted, which must depend upon local circumstances, to be ascertained upon the spot. In opening to the Vizier this plan of the campaign, Major-General Moore will endeavour to enforce the great importance of leaving the army in the persuasion that our operations are in the first instance to be directed against Alexandria, and may state that in all probability a part of the fleet may be detached after the disembarkation is completed to keep the enemy's force there in check. While Major-General Moore endeavours to engage the Turks to enter heartily into this plan and to execute punctually their part of it, he will assure them of the most cordial co-operation on the part of the British

commander, as well as of his readiness to communicate on all occasions in the most unreserved manner every circumstance that may be interesting or important to either army.

“It must be established that the armies are to form distinct corps, acting, however, towards one common point and connected by one common interest. At the same time Major-General Moore will state that in the first instance it may be necessary that a corps of Turkish cavalry under an approved officer should join the British Army, and if circumstances allow him to point out any particular corps, he will pay more attention to the quality of the troops than to their numbers. He may, on the other hand, state that, should any particular service require it, a small corps of British troops will occasionally be detached to act with the Turkish Army. Major-General Moore will endeavour to ascertain the nature and extent of the Vizier’s intelligence respecting the force and situation of the enemy, and will encourage his Highness to carry on any useful correspondence he may have established in Egypt. The preparations on foot here render it difficult to state any precise time for commencing operations, but Major-General Moore may venture to say that it is hoped the army will leave the coast of Caramania about the end of this month, and may repeat the assurance which Sir Ralph Abercromby has already given the Vizier, that an officer will be despatched to the Ottoman camp previous to our departure, when it is expected the Turkish Army will be put in motion. An immediate communication of the success of the disembarkation will be made to the Vizier from Damietta. If it is agreeable to his Highness, a Turkish officer of confidence shall be resident with the British Army for the purpose of carrying on the correspondence. Major-General Moore will endeavour to ascertain the practicability of procuring a sufficient number of horses for mounting a body of cavalry to the extent of one thousand, and, should it appear that such a number or any considerable proportion of them could actually be brought forward with the Turkish Army on eligible terms, so as to join us soon after the disembarkation, he will enter into a

contract for that purpose in the name of the Commissary-General. Another object of attention will be the possibility of procuring at Jaffa, or elsewhere on the coast of Syria, a number of small craft for the purpose of aiding in the disembarkation of the troops and for the navigation of the Nile; the latter to be vessels not drawing more than four and a half or five feet of water; and on this subject he will collect whatever information may be in his power. Should the subject of future arrangements be touched upon, Major-General Moore cannot enter further into it than to state it to be the object of Great Britain to expel the common enemy from Egypt and not to interfere with internal concerns. Major-General Moore will communicate and act with Brigadier-General Kochler in the most confidential manner. The service performed, Major-General Moore will join the Army here as expeditiously as possible.

(Signed) RALPH ABERCROMBY."

I landed at Jaffa on the 9th January. The first thing I heard was the death of Brigadier-General Kochler. He died of a putrid fever on the 29th December, after three days' illness. I immediately proceeded to the Vizier's camp, which was about a mile from the town, and I communicated to Major Holloway, the senior British officer since poor Kochler's death, the object of my mission. He took me first to the Reis Effendi, and then to the Vizier. Their tents are very fine. They were seated cross-legged on sofas, with numerous attendants standing on each side. We were presented with pipes, then coffee, and then sherbet, each of which is a stage of compliment which is served out according to the rank of the visitor, or the respect they wish to show him. The Reis Effendi was four years secretary to the Embassy in England, and he speaks French, which is uncommon for a Turk. The conversation generally is carried on by means of a dragoman or interpreter. The first visit was confined to compliments, an hour in the evening was fixed for business. As I had told the Reis Effendi that my business was of a nature not to be trusted

to the common interpreter, I found in the evening with the Vizier only two persons, the Reis Effendi and Kaia Bey, the former of whom interpreted. I stayed with them near three hours, and had an opportunity to explain fully the plan proposed by Sir Ralph, and everything contained in my instructions. They talked a great deal in Turkish. The Vizier made a few not very important objections, which I answered. Upon the whole he seemed much pleased, and said that the sooner the operations commenced the happier he should be. I wrote next morning the heads of a plan such as I thought met the Vizier's wishes, without deviating from the spirit of Sir Ralph's instructions. I carried it to the Reis Effendi and begged he would show it to the Vizier. If he approved of it, I should draw it out for his Highness and me to sign. It was agreed that I should return in the evening. When I did so, he told me the Vizier was indisposed and could not see me, but he would send to me in the course of next day. In the meantime I lived with Major Holloway and the British officers of the mission.

A very good tent was found me, and a dinner from the Vizier's kitchen every day. I employed myself in observing the Turkish camp, their soldiery and manners, so different from everything I had seen before. The death of General Kochler was particularly unfortunate at this time, as he certainly knew something of the state of their magazines, and of the administration of the Turkish army and its organisation. Major Holloway did not; and, as I could not altogether depend upon either what the Reis Effendi or Vizier asserted in conversation on those subjects, I applied in writing to the Vizier for information both in respect to the effective force under his command, the extent of his magazines, the means he had of forwarding them as the army advanced, and the measures he had taken to keep them complete. I applied also in the same manner for the information he had received respecting the situation of the enemy. In a conference I had with the Vizier in consequence of this application, he told me that at Jaffa and El Arish he had sufficient supplies of ammunition and biscuit for his army, but that

he had no barley for the cavalry or beasts for the army; that without it, it would be impossible for him to pass the desert; but that he had long ago taken steps to provide a sufficient quantity, and he was looking hourly for the arrival of the ships that were to bring it. He stated his force at 7500 cavalry and 7500 infantry, fifty pieces of field artillery. I desired that he might send me in writing these answers to my letter.

By the Vizier's confession, the advance of his army depended on the arrival of barley. Upon further inquiry I had every reason to believe that the quantity of even biscuit was by no means sufficient to enable his army to act if he was detained any time upon the frontier of Egypt. From a view of his troops, and from everything I could learn or observe of their composition and discipline, I could not think they were otherwise than a wild ungovernable mob, incapable of being directed to any useful purpose; and, as they were destitute of everything that is required in an army, while their chief, the Vizier, was a weak-minded old man, without talent, or any military knowledge, it was in vain to expect any co-operation from them. The prospect of assistance from them was at any rate not sufficient to make it advisable to change, merely upon their account, any plan which in other respects might be preferred. This is the opinion I formed, and which I gave to Sir Ralph upon my return. The Vizier, however, signed the plan I at first proposed, after detaining me five days for that and the answer to the different questions I have mentioned. I got from him little or no information respecting the French in Egypt; for, though the communication from Cairo is open, and persons are frequently coming from hence, they have no information. They seem equally ignorant of its importance, and of the means of obtaining it. The plague is always in their camp; it rages with sometimes more, sometimes less violence. A great many persons died of it when I was there. The Vizier's family in particular were very sickly; nine of them were buried in one day; and the loss in the camp was estimated one day at 200 persons. The Turks

are so extremely careless that the clothes of the persons who die of the plague are sold publicly at auction, and are generally worn by those who buy them, without even being washed. The army has lost 6000 persons by plague within these seven months. Upon taking leave of the Vizier, it is customary to receive the present of a pelisse, which he throws over your shoulders. It is not proper to refuse this present, but I requested it might be sent to me, not wishing to run the risk of catching the plague by wearing it before it was fumigated.

The Vizier's army is not composed of professional soldiers; the Janissaries are the only troops they have of that description. Even these, being generally resident in the same districts and having no parades or exercises, follow trades and other occupations. The Bashaws of the districts through which the Vizier passes are ordered to attend him, each with a certain number of followers. These are the inhabitants of the country, who have all arms of their own and attend on foot or horseback according to their means. They are in general a stout, active, and hardy people, and are allowed to be individually brave. They are certainly material of which excellent soldiers might be formed; but under a Turkish Government everything becomes debased. It could be no dread of the Turkish army that induced Kleber to enter into the convention of El Arish. He and the troops were tired of the country, and it does not seem to have been at that time the policy of France to persevere in retaining their army in Egypt; but the moment the revolution that had taken place at Paris, which placed Buonaparte at the head of the Government, was known to them, the French seized the pretence given to them to break the convention. They marched out of Cairo and drove the Vizier's army before them to Salahih, where they left them to find their way through the desert as best they could. It could hardly be called an action; the French did not lose thirty men. Since that period the politics of both Governments are altered. We consider it as essential to the safety of our possessions in India that the French

should evacuate Egypt. Buonaparte is equally determined to keep possession of it.

MARMARAS BAY, 24th January.—I left Jaffa on the 14th and arrived here on the 20th. I delivered to Sir Ralph the plan with the different papers which had passed with the Vizier, and I told him my opinion of their army and how little it was to be depended on. He seemed prepared for this report. He said he had long been convinced that we had ourselves alone to depend on; but that it was necessary to ascertain the character and state of the Turkish army by the report of an officer sent for the purpose. He had pitched upon me for that service; my report was such as he had expected and was prepared for. His determination, he said, now was to land in the neighbourhood of Alexandria and at once attack that place. There was the only harbour for our fleet. By the possession of it the enemy's communication with France would be cut off, and there, if we found ourselves not sufficiently strong to advance into the country, we could wait for reinforcements and assistance from England. A kind of council of war was that day to be held on board the *Foudroyant*, and I went with Sir Ralph to it. There were present, besides Lord Keith and Sir Ralph, Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton, Captains Sir Sydney Smith and Hollowell, General Hutchinson, Brigadier-General Hope (Adjutant-General), Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther (Quartermaster-General), and I. Sir Ralph gave the reasons I have stated for preferring Alexandria as the point of attack; he wished for a naval opinion how far the anchorage in the Bay of Aboukir could be depended upon for the fleet, and how far the navy would be able to land the ordnance, ammunition, provisions, and water which would be necessary for a fortnight or three weeks that the army might be employed in besieging Alexandria. Captain Hollowell and Sir Sydney Smith, but particularly the former, did not doubt from the experience he had of the coast that the fleet, when anchored in Aboukir Bay, would be able to land a sufficient quantity

of water and provisions for the army for a fortnight immediately after the troops had been landed. From thence, as the march of the army to Alexandria would be along the coast and always within a mile of it, boats with water and provisions might attend it and secure to the army the necessary supply. When it began to blow and a surf to rise the boats could be hauled up on the beach under the protection of the army. Captain Hollowell asserted that no part of the coast between Aboukir and Alexandria was so rocky but that places could be found for landing the supplies. The evidence of other persons, also conversant with the coast, stated it to be so rocky for the five or six last miles towards Alexandria that no boats could approach it.

It is determined that the landing shall be made at Aboukir; it is eighteen miles from Alexandria, and every supply, even water, must be landed there and conveyed to the army as it advances and whilst employed in the siege. The French have had time to complete the plan projected for fortifying Alexandria, and it is undoubtedly very strong. Besides the garrison, we shall have to contend with whatever force the French can spare from Cairo and other posts. Every account states their number of effectives in Egypt to be about 13,000 or 14,000 French, besides a number of Greeks, and natives whom they have armed and disciplined. They will be able to spare 10,000 men, including the garrison of Alexandria, to act against us. Were they with this force to attempt to fight us, I should have little doubt of our success; but they will probably rather employ it in harassing us, in intercepting our communications with the sea, &c., and in this their superiority in cavalry will much assist them. I cannot but think the enterprise in which we are about to engage extremely hazardous and doubtful in its event. We cannot, however, hesitate; we must attempt it. We wait here for horses for the artillery and cavalry, for shipping to transport them, for mules, &c. Gunboats are being fitted up at Rhodes. It is thought that we shall not be able to sail before the end of the

month. The 12th and 26th Regiments of Dragoons have arrived from Lisbon, but without horses. Yesterday the Reserve and 1st Brigade were landed in the order that it is intended to be observed when we land in Egypt; this was done by way of practice. We shall have another rehearsal before we sail; it appears that there are boats for about 6000 men and fourteen field-pieces.

MARMARAS BAY, 11th February.—Yesterday a vessel arrived from off Alexandria with an account of two French frigates, the *Justice* and *Egyptienne*, having got in with a reinforcement of 800 troops, besides artillery, ammunition, and other military stores, of which it is believed the French are in great want. Our cruisers, the *Minotaur* and *Northumberland*, had been blown off the coast, which was the cause of these frigates getting in. We shall not sail from this for some days, the horse-ships are not yet watered, and part of the convoy expected from Smyrna with mules has not yet arrived. By coming here we have got about 400 cavalry mounted, horses for the field-artillery, mules, which will be of use in the transport of stores, besides fascines, palisades, and other materials necessary for a siege; but we have lost two months and the advantage of a surprise. Had we sailed straight from Malta to Alexandria, or after staying here a few days to water, we should certainly have taken the French unawares. They have now had time to prepare and to digest their mode of defence, and have by the arrival of these frigates been supplied with means which they wanted. Fresh orders from France, the promise of further reinforcements, together with the account of the success against the Austrians, the truce and peace which must follow with that power, the war which is likely to take place between us and Russia; these circumstances, of which they have now heard, will all tend to raise the spirits of the French in Egypt, and to make their resistance more obstinate. A vessel, thirty days from England, has brought orders to stop all Russian ships and detain them till further orders.

"DIADEM," 22nd February.—Everything was ready upon the 18th, but contrary winds and bad weather detained the fleet until this morning, when, the wind blowing fresh from the North-West, the signal was made soon after daylight to unmoor, and the ships are now getting out of Marmaras with all speed. The general orders to the fleet and army explain the order of debarkation, the conduct of which is given to Captain Cochrane, and everything respecting it is supposed to be so well understood that it is to be hoped that no time will be lost in instantly carrying it into execution the moment we arrive upon the coast. The Reserve and Guards, with ten field-pieces, form the first disembarkation, forming together about 5000. Then the Brigades according to their rank, 1st, 2nd, &c. &c. Our cruisers off Toulon have taken, lately, two corvettes bound to Alexandria with medical staff, medicines, bullets, &c. &c.

"DIADEM," AT SEA, 1st March.—About twelve o'clock this day a frigate sent forward to look out made the signal that she was about ten miles ahead, and by the observation we were about thirty-four miles from Alexandria. Five sail have been since seen to the South-East. These proved to be the *Minotaur*, *Northumberland*, and the ships blocking Alexandria. The winds, since we sailed from Marmaras, have been generally fair, but the weather has been squally and the sea has run high. It still appears to be unsettled; the wind, however, is from the North-West and the sea is tolerably smooth. The Admiral is edging down to speak the *Minotaur*, and it will probably depend upon the report he receives from Captain Lewis whether he will continue to stand in for the shore or wait till to-morrow in hopes of the weather getting more settled. I should imagine, from the strong winds which have prevailed, that there must be too much surf on the shore to admit of landing; if so, it will certainly be better to keep out of sight. The officers of the Turkish men-of-war told me at Marmaras that the weather was not to be depended upon until after the 12th March: hitherto experience has shown that they

were right. Only one Turkish man-of-war sailed with us. When we left Marinaras we were about 180 vessels of all descriptions. I cannot now count above 140.

ABOUKIR BAY, THE "DIADEM," 3rd March.—On the afternoon of the 1st instant we stood in so near to Alexandria as to distinguish the vessels in the harbour and the colour of the signals. We lay for some hours in this situation, and at dusk made sail to the North-East. The weather was extremely unsettled, and did not promise to be such as to admit of a disembarkation. I thought we should have stood off until it became more favourable, and I was at a loss to conceive why Lord Keith had shown himself before Alexandria. The morning of the 2nd the signal was made soon after daylight to cook three days' provisions and to prepare to land. We stood into this bay and could already distinguish the Castle of Aboukir and the vessel which had been sent in in the night to mark the anchorage. The weather was so boisterous that I could not persuade myself that we should land. By nine o'clock we were at anchor. I immediately went to the *Kent*, but Sir Ralph was gone to the *Foudroyant*, where I followed him. He was going in a cutter to reconnoitre and I accompanied him. The men-of-war lie at about six or seven miles from the shore in from six to nine fathoms; we went in the cutter into two fathoms but were still three or four miles from the shore. The coast, in general, appeared to rise from the beach. It was sandy, with here and there groves of palm trees. It is favourable to oppose a landing, inasmuch as the enemy can be completely covered from the fire of gunboats. We could perceive one or two gunboats of the enemy anchored close to the shore, some small detached camps between the fort of Aboukir and the entrance of the Lake Madie. The place was pitched upon for landing, and we returned on board the *Foudroyant*.

It was now near two o'clock, and therefore too late to commence a landing. It was arranged for next morning.

The orders were issued for the troops of the Reserve and Guards to be ready to get into the boats at four in the morning. I remained to dine with Lord Keith, as he said he wished to talk to me. Captain Cochrane, to whom the direction of the landing is given, dined also, and we had everything we wished explained. The wind had been high all day: it increased towards evening; the sea got up. Unless a favourable change took place in the night it was evident that it would be impossible to land. The same weather continued all night, and does still. The signal to land was not made, and until the weather calms the French will have time to prepare themselves. We could observe them at work yesterday upon a sand height opposite to where our right is to land. I can see them this morning at work in other places. Whilst at dinner yesterday a vessel from sea crossed the fleet and anchored under the guns of the Castle of Aboukir; it would have been easy for several of our men-of-war to have prevented this, but when the Captain reported it to Lord Keith, he said he could not spare a vessel to go after her. The ship at Aboukir is now stationed so as to rake the beach, and seems to have ten or twelve guns. We have nothing cruising off Alexandria; Lord Keith gives the same reasons for this that he gave for not cutting off the vessel last night. Major McKerras, the chief engineer, and Major Fletcher, who were sent from Marmaras Bay to reconnoitre the coast, got too near in an open boat, and were attacked by an armed "Germe" from Aboukir. Major McKerras was killed, and the boat with Fletcher taken.

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The orders were issued for the troops of the Reserve and Guards to be ready to get into the boats at four in the morning. I remained to dine with Lord Keith, as he said he wished to talk to me. Captain Cochrane, to whom the direction of the landing is given, dined also, and we had everything we wished explained. The wind had been high all day: it increased towards evening; the sea got up. Unless a favourable change took place in the night it was evident that it would be impossible to land. The same weather continued all night, and does still. The signal to land was not made, and until the weather calms the French will have time to prepare themselves. We could observe them at work yesterday upon a sand height opposite to where our right is to land. I can see them this morning at work in other places. Whilst at dinner yesterday a vessel from sea crossed the fleet and anchored under the guns of the Castle of Aboukir; it would have been easy for several of our men-of-war to have prevented this, but when the Captain reported it to Lord Keith, he said he could not spare a vessel to go after her. The ship at Aboukir is now stationed so as to rake the beach, and seems to have ten or twelve guns. We have nothing cruising off Alexandria; Lord Keith gives the same reasons for this that he gave for not cutting off the vessel last night. Major McKerras, the chief engineer, and Major Fletcher, who were sent from Marmaras Bay to reconnoitre the coast, got too near in an open boat, and were attacked by an armed "Germe" from Aboukir. Major McKerras was killed, and the boat with Fletcher taken.

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